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The International Development Research Centre (IDRC) is proud to have provided 
a grant to the Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority (PSIRA) for the 
purposes of undertaking a research project titled: Promoting Crime Prevention 
Partnerships Between State and Private Security Providers in Southern Africa. The 
overall objective of the research was to explore crime prevention partnerships 
between the state and the private security sector in selected Southern African 
countries. This has successfully been achieved. Being the first research undertaken 
by PSIRA and funded by the IDRC, the work that has gone into this type of research 
is commendable. The IDRC grant was provided to PSIRA under the auspices 
of the Governance Security and Justice (GSJ) Programme, which supports the 
creation of policy-relevant knowledge that is aimed at addressing, inter alia, the 
challenge of insecurity, which hinders economic, social and political development. 
It is not disputed that the research findings will influence policy-processes aimed 
at improving crime prevention initiatives in these countries, namely: Botswana, 
Namibia, Swaziland and South Africa. This monograph will be helpful in the 
establishment and strengthening of crime prevention partnerships between the 
state and the private security sector. This will in turn contribute to the reduction of 
crime levels in these countries. A comparative study such as this has no doubt led 
to fresh, exciting insights and a deeper understanding of the approaches adopted 
by these countries in addressing crime. The study has also led to the identification 
of gaps in knowledge and pointed to possible directions that could be followed by 
states in the establishment and stregthening of crime prevention partnerships. 
Having undertaken the field research, it is plausible that the contributors have 
succeded in identifying and illuminating similarities and differences. This is 
important in informing possible policy options to be undertaken by a state, based 
on its needs and context. 
Each contribution to the monograph was peer reviewed by an independent content 
specialist, Prof. Laurence Juma and language editor, Mr Khomotso Bopape prior 
to publication. Ms Mindy Standford facilitated a writers workshop to enable the 
contributors to this monograph to minimise the language editorial work. The 
monograph was ably edited by Dr Sabelo Gumedze, who has become an African 
expert in the field of private security. Dr Julie Berg reviewed the literature and 
provided an extensive critique which informed its betterment. With regard to all 
the country reports, Mr John Kole, Dr Petros Magagula, Dr Edgar Bwalya, and Dr 
Lesley Blaauw provided extensive comments on the research questions addressed, 
the theoretical foundations, the methodologies, the analyses and results presented, 
and the implications thereof. I am very honoured that from the conception phase 
FOREWORD
to the final phase of this project, I have been fully involved and met all the role 
players who have made this project a success. Despite insurmountable odds, the 
Director of PSIRA, Mr Sam Chauke, made this project possible. His role was not 
only for the betterment of PSIRA, but also for the Southern African states, which 
have been subjects of the research. 
In paying heed to the recommendations in this monograph, there is no doubt 
that states, particulaly in the Southern African region, will come closer to solving 
the ever-escalating crime pandemic. This monograph, which connects theory to 
practice, is a must read for all: politicians, policymakers, security practitioners, 
scholars and students. As the first research publication by PSIRA, there is just so 
much to be gained by reading this well-researched monograph. It is hoped that 
this publication will prove useful and stimulating to its readers. 
Ms Njeri Karuru 
Senior Programme Specialist, International Development Research Centre 
30 March 2015 
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Private security is now considered to be part and parcel of the broader security 
sector. Not only are private security companies (PSCs) providing security services 
to those who can afford to pay for such services, but they also play a part in 
crime prevention within various societies. They arguably complement the role of 
the police whose role it is to detect and combat crime. In view of their roles in 
preventing crime, there is a need for the inclusion of the private security industry 
in crime prevention partnerships between the state and non-state actors. This 
should be the case despite the fact that the private security industry is largely 
profit-driven and that – in the pursuit of business – it largely serves the interests 
of those who hire its companies.
In light of the various roles that state security agencies and non-state actors 
play in crime prevention, the need for the establishment and strengthening of 
strong collaborations or partnerships among these security providers cannot be 
overemphasised. Crime prevention partnerships are very important due to the 
fact that crime negatively affects any country’s development. After all, crime 
prevention cannot only be left to the police. This is not to say crime prevention 
should no longer be a concern of the police, but a societal challenge requiring 
a multi-pronged approach. In order to address the challenges of crime, many 
states, including those in southern Africa, have adopted the concept of community 
policing, which emphasises partnerships between the community and the national 
police as a crime prevention intervention. While this intervention is effective 
in many states, it however overlooks the importance of the role played by the 
private security industry, which has now become a force to be reckoned within 
the field of security.
This monograph explores crime prevention partnerships between the state and 
the private security sector in four selected southern African countries, namely, 
Botswana, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland, with a view to influencing 
policy processes aimed at improving crime prevention initiatives. While the 
policy interventions targeted through this research mainly focus on the national 
level, utilising the research findings in influencing policies at the sub-regional, 
regional and international levels could be an important consideration. It is hoped 
that through this research, the establishment and strengthening of partnerships 
between the state and the private security sector, in particular, will result in the 
drastic reduction of crime levels in these countries and also prove that such 
partnerships could be viable and strategically sound tools for crime prevention 
in the southern African region.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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This publication is the first of its kind to have been undertaken under the 
auspices of the Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority (PSIRA), an entity 
established by South Africa’s Private Security Industry Regulation Act, No. 56 of 
2001. The Authority’s mission is to protect the constitutional rights of all people 
to life, safety and dignity through the effective promotion and regulation of the 
private security industry. According to the PSIRA Strategic Document, Strategic 
Priority 1 on the Industry Stewardship (Knowledge and Advocacy), PSIRA is to 
seek to ensure full understanding of the private security industry and to begin 
to respond to industry needs and challenges in order to be recognised as “the 
industry experts”.
As PSIRA understands it, the quest for industry expertise goes beyond just 
understanding the South African private security industry. It includes appreciating 
what is going on in other countries, both within the African continent and beyond. 
The idea behind the comparative study, which this monograph covers, is informed 
by the idea that in any field of study, comparable analysis allows for more informed 
decision-making. Needless to say, there is always an advantage in comparable 





1. The purpose of the study 
This monograph explores crime prevention partnerships between the state and 
the private security sector in four selected southern African countries, namely, 
Botswana, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland. Crime prevention in southern 
Africa is largely based on the principle of community policing, that is, partnerships 
between the community and the national or public police. The partnerships between 
the police and communities, which strengthen existing community policing forums 
(CPFs) are seen as viable tools for effective crime prevention in the region. Within 
these partnerships, however, the role played in crime prevention, by the private 
security sector, that is, private security companies (PSCs) and private security 
officers (PSOs) is often overlooked, ignored and/or downplayed, yet the sector 
has grown exponentially, taking centre stage in the security arena. In fact, the 
private security sector has become a force to be reckoned with not only within 
the southern African region but also globally. 
While CPFs are focused on securing communities with the assistance of the national 
police service (or force, as the case may be), private security companies mainly 
provide security to those who can afford to pay for their services. This is one of 
the many reasons why PSCs are usually not considered, yet they are critical role 
players in crime prevention in many instances. In fact, they form the key players 
in the field of security, not only in preventing crime but also in complementing the 
work of the police. It is not a secret that police are in most cases constrained in 
terms of their financial and human capital in almost every society. Figures 1 and 
2 show the population numbers and police force numbers in Botswana, Namibia, 
South Africa and Swaziland, respectively.
Figure 1: Population per country, 2014
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The main objective of this research study is to generate policy-relevant knowledge 
in the sphere of crime prevention partnerships. What is most glaring is the fact that 
the real function and potential of the private security sector, particularly in crime 
prevention, has not been studied. Writing from the perspective of the Republic 
of Macedonia, Gerasimoski (2013:296) argues that many of the laypeople view 
private security as a repressive security component and as something that has 
deviated from the very notion of security, i.e. security being seen as an integral 
social phenomena – a public good. As will be seen in the country case studies 
featured in this monograph, this view also prevails in the southern African region. 
The argument made is that private security cannot be envisaged or practised in 
any other way than preventive as its primary orientation (Gerasimoski, 2013:296). 
This is true in the sense that private security should only be seen as preventing 
the commission of crime. If such prevention is not effective and crime eventually 
occurs, the public police take over as the first port of call in the official justice 
system. 
2. Unpacking the research question 
In undertaking this study, the following research question was considered and 
comprehensively addressed: 
Based on the role played by the private security sector, that is, PSCs in the southern 
African region, to what extent can crime prevention partnerships between the state 
and the private security sector effectively prevent crime in Botswana, Namibia, South 
Africa and Swaziland? 
The main premise of this research study is the fact that it is quite clear that the 
private security sector is now playing a major role in crime prevention through 
the provision of security services that are aimed at reducing crime in our society, 
particularly to those who can afford to pay for these services. The research 
16
hypothesis, therefore, is two-fold: firstly, that since the private security sector 
has in the past decade grown at a tremendous rate in these countries, the levels 
of crime have also been drastically reduced; and secondly, that the establishment 
and/or formation partnerships between the state and the private security sector 
could be a viable and strategically sound tool for crime prevention in the southern 
African region. The study therefore seeks to test this two-tier hypothesis through 
systematic qualitative and quantitative research methods.
Through this study, the following key issues have been addressed: one, the role, 
trends and extent of the public police and private security sector in the prevention 
of crime in Botswana, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland; two, the legitimacy 
and accountability of the various security actors involved in crime prevention, such 
as the state security agents, the private security sector, the community police 
and civil society; three, the extent to which Botswana, Namibia, South Africa and 
Swaziland have realised and appreciated the role played by the private security 
sector (as non-state actors) and thus established and/or nurtured partnerships 
between the state institutions with the non-state actors, particularly the private 
security companies in their crime prevention strategies, taking into account the 
gender perspective; and finally, the extent to which these countries have effectively 
implemented the crime prevention strategies/policies (including their reform) in 
order to ensure the security of their citizens (both poor and rich).
To a large extent, the above-mentioned questions address the guiding questions 
reflected in the International Development Research Centre’s Governance, Security 
and Justice Programme Prospectus for 2011–2016. These include, firstly, what 
influences the relationship between state and non-state actors in situations where 
a high level of violence and criminality coexists with democratic governance? 
Secondly, how can incentives be framed to develop appropriate policies and 
reforms that promote citizen security and protect livelihoods in southern Africa? 
Thirdly, what effect does the proliferation of non-state security actors have on 
citizens’ efforts to hold them accountable and how does this impact on efforts to 
build more effective and accountable state security forces in the region?
3. Making a case for crime prevention partnerships 
Both the state police and PSCs are in the business of providing security services 
aimed at preventing and combating crime. The working definition for PSCs in this 
context is that they are private business entities legally registered and certified 
to provide security services for remuneration, reward, fee or benefit. The types 
of security services to be rendered by PSCs are determined by the country within 
which they are permitted to render such security services. According to the United 
Nations Draft of a possible Convention on Private Military and Security Companies 
(PMSCs), security service refers to ‘armed guarding or protection of buildings, 
installations, property and people, any kind of knowledge transfer with security and 
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policing applications, development and implementation of informational security 
measures and other related activities’. This definition may be extended to include 
other services depending on the country where such services are permitted. The 
aforementioned Draft was elaborated by the United Nations Working Group on the 
use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise 
of the right of peoples to self-determination and submitted for consideration and 
action by the Human Rights Council. 
Since the 1990s, PSCs have undergone a rapid expansion, providing security 
guards (and police-type security services), which more often than not outnumber 
national police officers. This sometimes creates an equilibrium challenge in the 
security domain. The private security boom within the southern African region 
revives many of the long-standing debates about the use and legitimacy of private 
force, as this challenges the very nature of the notion of state monopoly on the 
use of force. Three objections are usually raised in relation to the privatisation 
of security: firstly, they provide their services for money rather than a particular 
cause; secondly, they challenge the democratic relationship between the state 
and its citizens, as the state’s monopoly on the use of force is compromised, 
particularly in security guards making use of force in providing their security-
related services; and thirdly, they do not operate under effective state regulation 
and control. 
In view of these objections, the consideration of the private security industry in 
crime prevention partnerships becomes even more complex. The reality of the 
matter, however, is that the trend towards the privatisation of security is very 
unlikely to be reversed in the near future. Hence, it has been contended, “[t]he 
mixture of state and private actors within the field of security is here to stay and 
consequently the international community has to find a way, if not to embrace 
it, at least to cope with it”. (Creutz, 2006:9) This challenge is not only confined 
to the international community but also to nation states. Involving the private 
security sector by nation states in crime prevention partnerships could debatably 
be viewed as embracing this sector, which continues to define the privatisation of 
security at a domestic level, particularly in affluent neighbourhoods and businesses.
   
With the private security sector increasingly performing duties and activities that 
were previously assumed to be the province of public actors, several challenges 
emerge. First, there is the obvious erosion of the state monopoly on the use of 
force (Weber, 1919). (Weber sees the use of force as the main defining element 
of a state, i.e. ‘a state is a human community that (successfully) claims the 
monopoly of legitimate use of physical force within a given territory’.) This shift 
of power from the public to private actors, often directed and overseen by private 
superiors who are not directly accountable to public oversight, raises questions of 
how governments can effectively protect and defend state interests, including the 
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rights of its citizens. While private security actors may bring a degree of stability 
and effectively fight crime, in the long run, some governments may see reliance 
on the private security actors as the main way of resolving internal problems. It 
must be noted that sometimes these private security actors include those who have 
engaged in violations of human rights, such as rebel factions and other militia.
 
Second, the use of private security actors results in democratic and accountability 
deficits, otherwise known as the twin deficits. In this case, there is always a lack 
of quality information and transparency regarding the nature and scope of private 
security sector personnel, practices and applicable laws and regulations. This 
leads to the lack of democratic accountability in the provision of private security. 
As private security companies are only accountable to a mix of management, 
company boards and shareholders (Richards & Smith, 2007), they are not 
necessarily directly accountable to public oversight. Therefore, both corporate 
and individual accountability is generally lacking in so far as the private security 
actors are concerned. 
Third, due to the fact that private security companies are not accountable to the 
public, there is always a higher risk in their violation of human rights. Without 
doubt, criminal liability issues are a major cause for concern for the utilisation of 
PSCs, which are constantly becoming major players in the security arena. There 
is also the issue of states contracting private security (and military) companies at 
the international levels, whose desirability is not yet settled. It has been argued, 
for instance, that states should not be allowed to contract, out of international 
legal obligations’ the use of non-state actors (Dutly, 2007). 
Fourth, proliferation of the private security industry results in the weakening 
of national security (Heinecken & Motzouris, 2011). Private security companies 
sometimes pay more than national security forces, and this has led to a considerable 
number of police and soldiers leaving public life in favour of better-paying jobs 
in the private security sector and providing much of the private security sector’s 
workforce. This was highlighted in an interview with Barack Obama on 2 July 
2008. There is no doubt that this has left the remaining police and military 
forces strained, as they are required to work more shifts. Over and above this, 
national military and police colleges are seemingly providing training for the 
private security sector, and this results in a considerable ‘brain drain’ within the 
national forces and services. 
Fifth, there is a lack of consistent or coherent private security industry standards. 
This is due to the fact that companies in the private security industry are dynamic 
(both locally and internationally) in their activities, and they still do not have a 
universally accepted definition. The terms ‘private security companies’ and ‘private 
military companies’ are often used interchangeably in the press and academic 
literature, and there is much debate as to what collection of duties each label 
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refers. It is for this reason that the term PMSCs is always used to cover both. 
This, however, does not help, particularly in the development of legal instruments 
that may best regulate this sector. 
Given the above-mentioned challenges, the consideration of establishing crime 
partnerships to include the private security industry requires the exercise of some 
level of circumspection. For example, the question could be posed on why a non-
state actor, which arguably seeks to challenge the notion of state monopoly on the 
use of force, should be considered important in crime prevention initiatives. The 
other issue that must be addressed is whether the private security sector should be 
included in crime prevention partnerships, despite the fact that its clientele is largely 
affluent; still, community policing is mainly focused on communities that cannot 
afford to pay for security services. The need for this study is therefore to provide 
policymakers with the necessary information and required analysis in establishing 
and/or reforming crime prevention strategies in their respective countries. 
4. The gender perspective 
It has also been observed that most national crime prevention strategies/policies 
make no distinction between the needs or impact of crime on men and women. 
This is despite the request made to governments during the UN Beijing Conference 
in 1995 to respond to gender issues. According to the United Nations Platform of 
Action of 1995 (para. 123), “[I]n addressing violence against women, governments 
and other actors should promote an active and visible policy of mainstreaming a 
gender perspective in all policies and programmes so that before decisions are 
taken an analysis may be made of their effects on women and men, respectively.” 
In this context, “gender refers to the particular roles and relationships, personality 
traits, attitudes, behaviours and values that society ascribes to men and women” 
and gender mainstreaming refers to “the process of assessing the implications 
for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or 
programmes, in all areas and at all levels” (Schulz & Yeung, 2008:3). It has 
been asserted that as the trends towards privatisation of security increases and 
regulation of private security actors develops, incorporating gender could greatly 
improve operational effectiveness throughout the sector and positively shape its 
development (Schulz & Yeung, 2008). It could be argued further that incorporating 
gender in crime prevention partnerships between the state and non-state actors 
could improve the partnership strategies and positively shape and improve the 
security situation in any given country.
In conceptualising, establishing and implementing crime prevention partnership 
strategies/policies between the state and the private security sector, there is 
therefore a need to consider their impact on men, women, girls and boys in 
the various countries, namely, Botswana, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland. 
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Local ownership of these crime prevention partnership strategies/policies may be 
enhanced significantly in the event that the key players have undergone gender 
training tailored to suit the local context. Ensuring that women are involved during 
the conceptual, establishment and implementation stages of crime prevention 
partnerships is the most important strategy for improving their effectiveness.
The involvement of women, particularly in the private security sector as well as in 
crime prevention partnership programmes, is important for the following reasons 
(Schulz & Yeung, 2008:4): one, female staff are seen as more approachable 
and less threatening, even in traditional societies; two, female operators are 
needed in a variety of places in order to perform body searches on women; three, 
female security operators can serve as positive role models for local women who 
are considering joining secure forces/services, such as the police, the army as 
well as the private security industry; and four, female operators may be able to 
take a different approach in the detection of security risks, thereby potentially 
enhancing identification of the specific types of danger that women are exposed 
to in various countries. 
Despite the fact that the ratio of women to men in security work is not balanced, 
the view that is taken is that crime prevention partnerships between the state and 
non-state actors may be used as tools for addressing this equilibrium challenge 
by ensuring their involvement. This would, in turn, contribute in fighting all kinds 
of crime in society. In particular, the involvement of women could also address 
gender-based violence. According to the Platform for Action, violence against 
women is an obstacle to the achievement of the objectives of equality, development 
and peace (United Nations Platform of Action, 1995, para. 112–113). The term 
“violence against women” means any act of gender-based violence that results 
in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to 
women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, 
whether occurring in public or private life (United Nations Platform of Action, 
1995, para. 113). The Platform of Action further provides that violence against 
women both violates and impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by women of their 
human rights and fundamental freedoms (United Nations Platform of Action, 1995, 
para. 112). The crime prevention partnership between state and non-state actors 
should therefore be seen as a viable tool in addressing the violation of women’s 
rights as part of preventing crime in various societies. 
5. The monograph in a nutshell 
In contextualising this research study, the monograph begins with an exhaustive 
literature review by Margaret Gichanga, in an attempt to understand the broader 
discourse of crime prevention strategies between state and non-state actors. Among 
other things, the literature review considers the pros and cons of such partnerships 
and the implementation of the Handbook on Crime Prevention Guidelines developed 
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by the United Nations, as well as other relevant international, regional, and/or 
sub-regional tools/frameworks. The Handbook on Crime Prevention Guidelines 
offers a concise overview of the main considerations to be taken into account 
in planning and implementing crime prevention strategies and interventions. 
Further, the literature review critically discussed relevant scholarly writings in 
this field of study. It highlights the dearth of scholarly writings in so far as the 
southern African region is concerned. The argument, which Gichanga brings out 
strongly, is the need to undertake further research on how best crime prevention 
partnerships between the state and private security could be established and 
promoted within the region. 
In an attempt to fill in the gap identified by Gichanga, Mpho Molomo and Zibani 
Maundeni discuss the case of Botswana. In their work, the eminent scholars 
investigate how the public security sector interacts with the private security 
sector in preventing crime in Botswana. They state that while there is no formal 
public-private security partnership in existence, however, the police consider the 
private security sector as “brothers” in the security sector. Despite this so-called 
“brotherhood”, there is however no formal partnerships sanctioned by law or 
policy, except between the police, army and wildlife rangers. This is the so-called 
“public-public partnerships”. One of the reasons for this lack of formal relationships 
between the state and the private security sector is the (mis)perception that 
from the general perspective of the police, the private security industry is a rival 
force and a threat to the police’s credibility. This leads to the inadequate flow of 
information between the private security sector and the police. 
Despite the lack of trust between the police and the private security sector, 
Molomo and Maundeni observe that there are a number of areas in which the 
police informally collaborate with private security companies, such as cases 
where the latter are contracted to replenish Automated Teller Machines (ATMs) 
with cash. In these instances, an undercover unit of the Special Support Branch 
of the Police usually supports the private security companies in replenishing the 
ATMs. In conclusion, Molomo and Maundeni posit that the lack of a formal legal 
or policy framework for crime prevention partnerships between the state and the 
private security sector stems from the absence of a private security regulatory 
authority, which has the potential of helping the private security industry to grow, 
to impose some discipline, and to introduce standards. 
For the Namibian case study, John Nakutta, Nicole Duminy and Brian Simamuna 
highlight the lacunae on the legal definition of “private security” within the Namibian 
legal framework. They make reference to the definition of “security service”, which 
is found in the Security Enterprises and Security Officers Act, No.19 of 1998 (as 
amended), which provides that a security service may be defined as service rendered 
by one person to another for reward in exchange for the protection or safeguarding 
of people and property, or the provision of advisory services in this regard. Nakutta, 
Duminy and Simamuna question the sufficiency of this definition, particularly in 
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relation to the broader view of the role of private security in contemporary times. 
The case study also highlights the fact that while the private security in Namibia 
is constantly growing, due to a plethora of factors, it remains under-researched. 
Nakutta et al. submit that the relationship between the Namibian Police and the 
private security industry can at best be described as cordial. They maintain that 
there is currently no official forum for sharing vital information, experiences, 
resources and expertise. The relationship between the police and the private 
security industry only happens on an ad hoc basis. They make a distinction between 
City Police and the Namibian Police in so far as the collaboration with the private 
security companies is concerned. They argue that the City Police networks more 
frequently with the private security companies through the so-called zonal policing. 
While the Namibian Police have embarked upon a community policing programme, 
the role to be played by the private security industry is conspicuously silent in 
the Crime Management Strategy of the Namibian Police Force (2011–2014). This 
is despite the fact that the private security sector has become an indispensable 
component of peace and stability in the country. After all, it is viewed as being 
better resourced than the organs of state. One of the challenges highlighted is the 
dysfunctional status of the Security Enterprises and Security Officers Regulation 
Board (SESORB), which is empowered to grant applications and to register private 
security companies and security officers upon application, respectively. 
In so far as South Africa is concerned, Gichanga postulates that the proliferation 
of the private security industry in South Africa is a direct result of safety and 
security gaps. It is an industry that is considered to be one of the largest in the 
world. She maintains that the reality today is that the South African Police Service 
(SAPS) cannot ensure the safety and security of the South African population and 
property, hence the exponential growth of the private security sector in South 
Africa. Not only is the private security industry offering security services to private 
citizens but also to state organs. Gichanga states that the majority of the South 
African private security industry favours a government-endorsed partnership in 
the fight against crime. She argues that the need for promoting crime prevention 
partnerships between the state and non-state actors may prove to be effective 
and efficient in reducing crime in South Africa. Gichanga makes reference to a 
number of instances where crime prevention partnerships in South Africa, though 
on an ad hoc basis, have worked. 
Making a case for the development of a policy framework for promoting crime 
prevention between the state and the private security sector, Gichanga asserts 
that both public and private policing agents form an essential component of the 
security architecture aimed at safeguarding local communities in South Africa. 
She cautions that the way people think about crime prevention should be shifted 
towards their thorough understanding of the realities on the ground, such as the 
crime levels coupled with the existence of the private security industry, which has 
become a force to be reckoned with in so far as crime prevention is concerned in 
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South Africa. The ultimate recommendation made by Gichanga is that the state 
must take ownership in establishing and ensuring the effectiveness of crime 
prevention partnerships between the state and the private security sector. 
For the Swaziland country study, Hamilton Simelane and Wonderboy Maziya 
expound on the development of the private security industry in Swaziland. They 
argue that the growth of the industry derives its character from the economic 
disparities that accompany the growth of the Swazi economy. They posit that the 
presence of the private security industry fulfils the neo-liberal dream of rolling 
back the state in the sense that the state is now gradually withdrawing from its 
responsibility of providing security to its citizens. In so far as crime levels are 
concerned, Simelane and Maziya observe that Swaziland has experienced an 
increasing complexity of crime control and make a strong case for plural policing, 
which they view as productive and synergistic. This is provided there is some 
form of cooperation and/or partnerships between the role players, which includes 
the private security industry. 
Simelane and Maziya make an important observation that while state police in 
Swaziland are there to ‘protect and serve’, the private security providers are 
there to ‘protect and make profit’. This reality informs the relationships that 
exist between the police and the private security sector. They contend that the 
partnerships between the state and the private security sector exist in different 
forms and are mixtures of both formal and informal structures. One of the most 
glaring features of the Swaziland private security industry is the absence of an 
effective regulatory and oversight mechanism. This gap is viewed as an inhibition 
to any development of a policy or mechanism for crime prevention partnerships 
between the state and the private security sector. Simelane and Maziya also state 
that the community policing initiatives are always not inclusive of the private 
security industry despite their active role in crime prevention. 
From the country reports, it is clear that the private security industry is growing. 
The studies consider the population of each country in order to understand the 
ratio of the police to the public and thereafter the size of the industry.
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Figure 3 shows the population size versus security officers of each country studied. 
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Figure 4 shows the security officers vs police force per country. It is clear that 
South Africa represents a high number of the private security officers. Based on 
the figures reflected in figure 4, the ratio of the police officers to the security 
officers is almost 1:3. This illustrates the point that in the private security sector 
has become a force to be reckoned with. It also butresses the point that the 
private security industry is an industry that is heavily relied upon by the South 
African population.  
Figure 4: Security Officers vs. Police Force per country














































Figure 5 shows that South Africa has the highest number of security businesses 
as compared to the other countries subject to the study. The country with the 
least security businesses is Swaziland. The average number of security officers 
per company stands at 143 security officers, that is, assuming the security officers 
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are distributed evenly to the 70 security businesses. In the case of Namibia, the 
average number of security officers per company is 648 security officers, assuming 
the security officers are distributed evenly. As a result of the lack of effective 
regulatory frameworks for the private security industry, it would not come as a 
surprise that there are more companies in operation in these countries, than is 
reflected in these figures. 
Figure 5: Security Business numbers per country













For any partnerships between the state and the private security sector to work, 
to be established or even strengthened, it is important for the countries subject 
to the study to have an appreciation of the extent of the industry as illustrated in 
Figure 6. Furthermore, it is equally important for these countries to keep track of 
these numbers as the industry is growing at an exponential rate in almost every 
country. This results from the demand for security in both residential homes, 
business centers, as well as in government. This also reflects the formidable 
partner, which the private security sector has become in crime prevention. 
Figure 6: Security Officer numbers per country



















In this study, a strong case is made for the promotion of partnerships between 
the state and the private security industry for crime prevention. While the 
industry generally remains unrecognised and unappreciated in some countries, 
it nevertheless remains key to crime prevention. The study makes the point that 
there is a need for the recognition of the private security industry as a professional 
industry capable of partnering with the state in the fight against crime. Such 
recognition can be in the form of ensuring an effective regulatory framework 
for the industry. It also recommends that in the formulation of policies on crime 
prevention, the industry should be considered as one of the main players in the 
field of security. This has become even more important with the technological 
advancement within the industry, which makes use of electronic security systems 
in the provision of security services.
 
The study is also aimed at influencing the formulation and reformulation of legal 
frameworks for the regulation of the private security sector. Of course each country 
has its own fair share of challenges in addressing the privatisation of security 
phenomenon. These challenges range from the point of view of not recognising 
the industry as a professional player in the field of security to the sometimes 
misguided perceptions that the industry is part of the problem in so far as the 
increase in crime is concerned. The need for the cooperation between the private 
security industry and state security agents cannot be overemphasised. Afterall, 
the private security industry cannot be easily wished away as it is heavily relied 
upon as a result of its reputation in preventing crime. It is also a contributing 
force to the countries’ economies. It also contributes towards unemployment, 
particulaly to the people coming from the lower echelons of societies. Through 
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LITERATURE REVIEW  
Margaret Gichanga
Enhancing crime prevention strategies relies on a partnership between the state 
authorities responsible for safety and security and non-state actors, including the 
private security sector. The private security sector is largely made up of private 
security companies and private security officers who play a defining role in the 
provision of security. In the southern African region, the evolution of policing 
services has been an inevitable necessity, one that has been dependent on the 
flux and flow of crime. The evolution of this phenomenon must be carefully 
considered, owing to the interdependence between state and non-state security 
service providers, inherent in crime prevention strategies. Pooling the resources 
and expertise from agents of public and private policing would serve to enable a 
framework of cooperation and division of labour. This would help to cultivate an 
approach to policing that will mitigate the prevalence of crime in the long term. 
The purpose of a literature review is to review literature relevant to the subject 
under study. This literature review seeks to investigate what crime prevention 
strategies entail; it does this through an assessment of international and local 
perspectives of public-private partnerships engaged in the provision of security. A 
limitation experienced during the development of this literature review is related 
to insufficient scholarly attention that has been dedicated to this field of research, 
particularly in the southern African region. This is not surprising considering that 
such an evolution of policing, which necessitates a partnership between the state 
police and the private security industry, is a relatively new initiative. 
Such a partnership would be novel in the sense that it envisions the broadening of 
‘policing’ as a concept. From one that conceives of the police as the only guarantor 
of security, to one that refers to a body of people officially employed to maintain 
order and enforce regulations. A broader concept of policing is intended to facilitate 
and enrich partnerships between the public and private police for enhanced crime 
prevention. Reinforcing the prowess of public and private security agents, into a 
collaborative framework, would allow resources to be used optimally and enhance 
dramatically, crime prevention capacities.
Tackling the causal factors that foster crime should be included as a critical 
component of any crime prevention strategy. Engaging with local communities 
helps in cultivating local agency, a key factor needed to strengthen the capacity 
for communities to contribute and take ownership of their safety and security. 
Notwithstanding the relevance of community involvement in crime prevention 
initiatives, a coordinated multi-stakeholder approach is needed. The 2010 United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Handbook emphasises the importance 
of a shared responsibility for general safety and security. This is based on the 
recognition that the formal criminal justice system is not sufficient for preventing 
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crime. Furthermore, it is conceded that with the leadership of government, different 
sectors of society can work together to ensure a shift from deterrent and reactive 
to forward-looking and proactive approaches to combat crime.
Chapter V of the UNODC Handbook concedes that there are challenges related 
to a multidisciplinary approach and working in partnerships to address crime 
prevention. This is mainly attributed to an unwillingness to share areas of work 
that were previously under an exclusive jurisdiction of each respective security 
agency. The Handbook, however, maintains that ‘partnerships should be an 
integral part of effective crime prevention, given the wide-ranging nature of the 
causes of crime and the skills and responsibilities required to address them’. 
The Handbook asserts that government leadership should be demonstrated by 
establishing a central agency that can develop crime prevention strategies. Some 
key components for a successful partnership include strong leadership, a clear 
direction for the partnership, sufficient time, information, funding and expertise, 
and long-term staff allocated to the partnership.
According to the UNODC Handbook, developing proactive rather than reactive 
responses to crime prevention requires a problem-solving approach, community 
involvement, and decentralised management. The Handbook highlights the 
different community-oriented approaches to policing used in North America and 
Europe. The use of auxiliary and municipal police in the partnerships to develop 
crime prevention strategies is shown to play a pivotal role in providing greater 
visibility and community support, in addition to freeing up police time. In South 
Africa, the Johannesburg Metropolitan Policing Department (JMPD) is a municipal 
police force that manages and coordinates the city’s crime prevention strategy 
under the authority of the City of Johannesburg. Essentially, the JMPD offers a 
crucial support while having ‘limited powers and responsibilities than the national 
South African Police Service (SAPS).’
It must be noted that communities may also rely on informal and private police 
because they either fear or do not trust the police. This is compounded by the 
reality that in Africa, both state and non-state policing is required to provide 
security due to the skewed ratio of public police per head. That being the case, in 
order to ensure that policing, both public and private, is equitable and accountable, 
it is asserted that private security needs to be considered in national and local 
government plans and partnership consultations. This would enhance the efficacy 
of crime prevention strategies. 
Furthermore, the UNODC Handbook emphasises that the effectiveness of 
interventions based on situational approaches needs to be closely monitored to 
avoid producing a contrary objective, such as displacing crime from one street 
to another. This potential shortcoming of crime prevention strategies highlights 
the importance of multi-sectoral partnerships that include urban planning and 
environmental sectors. This represents a ‘spill-over effect’ that governs crime and 
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crime prevention strategies, revealing how changes in one area can have a direct 
impact on other areas. For example, improvements to housing, urban design, 
transport and road safety can have an impact on the opportunities for crime and 
victimisation and the sense of security for the population. An example of such 
urban renewal in South Africa is the Warwick Junction Urban Renewal Project 
in Durban that has contributed to job creation, increased tourism, a decline in 
violent deaths and an increased sense of security. The project was initiated by the 
local government and was aimed at addressing the sanitary and safety concerns 
of the area (Shipley, 2010). This was done by engaging street traders and other 
relevant stakeholders who had been considered a nuisance under the previous 
regime in the redesign of the site (Shipley, 2010). 
A public-private partnership would ensure that the different variables that govern 
crime and, more importantly, its prevention, could be integrated into a credible 
network for security provision. This would therefore help in establishing pre-
emptive responses for crime prevention and ensure the safety of citizens. It is 
widely held that deterrence through enhanced visibility and effective cooperation 
between public and private policing would lead to a safer society. The social, 
economic and political requirements for the consolidation of crime prevention 
initiatives will be examined through the hypothesis of different scholars that have 
contributed to an understanding of the fluidity of policing as a concept and its 
relation to the private security industry.
Bayley and Shearing (1996) examine the restructuring of policing in democratic 
societies globally, with emphasis placed on the USA, the UK and Canada. They 
highlight the evolution of crime control and law enforcement that has taken place 
in these countries. The lack of a monopoly by the public police over policing means 
that security is also provided by private companies on a commercial basis and 
by communities on a voluntary basis. Their research also highlights the process 
of self-questioning that police (in the specific states under study) underwent 
owing to the realisation of their inability to satisfy society’s longing for effective 
security. The research considered all explicit efforts to create visible agents of 
crime control as policing and hence not just the police. The two are concepts 
which have increasingly become blurred. While customary police are paid, new 
policing agents are both paid – such as private security companies (PSCs) – and 
non-paid – such as those agencies involved in community crime prevention. 
Indeed, there has been an acknowledgment that crime is too complex to be dealt 
with solely by the police and that the profit motive is not to be feared in policing. 
Developments in security provision mean that policing has become pluralised and 
police are no longer the primary crime deterrent presence in society. This means 
that the public police have been supplanted by numerous private providers of 
security. Bayley and Shearing (1996) also note that police have started to charge 
fees if electronic alarm systems summon police to false alarms more than a 
specified number of times and even charge a fee to cover concerts and sporting 
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events. These series of events demonstrates a mutually reinforcing dichotomy 
that dispels the myths of public and private security agencies. Moreover, this 
illustrates the ‘force-multiplying effect’ displayed by the private security industry 
and the legitimacy and feasibility of a profit motive for security provision.
In an effort to save money, police have reduced the scope of their regulatory work, 
such as licensing bars and enforcing parking regulations. Police are also subject to 
more rigorous and intense scrutiny from both government and non-governmental 
agencies, particularly in instances of police misbehaviour and brutality. National 
databases to evaluate the performance of police have been established to ensure 
their accountability. Increased civilian oversight of police performance ultimately 
means that policing belongs to everybody – in activity, in responsibility and in 
oversight. This is significant with regard to PSCs and highlights a closer connection 
between safety and policing because if safety is not increased, PSCs can be fired. 
PSCs are primarily accountable to their contractors.
Bayley and Shearing (1996) further assert that in order to improve crime 
prevention, new approaches must be sought together with a shift in the logic of 
policing, from one that conceives of it as remedying past wrongs to one that seeks 
to promote security. A key element to the deterrence of crime is the reliance of 
visible policing for both the public police and the PSCs. That being so, it is feasible 
to accept that pluralising the sources of policing enhances not only the quantity 
but also the quality of policing. Bayley and Shearing maintain that the presence 
of alternative providers of security may in fact mitigate the limitations placed on 
governments in democratic societies, as getting ‘tough’ on crime faces resistance 
from those concerned about human rights. 
The view of crime prevention as the outcome of increased police-citizen contact and 
perceptions of safety can only be achieved when two conditions are met. First, there 
needs to be a shift in the expectation of citizens and security agencies of what is 
required for community safety, and secondly, a new multi-pronged approach to crime 
prevention must be sought. Neighbourhood Watch (NW) initiatives, for instance, give 
the perception of improved community safety. However, the lack of trust in high-
crime areas hinders crime reduction and the flow of information. This renders NWs 
dependent on networks between the police, the citizenry and other security agencies.
Flemming (2005) argues for a change in the criteria used to determine the success 
of NW initiatives. This is deemed essential in order to view the NW as a conduit 
through which partnerships between the police, other agencies and the community 
are improved. This is pivotal to changing the perceptions of safety and security, and 
encouraging community engagement in broader crime prevention endeavours. The 
research findings of Flemming (2005) suggest that the NW initiative is an ineffective 
tool when ‘evaluated in terms of minimising the incidence of preventable crime, 
reducing crime and increasing the flow of information between the community and 
the police.’ His paper focuses on NW schemes in different cities across Australia 
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where the police and volunteers from the community work together to prevent crime. 
Some state-wide NW programmes also hold a state forum to exchange information 
between the different programmes; a liaison officer from the state police usually 
assists in the programme. Police involvement differs in each case; however, in most 
cases where there is a shortage of funding, police contribute in kind by attending 
meetings, providing information and providing criminal checks for volunteers.
It is noted that the emergence of NW schemes could be traced back to the 
second half of the 20th century when police sought closer relationships with their 
communities, after realising that crime prevention and control could not occur 
without the assistance of the community. While ‘community policing’ or ‘community-
oriented policing’ has considerable political, legislative and monetary support in 
the US and the UK, it is, however, conceded that this support is largely absent in 
Australia. The paper also finds that due to distrust, people in high-crime areas 
were least likely to organise themselves in a crime prevention initiative such as 
a NW. Having said that, Flemming (2005) makes the assertion that, in fact, NW 
schemes increase the fear of crime instead of lowering it. His research findings 
also suggest that NW initiatives do not encourage police reporting, nor reduce 
crime, but ‘may displace those rates into other types of crimes.’  
The value of NW schemes was found in their ability to increase perceptions of 
safety in the community through increased police-citizen contact, which increases 
visibility, accessibility and familiarity. Undoubtedly, in areas where the police were 
seen to respond and interact positively with the community, there was a greater 
willingness to obey the law and a reduction of serious crime. Flemming (2005) 
therefore emphasises that a better way to assess the efficacy of NW schemes would 
be to view the reduction of crime as a benefit of the programme, as opposed to 
the main objective. This would be in line with the concept of ‘reassurance policing’ 
and the acknowledgment that no single agency, and certainly not the police, 
commands the resources necessary to control crime in a contemporary setting. 
Resources are a critical determinant of the inputs and outcomes regarding crime 
prevention and its public and private approach. Property ownership has led to 
the rise of the private security industry, as surveillance strategies have become 
a central aspect for the management of privately owned commercial spaces. The 
British government’s promotion of the private security industry, through outsourcing 
and inter-agency partnerships, has shifted the emphasis from crime prevention 
to community safety, fostered by state and non-state agencies.
The central argument presented by Wakefield (2005) is that surveillance strategies 
carried out by private security personnel represent much more than an approach to 
policing such settings. Rather, they are a central component of broader management 
strategies that are critical to the successful governance of public spaces. This is 
in particular reference to publicly accessible spaces controlled by private interests 
such as shopping malls, business park railway stations and airports. 
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Wakefield (2005) asserts that localised foot patrols and closed-circuit television 
(CCTV) surveillance present a fundamental feature of commercial management for 
such venues. She underscores the link between property trends and the growth of 
the private security industry, as property owners recognise the commercial benefits 
of hiring their own security providers. This allows them to control the conditions 
under which the security staff execute their duties and exclude visitors who breach 
the property’s conditions. Hiring private security personnel is preferred due to the 
security hardware that they have at their disposal, such as radio communication 
and CCTV. This technology facilitates a pre-emptive approach to security rather 
than the reactive style used by state police agencies. Private security personnel 
in public spaces are responsible for the following duties: CCTV monitoring, form 
filling, participating in security networks, engaging in informal liaisons with the 
police, and providing information for police investigations. The gap filled by private 
security companies with regard to security provision would be further reinforced 
through a formal partnership for enhanced crime prevention with the public police.
In addition, Wakefield (2005) assesses the participation of private security personnel 
in ‘private worlds’ within what is termed governmental ‘responsibilisation’ strategies. 
This is in reference to the British government’s promotion of ‘private sector involvement 
in criminal justice through the outsourcing and fostering of inter-agency partnerships’. 
This promotion has in effect legitimised the private security industry. The British 
crime control policy embarked on a campaign to reformulate the shortcomings in 
their approach through a shift in emphasis from ‘crime prevention’ to ‘community 
safety’. This was complemented by the Crime and Disorder Act of 1998 that requires 
police authorities, health authorities and fire brigades to work alongside the private 
security industry in order to promote community safety strategies. Wakefield 
highlights that this Act also prioritises the sharing of information by the police to 
non-police agencies for purposes of crime detection and prevention. The Police 
Reform Act of 2002 introduced the concept of an ‘extended police family’, whereby 
police confer limited powers to ‘designated civilians’ and ‘accredited civilians’. This 
serves to ensure the credibility of public-private partnerships. 
The changes in conditions of ‘stateness’ have encouraged the deconstruction of 
traditional state-centric ideas of security. This change has been compounded by 
a shift in global discourse in favour of hybrid forms of governance. Abrahamsen 
and Williams (2007) aver that state centrism and the marriage in international 
relations of the state, territory and authority is becoming increasingly challenged. 
This has led to an acknowledgment of the integration of domestic and global 
realms, particularly when it comes to the growing expansion and importance of 
non-state actors in the provision of security.
The study of the private security sector’s contribution to public safety is indicated 
by the acceptance of the Central City Improvement District (CCID) initiative in 
Cape Town. The CCID (that will shortly be elaborated on) reveals how the day-to-
day security provision by private security companies in the city has blurred the 
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distinction between public and private security provision. Abrahamsen and Williams 
(2007) state that security privatisation creates the need to unpack state-centric 
conceptions of security. This would eliminate the misconception that private security 
actors pose a threat to the State and contribute to the erosion of state capacities.
Abrahamsen and Williams (2007) emphasise that authority is not a zero-sum 
game and that it is possible that a private force can strengthen and support the 
authority of the State. Also, it is exactly the relationship with the State that gives 
the private security industry legitimacy for its activities. A re-conceptualisation 
of the ‘state, territory, authority’ marriage is advocated for in order to enhance 
the understanding of new networks between state and non-state actors. In an 
era of globalisation, PSCs are changing the conditions of ‘stateness’ through their 
day-to-day provision of security and the protection of life and assets. The services 
PSCs offer include basic manned guarding, patrol, alarm response services, 
surveillance, and satellite tracking systems. It is noted that, increasingly, they 
have expanded their services to risk management and consultancy. 
Since 1997, there has been an emergence of powerful global PSCs which, 
through their resources, revenue and reach constitute a significant presence in 
international politics. Examples of these globally relevant PSCs include Securitas, 
Group 4 Securicor, and Chubb. The clout wielded by some PSCs reveals the broad 
transformations in global governance, the de-politicisation of security and the 
acceptance of security as a commodity to be provided in the market. Abrahamsen 
and Williams (2007) point to how increasingly the public-private distinction is losing 
its relevance, spurred on by the global discourse in favour of hybrid governance. 
States can confer authority on PSCs by incorporating them into law and leaving 
them to self-regulation. This strategy relieves the State from the burden of 
negotiation, implementation, and enforcement. However, the State maintains 
legislative authority and a breadth of jurisdiction that no other actor possesses.
The case study under scrutiny by Abrahamsen and Williams (2007) is the city centre 
in Cape Town, South Africa, where a significant shift in perception was observed. The 
private security industry was no longer viewed as potentially politically subversive, 
but rather as an essential factor in maintaining law and order. Immediately after the 
end of apartheid in South Africa, the public police guarded their status vehemently, 
owing to the threat posed by the well-resourced private security sector and the 
ideological opposition of the dominance of white ownership of most PSCs that 
employed low-paid black officers. Ultimately, PSCs were accepted by the SAPS, 
which stated that there was a need for ‘the police, the public, elected officials, 
government, business and other agencies to work in partnership to address crime 
and community safety’. In Cape Town, the CCID is an initiative that represented a 
paradigm shift. This was illustrated by the policing partnership with the SAPS and 
G4S (operating as Securicor) to make the Cape Town city centre safer. It is stated 
that the city’s ratepayers, business and City Council contracted Securicor due to 
the company’s expert knowledge in the provision of security.
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The complementary role played by PSCs should spur robust debate, followed by a 
commitment to cultivating new measures and partnerships for crime prevention. 
This should be composed of a strategy to highlight the strengths and eliminate 
the weaknesses found in public and private policing. Cavallaro (2008) posits that 
the greatest threat to human security and political stability in the 21st century 
is not terrorism, but rather non-political violent crime. The threat to human 
security that non-political violent crime poses represents a global challenge. 
Using crime surveys and health data in the United States, Cavallaro reveals that 
homicide rates have been increasing steadily over the past several decades. As 
this usually is an indicator of the future, it can be expected that common crime 
will continue to pose a great threat to human security in years to come. Although 
human security constitutes a wide spectrum of elements, physical security and 
crime form the major concern for the public. 
Cavallaro (2008) focuses on the surge in crime in states that have undergone some 
form of political transition over the past two decades. For many post-transitional 
countries, ordinary crime is a leading cause of loss of life and is perceived as a central 
political issue by the domestic public. Cavallaro asserts that nation-building – the 
central task of transitional efforts – needs to address common crime more directly and 
build a transparent and efficient justice and criminal system to control it. A common 
trend of post-transition states is the desire to engage in a process of reckoning 
with the past and preventing the types of abuses committed by state agents under 
the prior authoritarian governments. Nonetheless, while addressing past abuses is 
necessary, it is an insufficient approach to responding to the major challenges facing 
the criminal justice system and police forces in the transition period and beyond.
Sociology’s neo-institutionalism is used to explain the mimicry of governance models 
that focus on backward-looking scripts, despite the varied political contexts. Cavallaro 
(2008) uses this theory and insights from international relations scholarship to offer 
an account of socialisation of global models. This means that state behaviour is 
likely to be influenced by the international environment, particularly with respect to 
human rights, despite the differing demands. This results in transitional police and 
societies being inadequately empowered to address rising criminality by focusing 
on past abuses. Three country case studies are used to emphasise the Cavallaro’s 
hypothesis, namely, Brazil, El Salvador and South Africa. In Brazil, widespread 
public insecurity has led to the rise in PSCs and vigilantism, and decreased the 
support for democracy as a form of government. El Salvador represents an example 
of good faith in the efforts to reform the police; however, the strong presence 
of actors that were part of the previous public security forces has undermined 
the capacity to protect human rights. This has contributed to a highly politicised 
and inefficient national police that relies on unsuccessful reactionary policies to 
respond to the high crime rates in the country.
Cavallaro (2008) finds that in South Africa, immediately after 1994, there was 
a perception that organs intended for social control developed no real effort 
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to control crime. This led to a lack of confidence in the government’s ability to 
protect its citizens and the proliferation of the private security industry. This was 
evidenced by the first phase of Western-led assistance, which aimed to transform 
and legitimise the police as an organ for social control, followed in 1996 by a 
second phase of Western assistance to address emerging crime. In 2001, an 
overwhelming majority of South Africans were not confident in the government’s 
ability to control crime. This spurred the proliferation of the private security 
industry and vigilantism in the country. Essentially, Cavallaro notes that the surge 
in crime and its consequences for transitional states should inform thinking and 
practice during the transition period and beyond.
The tenets intrinsic in neo-liberalism in support of the private sector, as a more 
efficient provider of public goods, have given credence to the expansion of 
private security. Consent for the industry will mean that it can contribute to an 
integrated security sector. In their paper, Buckland and Winckler (2010) begin 
with a prudent quote by Edmund Burke stating that, ‘one of the finest problems 
in legislation [is to determine] what the State ought to take upon itself to direct 
by the public wisdom, and what it ought to leave, with as little interference as 
possible, to individual discretion’. Buckland and Winckler state that the growth 
of the private security industry has been propelled by the neo-liberal policies of 
the mid-1980s, premised on the belief that private actors could deliver services 
more quickly and cheaply than their government counterparts. 
Buckland and Winckler (2010) highlight two major findings, first, that despite 
the merits of privatisation, there are resultant democratic governance challenges 
that remain to be addressed. Secondly, that states facing contemporary security 
challenges are poorly equipped to meet these challenges and have to increasingly 
rely on ad hoc security governance networks, often involving private partners. 
Ad hoc security governance networks are identified as cooperation between 
governments, the private sector, non-governmental organisations and international 
organisations. Buckland and Winckler assert that as long as consent and social 
recognition can be conferred on private security actors by the State, their role 
in security provision can contribute to establishing a fully integrated security 
sector. A formal framework would ensure that partnerships between public and 
private policing consolidate the efforts from actors engaged in security provision.
 
It is conceded that arguments about public-private partnerships must be analysed 
on a case-by-case basis before conclusions can be drawn (Buckland & Winckler, 
2010). This would avoid the perception of the displacement of the State in the new 
arrangements while ensuring practical compromise regarding the interdependence 
inherent in public-private partnerships. Challenges regarding democratic governance 
and oversight of the private security industry are emphasised as a critical point 
of departure that should inform measures to hold public and private security 
agents accountable. Finally, Buckland and Winckler suggest a ‘reg-neg’ approach 
for the regulation of the private security industry, which incorporates stakeholder 
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consultations, followed by government regulation. This approach is presented 
as a solution to ensuring accountability and compliance. However, it is conceded 
that this must also be subject to specific contractual provisions. 
The South African case presents a progressive example of policing partnerships. A 
background regarding the evolution of security service providers is carried out in a 
paper by Irish (1999), which reflects on the concomitant factors that have contributed 
to the ‘silent revolution’ of the private security industry. The absence of a robust 
debate about the changes in policing is highlighted as a potential risk to democracy. 
In South Africa, historical circumstances led to the withdrawal of the public police 
from certain key functions, such as guarding and armed response, thus leading to 
the subsequent growth of the private security industry. This continues to influence 
contemporary debates about the best way to approach the safety and security of 
the country. Irish begins by delineating the different objectives that distinguish the 
SAPS, which seeks to protect the public at large and the private security industry, 
which operates on a profit motive and is primarily accountable to its clients. 
Irish (1999) states that in South Africa, expansion in the private security industry 
since the 1980s was due the vacuum created by the withdrawal of police from certain 
key functions. Additionally, this expansion was also informed by the increased access 
for the public to private property and a perception that the police were unable to 
protect the public. Assessing trends from different countries such as Australia, the 
United Kingdom, the United States and Japan, Irish describes the growth of the 
industry as a ‘silent revolution’. She laments the lack of public debate about the 
changes in policing as a serious risk to democratic societies. However, no clarity 
is given on how and to what extent each of the democratic societies she includes 
in her study is affected. The contribution of the private security industry in order 
to reduce the risk of crime is highlighted. This allows the police to concentrate its 
resources on more serious matters. Irish contends that private security officials are 
more likely to infringe on the rights of people than the police, who are constrained 
by statutory limitations. This argument must be scrutinised and refuted due to the 
absence of verifiable data to indicate that statutory limitations deter the public 
police from committing infringements on the rights of people.
Irish (1999) decries the shift of responsibility from the State to PSCs and the duality 
the industry creates by taking power away from the State and not distributing 
it to more people. Background is given on South Africa’s apartheid government 
that encouraged the expansion of private security so as to focus police services 
on consolidating political control. This is used to explain the dominance of white 
former police and military personnel in management positions of PSCs. This 
dominance has changed rapidly, as the private security industry is increasingly 
seen as a lucrative and entrepreneurial enterprise. Inadequate regulatory standards 
are criticised, particularly the fact that three-quarters of all security guards only 
have grade E qualifications and the fact that firearm training was sorely under-
prioritised. Irish concludes by recommending a streamlined regulatory system 
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financed jointly by the State and with fees from the PSCs in order to help develop 
a more concise regulatory framework for the industry.
Certainly, crime prevention strategies in South Africa should be informed by the 
rate (increase or decrease) of crime. This would best be achieved by conceiving 
the efforts of relevant security agencies, both state and non-state, through a 
binding and accountable multi-stakeholder approach, catered to preventing 
crime. When developed together with the principles of the 1996 National Crime 
Prevention Strategy (NCPS), this should elicit an understanding of the importance 
of cooperation and collaboration in the country. The NCPS envisaged a strategy to 
tackle the root causes of crime through an integrated and coordinated government 
response (Rauch, 1996). The NCPS floundered on many fronts but mainly due 
to the failed integration of different departments and agencies (Rauch, 1996). 
Marais (2001) carried out a study of the nature and scope of the services provided by 
the police services in South Africa. In terms of the 1998 Draft White Paper on Safety 
and Security, the primary objective of the SAPS is to maintain order and protect 
lives and property. The paper points to crime prevention, which is only considered 
a secondary objective needed for the realisation of the primary objectives. Marais 
asserts that according to the Draft White Paper on Safety and Security, provincial 
governments are responsible for monitoring the provision of policing services 
through command, control and communication. Provincial governments are also 
tasked with ensuring crime prevention at the provincial level through a variety of 
initiatives aimed at coordinating and mobilising resources for social crime prevention. 
Provincial government’s role in crime prevention extends to a responsibility to 
assume a joint ownership for social crime prevention initiatives in areas where the 
local government either lacks the resources or the capacity to undertake the task.
The role of local governments is also scrutinised and the findings of Marais (2001) 
point to thriving coordinated crime prevention operations between the SAPS and 
local governments. Examples of this include the ‘Operation Kwano’ in Pretoria and 
‘Vrugteslaai’ in Kempton Park that enhanced the safety and security of residents. 
The former refers to a joint crime prevention initiative between the City Council of 
Pretoria’s Department of Community Safety, the SAPS, and the Central Business 
District (Palmary, 2000). This joint initiative was responsible for coordinating the 
Pretoria Inner City Partnerships, including the deployment of private security 
companies to maintain a security presence in the inner city (Palmary, 2000). The 
latter refers to an initiative that encouraged the training of traffic officers to assist 
the SAPS in their fight against crime (Beeld, 1993). This collaboration ultimately 
led to the inclusion of the fire and ambulance services, the security department 
of the City Council and the Neighbourhood Watch initiative in the region as part 
of a crime prevention partnership (Beeld, 1993).  
Marais (2001) avers that increased cooperation between different agencies 
contributes to crime prevention and is necessitated by an escalation in crime 
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rates. Cooperation between NGOs and government institutions is highlighted as 
a valuable mechanism needed to improve communication and help governments 
understand the fears and needs of people. The utilisation of technology and 
resources is hindered by police budget cuts, which affect state police agencies 
from undertaking their duties efficiently and effectively. 
Marais (2001) encourages information sharing and the utilisation of resources 
and technology between different agencies for enhanced crime prevention. The 
different agencies he refers to include the SAPS, local government, security officers, 
traffic officers and other institutions involved in crime prevention. In 2000, the 
government’s Strategy on Crime Fighting identified the need for clusters in order 
to consolidate the resources and expertise of different security agencies. These 
agencies included the Ministries of Safety and Security, Justice and Constitutional 
Development, Correctional Services, Home Affairs and Defence. Despite calls for 
clustering, the various roles of different security agencies including the contribution 
of local governments, corporate crime investigations, forensic auditors, Correctional 
Services, the Department of Social Welfare and the private security industry 
were ignored. Marais posits that the NCPS should have formed the basis of an 
integrated crime intelligence strategy; however, many of its good policies have 
floundered due to a lack of commitment to implementation.
The fluidity of policing as a concept seeks to expand on the perception of policing 
as a ‘broader activity than just what the police can do’ and is informed by a culture 
of self-reliance. In South Africa, this is further compounded by the presence of 
former state police officers operating within the private security industry. More 
effective crime prevention would fare better when conceived through effective 
partnerships between agents of public and private security.
Baker (2002) begins with the assertion that policing is an elastic concept, but 
that due to the instruments of coercion used to maintain order, prevent and 
respond to crime, it is perceived as a public good, one that should reside in the 
hands of the State. His study reveals that the emergence of formal and informal 
policing has been widespread, and in South Africa, non-state policing has been 
documented as a ‘broader activity than simply what the police do’. Non-state 
policing, it is stated, is a broad category that covers anything from commercial 
security firms, semi-official community guards and formal and informal vigilante 
groups. Although different forms of policing are inherently separate, they stem 
from an established culture of self-reliance. Baker claims analytic gain can be 
achieved from collapsing all forms of non-state policing into one, as all policing 
activity is not performed by the state police force. 
The 1994 political transition in South Africa was accompanied by a surge in crime by 
marginalised people, which influenced the shift from public policing to a proliferation 
of private policing agencies. Under apartheid, autonomous groups, in both black and 
white communities, arose to protect themselves due to inadequate state security. 
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Non-state policing is viewed as a growing interpenetration of previously unpoliced 
areas, particularly due to the recruitment of former state police officers into private 
security firms. This is facilitated by the covert disclosure of public criminal records 
to private police groups. The distinction between protection offered to the public 
and that offered to private clients is becoming increasingly blurred. This is because 
the public police service does not offer a uniform service, as certain sections of 
the public feel relatively neglected, while criminality, corruption, and human rights 
abuses are still prevalent within the public police. Meanwhile, non-state policing is 
seen to go beyond its mandate and not only to protect its clients, but also seeks 
to ensure safety for the public, simply because it is good for business. 
Baker (2002) highlights three categories of non-state policing including vigilantes that 
are associated with violent methods of control and fail to cooperate with the police, 
‘responsible citizens’ that patrol their communities with the approval of the police, 
and registered PSCs. The case study depicting a successful partnership between 
the private security firms and the SAPS in Grahamstown reveals the potential for 
the former to complement the efforts of the latter and vice versa. Through the 
approval and in conjunction with the SAPS, it is documented that car guards in 
the Grahamstown city centre were able to contribute to a 70 to 80% decrease in 
car theft. This outcome gives credence to the strength that can be gained from 
cooperation and division of labour between the public and private police.
In South Africa, an endorsement of police partnerships was hinted at by former 
President Thabo Mbeki. According to the former President, police partnerships 
would allow security expectations to be met. This was further highlighted by the 
then Minister of Safety and Security Charles Nqakula when he called for partnership 
policing because, the private security industry had already been ‘looped in for crime 
prevention’. The current Minister of Police Nathi Mthethwa urged private security 
companies to work with police to enhance the fight against crime, affirming that the 
private security industry could complement the police’s efforts and have a crucial 
role to play in making South Africa safer. In 2008, the Democratic Alliance (DA) 
published a Discussion Document in which the party asserted that bringing in the 
private security sector to work effectively with the SAPS would double the number of 
people available for the fight against crime, underscoring the value of a partnership 
between the private security industry and the SAPS (Democratic Alliance, 2008). A 
review by Minnaar (2007) emphasises the urgent need for a formal structure and 
guidelines for cooperative policing to be established. He asserts that this would 
address issues regarding accountability, monitoring and civil liabilities, which would 
enhance information sharing for enhanced crime prevention.
Minnaar (2007) presents a comprehensive assessment of the private security industry 
and its regulation. He traces the history of the private security industry in South 
Africa and elaborates on the reasons for its growth, namely, the increased perception 
and fear of crime, the opportunities that abound within the industry to create 
employment, and the industry’s role in protecting valuable assets. This invaluable 
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role is highlighted by the expansion of in-house security followed by guarding and 
alarm response. Regulation and monitoring of the private security industry, it is 
noted, has come a long way since the Security Officer’s Act, No. 92 of 1987 (only 
promulgated in 1989 and amended three times in 1990, 1992 and 1997). 
The Private Security Industry Regulation Act, No. 56 of 2001 introduced a re-
definition of a security service provider, obliged across-the-board registration and 
gave stronger powers for inspection. The Private Security Industry Levies Act, 
No. 23 of 2002 supplemented the PSIRA Act and was meant to underscore that 
enforcement and control would be stricter. However, neither Act gave provisions 
for a partnership between the private security industry (PSI) and the SAPS; 
any such cooperation was to be left to the prerogative of the latter. However, 
the National Police Commissioner may under Criminal Procedure Act, No. 51 of 
1977 delegate powers of ‘peace officer’ to a private security officer. It is noted in 
the review that the lack of a formal framework has been the main root cause of 
distrust and resentment between public and private policing. In order to better 
understand how policing in South Africa – by public and private agents – can 
be integrated into a productive partnership, an empirical study on a partnership 
between the police and the private security industry is imperative. 
Although legislation has been effective in fostering a structure for regulation, 
enforcement and management of the PSI, this is hampered by concerns regarding 
foreign ownership and the perception of low-quality training standards. Additionally, 
this is exacerbated by the growth, sophistication and specialisation of the PSI through 
the use of technology and hi-tech aids. Viewed within the framework of a partnership 
between the police and the private security industry, technology could be used to 
help enhance the mandate of such a partnership. In addition, challenges experienced 
respecting regulation emanate from funding constraints, poor organisational structure, 
and staff shortages within PSIRA. This has hindered background checks from being 
carried out and weakened the enforceability of sanctions. 
Another factor that deters more effective regulation of the PSI is a poor database 
that allows transgressors to re-register with new companies. This gap is influenced 
by once-off registration, which means that the database cannot be updated. Minnaar 
(2007) recommends the creation of online opportunities to change information, 
access to the Home Affairs fingerprint database and outsourcing the function of 
background checks to enhance efficiency in regulation. Certainly, integrating the 
efforts of relevant stakeholders and organs of state would facilitate more effective 
partnerships and improved crime prevention strategies.
Minnaar (2007) asserts that partnership policing brings up questions regarding 
the kind of partnership and cooperation to be formed and the kind of information 
that would be shared. Also, there are concerns about how the PSIRA Code of 
Conduct will be enforced and its regulatory policies implemented, and ultimately, 
with whom shall the final accountability of the PSI belong? Developed countries in 
the mid-1990s began initiatives to strengthen community safety through public-
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private partnerships. This was informed by a break from the narrow interpretation 
that the public police were solely responsible for crime prevention. A shift in 
people’s perception of crime prevention in South Africa may indelibly change the 
way people allocate responsibility and efforts towards tackling it.
In South Africa, the 1996 NCPS was aimed at altering the occurrence of crime 
by identifying the conditions that cause crime and undertaking efforts to address 
them. Since then, the proposal for a preventative approach to crime has been 
sidelined for reactive and aggressive policing tactics used by both state and non-
state security agents. Changing the way people think about crime may indeed 
help to develop more effective strategies to understand the cause of crime and 
reduce the likelihood of its continued occurrence.
Berg and Shearing (2011) recalls the laudable crime prevention strategies proposed 
in the 1996 NCPS and the 1998 White Paper on Safety and Security. It is averred 
that these policies espoused a whole-of-society approach to safety and security in 
the country and its governance. The aim was to encourage activities that would 
deter specific crimes by altering the environment in which they occur and the 
conditions which are known to cause them and through the establishment of an 
effective justice system. 
However, it is noted that despite calls for a preventative approach to security 
governance, a reactive law enforcement approach has been prioritised. This is 
underscored by more aggressive policing tactics and statements about ‘shooting to 
kill’ and the reintroduction of military ranks within the police service. Consequently, 
PSCs and neighbourhood community patrols have developed in a way that reinforces 
a law enforcement approach to policing, as opposed to a more preventative one. 
Security governance during the FIFA Soccer World Cup is highlighted as the only 
good example of successful crime prevention owing to relevant state and non-state 
resources being aligned in a novel way to resolve potential safety issues.
Berg and Shearing (2011) advocate for a change in the way people think about 
crime, the institutions designed to govern crime and the way tax monies are 
allocated in crime prevention initiatives. Berg and Shearing lambaste the culture in 
the criminal justice system that upholds ‘blame’ as a ritual of comfort and asserts 
that ‘blaming’ precludes ‘prevention’ because of the overwhelming focus on the 
former. The hypothesis put forth is that the label of ‘crime’ and the meaning it confers 
constitutes a problem for ‘prevention’ – the point is made that when people call a 
‘harm’ a crime, people ‘call out’ a blaming response. This is not to take away from 
the relevance of the ‘blaming aspect’ of the criminal justice system within security 
governance, but to emphasise that blaming offenders and allocating punishment 
should not be the only mainstream response. Berg and Shearing suggest that 
crime prevention would fare better if more emphasis is placed on reducing the 
crime from happening again, as observed in the response to accidents in the airline 
industry where blaming might take place, although it is not considered a solution.
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Changing the way people think about crime and the design of the institutions 
that develop crime prevention strategies is essential in order to appropriately 
designate resources. Finally, Berg and Shearing (2011) maintain that a change 
in the flow of tax monies is critical. This would be in order to develop budgets to 
support partnerships aimed at finding and maintaining preventative initiatives 
to fighting crime. This, it is said, should involve different agencies including the 
police, local government, community groups and the private sector.
This review has examined various organisational, international and South African 
perspectives with reference to the development of crime prevention strategies through 
partnerships between agents of public and private policing. An affirmation of the value 
of public-private partnerships that are designed to enhance safety and security can 
be inferred from the different guidelines and hypotheses, as discussed in this review. 
Furthermore, this review has revealed the shortcomings that abound in a narrow 
conception whereby agents in society are responsible for crime prevention. The 
emphasis has been placed on ensuring a shared responsibility for crime prevention.
Notwithstanding these findings, it is critical to undertake further research on the 
best practice regarding partnerships between the police and the private security 
industry owing to the absence of scholarship with this specific focus. Comprehensive 
and empirical research on the southern African context for partnerships between 
the state authorities responsible for security and PSCs whose efforts complement 
those of the State have been overlooked. Concerns regarding democratic 
governance, accountability and how such partnerships should work have not 
been addressed. In order to ensure a greater understanding of the paradigm 
shift that this would entail, further research must be carried out. This would fill 
the gap and help clarify how public-private partnerships would work and would 
also create a framework to coordinate and enhance crime prevention strategies.
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BOTSWANA
Mpho Molomo and Zibani Maundeni
1. Introduction
Botswana stands out as the only African country to have sustained an unbroken 
record of liberal democracy and political stability since independence. The country 
has been dubbed the ‘African Miracle’ (Thumberg-Hartland, 1978; Samatar, 1999). 
It is widely regarded as a success story due to its exploitation and utilisation of 
natural resources, establishing a strong state, institutional and administrative 
capacity, prudent macro-economic stability and strong political leadership. These 
attributes, together with the careful blending of traditional and modern institutions, 
have afforded Botswana a rare opportunity of political stability in the Africa region 
characterised by political and social strife. The expectation is that the economic 
growth in Botswana will bring about development and security. However, a critical 
analysis of Botswana’s development trajectory indicates that the country’s prosperity 
has its attendant problems of poverty, unemployment, inequalities and crime. 
Historically, crime prevention was a preserve of the state using state security agencies 
such as the police, military, prisons and other state apparatus, e.g. the courts and 
laws. However, since the late 1980s, with the expanded definition of security from 
the narrow static conception of including human security, it has become apparent 
that state agencies alone cannot combat the rising levels of crime. The police in 
recognising that they cannot on their own cope with the crime levels have been 
innovative and embarked on other models of public policing, such as community 
policing as a public society partnership to combat crime. To further cater for the 
huge demand on policing, other actors, which are non-state actors, in particular, 
private security firms have come in, especially in the urban market, and occupy a 
special niche to provide a service to those who can afford to pay for it.
However, unlike state security, which provides the service for free or is funded from 
the state’s coffers (taxes and state revenue), private security providers are driven 
by the profit motive and render service to those who can afford to pay for it. This 
shift in paradigm in the provision of security requires research on how it operates. 
More substantively, the establishment of collaborative networks and partnerships 
between public and private security providers has become more imperative than 
optional. The creation of an optimal and effective framework for combating crime 
is important because development can only take place in a secure environment. 
It is the intent of this report to spell out the framework and environment of the 
interface between public and private security providers in Botswana.
The report is structured as follows: the first part briefly defines the subject matter 
and introduces the methodology guiding the report. The second part lays the 
contextual framework that underpins Botswana’s political economy in which state-
private security partnerships are embedded. The third aspect of the report grapples 
with the conceptual framework for understanding public and private security actors. 
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More importantly, it embarks on a critical examination and analysis of the extent 
to which Botswana has realised and appreciated the role played by private security 
companies and whether the state has established and/or nurtured partnerships 
between state institutions and private security firms in their crime prevention 
strategies. Fourth, the report discusses the nature and character of the Botswana 
state and how it has shaped the interface between public-private security providers. 
The definition of the state is significant because it influences power relations in 
society. The underlying feature is to understand class relations in society because 
the poor tend to rely almost exclusively on the state to provide them with security, 
while the rich are able to source it privately from the market. This analogy brings 
to the fore the concept of ‘commodification’ of security as a product that can be 
sold and bought in the market. Related to class are issues of ethnicity and gender 
relations. The question is the conception of security mediated through ethnic lenses. 
Furthermore, has gender been incorporated in crime prevention partnerships 
strategies by state and non-state actors? Fifth, after defining the nature of the 
state in Botswana, it is important to identify the security threats facing the country 
and what sort of interventions are necessary for redress. The sixth aspect of the 
report analyses issues around partnerships, rivalry and incompatibility. 
Perhaps the most problematic area in this discourse is how to manage relations 
between public and private security actors wherein the public security sector 
appreciates private security firms as partners rather competitors. The report seeks 
to enhance the perspective of private security as legitimate players in the security 
sector and not as intruders who erode the importance and significance of public 
security providers. The seventh intent of this report is to identify entry points 
for the establishment and strengthening of crime prevention strategies/policies/
initiatives in order to ensure the security of people. More succinctly, it suggests 
reforms necessary to enhance public-private partnerships. Additionally, the report 
endeavours to provide an analysis on the legitimacy, accountability and oversight 
of the various security actors involved in crime prevention. 
The report underscores the fact that there is no specific law or Act governing the 
operations of private security providers. More importantly, there are no oversight 
structures to regulate private security companies and also none that regulate public-
private security partnerships. In addition, there are also traditional institutions 
called Mephato (regiments), which are known in some instances to partner with 
state institutions to maintain law and order in the rural villages. In some cases, 
as in Kgatleng District, Mephato were said to be sources of instability. However, 
Mephato will not be discussed, as they are outside the scope to be reported on. 
At this stage, it is only sufficient to indicate them as an area to be reported on 
in the future, given their location in traditional settings. Lastly, the report will 
provide a conclusion arguing that public-private partnerships on crime prevention 
are important and that Botswana should take them seriously. The report proceeds 
to address these issues by first outlining the methodology used in this study.
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2. Methodology
This report focuses primarily on the interface between public-private security 
partnerships. The research methodology employed in this research was manifold. 
First, the study utilised a standard questionnaire supplied by the Private Security 
Industry Regulatory Authority (PSIRA) that explores issues related to security threats, 
the existence or absence of public-private security partnerships, outsourcing and 
human rights abuses in the security sector. In measuring public-private partnership 
or its absence, the PSIRA questionnaire enquires about the existence or absence 
of legislation providing for formal working arrangements between the public and 
private security sectors; the existence or absence of informal operational cooperation 
between the public and private security sectors; and the existence of or initiatives to 
introduce regulatory authority over the private security sector. In all three instances, 
interviews were conducted with various public and private security actors, as well 
as government officials who handle the licensing of security companies. 
Second, the researchers conducted desktop research that helped gain background 
information about Botswana’s socio-economic structure and its security threats. 
Diverse sources were relied upon to map the security threats facing Botswana 
and its people. Third, a focus-group discussion was organised for police officers to 
explore challenges of partnering with the private security sector. Fourth, a validation 
workshop was organised which helped to further generate information, sharpen the 
researchers’ thoughts and to correct the draft report. To this end, a discussant was 
identified who is an academic at the University of Botswana to review the report. In 
addition, invitations were extended to security stakeholders, the majority of whom 
were interviewed when research for the first draft of the report was undertaken, 
and the authors of the report made a presentation that was further subjected to 
review. This report is a result of an elaborate methodology that sought to provide 
rich empirical sources and a solid scholarly work that could inform security policy. 
3. Theoretical framework
During the Cold War period, security was the preserve of the state, which had the 
monopoly over the use of violence. With the advent of market-based economies, 
the post-Cold War period has seen the rise of private security firms in the provision 
of security. Private security companies have become a permanent feature of the 
security architecture and in many instances “outnumber their public counterparts by 
a considerable margin” (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2011:1). Since the 9/11 attacks 
on the United States and the subsequent global war on terror, security has gained 
prominence in international relations discourse. More substantively, “globalisation 
has eroded traditional understandings of state sovereignty” (Abrahamsen & Williams, 
2011:217). As part of the transformation in global governance and the shifting of 
social forces and power relations, private security companies have come to occupy 
a central position in international security. The interface between public and private 
security companies is conceptualised and formed by the nature and character of 
the state.
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This report begins by making a theoretical account of the state and how it refashioned 
itself to adapt to changes brought about by changes in the global political economy. 
The next level of discussion is an empirical investigation into how the public security 
sector works with the private security sector. The private security sector emerged 
in the 1980s and has existed side by side with the public security sector. 
The argument as far as the private security sector is concerned is that although 
there are no formal partnerships between the public and private security sectors 
constituted by the Botswana Parliament, these partnerships have been forged 
by market forces to some degree. The report posits that the market has forged 
partnerships in some cases, such as with cash-in-transit and outsourcing security 
services such as guarding government buildings. These contradictions are expected 
to manifest themselves, as local security companies feel excluded from the lucrative 
transportation of precious goods such as diamonds and money. Insecurity is a 
permanent feature of life in Botswana; however, it affects people differently. The 
poor tend to rely on the state to provide their security needs, while the rich source 
this service from private providers. In this regard, a country’s security architecture 
is one of the important pillars or indicators of a secure government. This will become 
clearer when the notion of commodification of security is discussed.
The report problematises the debate on what constitutes partnerships for crime 
prevention between the state and private security providers. An increase in the 
role of private security firms in Botswana’s security landscape is set to change 
the political discourse in the country. More often, there is a tendency to conflate 
the conception of private security companies with private militaries, commonly 
known as mercenaries. To properly anchor the debate, private security companies 
are those that are mandated to “protect life and assets as opposed to support 
for military activities” (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2011:39).
The conception of security manifests in two basic forms: State security and human 
security. The first or perhaps the oldest conception of security is state security, 
sometimes referred to as national security; it entails building the capacity of the state 
to prevent internal insurrection and external aggression. State security invariably 
involves arming the state so that it can be more effective in warding off external 
aggression. It is a state-centred approach that is interested in survival of the state.
This concept of state security is founded on the realist and neorealist perspectives 
(Morgenthau, 1960; Keohane, 1986; Benjamin, 1996) that were more interested 
in state security; the two perspectives or theories were conceived in terms of 
sovereignty and territorial integrity. The state security paradigm was a dominant 
paradigm during the Cold War period. The dominant feature during the post-Cold 
War period was to link security and sustainable economic development. It also 
needs to be appreciated that the numerous security challenges that people face do 
not need guns to address but macro-economic planning and economic inputs that 
would increase and lead to sustainable development and equitable distribution of 
income and wealth. Invariably, prospects for redress do not require the military 
but a strong partnership between the state, the private sector and civil society.
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It is appropriate to begin with a conceptual understanding of private security firms. 
Abrahamsen and Williams (2011:1) state that the global security architecture 
“affects the distribution of social power, and the operations of the international 
political economy” respecting who gets secure, how and by whom? Although this 
report does not engage in a substantial theoretical framework, it needs to be 
pointed out that Botswana politics are influenced by the realist and neorealist 
approaches. Realism is essentially about the role of states in international politics 
and its role in preserving power and maintaining security in the nation-state 
(Keohane, 1986). This conception was based on the Machiavellian notion that 
good neighbours require good arms (Machiavelli, 1961). 
Nevertheless, there has been a shift in paradigm from a state-centric to a human 
security-based approach. It goes without saying that in the discourse on security, 
the concern about the security of the state has long been replaced, or at least 
been matched, by concern for the security of the people. The post-Cold War period 
has not only shifted the balance of forces in the world but has also redirected the 
energies to a redefinition of the role of security agencies in a democracy. Security 
has shifted from being seen only as state security to also including human security. 
People are now the referent objects of security. Increasingly, the military is called 
upon to address internal threats by helping the police to curb crime. The fact 
is that the conception of security is premised on people and human security is 
reflective of the multidimensional nature of security. This calls for the realisation 
that security is inexorably linked to economic and social development. 
Sustainable economic development and security are historically and socially 
constructed entities and are mediated through socio-economic factors in society, 
and constantly grapple to deepen and strengthen their institutional relevance. 
The trajectories that define these concepts – while some are hidden, others are 
manifest – bring up possibilities for sustainable economic development and more 
secure forms of human existence. These shifts are occurring within the framework 
of globalisation, which not only yields loss of national sovereignty but also leads to 
international flows in technology, international migration and the internationalisation 
of security, to mention but a few (Hettne, Inotai & Sunkel, 1999). Although primarily 
economic in nature, globalisation is conceived as a multidimensional phenomenon 
that embraces all aspects of human life and interactions between states. Globalisation 
is a very complex phenomenon that creates both opportunities and challenges 
for all countries, but more so for small, developing countries such as Botswana. 
Although the link between security and sustainable economic development is complex 
and sometimes unclear, this dialectic raises distinct but related issues. This report 
presents the case for constructing a credible paradigm that links sustainable economic 
development to security, in particular, public-private partnerships. It suggests a 
strong causal link between political institutions, strong macro-economic planning 
for sustainable economic development and security. It postulates that poverty and 
inequality breed social and personal and societal (and even state) insecurity. This 
problematic area therefore suggests that state and human security are intricately 
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entwined. Sustainable economic development is a complex, multifaceted and 
integrated process that entails the creation of an economic environment that will 
not only lead to economic growth but also alleviate poverty and secure livelihoods. 
It entails more than meeting people’s material needs but also harnessing their 
ingenuity to actualise themselves and live their lives to the fullest. According to 
UNDP parlance entailed in the Human Development Report (1994:23), human 
development is seen as striving to achieve ‘freedom from want’ and ‘freedom from 
fear’, and perhaps most directly ‘safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease 
and repression’ and ‘protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in daily life’. 
Further, sustainable economic development must take place in a positive political 
environment characterised by good governance and popular participation of people 
in the political life of a polity. This perspective links public safety to development 
and contends that the challenges facing developing countries are not only external 
but are also essentially internal conflicts. Human security involves, among other 
things, the realisation of human dignity, freedom from political repression and 
persecution, hunger, disease and ignorance. It also recognises that civil society 
has a role to play in the realisation of human development and security. 
The broadening of the security discourse from its narrow concerns with state security 
to include public-private partnerships illustrates the primacy of human security as an 
important paradigm of security. In a real sense, discussing the role of private security 
forms is in essence a way of addressing everyday security needs, as these entities 
are increasingly called upon to provide security for people. Private security firms are 
responsible for guarding public and private spaces. They control access in public places 
such as government departments, universities, banks, malls and residential homes. 
The purview of private security companies also include monitoring of alarms and closed 
circuit televisions, cash-in-transit and loading automated teller machines (ATMs).
The privatisation of security opens a new window in the security discourse, 
whereas in the past the privatisation of security was linked to mercenaries and 
‘dogs’ of war that were considered to undermine the authority of the state. Now, 
private security entities are considered auxiliary arms of the state. Abrahamsen 
and William (2011:3) suggest, “rather than private security eroding the power 
of the state, or threatening its power and authority, its proliferation is linked to 
changes inside the state, and its power stems not primarily from the barrel of 
the gun but from its embeddedness in contemporary structures of governance 
and its links to public forms of power and authority.”
This neo-liberal paradigm suggests, “to govern less is to govern better” (Abrahamsen 
& Williams, 2011:63). This neo-liberal model of governance entails an increasing 
“fragmentation and pluralisation of decision-making” away from the state to more 
localised and autonomous and atomised levels of the individual actors. In this new 
security architecture, state power and state-society relations are reconfigured 
in a less-threatening way than was conceived in a state-centric mode. In this 
new framework, the concern is around a new dialectic that recognises a shift in 
power relations that cannot be easily contained within the nation-state as was 
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conceived in Westphalian terms but now mediated in state-society relations. In 
this dialectic, security actors are in a constant tension between public and private 
domains of security mediated within the state and society.
The increasing role of private security companies needs to be situated in the 
emerging role of neo-liberalism in the global political economy. It also needs to be 
seen within the framework of an increasing global agenda on the war on terror. A 
part of the neo-liberal model and agenda of rolling back the state is making the 
state lean and outsourcing some of its duties. While there was resistance to privatise 
security – which was considered the last bastion of political power – privatisation of 
security has now joined the mainstream reforms. This was more of a watershed in 
that, even traditional institutions such as the military, the police and prisons were 
in varying degrees and extent privatised. This theoretical discussion needs to begin 
with first-order questions: the nature, form and character of the state. By definition, 
the state is that institution that monopolises the use of violence. The question is, by 
outsourcing the supply of violence, is the state losing its sovereignty and its power? 
In the scheme of things and the shifting locus of power, the state itself gets to be 
reconfigured and conceptualised. In emerging global economic and monetary markets, 
security companies have come to play critical roles in global monetary capital and 
cash transfers. These companies became part of the value chain that revolutionised 
banking and cash transfers. Through ATMs, they have transformed banking into 
a 24-hour service. In addition, the movement of cash and assets is secured by 
these companies. Security companies have acquired higher levels of technological 
advancement and sophistication. They have satellite tracking and communication 
devices that are at times more sophisticated than those used by the police.
The notion of commodification of security has not received sufficient analysis. This 
is a situation where security, instead of being perceived as a public good enjoyed 
by all in society, is rendered a private commodity that is purchased in the private 
market. In this sense, the neo-liberal understanding of security does not only 
replace the public anchors of security with private ones but also reconfigures the 
mindset of conceiving power relations and access to resources. This conception 
brings back into academic discourse class analysis and class relations in society. 
Botswana cities and peri-urban areas are slowly emerging into cities of high wall, 
electric fences and security alarms. These routines in daily lives of people have 
exposed the class nature of security provision. The politics of private security in 
urban spaces have exposed the class nature of private security. It juxtaposes 
and problematises security as a public and private commodity. 
 
4. The post-colonial state in Botswana 
It is perhaps appropriate to begin a discussion of public-private partnerships by 
understanding the nature of the state in post-colonial Botswana because it is 
within the realm of the state that these partnerships are mediated and formed. 
The state in Botswana remains a contested terrain; in some instances, it is seen 
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as privileging some people over others. It is necessary to begin by defining the 
character and nature of the state in Botswana in order to comprehend its role in 
giving direction to the public-private interface in the security sector. The complexity 
of defining the state in Botswana arises from issues of class, ethnicity, gender, 
and social construction of understanding its identity. 
The state, according to the Marxist perspective, could be seen as an instrument of 
the dominant or ruling class. Still, according to the pluralist perspective, it could be 
viewed as a neutral actor acting on behalf of all classes in society. Polemics aside, 
its identity will be defined by the interests it represents. In more basic parlance, 
the state is essentially a cluster of interrelated institutions that make authoritative 
decisions about the distribution of resources and holds the monopoly of coercive 
power. As discussed in Mohiddin (2007:26), “The state is the main supplier of the 
basic and essential public goods and services, ranging from the management of law 
and order, creating and maintaining the enabling environment of peace, security 
and stability, so that people could pursue creative and productive activities of their 
own choices, to the health and education services for all citizens.” 
The central thrust of this report is not only to define the nature of the state but 
also to discuss its dialogue with society. In light of the above quotation, the role 
and capacity of the state varies in time and space. In situating the state in the 
political economy of globalisation, it is imperative to understand the balance 
between the state and developmental democracy and security. In most African 
countries, ethnic strife is problematic and contentious but the post-colonial state 
in Botswana negotiated a healthy balance between the various ethnic groups. 
Nevertheless, this is not to say that the ethnic question does not exist in Botswana. 
It exists, although in a latent form. The Botswana society is premised on unity 
in diversity. Although the country has several ethnic groups, people are never 
overtly discriminated on the basis of their ethnic origin. In addition, a person 
can never be denied justice on account of their ethnic group. Be that as it may, 
given the historical hierarchies where some ethnic groups were accorded a lower 
status, Botswana needs to work hard to accord ethnic minorities, especially the 
Basarwa (San), a greater sense of inclusion and accommodation. 
Ethnic minorities have historically argued for social inclusion, which is the recognition 
of their languages to be taught in schools. The plight of the Basarwa is perhaps 
appropriate in order to discuss the extent of ethnic exclusion in Botswana. The 
Basarwa are the poorest of the poor; they are marginalised and considered a servile 
class (Werbner, 2002). Their relocation from the Central Kalahari Game Reserve 
(CKGR) is said to epitomise this marginalisation, and their leader, Roy Sesana, calls 
this dislocation ‘cultural genocide’. Government in its characteristic paternalistic 
outlook maintains that it wants to bring them into mainstream development. With 
the assistance of a British non-government organisation, Survival International, 
they maintain that they are relocated to give way to diamond mining and have 
labelled Botswana’s diamonds ‘blood’ or ‘conflict’ diamonds (Taylor & Mokhawa, 
2003). This campaign was meant to tarnish the country’s impeccable human 
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rights record and threaten Botswana’s source of livelihood. The characterisation 
of Botswana as a pariah state also posed the danger of undermining Botswana’s 
tourist industry, which is projected as an alternative engine of growth envisaged 
to diversify the country’s economy (Solway, 2009). 
Gender equality is another development that has been underplayed, and the human 
security paradigm recognised this. Since the 1990s, there has been a shift away 
from state security to human security and yet little attention has been placed on 
the interface between gender, security and development (Henry, 2007). Human 
security has been defined as being ‘secure or safe from harm’, but this cannot be 
comprehensive security until gender relations of domination and subordination 
are addressed and probably eliminated (Henry, 2007:65). Gender relations are 
important when addressing power relations in society because women often 
shoulder the burden of insecurity and the bad effects of development policies. 
State building in Europe was a function of wars; those with large and strong armies 
survived, while the weak were vanquished. However, state building in Botswana 
assumed a different trajectory. The post-colonial state of Botswana was built 
without an army. Its defence was predicated on the goodwill of its neighbours 
and a small mobile police unit. Nevertheless, Botswana’s developmental state 
facilitated the emergence of a strong state through a combination of factors, 
which coalesced at different levels of state activity.
It is vital not to take the emergence of a strong state in Botswana for granted; it 
came about as a result of an articulation of several forces and interests. Perhaps 
most paramount was the fact that before independence, Bechuanaland, as Botswana 
was called then, together with the other High Commission territories of Basutoland 
and Swaziland, were perceived as an “economic hostage” of South Africa with no 
prospect of sustaining an independent existence (Halpern, 1965). The salvation of 
these countries was considered as their incorporation into South Africa, which they 
strongly resisted. At the time, Botswana was desolate without any obvious means 
of subsistence. When independence was granted in 1966, it was in the interest 
of the political elite who had strongly lobbied for independence to build a strong 
state and proof their viability. The important question is: how was this possible?
The first area of contestation for the post-colonial state was to subdue the powers of 
dikgosi (chiefs) who hitherto were absolute sovereigns in their respective tribal areas. 
The independence constitution curtailed their powers by making them members of 
the House of Chiefs, constituting the second house of the National Assembly without 
legislative powers, serving only in an advisory capacity. The Chieftainship Act of 1965 
(Proctor, 1968) usurped the power of dikgosi (chiefs) and subordinated them to the 
Central Government. In this new dispensation, they no longer served as political 
leaders but civil servants under the authority of the Minister of Local Government 
and Lands. This dispossession and subordination were not without contestation. 
The most visible contestation came from Kgosi (means Chief) Bathoen II and Kgosi 
Linchwe II of Bangwaketse (an ethnic group in the Southern part of Botswana) and 
Bakgatla (an ethnic group located on the South eastern part of Botswana), respectively. 
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Kgosi Linchwe II was visible in opposition politics, as he provided the Botswana 
National Front (BNF) a platform to launch the party in Mochudi in 1965, after 
Kenneth Koma failed to unite the warring factions of the Botswana People’s 
Party (BPP). In a move to neutralise his influence, government appointed Kgosi 
Linchwe II as Botswana’s ambassador to the United States of America. Kgosi 
Bathoen II, for his part, in registering his strongest dissent, stepped down from 
the throne (passing the baton to his son Seepapitso IV) and joined opposition 
politics, on the BNF ticket. Bathoen’s political influence, as paramount chief of 
Bangwaketse, made the Ngwaketse District a stronghold of the BNF – a legacy 
that is still evident despite the strong challenge by the ruling Botswana Democratic 
Party (BDP). The powers of dikgosi were further eroded by the creation of the Tribal 
Land Boards, which relieved them of their remaining powers of land allocation.
At the time of independence, Botswana was one of the poorest countries in the world. 
Following the discovery of minerals in the 1970s and their subsequent exploitation, 
Botswana has been transformed into an economic success story in sub-Saharan 
Africa. Although there is a famous cliché by De Beers that ‘a diamond is forever’, 
the reality is that they are a finite resources and also get depleted. Botswana’s 
economy continues to be fragile due to overreliance on one export commodity, 
namely, diamonds. Diamond revenues account for about 80% of the country’s 
export revenue, 55% of government revenue and 35% of Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) (Throup, 2006). Arising from the country’s overdependence on diamonds, 
the country’s sustainability is dependent on global fluctuations in the demand for 
these precious stones. In recent years, the country was severely hit by the 2008 
global recession and financial meltdown. Over and above that, growth induced by 
the export of a single commodity – diamonds – has not led to a diversified economy. 
The overreliance on one export commodity has not only made the economy vulnerable 
to the shocks in the international markets but has also led to lopsided development. 
The paradox of a diamond-led growth has increased levels of poverty and income 
inequalities. These income disparities have produced instability as evidenced by an 
unprecedented industrial action lasting eight weeks and increased levels of crime, 
often involving armed robberies. As a landlocked and agriculturally unproductive 
country, Botswana’s economy depends on South Africa for crucial supplies such as 
food, electricity and water. Despite this dependent status, Botswana has been able 
to produce a strong state with strong links with the international arena, especially 
in the mining sector. In its partnership with De Beers, through a company called 
Debswana, the Botswana state has been able to develop into a strong state.
The second step in the creation of a strong state in Botswana was the creation of 
an institutional and administrative capacity to execute the ruling party’s policies 
and programmes. This was done through the creation of a civil service, which for 
a long time relied on expatriate personnel. As more Batswana received education, 
they took over some of the responsibilities and developed a strong and effective 
civil service (Molomo, 1989). At independence, the dominant economic activity 
in Botswana was cattle farming. This enterprise – which was and still remains a 
traditional mode of livelihood – was also facilitated by the protectorate administration 
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through the sinking of boreholes as a source of water for cattle (Peters, 1984). 
This made cattle farming a sustainable enterprise for capital accumulation. The 
establishment of the Botswana Meat Commission (BMC) in 1954 was also instrumental 
in the creation of a cattle-owning capitalist class. This class was largely drawn from 
traditional Tswana aristocracy comprising of chiefs, sub-chiefs and headmen (Tsie, 
1996). The ruling BDP government was quick to establish strong alliances with the 
cattle-owning elite and the rural peasantry. Seretse Khama and Quett Masire, the 
founding President and Vice President of the Republic of Botswana, epitomised this 
class. Civil servants also saw an opportunity in cattle farming, and many of them 
became weekend farmers and retired into farming. 
During this period, the cattle-owning class, to use the conception Gramsci, 
emerged as the hegemonic fraction of the ruling class (Hare & Smith, 1971). The 
government supported this sector by providing infrastructure, subsidies in vaccines 
and feeds, cordon fences to control the spread of diseases, veterinary services 
and agricultural extension services (Parson, 1981; Peters, 1984; Picard, 1980). 
Moreover, the profits that were made at BMC were distributed back to farmers at 
the end of the year in the form of bonuses. Arising from this, it was evident that 
interests of the ruling elite were congruent with those of the cattle-owning elite, 
civil servants and the rural peasantry (Parson, 1983). This alliance has over the 
years been a source of electoral support for the BDP. However, government has 
been relatively autonomous from the influence of the dominant class in that it 
has been able to put in place welfare programmes to benefit the poor.
Leftwich (1996:143) was incisive in articulating the parameters that define a 
developmental state, which include availability of natural resources, technological 
rationality, authoritarian rule, macro-economic planning, a bureaucracy and prudent 
leadership, and relative autonomy of the ruling class. The technocratic-bureaucratic 
approach informed the country’s developmental trajectory, which dominated the 
process of development planning and defined the path for capital accumulation. 
The discovery and exploitation of minerals, especially diamonds, gave government 
the ability to consolidate its position and control of state power. Mineral wealth 
gave government the capacity to deliver on development programmes and further 
consolidated state power by developing the military as the coercive arm of the state. 
While the cattle-owning class remains significant for the Botswana economy, it was 
weakened considerably during the term of President Festus Mogae and now under 
President Ian Khama. The technocratic approach of President Mogae led him to 
question the economic sense of some of the subsidies and loans write-offs that 
government extended to farmers (Molomo, 1998). It would appear that President 
Mogae, well-schooled in neo-liberal economics, wanted to give the economy macro-
economic stability and efficiency in the capital accumulation process. Furthermore, 
he endeavoured to give the country a competitive edge in global capital markets. 
It was during his administration that the idea of relocating the DTC from London 
to Gaborone was mooted. President Khama appears more inclined to tourism and 
conservation of natural resources. While the agricultural elite are trying to regroup 
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and maintain their dominance through the diversification of the agricultural sector 
to include poultry, piggery horticulture and young farmers’ schemes, they seem 
to be losing ground to commercial interests associated with mining and tourism. 
The tourism sector, as a new engine of growth, is largely controlled by foreigners 
and concession companies and is likely to lead to the recolonisation of Botswana’s 
land. The emergence of a strong elite based on tourism and mining fosters a new 
trajectory in the capital accumulation process and in defining the state.
The emergence of a rent-seeking characteristic of commercial cattle farmers, 
especially white farmers, some of whom own feedlots, seeks to end the monopoly 
of the BMC of benefiting from the lucrative export market, which manifests a new 
development in this sector. The challenge that this sector poses for the state is its 
pursuit to end the BMC monopoly, and this would deny the state the profits from 
the European Union (EU) market and the state would fail to continue to reward 
its traditional partners, the peasantry, with good beef prices. The fracture of the 
alliance might lead to reduced electoral support for the BDP. The cattle-owning 
elite, which for many years was hegemonic, appears to be losing ground to a 
new breed of politicians known as “tenderpreneurs” (Gabathuse, 2013). The term 
is used to refer to people who accumulate wealth through government tenders. 
This is a group of young entrepreneurs who wish to attain political power in 
order to secure their business interests by benefiting from government tenders. 
This group has gained hegemonic influence through contesting and winning 
key party positions, and has been instrumental in financing party activities and 
campaigns. This group does not bring to the party any particular ideology except 
their insatiable appetite for capital accumulation.
Overall, the trajectory of Botswana’s development strategy is premised on a 
contradictory reality, notwithstanding the economic meltdown and recession 
that characterised the world since 2008, of a country experiencing economic 
growth and rising levels of poverty and income inequalities. In addition, attempts 
to diversify the economy away from a mineral-led growth to more sustainable 
alternatives based on harnessing renewable natural resources is occurring at a 
slow pace. The class character of the opposition is by and large an alliance with the 
working class and a small fraction of the middle class. The working class, through 
the unprecedented public sector strike that lasted eight weeks – where parties 
bargained for increases of salaries and wages in solidarity with opposition – also 
called for a regime change. However, they do not command the numerical strength 
to dislodge the BDP from power. The BDP enjoys the power of incumbency and 
can use reward power to consolidate its power base. What is more, to assert its 
position, the state needs its coercive instruments, and public-private partnerships 
are instrumental in defining this relationship.
A case could be made that the Botswana developmental state has redistributed the 
wealth acquired from mining in tangible areas such as the creation of infrastructure 
– roads, rural and urban electrification and water reticulation, hospital and schools. 
During the time of independence, these services were non-existent. Redistribution of 
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resources has also been in the form of salaries to the huge government bureaucracy, 
including the police and military. However, with a low minimum wage, poverty 
and inequalities remain a security threat to the otherwise successful economy. 
The redistribution of resources also takes a token form in the provision of welfare 
services, such as ipelegeng and backyard gardens. In what could only be seen as 
political patronage, the President periodically distributes blankets to the rural poor. 
Nevertheless, the trajectory of Botswana’s development strategy has produced a 
limited trickle down of wealth and income, and the country has institutionalised a 
culture of dependency rather than of entrepreneurship and job creation. Disaffection 
with the ruling elite was also evident from the recent election where the ruling party 
won the election with a reduced simple majority of 47% against the combined poll 
of the opposition’s popular vote by 50%. The First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) electoral 
system guaranteed a BDP win by 37 to 20 seats of the position.
At independence, the dominant social formation comprised of the cattle-owning 
class, which represented the mainstay of the economy supported by a strong civil 
service that benefited from timely salary reviews. Support for this ruling fraction 
of the dominant class was seen through subsidies in cattle vaccines and feeds. 
However, over time, this class was replaced by technocrats, and now – as already 
mentioned – a new class that could be referred to as “tenderpreneurs” (a group 
relying on government tenders to enrich themselves) have gained hegemonic 
control of the state. Tourism has emerged as the second foreign exchange earner.
Botswana’s role in the world economy continues to evolve and change, as 
globalisation throws new opportunities and challenges that redefine relations 
between countries and people of the world. Globalisation has opened the country’s 
borders to international communication technology and cybercrime, thus making 
security an urgent undertaking. Botswana’s positioning in the global hierarchy 
may be marginal, but its political, economic and strategic importance is enormous 
given its political stability and control of the international diamond trade. The 
Diamond Trading Company (DTC) has relocated from the United Kingdom to 
Botswana. As a result, the country’s security can no longer be taken for granted.
Botswana is considered a model of political and economic stability in sub-Saharan 
Africa. According to the United States Department of State (2013:1), “Botswana 
has consistently maintained a democratic government, responsibly managed its 
natural resources, invested in its people and infrastructure”. Since Khama became 
the President in 2008, Botswana has been overzealous with the provision of security. 
Khama’s obsession with security has ensured the visibility of security institutions, 
especially the BDF, the Botswana Police Service, and in particular, the Directorate 
Intelligence Service (DIS). In some instances, the state security apparatus have 
gone overboard in the interventions to engage in extrajudicial killings. The case 
of John Kalafatis, who was killed in cold blood execution style, was instructive.
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5. Security situation and threats
Botswana’s defence and security policy was first conceived in 1977 out of a fragile 
sense of insecurity emanating from attacks from Rhodesia and South Africa. 
Following South Africa’s policy of ‘Total Strategy’ of the 1980s geared towards the 
destabilisation of the region, the security of the people and state became the primary 
preoccupation of the Botswana state. Thus, regional aggression informed Botswana’s 
early security threats, and the BDF was established in that regard. Nevertheless, 
leaders of the public and private security sectors note that external aggression 
was no longer an issue threatening Botswana’s security, but that regional criminal 
gangs and poaching are high on the security alert. The end of the Cold War and 
the demise of apartheid and its destabilisation campaign were replaced by regional 
criminal gangs and poachers as new security threats. In this regard, partnerships 
between the police, the army and wildlife rangers have been developed. Botswana 
has a unique history in southern Africa compared to some of its neighbours who 
experienced a war of liberation. The country does not have the problem of proliferation 
of small arms. Also, it has a strict protocol regarding the acquisition and registration 
of small arms, which is in accordance with the amended Arms and Ammunition Act 
of 1979. Nonetheless, despite the stringent regulations and controls, Botswana is 
experiencing an increase in the number of firearm-related crimes. 
Botswana displays the full panoply of factors that account for insecurity. These 
are high urbanisation, unemployment, inequalities, poverty and increasing 
levels of crime. The report maps out the security threats facing Botswana, and 
whether there are formal or informal partnerships between public and private 
security sectors. More concretely, it examines whether there is competition, 
incompatibility and rivalry between them. The inequality gap is pronounced, and 
youth unemployment is particularly high. Although Botswana is well endowed with 
natural and human resources, it suffers from extreme poverty and deprivation. 
Botswana also bears a great burden of other socio-economic ills: the scourge of 
HIV/AIDS, which is among the highest in the world, and other chronic diseases – 
further compounding this dire situation. Nevertheless, Botswana aspires to build 
a strong state that has significant social depth, and it is anchored on the virtues 
of a just and equitable society. 
The perceived and actual security threats in Botswana are diverse and ever 
evolving. To begin with, leaders of both public and private security sectors share 
the opinion that security (and/or insecurity) is a multidimensional and multi-level 
phenomenon which can best be described as having different referent objects, 
requiring interventions of both statutory (public) and non-statutory (private) 
bodies. Public and private security leaders agree that the sources of insecurity 
in Botswana are deeply embedded in its socio-economic structure of society. 
As alluded to earlier, Botswana is widely regarded as an economic and political 
success story in sub-Saharan Africa and is classified by the World Bank as a high 
middle income country. Its socio-economic and political success is measured by 
its high per capita income, relatively stable political system and a stable currency. 
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Security sector leaders argue that, given the country’s development trajectory, as an 
economy driven by diamonds whose exploitation is capital-intensive, this development 
presents itself as a double-edged sword. In the first instance, it provides development 
revenue for the state to undertake development projects and in providing security for 
the nation. Ironically, it also contributes to the growing wealth and income inequalities 
that have produced propertied classes and a reserve of the employed. The seemingly 
rich economy attracts investors of all sorts; some are bona fide investors, while others 
are fly-by-night entities without credible credentials. The country’s economic success 
has also led to the mushrooming of prosperity churches that swindle unsuspecting 
worshippers of their hard-earned money. As a stable country, Botswana also attracts 
political refugees who flee their countries due to political persecution. Botswana 
has also been a haven for illegal Zimbabwean immigrants who cross the border at 
ungazzetted points along the 800-kilometre border between the two countries. These 
illegal immigrants have been both victims and perpetrators of crime.
The tourism sector in the Chobe and North Western parts of the country, including 
some areas in the North East (Mashatu), has blossomed into a second engine 
of growth. This growth has its attendant problems. It manifests what could be 
called reconolisation of Botswana. The tourism sector in Botswana is dominated 
by foreigners with very few Batswana elites having a stake in it. This sector has 
emerged as an enclave where the majority of Batswana are excluded, and this 
has led to tension among Batswana. Batawana (an ethnic group in the North 
West) are at loggerheads with government over Moremi Game Reserve, which 
they claim is theirs and want to wrestle it from government.
The leaders of the security sectors also view the growth of the tourism industry 
as an important additional aspect of the Botswana economy that has generated 
massive property, jobs and insecurity as well. In this regard, Botswana established 
national wildlife parks as well as the Department of Wildlife and National Parks, 
which employs permanent armed rangers that provide anti-poaching services and 
help to ease human-animal interaction. As a result, Botswana has a huge wildlife 
population that has attracted the private and community tourism industry, as well 
as poaching. Because of poaching, government has resorted to a policy of shooting 
on sight, and this raises serious human rights concerns. Poachers are interested 
in elephant tusks and rhino horns. The tourism sector in the Okavango Delta 
and other areas is dominated by private lodges and campsites that provide their 
own security and hire guards from private security companies whose guarding 
services are highly required in that industry. 
The diamond-rich economy has created an educated citizenry, but it creates very 
few jobs for the young educated citizens who flood the army of the unemployed. 
The jobless diamond-led economy has also created space for the private sector to 
flourish, helping to create more wealth and jobs. This prosperity has also created 
insecurity, and rich individuals have resorted to hiring private security guards for 
the private malls and property, installing security features into their residences 
and vehicles and guarding their parking spaces. 
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The growth of the criminal economy in the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) manifests in the growth of illicit trade in goods, illegal drugs and black 
market currency exchanges. The use of Botswana as a transit point for money 
laundering, drug trafficking and human trafficking has been a source of concern 
for the Botswana government and Interpol. The leaders of the security sectors 
also acknowledge that the upsurge of globalisation and its borderless characteristic 
poses threats, such as cybercrime that could undermine Botswana’s prosperity 
(the so-called fire-churches and pyramid schemes were singled out in this regard) 
threaten the coherence of national development planning and the security of the 
nation state. Ironically, the public security sector sees the private security companies 
as part of the security threat, with the potential to employ a large army of foreign 
criminals and thus expose property to risk, and with the potential to allow foreign 
security companies that could endanger the security of the state. 
Botswana’s security challenges transcend traditional conceptions of security to include 
shortages in water and energy (frequent power outages have become a common 
feature in Botswana’s urban centres in the first quarter of 2014) plunging cities and 
other urban centres into prolonged darkness that has become a haven for criminals, 
including illegal immigrants and local criminals. The leaders of the public security sector 
also hold the opinion that heavy rainfalls have caused floods in the northern parts of 
the country and caused power cuts there too, while the southern parts – where the 
capital city is located – make the provision of water (the very low water levels in the 
Gaborone Dam as of April 2014 is 15% empty – a national security concern). They say 
energy insecurity (given the failure of Morupule B power plant and the constant threat 
by Eskom to prioritise South Africa’s energy needs) amid the involvement of foreign 
contractors with uncertain track records, makes Botswana’s energy supply extremely 
precarious and a security threat. Thus, policing (both public and private) will have to 
contend with long periods of power blackouts that make policing a very dangerous task. 
In another twist, the private security sector sees unethical conduct by public 
security players with interest in the former as a threat to the private security 
industry and to the security of the nation. Allegedly, this is so because some 
officials in the Ministry of Defence Justice and Security (MDJS) and operatives in 
the intelligence services (DIS) are alleged to have vested personal interest in the 
private security industry. It should also be recognised that the private security 
industry has proved to be a reliable retirement home for retiring police, intelligence 
and army officers who open up their own private security companies. What is more 
disturbing are allegations that Ministry officials and their wives and friends, such 
as the former MDJS minister’s wife, own security companies that provide services 
to the police and other public security agencies, thus advantaging themselves 
over other companies. In another instance, the leaders of the private security 
industry allege that DIS operatives, such as its director, own security companies 
that provide services to important companies in the country’s economy. They hold 
the opinion that the fact that both public officials and their friends and relatives 
have vested personal interests has caused delays in legislation that could help 
clean the private security industry and enhance its growth. 
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Leaders of both public and private security sectors agree that Botswana’s development 
trajectory as an economic success story in sub-Saharan Africa makes it a target 
for transnational and cross-border crime and for economic migrants. They also 
say its porous borders make it vulnerable to illegal immigrants and to illicit 
trade of all sorts. Their views supplement those of the Head of the Sub-Regional 
Bureau of Interpol in Harare, Commissioner Frank Msutu (Gastow, 2002:1), who 
previously stated, “there are very clear relationships and interlinking factors 
between crime syndicates operating in Southern Africa. It is not a secret to law 
enforcement agencies in the region that the criminals in the region have better 
cooperation links than the police officers. They seem to know who to contact at 
all times and budgetary constraints, foreign currency shortages, visa problems 
or governmental authority to travel do not control their movements.”
Thus, there is a shared opinion among security players that regional criminal 
syndicates pose security threats to Botswana. It is therefore not surprising that the 
country was concerned about the increasing cross-border crime occurring in the 
region. According to Molomo, Maundeni, Osie-Hwedie, Taylor and Whitman(2007), 
the ethnic debate which was intended to make Sections 77, 78 and 79 of the 
Botswana Constitution ethnically neutral, healthy as it was, indicated that Botswana 
was not ethnically homogeneous and was premised on a false sense of stability. In 
the new millennium, Botswana’s security threats are primarily internal, including 
constitutional reforms that touch on sensitive issues such as ethnicity. As alluded 
to earlier, the relocation of the Basarwa from the CKGR is another potential security 
threat for Botswana. Following the forced relocations and human rights abuse, a 
British non-governmental organisation (NGO), Survival International, mounted a 
campaign in which it labelled Botswana’s diamonds, ‘blood’ or ‘conflict diamonds’. 
Maundeni (2004) observes that it is a known fact that Botswana’s political stability 
and economic success is partly derived from diamonds, and that if these were to 
be boycotted by the international community, Botswana’s sparkle would fade. He 
cautions that Botswana therefore needs to tread with great sensitivity in addressing 
this matter. Maundeni (2014) adds that the poor handling of industrial strikes such 
as the public sector strike in 2011 posed security challenges and proposes that state-
trade union partnerships should be promoted, instead of the seemingly unmanaged 
rivalry between them. In the run-up to the 2014 general elections, the Botswana 
Federation of Public Service Union (BOFEPUSU) formed an alliance and called for a 
regime change. Maundeni (2014) quotes a newspaper article appearing in the Sunday 
Standard (2013) as a demonstration that state-trade union rivalry threatens the 
country’s prosperity. He notes that the newspaper story mentions the slowdown of 
border crossing despite a P250 million computerisation of Botswana passports, slow 
financial transaction speed despite a P63 million Accounting and Budgeting system 
(GABS) introduced in 2007 by the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning. 
Maundeni (2014) highlights the newspaper making the following observation: ‘Botswana 
government’s multimillion pula investments in information technology infrastructure is 
failing to speed up the sluggish service delivery in the public service because officers 
are sleeping on the job, the 2013 Public Survey Customer and Employee Satisfaction 
survey financed by UNDP has revealed’ (Sunday Standard, 2013). 
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Maundeni (2014) further notes that the poor handling of the 2011 industrial 
strike led to resistance politics against the Khama regime, thus threatening the 
existence of the regime itself. In the 2014 elections, the combined opposition 
parties increased their fortunes by polling 20 to 37 seats of the ruling party. He 
continues to observe that resistance against the Ian Khama regime was building 
against the manner in which senior civil servants (about 19 in a space of six 
months) were expelled during that time, in which senior ruling party officers 
(including ruling party MPs) continued to be expelled without regard to human 
rights, in which senior army officers were being speedily retired, and in which 
academics (the Zimbabwean professor lecturing in media studies immediately 
comes to mind) and priests who had lost favour with the regime were declared 
persona non-grata. Maundeni (2014) cites Gomolemo Motswaledi, a senior ruling 
party functionary who had taken President Khama to court over sharp differences 
over the running of the party, who was suspended and his candidature recalled 
in a manner that bordered on inhumanity (his candidature was withdrawn just 
before elections and was suspended from the ruling party for six months pending 
an investigation that led to his expulsion from the party). Maundeni (2014) adds 
that all those that were retired or expelled after Motswaledi bore the same stamp 
of inhumanity and abuse of human rights.
Maundeni (2014) observes that in response, their supporters (including opposition 
parties) joined forces with striking public servants to confront the Khama 
regime, spearheading a strike never seen in Botswana’s entire history, and the 
threatening collapse of service delivery that followed. All these serve to show that 
the Botswana government needed to partner with its people to pursue successful 
developmental goals. Refugees are always a potential threat to the security of any 
country. According to Molomo et al. (2007), refugees and illegal immigrants have 
long been regarded as security threats to Botswana. Illegal immigrants are very 
difficult to keep track of because they crossed the border at ungazetted points 
and also did not report their presence to the police. Frequently, they are not only 
the originators of crime but its victims as well. Botswana has always maintained 
an open-door policy respecting refugees and has always ensured that they are 
treated in line with the international legal instruments that apply. 
As a signatory of international conventions concerning people who flee their countries 
for political reasons, Botswana welcomes bona fide refugees. Asylum seekers 
constitute a security threat if they use the host country to attack or destabilise their 
home country. However, the long-standing foreign policy of Botswana is that it does 
not allow refugees to attack their countries using Botswana as a springboard. The 
case of Meshake Muyongo of the Caprivi Liberation Army in Namibia is a case in 
point. Muyongo crossed into Botswana armed with a group that wanted to break 
away from Namibia and form their own independent state. Botswana tried to 
diffuse this problem by handing the problem of refugees to the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees. For example, the Government of Botswana allowed the 
Namibian Minister of Foreign Affairs to come and view the Namibian refugee camp 
on its border. Following bilateral discussions (state-state partnership) between the 
two countries, some of these refugees were given amnesty and repatriated back 
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to Namibia. Nevertheless, Namibia has not found closure to this issue; Muyongo 
is still in exile in Denmark, while others are still in Namibian jails.
According to Molomo, et al. (2007), many of the prisons within Botswana were filled 
with large populations of illegal immigrants who often created misunderstandings 
due to their perception that they were “ill-treated prisoners”, creating potential 
problems with Botswana’s neighbours. The former Vice President and Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Mr Mompati Merafhe indicated that illegal immigrants and refugees 
were also potential contributors to both the problems of poverty and HIV/AIDS. 
The presence of large numbers of refugees and Zimbabwean illegal immigrants has 
led to increased pressure on the provision of public security and safety. In most 
cases, the police find themselves overstretched, and private security providers 
have often filled the gap left by the police. 
According to Maundeni, Bwalya and Kwerepe (2014: 5), separatist nationalism of 
the Barotse of Zambia is also emerging as a serious security threat to Botswana. 
They say this is because Botswana’s tourism is in the region bordering Zambia, 
that is, near Barotseland. They quote the Botswana Tourism Board (2012) that 
confirmed that Kasane, in the northern part of Botswana, is the country’s top safari 
destination and home to the magnificent Chobe River and Chobe National Park. 
The tourism board regards it as the perfect location where the Botswana safari 
provides visitors easy and trouble-free admission to the Chobe National Park, 
which is the best reserve for game viewing and birdwatching. The Botswana 
Tourism Board further observes that the mesmerising wilderness of this wildlife 
park just amazes the visitors with its diversified eco-system and magnitude of 
wild animals. It further notes that Zimbabwe’s Zambezi and Victoria Falls are two 
widely visited tourist destinations that can be explored from Kasane. According to 
the Tourism Board (2012:1), “Inching fishing camp is a renowned fishing safari 
destination and Kasane hot springs are the natural spots which are also widely 
visited spots. Kasane has a lot of safari activities which include: Boat excursions, 
sunset boat cruises, fishing, game drives, Day-excursions to Victoria Falls, 
Seboba water springs, Kasika village cultural tour and cultural activities through 
Mowana Lodge. All these activities are what tourists expect to find when they go 
to Kasane-scenic views and wildlife. Kasane also offers a wide range of hotels, 
lodges, guest houses and camping sites.”
According to the Botswana Tourism Board, Kasane is also Botswana’s important 
gateway to Central Africa. “At Kasane, one can expect to cross the Chobe River 
through the ferry from Botswana to Zambia. Strategically located by the Chobe 
River’s convergence with the Zambezi river, where Botswana, Zambia, Zimbabwe, 
and Namibia meet, it is clear to see that Kasane is a gateway to the three 
other countries in the region” (Botswana Tourism Board, 2012: 7). In addition, 
“Kasane is an important point of debarkation for the Victoria Falls in Zimbabwe, 
Livingstone in Zambia, and Namibia’s Caprivi Strip. All of these countries share 
a natural border being the river. Namibia, Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe 
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are also jointly marketing their touristic natural resources and wildlife packages 
for the Victoria Falls/Chobe/Okavango region which become very attractive and 
economical for tourists whilst the four countries have a share of the tourism 
market” (Botswana Tourism Board, 2012: 12). All these tourism activities face 
threats from the separatist nationalism of the Barotse of Zambia. This calls for a 
working partnership with the security forces of the neighbouring countries and 
with the private security forces working for lodges in the area.
Maundeni, Bwalya and Kwerepe (2014) maintain that in the past, the border between 
Botswana, Namibia and Zambia has always been marred by some controversies 
and disputes. They say, first, Botswana had a dispute with Namibia over the small 
river islands. Second, Namibia accused Botswana of helping the Caprivi nationalist 
movement of Mishake Muyongo in his search for independence for the Caprivi 
from Namibia. Barotse people in that region of Namibia share a common kinship 
with those in Barotseland in Zambia and those in Botswana in the Kasane region. 
Maundeni et al. (2014) state that the then Caprivi secessionist leader chose 
Botswana for political asylum in October 1998 when it became known that the 
Namibian government was about to arrest him and his group of agitators. They 
quote the Namibian Windhoek (1998) that noted that by December 1998, more 
than 2 200 Caprivian secessionists, including some 700 from the Linyanti area 
alone, had fled into Botswana to escape possible persecution from the Namibian 
government. Namibia’s Barotse chief, Boniface Mamili, fled to Botswana claiming 
persecution and seeking asylum. He was linked to a separatist movement in the 
Caprivi Strip (Minorities at Risk Project, 2004). Presently, the Barotse of Zambia 
are mounting a separatist bid to establish an independent state. 
6. Public security sector
The peaceful predisposition of Batswana as a peace-loving nation has enabled the 
Botswana Police Service substantial mileage in maintaining public order and public 
safety. A renowned Setswana dictum is that ntwakgolo ke ya molomo (it is better 
to dialogue rather than to embark on war); it underlies Botswana’s preoccupation 
with peace rather than war and a predisposition to resolve differences through 
dialogue and negotiations. Moreover, the conception of multiple actors in the 
security domain has led to the development of new concepts such as “plural 
policing” (Stenning, 2009:31). Plural policing arose out of the awareness that 
the police alone cannot cope with the level of crime and maintain law and order. 
Plural policing recognises the multiplicity of state and non-state policing providers. 
As a precursor to a detailed discussion of the Botswana Police Service (BPS), 
it is important to have an overview of the constitutional and legal framework 
that guides the operations of the police. The Botswana Constitution represents 
the supreme law of the land. It provides the legal framework upon which all 
laws are premised. The police exist primarily to protect, and based on its laws, 
provide public safety. Nevertheless, for Botswana, only first-generation rights 
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are entrenched in the Constitution; they involve civil and political liberties. The 
Constitution is silent on second- and third-generation rights. Second-generation 
rights manifest socio-economic rights, which entail cultural and workers’ rights. 
Third-generation rights include the right to development. 
The BPS has a broad mandate of maintaining law and order, and providing law 
enforcement to the people of Botswana. Its core functions include protecting life 
and property, preventing and detecting crime, repressing internal disturbances, 
maintaining security and public tranquility, apprehending offenders, bringing offenders 
to justice, duly enforcing all written laws with which it is charged, and generally 
maintaining the peace in the country (Anon., 2011). The BPS is a huge organisation 
that was initially located in the Ministry of the State President, but now it is in the 
new Ministry of Justice Defence and Security. It comprises of two broad sections: 
operations and support services. The operations division comprises the Criminal 
Investigations Department; Traffic, General Duties; Forensic Science Laboratory; 
and Crime Intelligence. Support services, on the other hand, consists of the Special 
Support Group (SSG); Transport and Communications; Departmental Management; 
Police College; Air Support; and Finance, Development and Procurement.
The Botswana Police predates the post-colonial state of Botswana, while private 
security companies only started to exist in the 1980s. The Bechuanaland Mount Police, 
as it was initially called, evolved over the years into the Bechuanaland Border Police, 
then into the Bechuanaland Protectorate Police, then into the Botswana Police Force, 
and lately into the Botswana Police Service (Anon., 2011). At independence, it was 
constituted into a police force that took on board paramilitary operations because 
the country did not have a defence force. Even after the BDF was established in 
1977, the police force retained its paramilitary operations in the form of the SSG. 
Generally, the police are unarmed except for their special units such as the SSG. 
The SSG unit within the police service is a paramilitary wing primarily concerned 
with monitoring and “policing public situations” (Anon., 2011). (Perhaps an incident 
where the SSG was most visible was during the disturbances in Mochudi in 1995 
resulting from the murder, allegedly for ritual purposes, of Segametsi Mogomotsi. 
In the whole process, a certain youth Binto Moroke was shot and killed in cold 
blood for his involvement and killing of a police officer during the strike.) They are 
often called upon when there are riots or public disturbances to institute public 
order. However, there are still uncertainties as to what types of weapons they 
should carry in relation to the military. In the 2011 public sector strike, although 
they were on the alert, the police maintained a low profile and acted in a highly 
professional manner in monitoring the disturbances.
Public security leaders acknowledge that public-public partnerships exist between 
the police and the army, and that even joint patrols have been mounted through 
presidential directives. They observe that given the nature of some internal security 
challenges that are beyond the capacity of the police, the military is often asked 
to render them assistance. The President, as Commander-in-Chief of the armed 
forces, has the prerogative, as mandated by the Constitution, to deploy the army in 
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other duties as national security may determine. Under the auspices of aid to civil 
authority, the army cooperated with the police in an operation called ‘Kalola Matlho’, 
which involved surveillance on matters of armed robbery, hijacking and other related 
robberies. In this operation, over 100 soldiers were attached to the Serious Crime 
Squad of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) of the Police Service. In 
addition, the army was engaged in low-intensity operations, such as anti-poaching 
patrols. It was also deployed along the borders between Botswana and Zimbabwe 
to reinforce police operations in curbing the movement of illegal immigrants. 
Police officials observe that the Botswana Police Force rebranded itself in 1996 from 
a police force into a police service suited for democratic policing. The rebranding 
included public education meant to foster an image of collaborative work with 
local communities (urban and rural residences). The police have established a 
community police service where they work with communities under the auspices 
of “Twantsho borukutlhi” (fight against crime) and neighbourhood watches, 
neighbourhood horse patrols and neighbourhood bicycle patrols. Community policing 
by its nature requires cooperation and teamwork. Policing is a vocation that entails 
a lot of responsibility on the part of officers; they are entrusted with the coercive 
instruments of the state and, as such, they must not use them to the detriment 
of the people. The interface between the police and local communities has made 
significant inroads in narrowing the avenues for crime in various areas in Botswana. 
Through the crime prevention unit at the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) 
the BPS has embarked on an outreach programme that educates the public about 
crime through workshops, billboards, radio and televisions programmes. The BPS 
recognises that its strength lies in a “skilled, well trained, motivated and developed 
officers who enjoy equal opportunities and proper deployment” (Anon., 2011). It 
also recognises that teamwork based on “collective effort, trust, understanding, 
support, hard work, perseverance and respect irrespective or rank and gender” 
(Anon., 2011) are critical to the success of their mission.
BPS operates in a complex environment in which crime has not only increased 
in sheer frequency but has an unparalleled level of sophistication. The BPS has 
divided the country into three zones: the north (comprises places such as Semolale, 
Bobonong, Selebi Phikwe, Francistown, North East, Kasane and Maun), the south 
central (comprises of Serowe, Palapye, Mahalapye, Mochudi, Gaborone, Tlokweng, 
Mogoditshane and Ramotswa) and the south (comprises of Molepolole, Lobatse, 
Kanye, Ghanzi, Kang and Tsabong). Most crime is located in the south central 
where there are greater job opportunities, better road networks, greater internet 
access and where the majority of the population resides. In particular, the areas 
that are most affected by crime are Serowe, Mogoditshane and Gaborone. In 
addition, given the large size of the country and the sparsely populated areas in 
the western parts and the high rate of urbanisation, policing has become a real 
challenge, calling for partnerships of all sorts. The paradox is that given the size 
of the country and population, is it improbable, that the state could create a police 
service that could meet all public safety needs. This gap has secured a market 
for private security. Private security companies operate more like an auxiliary 
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service to the BPS. They fill the gap that the police cannot fill. However, proper 
partnerships have not yet been worked out between them.
Because of increased incidents of armed robberies, carjacking, cross-border 
crime, including poaching involving automatic weapons, the police often go on 
joint patrols with the military. In some of these incidents, there are reports of 
excessive use of force, resulting in fatalities. Democratic policing entails the “use 
of force in a manner in keeping with the maintenance of constitutional rights” 
(Hutchful, 1997:536). However, the police maintain that where, for one reason 
or the other, there is an incident that results in a fatality, it is usually because 
of negligence on the part of the police officer, and usually necessary steps are 
undertaken to punish wrongdoing.
The Botswana Police College and International Law Enforcement Agency (ILEA) 
have been in the forefront of offering police officers quality education and training 
to ensure that Botswana is safe and secure. The Botswana Police College stands 
out as an important role player in ensuring that the BPS adheres to its mission, 
vision and values. The college is a tertiary institution within BPS established 
through Section 66 of the Police Act Cap 21:01 as amended by Act 15 of 2002. 
The college is registered with the Botswana Training Authority, and its programmes 
are accredited by the University of Portmouth in the United Kingdom. The work of 
the Police College is augmented by the ILEA (In addition to ILEA Gaborone, there 
are four other ILEAs located around the world: ILEA Budapest in Hungary, ILEA 
Bangkok in Thailand, ILEA Roswell in New Mexico, USA, and ILEA San Salvador 
in El Salvador. There is also an ILEA Regional Training Centre in Lima, Peru, 
supervised by ILEA San Salvador known as ILEA Latin America.), a joint venture 
between the Botswana and United States – it was set up under the leadership 
of the US Federal Law Enforcement Centre working under the Department of 
Homeland Security – governments (International Law Enforcement Academy, 
2010). It was established in 2000 out of the desire to combat transnational crime 
and cooperate in law enforcement to make the world, in particular, sub-Saharan 
Africa, safe and secure. ILEA provides training for middle-level managers in law 
enforcement with a view to support “criminal justice institution-building in Africa; 
to provide capacity building to combat transnational crime including terrorism, 
narcotics trafficking, financial crime, cybercrime, illegal firearms trafficking and 
migrant smuggling” (International Law Enforcement Academy, 2010).
In its efforts of becoming a 21st-century Police Service, the BPS has developed a 
corporate development strategy (Anon., 2011) focused on public education, crime 
prevention, community policing and human resource development to support 
its key performance areas. The overall thrust of this strategy, in line with the 
national vision 2016, is “to achieve a safe and secure nation” (as per Botswana 
government, Vision 2016). Notwithstanding its stated objectives of community 
policing, the BPS does not have a formal relationship with civil society. 
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Arising from the fact that crime transcends national borders, the BPS realises that it 
cannot combat crime alone. The BPS is affiliated with the Southern African Regional 
Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation (SARPCCO), which is a forum of police chiefs 
formed in 1995 with a view to foster greater cooperation and collaboration of the 
police in the southern African region. It was formed out of the realisation that with 
greater cooperation and sharing of information, the region could be a safer and 
more secure place. The aims and objectives of SARPCCO are to harmonise regional 
public safety and security by coordinating regional police efforts geared towards 
carrying out regular reviews of joint crime management strategies and curbing 
cross-border crime. Furthermore, it endeavours to build confidence and trust 
among police officers and the communities they serve, with a view of networking 
and coordinating regional security concerns (Dissel & Tait, 2011:2). 
The SARPCCO Code of Conduct represents an agreed standard of operation by 
the police chiefs of southern Africa that clearly sets out principles of integrity, 
respect for life and the rule of law, which if adhered to could avoid or at least 
minimise human rights violations. This Code of Conduct talks strongly against 
torture, inhuman and degrading treatment of people, including detention without 
trial. The SARPCCO Code of Conduct is derived from and borrowed a leaf from 
best international practice, drawing from international and regional norms and 
standards on human rights, accountability, democratic governance, and ethical 
and professional policing. Nevertheless, the constitution and code of conduct of 
SARPCCO are based on respect for national sovereignty, equality of police services, 
non-political professionalism, observance of human rights, non-discrimination 
and flexibility in working methods, mutual respect, and goodwill.
Policing in Botswana is anchored on observance of human rights, which depart 
from the basic premise that all human beings must be afforded dignity, freedom, 
security and equality. Human rights are based on the ethical consideration that 
human beings are “born free and equal in dignity and rights” (United Nations 
General Assembly, 2011). According to the United Nations Code of Conduct for 
law enforcement officials, they are expected at all times to “respect and protect 
human dignity, maintain and uphold the human rights of all persons” (Dissel & 
Tait, 2011:7). Nonetheless, despite the human treatment of people by the police, 
there are allegations of abuses by the BPS. Human rights organisations such as 
Ditshwanelo are inundated with reports from members of the public complaining 
about the police. These cases range from negligence to ill-treatment in the handling 
of suspects. The law requires that persons apprehended by the police should be 
accorded the dignity they deserve. However, one case brought before the courts in 
which five security officers, two of them special constables on a security patrol in 
Ramotswa village in November 2005, allegedly “arrested and forced Zimbabweans 
to have group sex, while they watched” (Morewagare, 2009:3). 
Media reports, over the years, have been awash with stories of “arbitrary and unlawful 
killings.” According to a US report, during 2009, there were eight incidents of police 
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shooting during apprehension, in which 11 civilians were killed. These allegations 
involve cases like: On January 4, 2009, the police shot and killed Mothusinyana 
Moag[i], who reportedly fled from the police who confronted him because he fit 
the description of a suspect; on March 4, 2009, the police shot and killed Mark 
Gumbo while in pursuit of Gumbo and others suspected of armed robbery; on 
March 9, 2009, the police shot Tshepo Molefe during an attempted robbery. The 
police claimed that Molefe and other suspects in the group fired at police and that 
Molefe ran toward the police officers, who then shot him (United States Department 
of State, 2010:1). Deaths in police custody include an incident that was an eye-
opener, the death in police custody of Peter Mokgware in the mid-1980s. The case 
of John Kalafatis on 13 March 2009, who was murdered execution style in a joint 
operation of the police and the military, was dramatic and perhaps unprecedented 
in the history of police killings in Botswana. Kalafatis was a wanted criminal who 
was killed during a lawful arrest and his killers are facing prosecution in the courts 
(Molomo & Mokhawa, 2012). In 2009, there were incidents of two people who died 
in police custody. On 5 March 2009, David Monggae collapsed during interrogation 
on accusations of cattle theft and subsequently died. In another incident, on 29 July 
2009, Italy Setlampoloka was arrested for a series of robberies and died in police 
custody (Morewagare, 2011:4). “It is alleged that the suspect died under torture 
as the police tried to extract a confession from him” (Morewagare, 2011:4). Upon 
realising that they had caused the death of Setlampoloka, “police allegedly took 
his body to Senamakola farm lands near Gabane where they simulated suicide by 
hanging his body from a tree” (Morewagare, 2011:4). 
Although the Constitution and the law prohibit torture and any inhuman treatment 
of people, there are reports from persons under their custody that the police 
often “beat and abuse suspects to obtain evidence or elicit confessions” (United 
States Department of State, 2010:1). There are also allegations that the police 
use force and torture to extract confessions from people in custody. It is alleged 
that torture is rife among suspects who are categorised as “high risk”, diamonds 
and narcotics, serious crime, car theft, and armed robbery. In an interview with 
a human rights activist on 1 February 2012 in Gaborone, the activist mentioned 
that the units that are alleged to be notorious of torture and inhuman treatment 
are said to be Military Intelligence (MI), CID and lately the DIS. The security 
agencies have been under the spotlight since the advent of the DIS. 
7. Public-private security partnerships and rivalry
Public-private partnerships need to be contextualised in the national and global 
contexts. The expanded or broadened conception of security to include human 
security has led to a number of functions that were traditionally the domain of the 
state performed by other actors such as private security firms. There is a growing 
awareness the world over, including the developing world, that policing is not 
only a domain of state actors but that non-state actors are also proficient actors 
in that market. This section explores the existence or absence of public-private 
security partnerships in Botswana. More substantively, it observes that there is no 
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legal instrument that formalises public-private security partnerships in Botswana. 
Second, it observes that there are instances of informal public-private security 
partnership, competition and rivalry as well. The interface or partnership between 
the police and private security providers varies from state to state and situation to 
situation. More essentially, it depends on the nature of the state. Some states are 
highly centralised and prefer to keep power rather than share it with other actors. 
In Botswana, leaders of private security companies say they are on good informal 
working relations with the police. Often, synergies develop out of personal relationships 
where a security manager previously worked in the police or military. In such a 
situation, the public security sector is likely to forge a productive relationship with 
private security providers. For instance, after Keabetswe Makgophe was appointed 
Commissioner of Police, the private security providers were some of the first stakeholders 
he addressed, and he referred to them as “brothers” in the security sector. The 
private security providers reminisce that they also had good working relationships 
with previous police commissioners. However, none of these cordial relations were 
sanctioned by law. Equally important is that in some jurisdictions, there is a tense 
relationship between public and private security providers. In some instances, the 
police may feel threatened by private security providers that they take their jobs 
and may eventually render them unemployed. Still, in some situations, the police 
may feel that private security firms exacerbate or compound criminality rather than 
reduce it. Such situations occur when private security personnel are not properly 
screened of criminal behaviour and perhaps not properly trained to do their job.
The first private security company to operate in Botswana was Way Guard Security, 
which was a joint venture between the Botswana Development Corporation (BDC) 
and a citizen of Botswana. This partnership was par excellence a public-private 
partnership because BDC is a government-owned parastatal created to promote 
private investment and diversify the Botswana economy. It would be simplistic to 
assume that the interface between state and private security providers is smooth 
without tensions. Way Guard ceased to operate because the ‘marriage’ between 
Mr Bothongo and BDC could not be sustained. Public-private partnerships have 
mushroomed and proliferated. In the arena of technology, which includes fitting 
alarm systems and automated security, private security companies have grown in 
numbers and expertise. They have developed a niche in this area, and the public 
security has secured their specialised services in, among others, close-circuit 
television (CCTV) and vehicle tracking devices. These various gadgets help the 
police to monitor and investigate crime. G4S is said to be the largest security 
company in the world, having offices not only in the advanced countries of the 
West but also many of the developing world. G4S and Security Systems are market 
leaders in the Botswana context, and they are able to use their social capital 
and corporate responsibility to consolidate their standing in the local market. 
Nevertheless, this is not a smooth trajectory; their space is highly contested. 
The activities of private security companies acting at the service of international 
capital are fairly nuanced and constitute an interesting dialectic that does not project a 
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natural convergence of national and international interests. The predatory tendencies 
of private security firms, especially those with transnational connections, tend to 
upset the local balance. These relations need to be politically and socially mediated 
and negotiated. Community policing is one model of public-private partnership. Other 
models of this partnership include the privatisation of prisons and airport security 
system, and G4S, among others, has become a big player in the market. G4S is one 
of the big actors in the security industry, as it has a market share in security valuable 
assets such as diamonds. This unequal access to this lucrative market has led to a 
concerted consternation where smaller companies, largely citizen-owned, demand a 
fair share of the market. G4S even introduced another security model in Botswana 
of a one-stop model where one company does one’s security and cleaning needs. 
In contrast, private security only emerged in the 1980s and has had no formal 
relations with the public security sector. The private security industry is complex 
and diverse; it also includes alarm installation and response, CCTV and surveillance 
monitoring, guarding ATMs, cash-in-transit, vehicle tracking devices, crowd control 
at events and festivals, to mention but a few. According to the chairman of the 
Security Association Botswana (SAB) and managing director Nynex Security Services, 
Gaolatlhe Modongo, in an interview on 6 March 2014 in Gaborone, he mentioned 
that there are 2 377 registered private security companies in Botswana. Industry 
leaders say the then Vice President, now President, Ian Khama encouraged them 
to form an association. However, out of the aforementioned total registered, only 
about 70 companies are visible in the market and are registered with SAB. The 
voluntary SAB does not know where the other companies are and where they 
operate. Officials at the MDJS estimate that over 80% of the companies were 
either small entities or not operating at all. Once registered with the Ministry, 
security companies are free to bid for projects; also, the clients make their own 
assessments and decide what security companies to hire and for what purposes. 
According to the common view, the few better-managed security companies win 
most of the tenders, particularly the more lucrative ones from big and wealthy 
institutions such as banks. In contrast, small companies allegedly win tenders with 
the district council authorities where corruption is suspected to be high. According to 
Mr Modongo of SAB, there is a misconception that security is an easy job that once 
one is registered, then one would get a job. He says the reality is that security is a 
low-profit margin job, and most companies are not able to withstand competition 
in the market. Leaders of the private security industry share the view that there 
are also numerous “briefcase” security companies that are only active after they 
win tenders, and as a result, they deploy untrained workers in the market.
Unaccountability about the rest of the private security companies is a disadvantage 
because both the association and the Ministry need the strength of numbers to 
lobby government for a regulatory framework and for reforms that would improve 
the image and advance the interests of the industry and its clientele. In contrast, 
as the licensing agency, the MDJS never carries out surveys on operations and 
does not even know the number of security companies in operation in each city; 
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still, it continues to approve new applications, thus saturating the market in some 
places. In short, the licensing authority has no capacity to manage the growth 
of the industry, which is a risky phenomenon. Meanwhile, the regulator spends 
more time mediating between disgruntled guards and some of their employers 
who fail to pay up as will be shown below. 
Nevertheless, the active members of the private security industry constitute a lobby 
and are transacting business with public stakeholders. As a member of the Botswana 
Confederation of Commerce Industry and Manpower (BOCCIM), issues concerning 
the private security industry are discussed at the High Level Consultative Council 
(HLCC), which is chaired by the President of the Republic of Botswana. Thus, by 
partnering with the larger private sector, the private security industry has been able 
to reach the highest levels of power and interacted with the President of the Republic.
The private security industry is currently legally reserved for citizens only, as 
foreign ownership is partly illegal and partly considered a national security threat 
and is opposed by powerful interests in the private security industry and in the 
intelligence sector. However, according to MDJC officials (who are pushing for 
opening the private security sector market to foreigners), citizen ownership 
has limited its growth in terms of technological advances and sophistication. 
According to the Ministry officials, most security companies in Botswana are 
less technologically sophisticated and cannot cope with the security demands of 
modern clients such as those brought in by diamond beneficiation. 
According to an interview on 5 March 2014 with Titus Modongo of Security Systems 
(which is headquartered in Tlokweng, near Gaborone and has 15 branches located 
at Mahalapye, Letlhakane, Molopolole, Francistown, Selebi-Phikwe, Maun, Kanye, 
Ghanzi, Orapa, Kasane, Palapye, Lobatse, Jwaneng, Mochudi and Moshupa), the 
Ministry holds the view that only international security companies such as G4S 
and the locally owned Security Systems and a few others are technologically 
sophisticated, and that this gives them an edge over others. Both companies 
have operations throughout the country and command a workforce of about 7 000 
employees. According to an interview with Victor Baiketsi of G4S on 3 March 2014, 
the company has been in the Botswana market since 1998. The original company 
was Automated Security, which later evolved into Securicor and later bought by 
G4S. G4S strives to become a ‘one-stop shop’ security company where it would 
do everything under one contract, including cleaning services. 
To this end, G4S acquired companies such as Facilities Management and PS 
Cleaning. G4S has about 25% local holding and is the only security company 
operating in Botswana that is listed on Botswana’s stock exchange. G4S has an 
in-house training facility that is BOTA (training accreditation authority) accredited. 
The setback is that competitors poach its trained workers. In addition, only G4S 
is known to have informal working relations with the police and the intelligence 
sectors. Its cash centre in the city of Francistown is guarded by the police and 
intelligence officers. G4S alerted them of the centre and asked them to help 
secure it, and the police and intelligence officers have been assisting since then. 
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There is rivalry within the private security industry. G4S’s entry into the Botswana 
market was vigorously contested by local leaders of the private security industry 
who were however warned to back off by the presidency then. Its existence in 
the country is also opposed by the intelligence sector that sees foreign ownership 
of private security as a national security threat. In the views of industry leaders, 
G4S is operating illegally, as there are no laws allowing foreign-owned security 
companies in the country. The intelligence directorate (DIS) has been issuing 
warnings to all private security companies not to employ foreigners. Even 
institutions such as mines and the Bank of Botswana have been warned not to 
employ foreigners in their internal security sector. The DIS is legally authorised 
to screen all private security guards and to disqualify any that are of doubtful 
character. It is also authorised to screen all new public servants who are recruited 
into sensitive ministries and departments of government.
In contrast, Security Systems (a locally owned company) is giving G4S stiff 
competition, as some companies (primarily those owned by the government or 
that have government shares) prefer to work with locally controlled companies 
than with those that are controlled from outside (Sun Reporter, 2014:11). Security 
Systems prides itself as the second security company to operate in Botswana and 
receives preferential treatment. According to Titus Modongo, manager of Security 
Systems, on 5 March 2014, in Gaborone, Security Systems has a covert task 
force which can gather intelligence information on demand by individuals and 
companies. Thus, there is rivalry within the private security sector that extends to 
government security actors. However, compromising the capacity of locally owned 
private security companies is the fact that there is no formal training provided to 
their guards. It was reported at the validation workshop that Security Systems’ 
training institute collapsed and that it no longer has accreditation with BOTA. 
Lack of training of security guards also makes it difficult for them to work with 
the police and with other public sector security agencies who subject their own 
to rigorous training in various security aspects. It should be appreciated that 
each public security agency has its own training. For instance, the army trains 
separately from the police, who also train separately from prison guards, from 
wildlife rangers and from intelligence operatives. In short, there is not much 
cooperation regarding the training of public security operatives. According to 
Bonnie Mokalane, Department of Wild Life, Gaborone, 9th January 2014, only the 
army and wildlife rangers share some training facilities. While the local training 
institutions do not cater for private security companies, the industry has failed to 
fill the gap with a formal training facility for security guards. Part of the reason why 
Security System’s institute collapsed was that other private security companies 
were not sending their guards for training. Worse still, there was no specified 
educational requirement for the security guards. 
According to leaders in the private security industry, the absence of educational 
requirements exposes it to those who failed to advance in their educational pursuits 
and are therefore largely untrainable. They say, initially, guards were restricted to old 
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men who had long retired from their manual work careers and had a strong sense of 
duty. This only shows that historically, training was never part of the culture in the 
private security industry. In contrast, the MDJS insists that private security companies 
should limit themselves to hiring people who obtained a junior certificate or higher. 
However, the industry indicates that while this is a welcome development, young 
educated people do not fit very well in the private security business. First, according 
to official of Naconda Security Company, Jwaneng Township, 15 November 2013 
educated young people who have not been exposed to any serious training, lack 
discipline and respect, such that they fail to open gates of important clients at their 
residences. For instance, in the diamond town of Jwaneng where mine executives 
have security guards posted at the residences, the clients commonly open gates 
for themselves because the young guards ignore their presence. 
Young educated guards are also undisciplined, sleeping on the job (literally), 
deserting their workstations without giving notice, sometimes abandoning their 
positions to go and congregate and chat at a common place, and also dent the 
image of the industry by urinating in public. In addition, young educated guards 
also refuse to wear boots. Thus, the insistence on educated young people for 
personnel without affording them proper training is not working well for the security 
industry and for their clients. This is an area in which public-private partnerships 
could help the industry instil discipline in its young guards. 
With the BDF, police and wildlife sectors running training institutes, there is no 
reason why security companies should be struggling with indiscipline among 
their ranks. There is also no need for them to reinvent the wheel. Public-private 
security partnerships should be able to avail expertise for the benefit of the private 
security industry. Security companies are open to the idea of gender equality, 
and they have made some efforts to employ women in this industry that is still 
predominantly male. Although private security firms neither have a gender quota 
nor policy on the employment of the disabled, they always strive to abide by the 
laws of Botswana. Their estimation is that their workforce maintain about a 50:50 
gender balance. However, the situation is different on the ground. For instance, 
official of G4S Jwaneng Office, 15 November 2013 informed the researchers that 
G4S in Jwaneng has 28 employees, and 12 are women. In contrast, Anaconda in 
Jwaneng has 47 guards and other employees, and only 18 of them are women. 
This does not translate into 50:50 gender ratios. Women are mainly employed 
during the day for access control in shops and industries and also guarding ATMs. 
The woman workforce is said to be more stable, and the majority do not drink. 
Women allegedly pose challenges for security companies: they ask for leave too 
many times in an industry in which physical presence counts more. As a result, 
women do not quite fit the industry. However, this is a challenge that public 
security sector players have also long experienced. While the defence force is 
still struggling with it, the police and wildlife sectors have actually overcome it. 
Thus, sharing experiences with the private security sector could easily assist in 
overcoming similar gender challenges. Men are mainly deployed at night and 
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at risky guarding jobs. Despite the fact that there is no policy on people with 
disabilities, those who meet disability requirements at work are given jobs in 
offices and control rooms; young educated males also pose challenges of a 
different sort – indiscipline. 
In addition, large private security companies that have branches all over the country, 
such as Nynex, which employs 234 guards who remain un-unionised, could learn 
from the public security sector that also remains un-unionised. Ministry officials see 
unionisation as a security threat and do not allow it for either the public or private 
security sectors. In contrast, conditions of service in the public sector forces remain 
some of the best in the country while those of the private security sector remain 
some of the worst. This is a disparity that also works against possible partnerships 
between the two sectors. While members in the private security industry hold the 
view that the sector promises to generate employment in an economy that fails to 
create jobs, they believe that government has largely marginalised it.
Entry into the private security industry is open to every citizen who can afford to buy 
a shelf company or to register a company. However, the successful private security 
companies are allegedly owned by retired security personnel such as former police 
officers and soldiers. In one case, it was reported to the researchers that when 
Coin Botswana folded its operations in the country, some of its former employees 
formed a new company called Anaconda, and it is one of the successful companies 
in Jwaneng town. It employs 47 people (primarily guards) and has expanded its 
operations to Molepolole township. Criteria for employment include availability of 
accommodation for the concerned individuals in the area of operation; that is, for 
one to be employed in the private security sector in Jwaneng, he/she must have 
his/her home village in the vicinity of the town for accommodation purposes. 
However, as noted before, most of the small companies that are owned by ordinary 
citizens have either collapsed or remained small and ineffective. According to MDJC 
officials, many security companies underprice to win bids (these are the types 
that win bids particularly at district councils) and fail to pay guards in accordance 
with the government minimum wage policy, thus creating endless labour disputes 
that place guarded property at risk. In fact, private security leaders confessed at 
the validation workshop that they are the biggest client of the Industrial Court. 
They even admitted that sometimes their lives are in danger from guards who had 
lost their jobs and come charging and threatening their employers with knives. 
However, what has also come up in the research is that government labour laws work 
against the private security industry. For instance, labour laws stipulate eight working 
hours, and anything beyond is considered as overtime and is to be compensated 
as such. However, government tenders do not cater for overtime in an industry in 
which the normal working hours is twelve and not eight. On that account, security 
companies end up paying for overtime that is not included in the tender. The industry 
is busy pushing for reforms in the labour laws to accommodate its needs. 
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In an interview with Faried van Wyk, owner of Nova Security, a private security firm 
based in Gaborone on 13 November 2013, he stated that private security companies 
hold the view that they are in the ‘frontline’; they are the ‘eyes on the ground’ and 
do what could be perceived as citizen’s arrests. In most crime situations involving 
burglary and housebreaking, private security companies are usually the first to arrive 
at the crime scene, arrest the suspects and report the matter to the police. The 
industry leaders argue that in this area, they have cordial relationships with the police. 
However, they observe that the police are clueless on the use of CCTV surveillance 
cameras and do not know how to use them for evidence in the courts of law. 
Private security companies call for the police to outsource activities to them and 
not for formal partnership as such. They say outsourcing could allow the police to 
focus on its core business of policing. For example, private security leaders say 
as an attempt to control traffic congestion, the police control traffic and such a 
necessary but menial task could be outsourced to private security companies. They 
acknowledge that most government buildings in Botswana are secured by private 
security guards, but strategic installations such as at the Bank of Botswana and 
the DTC use their own security or state security forces. The business community, 
such as the retail sector and the construction industry, use private security firms 
to transport money to the banks. When arrangements are done on time, the 
police are always willing to escort the transfer of money.
According to More Gondo, Assistant Commissioner, Botswana Police, Desk Officer at 
the Ministry of Justice Defence and Security 3 March 2014, Gaborone, the police also 
see private security as a threat to its own credibility and therefore regard private 
security as a rival. The advantages of private security companies are that unlike 
the police who respond to crime, they wait for crime; where a crime is committed, 
there is usually a private security officer nearby. In this regard, private security 
firms consider themselves as “an extended arm of the police” (Modongo, 2014). 
The advantages that private security providers offer involve capability enhancement 
and simply the strength of numbers. Private security providers fill the gaps that 
the police are not able to address; they provide security where public security is 
deficient. In most situations, it is efficient and cost-effective to deploy private security 
firms rather than the police. For instance, leaving menial tasks to private security 
firms allows the police to focus on the core business of policing. Private policing 
is demand- and market-driven. Private security guards endear themselves to the 
public due to their quick response to crime situations, while the police often take 
a long time to respond. The police consider private security firms as support staff 
who occupy a special niche such as guarding shops, private homes and also install 
and monitor alarms and CCTVs.
According to the BPS, private security companies are slowly encroaching into 
areas that used to be their core business. The danger of this development is that 
most people may lose confidence in the police and use only the service provided 
by private security companies. The private security companies felt that their 
relationship with the BPS should be institutionalised to the extent of having joint 
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patrols and regular forums. In operational terms, often when crime is reported 
to the police, their response is that they do not have any transport. However, 
at every corner of the street there is a security vehicle that could be of service 
to the police. The SAB wonders why the police cannot enter into an agreement 
with private security firms that, when such a situation presents itself, they simply 
climb into a private security vehicle and attend to the crime.
However, there are a number of areas in which the police collaborate with private 
security firms. Private security firms have contracts with commercial banks 
to replenish ATMs with cash when a cash out situation occurs. According to a 
source in the private security industry, when they do these transactions, they 
are usually supported by an undercover unit of the SSG. Respecting the cash-
in-transit operations, private security firms often receive intelligence that their 
operations are targeted, and that way they avoid being robbed. The lack of a policy 
governing the relationship between private security firms and the police results 
in the lack of a framework that regulates their informal cooperative endeavours. 
When private security companies go to the bank to collect or deposit money, 
they do not queue. However, when private security companies go to the police to 
report a crime, they are made to queue. Time is of the essence here; why do the 
police not create a special desk for private security firms to use when reporting 
a crime? This clearly shows poor cooperation between the two security services.
Private security is completely excluded in matters concerning diamond security. In the 
mining town of Jwaneng, the Debswana mine provides its own security. Debswana’s 
security personnel are integrated into company operations. Even the mine gate is 
manned by company security officers. In short, diamond mining is mostly not part of 
the clientele of security companies. Escorting the transportation of diamonds between 
the mine and the Jwaneng airport is done by armed police officers, and recently by 
the armed SSG. Escorting diamonds is a no-go area for private security companies in 
Botswana. However, cash-in-transit for the mines to and from the banks is handled by 
private security companies. While some private security companies provide guarding 
and alarm services at the residences of mine executives, others provide cleaning 
services to the mine offices. For instance, G4S private security company provides 
cleaning services to the offices of the Jwaneng diamond mine. G4S has a small branch 
in Jwaneng town that manages its cleaning services to Debswana offices. Thus, the 
relationship between mining and private security companies in Botswana has been 
restricted to non-diamond operations. In Jwaneng town, there are three dominant 
private security companies: G4S, Security Systems and Anaconda.
Botswana’s security framework, as a developing country, has been a matter of serious 
concern, particularly since the relocation of the DTC from London to Gaborone. 
Despite the fact that Botswana is by value the largest producer of diamonds, 
over the years, there has been scepticism that relocating the DTC (Botswana) to 
Gaborone and the beneficiation of diamonds through value-addition in diamond 
polishing and jewellery manufacturing would not be viable. This relocation has 
been an act of monumental proportions that is likely to change the nature and 
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worth of the Botswana economy and its security. The critical question that should 
occupy the minds of security personnel is whether the country has the capacity 
to counter sophisticated criminal syndicates.
Despite still being at the formative stages, the diamond sites held in Botswana have 
surpassed expectations. Additionally, the establishment of the Diamond Technology 
Park (DTP) is a strategy of the Botswana government to move the country from a 
mere diamond producer to an international diamond centre. The overall strategy is 
geared to promote direct foreign investment by providing a favourable environment 
for international diamond companies to buy into the local industry (Anon., 2014). 
For instance, diamond polishers, international jewellery manufacturers and other 
support services already operate in Botswana. Nevertheless, the emerging diamond 
beneficiation enterprise, including the relocation of DTC (Botswana) to Gaborone poses 
big security challenges for Botswana. According to government officials, this is an 
industry requiring high-tech security, and diamond mining companies hardly outsource 
security services to local security companies; what more of the finished product?
The Botswana diamond mines are owned 50:50 by De Beers and Botswana government 
under a partnership called Debswana. It sells its rough diamonds to DTC (Botswana), 
which is also jointly owned (50:50) by the Botswana government and De Beers. 
De Beers’ diamonds – from its mines in Canada, South Africa and Namibia – are all 
sent to DTC (Botswana) for aggregation. De Beers and the Botswana government 
each have 10 different sites where they sell their diamonds. Okavango, a company 
wholly owned by the Botswana government, buys 10% of DTC (Botswana) diamonds, 
which it sells at its sites on auction. De Beers buys 90% of the diamonds from DTC 
(Botswana), which it sells to its site holders by allocation. There is already three to 
four diamond polishing industries operating at the DTP.
Based on the foregoing, security is of great essence to Debswana and DTC (Botswana). 
At any given time, diamonds worth billions of Pulas are at De Beers, DTC (Botswana) 
and DTP. Diamonds are flown from the mines into Gaborone by a private jet, and 
the security at the airport is also made very tight. It is important that diamonds are 
transported safely from the mines to Gaborone and from Gaborone to its various 
destinations. Botswana needs to be secure so that De Beers and DTC (Botswana) as 
well as high-profile site-holders are not exposed to danger. The diamond enclave, 
hotels, restaurants and taxis that high-profile users utilise must be up to standard 
and secure. In the wake of the ‘Brussels Airport diamond heist’, wherein a developed 
country, Belgium, experienced an armed attack in which diamonds worth about 
US$50 million were stolen from a Swiss jet preparing to fly to Zurich, security 
simply cannot be compromised, as indicated by Chris Lloyd, security operations 
manager at De Beers Group of Companies in an interview on 13 March 2014 in 
Gaborone. Without doubting the prowess of Botswana’s security establishment, 
the precision with which the robbery took place, within a record time of about 20 
minutes, makes one wonder whether Botswana’s security structures would match 
that sophistication of armed robbery. The relocation of DTC to Botswana demands 
a high level of readiness and intelligence to counter such moves by criminals.
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Private security companies that work with diamonds are Brinks, Malca-Amit 
and, to some extent, G4S International. De Beers, Debswana, DTC (Botswana), 
police, Civil Aviation Authority, Air Botswana, BDF, Brinks and Malca-Amit meet 
regularly to monitor and make the security situation better. Debswana, De Beers 
and DTC (Botswana) work closely with the Botswana government in securing what 
Chris Lloyd, security operations manager at De Beers Group of Companies in an 
interview on 13 March 2014 in Gaborone referred to as ‘the wealth of the nation’. 
A reconfigured Diamond and Narcotic Squad known as the Diamond Protection 
Unit, the SSG and the Botswana Defence Force work together in securing the 
diamonds. Although private security is said to be restricted to 100% citizen-owned 
companies, international players have entered the market without reforming the 
laws to accommodate them. 
For instance, the entry of Brinks Global Services Botswana (Brinks was founded 
by Perry Brinks in Chicago, Illinois in the United States of America (USA) in 1859. 
Its headquarters are in Richmond, Virginia in the USA. Brinks is said to be a global 
leader in security-related services for the diamond and jewellery industry, banks, 
retailers and a variety of other commercial and governmental customers. Their 
services include armoured car transportation, money processing, and long-distance 
transport of valuables, vaulting and other value-added solutions. It employs about 
70 000 personnel around the world and Malca-Armit (Malca-Amit is an international 
security company that has dealt with the movement of money and precious assets 
since 1963) has secure vaults and storage facilities. It has a reputation of successfully 
transporting valuable assets in armoured vehicles. It has expert knowledge, established 
networks and integrated technology in moving precious assets worldwide and is not 
sanctioned by any law (Rapaport, 2014; Malca-Amit, 2014). 
According to Modongo (2014) and other stakeholders at the validation workshop, 
the diamond industry is not open to local security providers. When SAB challenges 
the status of the two aforementioned international security firms, they are told that 
these are courier companies and not security companies. The security association 
holds that at least if they were told they do not meet the standards of transporting 
diamonds and precious minerals, they would enhance their capacity in order 
to gain entry into the diamond security market. Brinks issued a press release 
on 12 November 2013 that it was “proud to announce ... the first international 
rough diamonds site shipment from Botswana left Gaborone airport under [its] 
supervision marking a new era in the diamond industry ... this is a landmark 
moment in the diamond industry and we feel privileged to play an integral part 
in it” (Rapaport, 2014). 
It seems that the negotiations for relocation of the DTC to Gaborone included 
assurances from the Botswana government that the law would be reformed to 
allow international security players to ensure the safety of diamonds-in-transit. 
The perceived security challenges involved in protecting and shipping of diamonds 
to their international destinations prompted De Beers to put pressure on the 
Botswana government to seek to introduce the Private Security Bill which sought 
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to open up the industry to international players (Brinks Global and Malca-Armit) 
who were already involved in diamond protection and transportation. Unfortunately, 
this is one of the stalled reforms as shall be shown below.
The private security industry has also been excluded in terms of workshopping. For 
instance, an important initiative made by former participants of workshops that 
had been organised by the United States of America’s Africa Centre for Strategic 
Studies came together in 2005 to form the Africa Centre for Strategic Studies-
Botswana Chapter. Its members consisted of retired army officers, practicing 
soldiers, academics, police officers, politicians, members of the Red Cross, and 
members of NGOs. The training focused on security studies, counterterrorism, 
civil-military relations and defence economics. Facilitators came from different 
militaries in the continent and abroad and included civil society leaders and 
academics. A cordial working relationship exists between the security forces and 
civil servants. In one instance, the Ministry of Trade and Industry organised a 
breakfast briefing on the Local Entreprise Authority for all permanent secretaries 
and special institutions (such as Ombudsman, IEC, and Auditor-General, Directorate 
on Corruption and Economic Crime), the BDF and the Botswana Police Service. 
In this briefing, private security was also ignored.
In another instance, the army organised a seminar on counter-terrorism, aimed at 
bringing together civil servants and the military officers in 2001. It is interesting 
to note that leaders of private security companies were not invited. The purpose 
of the seminar was to educate stakeholders on their expected role in the case of a 
terrorist attack, especially in a hostage-taking situation. This was initiated based 
on assessments from a military point of view that the concerned ministries and 
departments did not know their role in a hostage situation. The army believed that 
if nothing was done to bring awareness to them, such a situation would present 
a real problem in case of a hostage-taking situation in that the army would be 
expected to do all the work despite the fact that such operations are multi-agency 
and inter-department type, not a purely military operation. The attendance was 
very disappointing because almost all ministries failed to attend except just a few. 
Most of the attendees were members of the police, Prisons Department, Civil Aviation 
Authority and Air Botswana. The point here is that the private security industry that 
is in the ‘front-line’ was not invited and did not participate in workshops aimed at 
preparing the nation for terrorist attacks and hostage taking. Thus, the army failed 
to notice the importance of private security companies and did not invite them to 
such an important seminar on terrorism. Even regional and international security 
bodies have failed to notice the relevance of private security services. For instance, 
in 2006, the army attended a conference on combating and preventing terrorism in 
Africa that was held in Johannesburg. There is no evidence to suggest that private 
security was also invited there. The BDF was also invited by the International Centre 
for National Security Studies to an international conference on terrorism in the 
Middle East. This shows the growing importance of the issue of terrorism in Africa 
and the importance that the army attaches to it. Still, private security companies 
have generally been ignored on matters of terrorism. 
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Civil society and governmental institutions have organised numerous workshops 
and activities and have invited the security forces, but have also ignored the 
private security sector. As an example, the prisons and the army have confirmed 
attending many such workshops, but the private security sector never attended 
any of them. Members of the Prisons Department attended workshops on HIV/
AIDS, gender equity, crime prevention, defensive driving, firefighting, and so on. 
However, members of the private security sector never heard of such workshops. 
In another instance, members of the army attended seminars in Francistown and 
Gaborone organised by the judiciary on the issue relating to the maintenance 
of wives and children. This was after the recognition that there was an increase 
in cases on such matters involving soldiers. In contrast, no such has ever been 
organised for the private security sector whose involvement in domestic violence 
is not even known.
In 2006, members of the security services were also invited and attended 
conferences organised by the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Board 
(PPADB) ‘towards attaining service excellence in public procurement and asset 
disposal’. The public security sector also attended seminars on discipline and 
administration of military justice that was facilitated by Justice Ian Kirby. Thus, 
there is mutual cooperation between the security forces and civil administration 
to help improve the administration of military assets and military justice. On the 
other hand, the Prison Service Department and the army have also attended joint 
workshops with civil society and civil servants on strategic planning, gender and 
energy, dissemination and training in human rights and humanitarian principles, 
and on HIV/AIDS. According to the Prison Service Department, such interaction 
is important for sharing ideas and benchmarking. While some investment was 
made towards educating parts of the security sector on numerous dangers, not 
much has been done to include the private security sector.
 
8. Privatisation of security and human rights
Botswana is a state party to numerous regional and international treaties and 
protocols that guarantee people’s human rights. It has ratified a number of 
these protocols. These include welfare of women and children, which are meant 
to protect women and children from harsh treatment such as being denied food 
and rest. Domestic violence and gender-based violence are problems that are 
rife in the developing world, including Botswana. Sections 3-19 of the Botswana 
Constitution address the fundamental human rights that Botswana should enjoy. 
There are also statutes that address specific issues affecting the lives and welfare 
of people. These include the Employment Act and labour laws.
Guards carry handcuffs and are empowered to detain suspects and hand them over 
to the police. The act of arrest may infringe on personal and human rights of people, 
and needs proper regulation. Botswana has a strict protocol on the use of firearms. 
The army, DIS, wildlife rangers and the SSG of the Botswana Police Service are 
the only security actors that are allowed to carry firearms. The use of firearms by 
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citizens is limited to rifles and to shotguns for livestock protection and for trophy 
hunting when licences to do so are available. In contrast, private security companies 
are not allowed to carry firearms. However, SAB (2014) is of the view that, while 
it accepts the law as it stands, private security personnel be allowed to carry arms 
on special assignments (such as transporting precious items, cash-in-transit and 
while responding to alarms). At present, when private security companies have long 
distance cash-in-transit, they are expected to inform the police to keep surveillance 
on their armoured vehicles. However, this surveillance system has its own blind 
spots, which compromise the security of the operation and place the lives of guards 
in danger. There are reported cases where guards transporting cash-in-transit 
have seen unknown vehicles following them without any information that these are 
surveillance police vehicles. This subjects guards to fear that robbery is imminent.
In addition, guards are neither clearly defined in the labour laws of the country 
nor unionised. According to ILO, unionisation is a human right that all employees 
(including guards) should enjoy. According to Botswana labour officials, the 
labour department has addressed private security companies on numerous 
occasions respecting the need to form a labour union that could address their 
specific needs. As a result of lack of norms and standards, security companies 
are lumped together with industrial workers, and this undermines the integrity 
of the industry and violates the human rights of the guards. According to private 
security officials, private security needs to be properly defined to take its place as 
a professional entity commensurate with the type of work it does. For instance, 
private security guards keep ATMs safe, which is a big responsibility, as they are 
required to know safety procedures such as fire drills in case there is fire. Also, 
in handling cash-in-transit, they play a vital role in protecting the integrity of the 
currency, and as such, should not be treated at the same level as Namola Leuba 
(drought relief workers), Ipelegeng (Self-Reliance) and other manual workers. 
Private security officials emphasise the point that the minimum wage of all industrial 
workers is set at P4.50 an hour, which translates to P36.00 on an eight-hour day 
and P40.50 on a nine-hour day. This rate is low for security personnel who not 
only work in high-risk jobs but also require personal and professional integrity. 
With this minimum wage, private security workers are underpaid, and a company 
cannot increase wages knowing that they would be unattractive when they bid for 
tenders, as the market usually prefers the lowest bidder. As a result, private security 
companies need to be detached from industrial workers to help professionalise the 
industry and to help it become competitive.
Private security companies have problems with the eight hours a day (that is meant 
to provide a time of resting, which is an international human right) because they 
operate 24 hours a day and seven days a week. According to SAB, what works for 
the industry is 12-hour days (For a six-day week, it translates into eight hours a day 
plus four hours overtime = 12 hours. For a five-day week, it translates into nine hours 
plus three hours overtime = 12 hours) with two shifts, which violates the labour laws 
and violate the human rights of guards. The idea is that with a regulatory framework 
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that appreciates the industry, a dispensation that works for guards and employers 
could be developed. The private security association also has difficulties with the 
new dispensation of severance benefit that replaced gratuity. It says this does not 
work for private security firms, as it does not promote continuity and skills transfer. 
The spirit of the new dispensation is understood as it was meant, among other 
things, to protect guards where unscrupulous employers would expel a worker 
who has worked for four years and deny them their benefits. Severance benefit 
affords guards benefits even when they have worked for one month. However, 
guards have found a loophole in severance pay where after one year, especially 
towards the Christmas vacation when workers want to raise quick money, they 
give notice for termination of employment knowing that they would cash in on 
their termination benefits and secure new employment from another company 
in the new year. SAB feels that some safety measure needs to be put in place to 
protect employers from this unstable situation. 
Outsourcing has also proved to be a threat to human rights. It is ironic that 
when government had its own security company to guard government buildings, 
it had an elaborate structure that allowed for progression and the development 
of a clear career structure with pension and support structures. It appears that 
when government outsourced this service, it was simply a cost-saving measure. 
According to the chairman of SAB, government awards tenders to the lowest 
bidder who often undercuts the minimum wage and collapses the pay structure 
into one layer. These bids do not accommodate the development of private security 
companies into a full-fledged career structure.
9. Stalled reforms
Efforts to establish a regulatory framework for the private security industry have 
not yet borne fruits. A Private Security Bill was initiated in 2007, and was presented 
in Parliament in 2012 after extensive consultations with various stakeholders and 
private security firms. The Bill sought to establish a regulatory framework that 
included ‘Private Security Services Licensing Board’, and an ‘appeals board’. The 
Private Security Services Licencing Board was to consist of a chairperson appointed 
by the minister and nine other members, three of whom were to be public officers, 
two representatives of the private sector, two representatives of the security 
association, one representative of the trade unions, and two additional members. 
According to the Bill, the tasks of the licencing board were to include the following:
1. Receive applications for licences, verify information contained in the 
applications, and issue licences in accordance with this Act;
2. Set the minimum standards of training for security service providers and 
security guards and ensure compliance with the minimum standards;
3. Encourage and promote efficiency in and responsibility within the private 
security service industry;
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4. Set a code of conduct for private security service providers and ensure 
compliance with the code of conduct;
5. Promote the protection and enforcement of rights of security guards and 
other employees in the security service industry;
6. Ensure compliance with existing legislation by security service providers 
through active monitoring and investigation of the affairs of security service 
providers; and
7. Protect the interests of users of security services.
It is clear that the Bill would go a long way to enhance the integrity of the private 
security industry. There is talk of ‘corporate good practices’ as part of a system 
to oversee private security companies. Currently, the private security industry is 
unregulated, exposing it to fly-by-night entities that damage its image. It is for 
this reason that the industry urges the government to tighten the rules. According 
to leaders of the private security sector, private security is a multifaceted industry 
that involves fitting of automated alarm systems and facilitating cash in transit. 
Yet what is surprising is that people who install automated alarms do not need 
a licence in spite of the fact that they fit them inside residential and business 
premises. The industry calls for reforms that will include regulating alarm equipment 
and those who fit it in residences. 
Moreover, regarding transporting cash, all one needs is permission from the Bank 
of Botswana but vehicles that do the business are not inspected for road worthiness 
and safety standards. In this regard, the Bill is offering a comprehensive definition 
of private security to include all those who are (a) protecting or safeguarding 
a person or property in any manner; (b) giving advice on the protection or 
safeguarding of a person or property, or on the use of security equipment; (c) 
providing a reactive or response service in connection with the safeguarding 
of a person or property; (d) providing a service aimed at ensuring order and 
safety on the premises used for sporting, recreational, entertainment or any 
similar purposes; e) manufacturing, importing, distributing or advertising of 
monitoring devices or surveillance equipment; (f) performing the functions of 
a private investigator; (g) installing, servicing or repairing security equipment; 
(h) providing security training or instruction to a security service provider or 
prospective security service producer; (i) monitoring signals or transmissions 
from electronic security equipment; (j) performing the functions of a locksmith; 
(k) making a person or the services of a person available, whether directly or 
indirectly, for the rendering of any service referred to in the above paragraphs 
to another person; and (l) managing, controlling or supervising the rendering of 
services referred to in paragraphs (a) to (j). All these aspects were to be regulated 
for the orderly development of the private security industry. 
Standards were to be enhanced partly through screening. The screening of members 
of the licensing board was aimed at excluding the bankrupt, those with a criminal 
record, active politicians, the physically and mentally unfit. The intent of the bill 
was to provide a clean legal framework for the operations of private security firms, 
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as well as authorisation of international private security firms to operate in the 
country. The proposed reform would also improve the integrity and professional 
standards and thereby inspire confidence for effective work between the police 
and private security companies. However, the issue of internationalisation has 
united local industry managers with the intelligence to resist and to kill the Bill. 
The alleged confrontations between the minister of defence, and the director of 
intelligence, have compromised the progress of the Bill.  
In contrast, the government’s interest (through the MDJS) is more into opening up 
the private security industry to international competition. This position is opposed 
by the industry that primarily consists of citizen-owned companies and by the 
intelligence agency – DIS. As a result of the divergent positions, there has been little 
progress in completing the reforms, which stalled for several years now. However, 
a regulatory framework would have helped to define all the trades that fall under 
the purview of private security. Activities such as vehicle tracking systems do not 
fall under the purview of private security and are not regulated. It is clear that 
people who operate explosives in the mines and elsewhere require a licence to 
do their work and that there is a regulatory framework that oversees their work. 
Leaders of the private security industry say that over the years, there has been an 
increase in robbery activities in which explosives were used on ATMs; this indicates 
loopholes in the existing regulations and calls for reforms. Thus, there is a need to 
review the handling of explosives and all other security-related matters.
It is clear that the operations of private security companies are constrained by a 
number of unresolved issues. Security companies hold the view that a regulatory 
authority that is independent of government is required to regulate the industry. 
The SAB calls for a regulatory authority that is established by an Act of Parliament 
operating as an autonomous entity which will establish ethics, norms and standards 
regarding their operations. At present, private security companies are loosely 
regulated by the ‘Controller’, whose substantive position is the Deputy Permanent 
Secretary in the MDJS. SAB is of the opinion that this arrangement is not working 
for the industry as the Controller is not dedicated to overseeing private security.
In contrast, in a focused group discussion with officers (Mr F Majingo, Assistant 
Commissioner; Mrs K Malete, Senior Superintendent, Crime Prevention Unit, CID; 
Mr D Motube, Senior Superintendent, Public Relations Unit; Mr A.B. Taliyana, Assistant 
Superintendent, Traffic; Mr M Mmalane, Senior Superintendent; Mrs C.B. Ncube, 
Inspector; Mr C Ndlovu, Senior Superintendent, Traffic; Ms C Mokhanya, Superintendent, 
Central Intelligence Division; and Mr M Tlhalefang, Senior Superintendent) at Police 
headquarters at the Botswana Police Service on 6 March 2014 in Gaborone, the police 
observed that private security companies are always the first at the scene of crimes 
and where they are not trained to ‘protect the scene of crime, they may contaminate 
evidence’. This view is corroborated by the chairman of SAB that such a situation 
calls for joint training of the police and private security personnel in recognition of 
the integrity of evidence that must be protected. Where training is not done, there 
is a need to establish norms and standards that inform training of private security 
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personnel. Security guards should know what to do in situations of burglary, ATM 
robbery and fire, and this requires elaborate training. Reforms are expected to 
address these issues. 
Private security companies also hold the view that there is no adequate flow of 
information between themselves and the police. There is a need for joint meetings 
between the police and private security managers. For example, private security 
companies install automated alarms and CCTV cameras, and in the event of a 
break-in, the police conduct investigations but never give private security managers 
feedback on what transpired and what corrective measures are necessary to close 
gaps in fighting crime. Private security managers say perhaps the police also need 
to be trained in alarm technology. In accordance with the Criminal Procedure and 
Evidence Act of 1939 (as amended), private security providers are allowed to 
make citizen’s arrests and hand the perpetrators over to the police to do further 
investigations and prosecute where there is a case to answer. 
Lack of training of private security personnel in criminal law led to contradictory 
behaviours from that of the police. For instance, suspects who are released on 
bail usually get caught up again in criminal activity, and when private security 
arrests them, private security is told that they are on bail. It ends up appearing 
as if private security chases after the same criminals over and over again without 
proper custody. This ends up demoralising the guards because they feel they 
are chasing the same criminals. Formal partnerships would compel the police 
to provide regular reporting and debriefing exercises with the private security 
sector. Private security providers also report that many times when they ask for 
crime statistics from the police with a view to strategically position themselves 
in the market, such information is not readily available. These are instances that 
require legislation to compel the police to share information with private security.
10. Oversight of the security sector
Botswana could be said to be experiencing parallel policing in which there are no 
formal arrangements for public-private partnerships. While there are administrative 
and politically sanctioned partnerships between the police, army and wildlife rangers, 
such do not currently exist with the private security sector. Botswana does not have a 
regulatory framework such as the one Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority 
(PSIRA) has to regulate the work of private security companies. Neither is there an 
overarching framework such as a national security policy that coordinates all security 
policies. There are actually complaints within the security sector that in the absence 
of a national security policy, there tends to be a conflation of roles by security actors. 
The problem has been most evident with the establishment of the DIS in 2008.
Perhaps what is lacking in Botswana that could inspire confidence is the lack of a 
legal framework that sets out the parameters of private security practice. Equally 
important is the setting up of norms and standards and a regulatory framework 
that would not only enhance professionalism in the industry but would also inspire 
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confidence in the police to work with them. Both the police and private security 
companies require effective means of oversight and accountability. The lack of a 
human rights commission to oversee the police, a Police Ombudsman or a dedicated 
parliamentary committee to oversee the police is a serious omission in Botswana’s 
policing sector.
In line with their professional conduct based on integrity, police officers are not 
expected to abuse the rights and privileges of their office, and are expected at all 
times to display “ethical behavior that appreciates the need for confidentiality”, 
respect for human rights and zero tolerance of corruption (Botswana Government, 
2011:3). However, according to the 2009 U.S. Human Rights report on Botswana, 
“police officials acknowledge that corruption was a problem in the lower ranks. Some 
officers took advantage of illegal immigrants and traffic violations.” (United States 
Department of State, 2010:3). Although there are cases of corruption by the police, 
the problem is not as entrenched. Perhaps what is more prevalent is abuse of power.
Safe for the courts of law which enforce juridical justice, the Directorate on Corruption 
and Economic Crime (DCEC) and the Ombudsman remain the only statutory bodies 
that can bring relief against corruption and unfair treatment. DCEC investigates 
cases of fraud, money laundering, tax evasion, to name just a few. The law does 
not provide for public access to government information, and government generally 
restricts access to it (United States Department of State, 2010:7). The Ombudsman, 
as the pubic protector, handles complaints of wrongdoing in the public sector. In 
democratic theory, the Ombudsman should be free from bureaucratic and executive 
control to investigate complaints and make recommendations for redress without 
fear or favour. However, in the specific case of Botswana, the Ombudsman – as the 
public protector – is statutorily precluded from monitoring and investigating security 
and intelligence issues. Moreover, public awareness of these institutions is limited. 
Besides, both the DCEC and the Ombudsman are not fully effective respecting 
their reporting lines. Their independence and effectiveness could be enhanced if 
their reports were tabled directly in Parliament to strengthen their oversight role. 
The robust oversight by these public interest organisations is constrained by their 
reporting lines. Instead of reporting to Parliament, they report to the President. 
Under the current setup, they are perceived as ‘toothless bulldogs’. 
The Police Council is the only statutory body that exists to oversee the work of the 
BPS. This entails internal structures such as disciplinary proceedings to ensure that 
institutions do not engage in unlawful conduct. However, the bulk of its work is to 
review disciplinary cases and conditions of service. It does not in the strict sense 
perform an oversight function. It is generally perceived as a ‘toothless bulldog’. As 
part of a system of accountability, Botswana should consider creating “external police 
oversight mechanisms, which can provide an important complement to internal 
police investigations, internal discipline, the criminal justice system, and legislative 
oversight” (Alston, 2010:1). In addition to public interest institutions such as the DCEC, 
Ombudsman, and Auditor-General, it is important to have parliamentary oversight 
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which goes beyond the criminality of the matter to include “corporate governance, 
maladministration, ethics, fair business practices etc.” (Motlogelwa, 2011:4).
External oversight is done by institutions external to the state. External oversight 
is also supported by independent institutions such as civil society, human rights 
organisations, academia and research think tanks. According to Diamond (1994), 
civil society is an intermediary bridge builder that facilitates dialogue between 
organs of the state and the people, and also serves as a watchdog of people’s 
rights. Broadly defined, it includes the media, trade unions, business associations, 
non-governmental organisations, human rights groups, churches and academia, 
and can serve as an intermediary between the people and organs of the state. What 
is lacking in Botswana is that there is no independent human rights inspectorate 
to oversee the police. Over and above that, the biggest problem that Botswana 
faces in terms of oversight of security agencies is lack of a national security policy 
that would be overarching and define and harmonise the various security agencies.
The greater calls for democratisation of the developing world have also led to 
demands for security sector reform. This has not created an awareness of democratic 
policing in creating and strengthening the greater probity of the democratic 
state, and also demanding different forms of accountability and oversight of the 
police. These include oversight committees of Parliament and independent civilian 
oversight bodies such as human rights commissions.
11. Conclusion
This empirical report on security threats and on crime prevention has explored the 
likelihood of public-private partnerships and has exposed the dangers of competition 
and rivalry between public and private security sectors. It observed that while 
the public security sector is extremely old (particularly the police), dating to the 
entry of colonialism in the 1890s, the private security only arose in the 1980s. 
Until then, the Botswana economy and society did not promote the growth of the 
private security sector. It is ironic that the growth of the mining sector (the richest 
sector in terms of value in the Botswana economy) promoted embedded security 
in which mining companies established security personnel that were integrated 
into the workforce. This embedded security was assisted by public security through 
the police, intelligence and army. Even up to today, the mining sector has largely 
ignored the private security sector, marginalising it to guarding residences of mining 
executives, handling cash-in-transit and cleaning at the mine headquarters. 
It was only after the growth of the private sector (banks, retailers, malls and so 
on) and the tourism sector that private security established a strong footing in the 
Botswana economy. The private sector places its security hopes on private security. 
However, the government has also been slowly hiring private security guards to 
secure its buildings and parking spaces. The irony that the public security sector 
views the private security sector with suspicion as an employer of criminal elements 
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and as having the potential to endanger the security of the state by opening the 
industry to foreign investors has been noted. This unresolved issue of opening up 
the market to foreign investors threatens all reforms related to the private security 
industry. This issue should be left out if the country is not ready for it. Unfortunately, 
the government has already allowed international private security companies to 
operate illegally, creating a very difficult situation for reforms to go ahead without it.
It has been shown that the growth of the private sector necessitated the growth 
of the private security sector. Currently, the thinking is that the relocation of DTC 
to Gaborone necessitates the participation of foreign investors – a hotly contested 
view that divides the public security sector. However, it has also been shown that 
mining in general and diamond mining and handling, in particular, has never been 
friendly to private security companies. This may imply that the reforms make a 
distinction and allow international security companies into this sector only, rather 
than opening up the whole private security industry to foreign competition.
It was noted that there were more informal partnerships between the public security 
sector and the foreign-owned G4S that runs a huge warehouse for cash-in-transit. 
The informal ‘partnership’ is partly anchored on risk analysis, regarding it too 
risky that a private warehouse holding large sums of money could be guarded 
by a foreign-owned security company alone. Thus, the presence and visibility 
of the police and intelligence operatives guarding the G4S warehouse together 
with private security guards should be seen in the context of high-risk factor, not 
trusting the foreign-owned company. Accordingly, Botswana needs partnerships 
based on trust, and not on mistrust, as it is now the case.
Botswana enjoys more public-public security partnerships in which the army aids 
and cooperate with the police or with wildlife rangers. Joint (police-army) night 
patrols are common, as are joint (wildlife rangers-army) anti-poaching patrols. 
Presidential directives have been issued to make these possible. In the case of 
diamonds, joint (mine security-armed police) operations are the order of the day. 
In contrast, banks and other businesses are legally required by law to inform 
the police and intelligence so that they provide surveillance over cash-in-transit 
operations by private security companies. This cannot be regarded as a partnership 
because it does not involve the security companies themselves that may not 
even know that they are under surveillance. However, in other instances, private 
security companies themselves contact the police and ask for an escort – in this 
case, informal partnerships are in place. In addition, while police commissioners 
are known to address meetings of the private security association, the leaders of 
the latter are not known to have ever addressed police meetings and workshops. 
Botswana lacks legislation formalising the interaction between public and private 
security sectors. In addition, Botswana lacks a regulatory authority that could 
help grow the private security industry to impose some discipline, to introduce 
standards and to protect the industry and clients from fly-by-night companies 
that swindle the economy. On the one hand, the absence of legislation means that 
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public-private security partnerships can only be informal. On the other hand, the 
absence of a regulatory authority means that there are norms and standards, and 
that everything is permissible, thus placing clients and their property in danger. 
Botswana has even allowed the entry of foreign private security operators without 
the necessary legal framework to control their operations.
It has also been noted that the growth of the private sector and the insufficiency of 
public security to protect it triggered the unplanned growth of the private security 
industry. While there is still instability within the private security industry (with 
numerous companies collapsing and new ones registering all the time, and with 
poor training and lack of standardisation), the sector is growing fast, diversifying 
its services and complementing the inefficiencies of the public security sector. 
This has reached a point where public-private security partnerships become a 
requirement. However, the report showed that such partnerships were not yet 
in place, limiting the benefits that could accrue from it.
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NAMIBIA
John Nakutta, Nicole Duminy and Brian Simamuna
1. Introduction
This report forms part of a four-country comparative study commissioned by 
the Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority of South Africa (PSIRA). The 
overall objective of the research was to explore crime prevention partnerships 
between the state and the private security sector in Namibia with a view of 
influencing policy processes aimed at improving crime prevention initiatives. This 
report, while not intended to be exhaustive or definitive, is meant to contribute 
to a better understanding and quantification of the issues that are relevant to 
the establishment of crime prevention partnerships between the State and the 
private security sector in Namibia. 
The findings of this report are based on extensive literature research and key 
informant interviews conducted with key industry participants in both the public 
and private sectors. For this, the questionnaire – prepared by PSIRA – was 
used and adapted to the Namibian context. In addition, a few spot surveys 
were also conducted with security guards on duty to gain an impression of their 
actual working conditions. The draft report was presented to the key industry 
participants in both the public and private sectors. This was done with the view of 
detecting omissions and inaccuracies with the view of improving the final product. 
Generally, there were no major limitations experienced during the compilation of 
this report. The major limitations related to time and financial constraints, thus 
resulting in no field work been conducted to, for instance, identify personnel in 
private security companies who were demobilised after the end of the liberation 
war. In addition, this report does not and cannot analyse each and every issue 
in detail. Thus, many of the issues considered herein appear ripe for further and 
more detailed study and analysis.
1.1. Population trends and demographics
Namibia covers an area of 825 234 square kilometres. It is bordered by Angola 
and Zambia on the north-east, Botswana on the east, South Africa on the south, 
and the Atlantic Ocean on the west. After Mongolia, Namibia is reportedly the 
least-densely populated country in the world. The country has been administered 
in 13 regions since 1993. A 14th region was added in 2013 on the recommendation 
of the Delimitation Commission. The latest population size as recorded in the 2011 
National Housing and Population Census shows that Namibia has a population 
of 2 113 077 people. 
The 2011 Census also shows that most of the population live in rural areas (1 209 
643) compared to 903 434 living in urban areas (Namibia Statistics Agency, 2012). 
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The census further reveals that the country is experiencing high rates of rural-
urban migration. In this regard, it shows that the urban population grew by 49.7% 
between the two preceding censuses (2001 and 2011), while the rural population 
decreased by 1.4% during the same period (Namibia Statistics Agency, 2012:26). 
Namibia reportedly has a relatively young population, in that close to 37% of the 
whole population is less than 15 years of age. Furthermore, the female population 
in Namibia continues to be higher than the male population (1 091 165 females 
versus 1 021 912 males), representing 51.5% of the total population compared to 
48.4% for males (Namibia Statistics Agency, 2012:29). 
The overall unemployment rate for Namibia, as measured by the broad unemployment 
definition, is 29.6% (Namibia Statistics Agency, 2013). Unemployment has a 
gender dimension. The latest Labour Force Survey for the country shows that the 
overall unemployment rate for females in all age groups under 60 years is higher 
than for males in the same age group. Overall, 33.1% of females are unemployed 
compared to 25.8% males (Namibia Statistics Agency, 2013:75). Unemployment 
in Namibia also mostly affects the youth. The overall unemployment rate for youth 
aged 15 to 34 is 41.7% (Namibia Statistics Agency, 2013:81). 
1.2. Historical background
Historically, it is said that about 2 000 years ago, Namibia was inhabited by the ‘San’ 
people. As the years went by, Europeans started exploring the continent of Africa. 
It was German explorers who were particularly attracted to the territory of Namibia 
and accordingly placed it under its control mainly for exploitation of its resources. 
When Germany lost the First World War, it also lost all its colonies. Thereafter, the 
League of Nations was tasked with the allocation of how these territories were to 
be governed. In 1920, the League of Nations awarded the territory of Namibia/
South West Africa to South Africa with the aim that the latter would prepare the 
territory for independence. Instead, South Africa governed the territory (Namibia/
South West Africa) as if it were a fifth province and imposed upon the territory its 
racist and apartheid policies. After a century of colonialism and a long period of 
armed struggle, Namibia attained independence on 21 March 1990. 
Namibia is said to be one of the richest countries in Africa. The country, however, 
as noted by the then Central Bureau of Statistics in 2008, is also one of the most 
unequal societies in the world. For instance, in Namibia, the wealthiest 10% in 
the country have consumption levels that are 50 times higher than the poorest 
10%. Also, the Gini coefficient, which is the standard summary measure for 
inequality, is 0.63 and with a great variation according to various background 
variables such as gender, age, main source of income and administrative region. 
Additionally, a comparison with countries for which comparable data is available 
reportedly suggests that the level of inequality in Namibia is among the highest 
in the world (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2008).
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1.3. Current context
Since independence, Namibia has enjoyed political stability and steady economic 
growth, achieving the status of a middle-income country. While the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) has increased considerably, the poorest sectors of Namibian society 
have not benefited in the way they should. For instance, inequality and poverty 
levels are still at unacceptably high levels. For example – as already stated – 
in Namibia, the wealthiest 10% of the population reportedly has consumption 
levels that are 50 times higher than that of the poorest 10% of the population 
(UN Human Rights Council, 2012). High unemployment is an important feature 
of poverty in the country (UN Human Rights Council, 2012). 
After more than a century of colonial domination and three decades of liberation 
struggle, the Namibian Constituent Assembly, on 9 February 1990, adopted the 
Namibian Constitution. The Namibian Constitution has been hailed as one of the 
best in the world. The Constitution is based on a set of constitutional principles 
adopted in 1982 by the UN Security Council after consultations with the parties 
involved in the Namibian conflict. The 1982 constitutional principles were agreed 
on by the Western Contact Group consisting of five states, namely, the United 
States, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, and West Germany and served as a 
set of principles for the Constituent Assembly and for the future constitution of an 
independent Namibia. The Constitution adheres to the principle of separation of 
powers in terms of which state power is distributed to the Executive, comprising of 
the President and his/her Cabinet, the Legislature and the Judiciary. The country has 
adopted a combination of unitary frameworks for the organisation of the State and 
a hybrid of both presidential and parliamentary systems of government (Kaapama, 
Blaauw, Zaaruka & Kaakunga, 2007). Hitherto, the country’s political system is in 
a stable state and provides an enabling environment for democratic consolidation 
(Kaapama et al., 2007:30). Tötemeyer (2013) argues that although Namibia is 
a one-party dominated state, the Constitution secures multi-party democracy. 
Indeed, although Namibia is marked by dominant one-party governance, the 
ruling party, i.e. the SWAPO Party, to its credit, does not reject democracy as a 
principle and as a process (Tötemeyer, 2013:66). 
1.4. The Namibian Constitution and human rights
Namibia’s Constitution brought about a shift from an era of parliamentary sovereignty 
to constitutional supremacy. In this regard, Article 1(6) of the Constitution proclaims 
that the Constitution shall be the supreme law of the land. The Namibian Constitution, 
as correctly observed by Kaapama et al. (2007:30), is committed to the preservation 
of fundamental human rights and freedoms. In Article 5, the opening article of 
the Namibian Bill of Rights (Chapter 3), it stipulates that the Bill of Rights applies 
vertically and horizontally and thus constrains both public as well as private actions. 
It accordingly imposes a positive duty on the legislature, the executive, the judiciary 
and other organs of state as well as juristic and natural persons, where applicable 
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to them, to respect and protect all the fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed 
in the Constitution. Some of the fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed and 
protected in the Bill of Rights include the right to life, human dignity, equality and 
non-discrimination, fair trial guarantees, administrative justice, and various freedoms 
such as academic, freedoms of association, free speech and expression, the media, 
the press, to mention but a few. The rights and freedoms guaranteed in Chapter 3 
of the Bill of Rights, like in all constitutional democracies, may be limited and even 
suspended provided certain requirements are complied with. 
In this regard, Article 22 of the Constitution provides for the limitation/restriction 
of the rights and freedoms enshrined in Chapter 3. Article 24 requires that any 
envisaged limitations be based on a law of general application, may not negate 
the essential content of the right in question, and may not be aimed at a specific 
person(s). Further, the Constitution in Article 24, as is universally accepted, 
makes provision for the suspension/derogation of rights and freedoms in defined 
circumstances such as when the country is in a state of national defence or when 
a state of emergency has been declared. Any suspension/derogation of rights is 
subject to detailed procedural guarantees and a maximum time period of 30 days. 
Article 24 also lists the rights and freedoms which may under no circumstances 
be suspended. These include the right to life; human dignity; equality and non-
discrimination; fair trial; administrative justice; freedom of speech and expression; 
and freedom of thought, conscience and belief, which include academic freedom 
and freedom of association. Similarly, no person or group of persons may ever 
be denied access to a legal practitioner or a court of law irrespective of the 
circumstances the country is facing (The Namibian Constitution, Article 24).
The Constitution also, as is required by international human rights law, provides 
for the right to an effective remedy where someone’s rights or freedoms have been 
threatened or actually violated. In this regard, Article 25 endows aggrieved persons 
with the right to approach the courts for redress. In guarding this constitutional 
injunction, the superior courts in the country have shown their resolve to guard 
these constitutional imperatives. The courts have on different occasions nullified 
legislative provisions, executive and administrative conduct, common law provisions 
and customary law and conduct found to be in conflict with the Constitution. People 
may also file complaints with the Ombudsman. In Namibia, the Ombudsman 
performs both the functions of a traditional Ombudsman, i.e. investigating and 
dealing with complaints of maladministration and those ordinarily assigned to a 
human rights commission. Worryingly, only a small percentage of people regard 
courts and the Office of the Ombudsman as protectors of human rights in the 
country. This was the finding of a Baseline Survey on Human Rights in Namibia 
which was recently published by the Office of the Ombudsman towards the end 
of 2013 (Office of the Ombudsman, n.d.). 
The right to peace and security is not specifically guaranteed in the Namibian 
Bill of Rights, Chapter 3. Namibia, however, is a state party to several human 
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rights instruments which guarantee the right to security of a person. The right to 
security of a person is closely associated with the right to liberty. However, it is 
also relevant in a variety of other contexts in which the State is required to keep 
its citizens safe, ranging from the threat of terrorism to domestic violence. The 
right to peace and security, though not expressly provided for in the Constitution, 
is guaranteed in Namibia through the operation of Article 144. This article dictates 
that all international agreements that are binding on Namibia shall automatically 
form part of the laws of the land. 
1.5. The public security sector in Namibia
The state institutions responsible for safety and security in Namibia include the 
Ministry of Defence (which incorporates the army, air force, and the navy), the 
Namibian Police (Nampol), the Namibia Central Intelligence Service (NCIS), and 
the Security Commission. The paragraphs that follow will give a brief outline of 
the mandate of each of these role players in the context of safety and security. 
The Namibian Defence Force (NDF) consists of (i) the Namibian Army, (ii) the 
Namibian Air Force, and (iii) the Namibian Navy. Section 5 of the Defence Act 
states that the entire NDF or any of its wings or a member of it may at any time 
be employed on service in defence of the country. Such services further extend 
to the prevention or suppression of terrorism; the prevention or suppression 
of internal disorder in Namibia; the preservation of life, health or property; the 
maintenance of essential services; or any other service as may be determined 
by the President as Commander-in-Chief. This section further empowers the NDF 
or any of its wings or a member of the Force to be used to perform any of the 
police functions provided for in the Police Act. These include the preservation 
of the internal security of Namibia, the maintenance of law and order, and the 
prevention of crime. The NDF has an estimated staff complement of 20 000 
members. Nonetheless, attempts to get official documentation with regard to 
the foregoing figure proved futile.
The Namibian Army comprises of an estimated 10 000 staff members (out of the total 
for the NDF). The Defence Policy commits the army to strive for perfection, to remain 
a disciplined, accountable, professional, and a volunteer force. It further commits 
the army to promote a good public image and assist the communities in which it 
is based. In terms of the policy, when called upon to assist the Namibian Police in 
the maintenance of law and order, the army shall do so in the public interest. This 
shall in no way be construed as assuming policing duties (Ministry of Defence, n.d.).
The primary mission of the Air Force is to protect Namibia’s airspace and to protect 
the country’s cultural and national economic assets and installations (Ministry of 
Defence, n.d.:84). Its peacetime role includes, among others, search and rescue 
operations, support to civil power and communities by providing air assets and 
personnel in times of emergencies (Ministry of Defence, n.d.:87).
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The Navy’s wartime role, as assigned to it in terms of the Defence Policy, include 
surveillance and security of the country’s entire coastline, naval combat engagements, 
search and rescue operations, casualty evacuation, naval blockades and landward 
combat operations by maritime airborne and seaborne forces (Ministry of Defence, 
n.d.:90). During peacetime, the Navy has the role of augmenting civil offshore patrol 
forces. Specific tasks in this regard include assisting civil authorities to combat illegal 
immigration, smuggling (arms and drugs) and threats to the environment, as well 
as assisting the Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources with the enforcement 
of the fisheries protection regime (Ministry of Defence, n.d.:91). 
Article 115 of the Namibian Constitution provides for the establishment of a Namibian 
Police Force by way of an Act of Parliament. Subsequent to this constitutional 
injunction, the Police Act, No. 19 of 1990 was enacted. This Act, amongst others, 
provides for the establishment, organisation, administration, and powers and 
duties of the Namibian Police Force (NamPol). The prime constitutional mandate 
of NamPol is to secure the internal security of the country and to maintain law 
and order. Section 13 of the Police Act expands on this mandate by directing 
that the powers of NamPol shall be (i) the preservation of the internal security 
of Namibia, (ii) the maintenance of law and order, (iii) the investigation of any 
offence or alleged offence, and (iv) the prevention of crime.
The Namibia Central Intelligence Service (NCIS) was established in terms of the 
Namibia Central Intelligence Act, No. 10 of 1997. The powers, duties and functions 
of the NCIS are outlined in Section 5(1) of the Act. It entails investigating, 
gathering, evaluating, correlating, interpreting and retaining intelligence-related 
information, whether inside or outside Namibia, for the purposes of:
• detecting and identifying any threat or potential threat to the security of 
Namibia;
• advising the President and the government of any threat or potential threat 
to the security of Namibia;
• assisting the Namibian Police Force by gathering intelligence to be used in 
the detection and prevention of serious offences; and
• taking steps to protect the security interests of Namibia, whether political, 
military or economic.
Article 114 of the Namibian Constitution provides for the establishment of the Security 
Commission. Article 114(1) of the Constitution empowers the Security Commission 
to recommend to the President the appointment of the Chief of the Defence Force, 
the Inspector-General of Police and the Commissioner of Prisons. Additionally, Article 
114(2) of the Constitution states that the Security Commission shall consist of the 
Chairperson of the Public Service Commission, the Chief of the Defence Force, the 
Inspector-General of Police, the Commissioner of Prisons and two members of the 
National Assembly appointed by the President on the recommendation of the National 
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Assembly. Additional functions of the Commission, as outlined in the section of the 
Security Commission Act, No. 18 of 2001 include advising the President on matters 
relating to defence or internal security when requested to do so by the President 
or on its own accord. The Commission is also empowered in terms of Section 5 of 
the Act to alert and recommend to the Minister of Home Affairs the presence in 
Namibia of a named person regarded as inimical to peace and the public interest or 
that a named person, by his or her conduct, is a danger or is likely to be a danger 
to peace and good order in Namibia.
From the foregoing, it is thus clear that the Namibian government is responsible 
for ensuring peace and security in the country. 
1.6. Staff complement of the army and police 
The estimated staff complement of the Namibian Defence Force (NDF) is 20 000. 
About 10 000 of this figure is assigned to the army, another estimated 3 000 to 
the Navy, and the remainder to the Air Force. Unfortunately, no official document 
was made available to the researchers to verify these figures. The NDF, as noted 
by Graham Hopwood – the Director of the Institute for Public Policy Research 
(IPPR) – is run on a professional basis and operates with neutrality when it comes 
to political or tribal issues (Poolman, 2014). Hopwood further opines that the NDF 
has by and large avoided political controversy and worked to serve the country’s 
interest rather than any particular political or ethnic group (Poolman, 2014). 
In an interview with Deputy Commissioner Edwin Kanguatjivi, the police spokesperson, 
on 24 January 2014 in Kanguatjivi, the total estimated staff complement of the 
public police (NamPol) stands at 14 094 staff members. Remarkably, no official 
document could be obtained to verify this figure. This figure is divided among the 
Special Field Force (SFF), Very Very Important Persons (VVIP) and Very Important 
Persons (VIP) Protection and the Special Reserve Force. About half of the officers 
belong to the SFF and are mainly responsible for conducting border patrols. A 
significant number of the remaining members, according to Kanguatjivi, are 
designated to do VVIP and VIP protection, whereas others serve in the Special 
Reserve Force to deal with riots and special situations, respectively. This leaves 
an active police force of about 5 000 staff members. That said, private security 
officers outnumber Namibian police officers by over three-fold at a ratio of 3:1.
1.7. International treaty obligations on peace and security 
Namibia signed, ratified and/or acceded to the human rights and other international 
instruments relating to peace and security highlighted in Table 1. Table 1 shows 
some of the main instruments relating to peace and security the country is bound to.
102
Table 1: Main instruments related to peace and security
Name of Instrument Signed Accede Ratify Date
United Nation Level




2. The four 1949 Geneva Conventions √ √ 22.08.1991
Continental Level
1. Constitutive Act of the AU √ √ 11.07.2000
2. Protocol relating to the 
establishment of the Peace and 
Security Council of the AU
3. Common African Defence and 
Security Policy (CADSP)
SADC Level
1. SADC Treaty Articles √ √ 17.08.1992
2. The Protocol on Politics, Defence 
and Security Co-operation 
2. Namibia security threats 
Namibia is ranked among the few countries in the world that have consistently 
enjoyed peace and stability with virtually no civil strife resulting from political turmoil 
(The Namibia Sun, 2013). The country has been ranked third in sub-Saharan Africa 
and 46th in the world in terms of the high level of peace prevailing in the country 
by the 2013 Global Peace Index (GPI) Report (Institute for Economics and Peace, 
2013). Previously, the nation experienced one visible incident that threatened 
the peace and stability enjoyed in the country in the form of an armed rebellion. 
2.1. The Caprivi secessionist issue
In the early hours of 2 August 1999, the peace and stability of Namibia was briefly 
disturbed when members of a secessionist group, the Caprivi Liberation Front 
(CLF), attacked government installations in the regional capital of Katima Mulilo in 
the then Caprivi region (now Zambezi), in an attempt to secede this region from 
the rest of Namibia. The group attacked the police headquarters, the local offices 
of the Namibian Broadcasting Corporation, an army base, and an immigration 
post. The Namibian security forces acted swiftly and rather zealously to quell 
the uprising. Officially, nine lives were lost, dozens were reportedly missing, and 
hundreds were jailed and tortured (Harring & Odendaal, 2012). One hundred 
and twenty people were subsequently arrested for their alleged involvement 
in this armed rebellion to face charges ranging from high treason, murder and 
attempted murder. 
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The Caprivi trial, as it is commonly referred to, has become known as one of, if 
not the longest trial, in an independent Namibia. Several of the accused have 
since died in detention. On 11 February 2013, a total of 43 of the accused were 
acquitted by the High Court when it ruled as inadmissible the admissions and 
confessions allegedly made by the accused persons during their arrests and 
arraignment. The rest of the accused still await, after more than 13 years, the 
outcome of this highly publicised treason trial. 
Some people in the Zambezi region, as pointed out by Tötemeyer (2013), still 
pursue, although more hidden than openly, the succession of this region from 
the rest of Namibia. This might not be a hyperbole considering the renewed 
endeavours by Lozi-speaking Namibians to secede the Zambezi region from the 
rest of Namibia, which were launched in 2012. In their protest march, which at the 
end was not authorised by the Namibian Police, they openly called and demanded 
the succession of the Zambezi region from the rest of Namibia. Moreover, the 
exiled leader of the CLF – the former Namibian politician Mishake Muyongo – in 
a telephonic interview in 2011 reiterated his resolve to “leave no stone unturned 
to ensure that the Caprivi gain its independence” (Poolman, 2011).  
Until now, the Government of Namibia (GRN) has adopted a rather hard-line 
approach in dealing with the Caprivi secessionist issue. For instance, on 1 
September 2006, the government announced that it considered the United 
Democratic Party (UDP) – the political party advocating for the succession of the 
Zambezi region from the rest of Namibia – as an illegal organisation. In terms 
of the announcement, the GRN demanded that the UDP abandons, rejects or 
denounces its secessionist agenda. The announcement further revealed the 
GRN’s intention to rigorously enforce national laws governing the prevention of 
illegal gatherings to ostensibly thwart the UDP’s intentions of undermining the 
constitutional order (Weidlich, 2006). The Dinyando announcement (named after 
the then Deputy Minister for Information and Broadcasting, Raphael Dinyando 
who made the announcement), however, stopped short of banning the UDP 
altogether. There is a strong argument to be made that the hard-line approach 
adopted by the GRN in dealing with the Zambezi/Caprivi secessionist issue falls 
foul to human rights principles and standards. It is respectfully submitted that 
advocating for the succession of the Zambezi region from the rest of Namibia 
cannot be equated with treason. Undoubtedly, the open and democratic society 
envisaged by the Namibian Constitution makes allowance for the advocating of all 
kinds of ideas, no matter how controversial, provided it is done through peaceful 
means. It is submitted that the suppression of a democratic debate surrounding 
the Zambezi/Caprivi secessionist issue only exacerbates intra-state tension and 
undermines the long-term peace, security and stability in that part of the country. 
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2.2. Unemployment, poverty and inequality 
How sustainable are the current levels of peace and stability enjoyed in the country? 
Such an interrogation is imperative given the disproportionate income distribution, 
the grinding poverty, and the depressing high unemployment rate plaguing the 
country. It is clear that risks can arise where there is a public perception that 
the benefits of national growth are not being shared equitably. It is worth noting 
that the 1994 Human Development Report of the UN Development Programme 
advocates for the concept of security to be shifted from the idea of a militaristic 
safeguarding of state borders to the reduction of insecurity in people’s daily lives 
(human insecurity) and from security through armaments to security through 
sustainable human development (United Nations Development Programme, 1994). 
Issues such as economic security, food security, health security, environmental 
security, personal security, community security and political security should 
as such be seen as threats to human security (United Nations Development 
Programme, 1994). 
The 2013 Human Development Report similarly warns that rising inequality, 
especially between groups, can lead to social instability. This report further 
warns against the potential of social unrest resulting from the persistence of 
inequality and the lack of intergenerational social mobility (United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), 2013). The CADSP similarly advocates for a new, 
multidimensional emphasis on human security which should be based on political 
values and social and economic imperatives. Such a multidimensional notion of 
security should necessarily embrace issues such as human rights; the right to 
participate fully in the process of governance; the right to equal development 
as well as the right to have access to resources and the basic necessities of life; 
the right to protection against poverty; the right to conducive education and 
health conditions; the right to protection against marginalisation on the basis of 
gender; protection against natural disasters; and ecological and environmental 
degradation (CADSP, Article 6).
In view of the aforementioned, it is fair to state that the current and growing 
unemployment, poverty and inequality in the country constitute a ticking time 
bomb that could present an unimaginable security threat for the country. 
Anecdotal evidence seems to suggest that for some of the unemployed, excluded, 
marginalised and poverty-stricken members in the country, violence and crime 
have become the only means through which they can make a living. Poverty 
and inequitable distribution of natural resources, as pointed out in the CADSP, 
constitutes an internal security threat which undermines the maintenance and 
promotion of peace, security and stability in a given country (CADSP, Article 6, 
8(ii)(k)). Time has come to view the triple challenge of unemployment, poverty 
and inequality in the country not only as a socio-economic problem but also as 
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a threat to the peace, stability and security of the country. This is so because 
Namibia, at the risk of being a sounding alarmist, faces a real security threat 
and challenge now and in the near future if nothing is done to address the huge 
unemployment, poverty and inequality facing the country. It is beyond dispute 
that the growing unemployment, poverty, and inequality in the country are the 
ingredients of crimes, social chaos, conflicts and instabilities. 
3. Legislative and policy regulatory framework of the 
private security industry in Namibia
Responsibility for private security companies in Namibia falls under the Minister 
of Safety and Security. The industry is governed by the Security Enterprises and 
Security Officers Act, No. 19 of 1998. The Act mandates the Minister, in consultation 
with the Security Enterprises and Security Officer Regulation Board (SESORB), to 
make Regulations relating to various aspects pertaining to the industry. However, 
the Regulations are still in draft form and thus of no legal force. Hence, it is a 
common complaint among representatives of the sector that it is currently way 
too easy to start a private security company. There is general concern that this 
lack of regulation has resulted in a vast number of unprofessional companies that 
provide poor services and ruthlessly exploit their guards.
3.1. Legislative framework 
The Namibian private security industry, as stated above, is currently governed by 
the Security Enterprises and Security Officers Act. This Act was amended in 2002 
by the Security Enterprises and Security Officers Amendment Act, No. 21 of 2002. 
The Act is complemented by the Regulations and the Code of Conduct. Both the 
Regulations and the Code of Conduct are still in draft form but are discussed here to 
provide the necessary context and a holistic understanding of the issues discussed. 
3.1.1. Definition of security
The Act strikingly does not define what constitutes a ‘security service’. In this 
regard, it is noteworthy that the equivalent of the Namibian Act in South Africa, 
the Private Security Industry Regulation Act, No. 56 of 2001, elaborately defines 
the concept of ‘security service’. A ‘security service’ in that country’s Act, for 
instance, include protecting or safeguarding a person or property in any manner; 
performing the functions of a private investigator; providing security training or 
instruction to a security service provider or prospective security service provider; 
and performing the functions of a locksmith (PSIRA, 2001).
3.1.2. A security enterprise 
The Act does not comprehensively define ‘security enterprise’. It stipulates that to 
operate as a security enterprise, a company must apply to SESORB for registration. 
Such an application must be accompanied by a clear set of fingerprints taken by 
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the police and a non-refundable fee of N$850. For the enterprise to be registered, 
the applicant (in the case of a natural person) – every director (in the case of a 
company) and each member (in the case of a close corporation or partnership) 
– must also be registered as a security officer. 
The draft Regulations further required that the application for registration be 
accompanied by an original or certified copy of a police clearance certificate 
regarding the criminal record status of each applicant, director or member, 
whichever is applicable (Draft Regulation 5(b), 2009). Applicants found guilty 
10 years prior to or anytime after the commencement of the Act of an offence 
specified in the Schedule to the Act are precluded from registering. Such offences 
– 27 in total – include high treason, rape, indecent assault, murder, culpable 
homicide, child stealing, malicious injury to property, public violence, theft of 
game or livestock (including illegal hunting), robbery, and assault with intent to 
do grievous bodily harm. 
A security company may be deregistered by SESORB for a number of reasons. 
These could include being found guilty of a Scheduled offence as listed in the Act, 
a misconduct committed under the Code of Conduct, failure to pay any outstanding 
fee(s) owed to SESORB, or failure to pay the prescribed annual amount to the 
Fidelity Guarantee Fund established for the private security sector.  
Both the Act and the draft Regulations create a number of statutory offences 
which may be committed by a security enterprise/company. These include failure 
to deliver a surrendered certificate of a deregistered security officer to SESORB 
within seven day of such a surrender; failure to display its registration certificate 
in a conspicuous place in each of the premises used by such a company; trading 
under a name other than the one registered with SESORB; and failure to issue 
a security guard with a durable identification card. 
3.1.3. Security officers
The Act also does not provide a definition of a security officer. Section 16 of the Act 
governs the application for registration as a security officer. Such an application 
must be made to SESORB. The application must be accompanied by a clear set 
of fingerprints taken by the police and a non-refundable fee of N$120. 
A prospective security officer must submit, together with his/her application, 
an original or certified copy of a police clearance certificate of his/her criminal 
record status (Draft Regulation 5(b), 2009). Persons found guilty 10 years prior 
to or any time after the commencement of the Act of an offence specified in the 
Schedule to the Act are precluded from becoming security officers.
Where a security officer provided SESORB with materially false information in his/her 
application for registration; is found guilty of an offence specified in the Schedule 
of the Act; is found guilty of a misconduct committed under the Code of Conduct; 
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or is declared mentally disabled by the High Court, that security officer may be 
deregistered by the Board/SESORB. A security officer who has been deregistered 
must surrender his/her registration certificate within seven days after deregistration 
either to his employer or SESORB if he/she is not employed by a security company. 
Both the Act and the draft Regulations create a number of statutory offences which 
may be committed by security officers. These include failure to surrender his/her 
certificate of registration to his/her employer or SESORB within seven days of his/
her deregistration; failure to surrender his/her identification card upon ceasing to be 
employed by a security company; changes, falsifies information on, defaces, destroys 
or fails to take reasonable steps to safeguard his/her certificate of identification.
3.2. The Security Enterprises and Security Officer Regulation 
Board (SESORB)
The Act, as stated in previous paragraphs, provides for the establishment of a 
regulatory body called the Security Enterprises and Security Officer Regulation Board 
(SESORB). The objects of the SESORB are to essentially exercise control over security 
enterprises and the occupation of security officers by way of maintaining, promoting 
and protecting the status of security companies and security officers, respectively. 
SESORB’s powers include the following: maintaining standards and regulating practices 
in connection with the occupation of a security officer; informing persons pursuing or 
intending to pursue such occupation about those standards and regulatory practices; 
gathering information relevant for the occupation of security officers; and advising 
the Minister of Home Affairs on any matter relating to security officers. 
SESORB is also responsible for the registration of security companies and security 
guards as already mentioned. It is also responsible for the enforcement of the 
Code of Conduct in the industry. It is further charged with the responsibility 
of keeping a register detailing names and particulars of all registered security 
enterprises and security officers. 
The Amendment Act, No. 21 of 2002, provides for the reconstitution of SESORB. 
It restricts the power of the Minister of Home Affairs to make the Regulations 
for the industry. It is of particular interest that while the Act makes reference to 
the Minister of Home Affairs, in reality, the draft regulations were made by the 
Minister responsible for policing. This raises various issues relating to administrative 
legality. For instance, the Minister responsible for policing is not the Minister of 
Home Affairs as per the ministerial portfolios. The police department reports under 
the Minister of Safety and Security. Thus, while the author (of the Regulations) 
is consistent with the daily realities, the Minister responsible for policing is not 
necessarily the designated person to have made the Regulations if regard is to 
be had to the provisions of the principal Act. Needless to say, this matter alone 
may give rise to legal battles in future. It is thus advisable that this matter be 
addressed before the actual promulgation of the draft Regulations. 
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In terms of reconstituting the SESORB, the Act provides that the SESORB shall 
consist of the following: 
• one staff member of the Ministry of Home Affairs (who shall be the 
chairperson); 
• one member of the Namibian Police Force (NamPol), designated by the 
Inspector-General of Police (who shall be the vice-chairperson); 
• one staff member of the Ministry of Labour, designated by the Attorney-
General; 
• one staff member of the Office of the Attorney-General, designated by the 
Attorney-General; and 
• six security officers selected by the Minister from a list submitted to him/
her (three shall be representatives of employers and three representatives 
of employees). 
SESORB, as can be seen from the above, is composed of 10 board members. It 
is supposed to meet at least twice a year. A special meeting is convened at the 
request of the Minister or of at least one-third of the SESORB members. It appears 
that the current legislative framework does make room for the full administration 
of the regulatory authority/SESORB. This begs a number of questions. For instance, 
are the different committees that SESORB is empowered to appoint/establish 
from time to time for the purpose of performing any of its functions supposed 
to fill this void (in respect of daily administration)? Also, what are potentially 
serious implications of limited regulation and accountability of an industry which 
continues to grow in both size and importance, and which is likely to be here to 
stay? Is a 10-member board, without any support staff, well positioned to play the 
kind of role and function as envisaged by the principal Act, the draft Regulations 
and draft Code of Conduct? Given these challenges, would it not make sense to 
emulate the South African model in this regard? In that country, the equivalent 
of SESORB is a Council, which, just like SESORB, serves on a part-time basis. 
However, the day-to-day activities of the Authority are overseen and implemented 
by a full-time administrative structure.
4. The use of firearms and uniforms by the private 
security industry 
4.1. Use of firearms by private security officers 
The current legislative framework allows for the use of firearms within the public 
security industry (PSI). There are currently no specific rules governing the use and 
specifications of firearms used by private security companies due to the lack of 
regulations in the industry. The Arms and Ammunition Act, No. 7 of 1996 thus serves 
as the general guide in this regard. This Act, among others, regulates the control over 
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the possession of arms and ammunition. Section 2 of this Act expressly prohibits any 
person from having a firearm in his or her possession unless he/she is licensed to 
possess such a firearm. However, there seems to be a clear vacuum in the current 
legal provisions as they pertain to the use of firearms by security officers. 
Currently, the licence of the PSC to buy and possess firearms is by default passed on to 
the security officer in the employment of that company. Thus, in terms of the current 
situation, such a security officer does not need to have a licence to possess and or use 
a firearm while on duty. Over and above that, there is currently no requirement that 
security officers must be subjected to a fitness test to determine whether they are fit 
to handle a firearm or not. There is currently also no requirement for a security officer 
to undergo some kind of training programme for the use and handling of firearms, as is 
the case in South Africa. Indeed, a random informal survey conducted among security 
officers, for this study, found that the majority of security officers spoken to received 
no or very little training on the use and handling of firearms. Currently, only a few 
private security companies (PSCs) and mainly the established ones provide firearm 
training to security officers. It is important to stress, though, that such initiatives are 
done voluntarily and in the absence of a statutory duty to do so.  
Once again, due to the absence of rules and regulations, PSCs may technically 
use whatever type of weapons they want to use except for semi-automatic to 
automatic rifles. Permission must be obtained from the police to use such types 
of rifles. Otherwise, firearms such as shotguns and small calibre AK-47s, which 
are single-shot firearms, may be used. In terms of this practice, PSCs only need 
to register themselves with the police as a security officer whereby they are 
allowed to buy any firearm they want. In this regard, pistols and shotguns may 
be used in self-defence. Furthermore, the use of concealed weapons applies to 
all persons in private clothes. Those in uniforms, including security officers, must 
place a weapon where it is easily identifiable. 
Furthermore, private security officers are only allowed access to firearms when on 
duty. While on duty, they normally use pistols, shotguns, semi-automatic weapons 
and, at times, AK-47s. All weapons, however, are to be stored on the employer’s 
premises. The law makes it mandatory that such weapons be stored in a safe. 
4.2. Registration of company weapons
In terms of the law, no firearm should be possessed without a licence. Part II and 
Regulation 2 of the Arms and Ammunition Act, No. 7 of 1996 are authoritative 
on this issue. As a requirement, there has to be, inter alia, documentary proof 
that the applicant carries on a business of rendering security services attached 
to an application for a licence.
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4.3. System in place for controlling the use of firearms by 
employees 
In relation to state-owned security entities, the police manual actually regulates 
the use of firearms (Operation Manual, Chapter 2, use of firearms). According 
to Abraham Kanime, Chief of City Police, in an interview on 22 December 2013 
in Windhoek, the police manual regulates the keeping of firearms. Police officers 
are 24 hours on duty, but they have to follow procedure when taking firearms. 
In terms of the internal rules regulating the use of firearms at City Police, the 
following procedure has to be adhered to:
• Make an application to the head of the police force for record purposes. 
The head may deny an officer access to the firearms based on disciplinary 
issues. 
• Such an officer should have a safe at his residential premises so that they 
can store the weapon when it is not on their body. 
The Arms and Ammunition Act, specifically Part II, specifically requires that all 
employees using firearms be registered in terms of the law. In the case of private 
security companies, there are no specific legal requirements. As a result, it is up 
to individual PSCs to come up with their individual controlling measures. In the 
absence of governing regulations, private security companies devised their own 
controlling system in this regard.
4.4. Criminality in the private security industry
From newspaper articles, it is evident that employees of private security firms 
are not immune from criminal activities. For instance, a Namibian newspaper 
reported that a security guard, Junias Uleko (31), was jailed for stealing sweets 
(Anon., 2013). Uleko admitted that he stole goods with a total value of N$1 388 
over a period of time while he was employed as a security guard at a service 
station shop. Magistrates sentenced him to 15 months imprisonment, of which 
five months were suspended for a period of five years on condition that Uuleko 
is not convicted of theft during the period of suspension. 
In a separate incident, a former detective inspector, Michael Booysen, was jailed 
for four years after he pleaded guilty to assault charges and was sentenced in the 
Magistrates Court in Katutura. The former detective inspector was imprisoned for 
assaulting his ex-girlfriend after burning down her flat in 2004 and threatening 
her with a firearm.
Similarly, The Namibian reported on an incident involving a killing resulting from 
the use of a firearm. A security company owner was accused of killing a former 
employee (Kafirovi) in a shooting that took place in his office three years ago. 
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The accused (Andreas Karupu) pleaded not guilty on a charge of murder in the 
Windhoek Regional Court (Menges, 28 January 2008).
The latest incident involving criminal behaviour of security guards occurred as 
recently as April 2014. In this instance, police in Rundu arrested four men, including 
two security guards, in connection with a robbery involving N$1.8 million from 
the First National Bank of Namibia in the town on 28 April 2014. The security 
guards initially claimed they were robbed of the money, which was supposed to 
have been distributed for use in ATMs at a Rundu shopping mall. Two security 
guards were reportedly supposed to distribute the money to ATMs at the Galaxy 
Shopping Mall, but staged a robbery instead (Kangootui, 2014). 
4.5. Uniform, identification and insignia of security guards
The enabling Act, as noted earlier, makes it mandatory for security guards to 
wear a uniform, have insignia, and have proper identification while on duty. It 
can be stated that the requirements relating to uniform and insignia are generally 
complied with. Nevertheless, this study found that most security officers are not 
wearing any form of identification while on duty. Once again, only the established 
PSCs consistently adhere to this statutory requirement. Additionally, the existing 
legal provisions forbid PSCs from having the same or similar uniforms as the 
Namibian Police or Windhoek City Police. This provision is customarily not adhered 
to with the result that every PSC is doing as it sees fit. Consequently, many of 
them use uniform closely resembling that of state institutions such as the police 
or the defence force. 
5. The extent of the private security industry in 
Namibia
Private security, as a concept, means different things to different people (Gumedze, 
2007-08). To some, it means mercenaries, yet, to others, it means private 
military companies (PMCs) and PSCs. Others think of private security as including 
vigilantes and community police, while some do not see a difference between any 
of the above (Gumedze, 2007-08). This review focuses on the private security 
industry within Namibia’s borders in the context of such services being provided 
by non-state actors. It deliberately refrains from delving much into definitional 
‘gymnastics’ which are likely to blur the global objective of the study. With that 
said, the private security industry comprises those actors that provide security for 
people and property under contract and for profit (Richards & Smith, 2007). This 
focus does not in any way detract, disregard or devalue the security provided by 
informal communities. Rather, it has been informed by the mandate and scope 
of the assignment and the fact that, worldwide, this industry is experiencing a 
period of rapid growth (Richards & Smith, 2007). Available evidence suggests that 
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the trend towards increased security provision by non-state actors is prevalent 
in all regions of the world (Richards & Smith, 2007:5). This begs the question, 
how has this global trend played itself out within the Namibia context?
5.1. The size of private security industry in Namibia
The issue of what constitutes private security is not well defined in Namibian legislation. 
Closest to this is the definition of ‘security service’ in the Security Enterprises and 
Security Officers Act, No. 19 of 1998 (as amended). Security service, in terms of 
this Act, is defined as a service rendered by one person to another for reward in 
exchange for the protection or safeguard of people or property, or the provision 
of advisory services in this regard (Security Enterprises and Security Officers Act, 
Section 1). It is debatable whether this definition sufficiently caters for the broader 
view of the role of private security that prevails today. For instance, the American 
Society for Industrial Security (ASIS) International – the largest association of 
private security professionals in the United States – has defined private security as 
‘the non-governmental, private-sector practice of protecting people, property, and 
information, conducting investigations, and otherwise safeguarding an organization’s 
assets’ (Strom, Berzofsky, Shook-Sa, Barrick, Daye, Horstmann, and Kinsey, 2010). 
The private security industry in the country, as mentioned in the literature reviewed, 
is under-researched. As a result, very little is known about the scope and nature 
of the industry in Namibia. For example, trying to discern the number of security 
enterprises and security officers from official documents such as the 2012 Namibia 
Labour Force Survey Report is impossible. This is so because the private security 
industry is not listed as a stand-alone industry. Thus, depending on the source 
consulted, the size of this industry appears to vary. For instance, an investigation 
conducted by labour inspectors of the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare (MoL) 
indicates that there were 216 security companies in operation in the major towns 
throughout the country in 2012 (Ministry of Labour and Social, 2012). The report, 
regrettably, does not show which of these companies are branches or outlets of the 
major security companies operating in the country. The given number may thus be 
an overstatement of the number of PSCs currently operating in the country. This, 
however, does not detract from the concerns expressed by various key informants 
in the industry about the high number of ‘fly-by-night’ security companies operating 
in this sector, such as a study conducted by the Labour Resource and Research 
Institute (LaRRi), allegedly administered and managed from a ‘suitcase’. These 
‘fly-by-night’ security companies reportedly do not have physical office space, 
do not pay their workers regular salaries, and usually do not pay the prescribed 
minimum wages set for the industry (Shindondola-Mote & Indongo, 2012).   
The same muddle regarding the exact number of security guards employed by 
the PSI prevails in the country. For instance, the latest Labour Force Survey does 
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not give an indication of the number of persons employed as security guards in 
the country. Also, two key informants for this study gave different estimates for 
the number of security guards currently employed by the PSI. In this respect, 
in an interview with A.J. Kannemeyer, president of the Security Association of 
Namibia (SAN) on 4 February 2014, he estimated that there are around 14 000 
guards employed by the PSI in the country. On his part, Mr J.H. Visser, Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) of the Namibian Protection Services, in an interview on 
3 January 2014, estimated the number to be 17 000. He based his estimation 
on the 2009 wage negotiations conducted for the industry in that year. Moreover, 
already back in 2009, The Namibian newspaper carried an article which estimated 
that there were between 15 000 and 20 000 people employed in this industry 
(Shejavali, 2009). Be that as it may, this industry is generally regarded as one 
of the fastest-growing industries in Namibia. 
5.2. Major private security companies in Namibia 
It is worth reiterating that the exact number of private security companies in the 
country is highly disputed. There is a general consensus, though, that the number 
of these companies is continuously growing. The companies vary considerably in 
size, with the majority being small to medium-sized, owner-managed companies, 
employing less than 100 people. The majority of companies operate in only 
one locality or town, whereas the major companies have operations in several 
main towns as well as rural areas. The highest concentration of companies is in 
Windhoek. The sector is dominated by approximately five leading companies. The 
largest company in terms of number of employees is Namibian Protection Services, 
with about 2 000 employees and operations in 11 branches across the country. 
Other main players include G4S Security Company, with approximately 1 800 
employees; Rubicon Security Services, with approximately 1 254 employees; as 
well as Omega Security Services, Eagle Night Watch Security Services, among 
others. Most of these companies operate throughout the country, although some 
have chosen to restrict their operations to certain towns and regions.
Table 2, compiled by the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare in 2012, shows 
the location of private security companies throughout the country. 
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Table 2: Location of private security companies in Namibia






















































Source: Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare Directorate (2012) 
It is worth pointing out that key informants from the private security industry 
questioned the accuracy of the total number of security companies per town in 
Namibia as given by the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare. They noted that 
the survey considered branches of established private security companies as 
independent outfits. This, in their opinion, erroneously creates the impression that 
the country has an oversupply of private security companies. These sentiments 
seem warranted if one considers the Master List of Security Companies in Namibia, 
which was also published by the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare in 2012. 
According to the said Master List, 85 private security companies were registered 
with the Ministry in that year. However, the discrepancy between the total numbers 
of private security companies operating per town and those on the Master List 
may also be directly linked to the alleged high number of ‘fly-by-night’ companies 
operating within the industry. This situation, needless to say, calls for urgent 
redress through active leadership to rid the industry of unscrupulous operators. 
5.3. Industry associations 
There are currently two rival industry associations in the country, namely, the 
Security Association of Namibia (SAN) and the Namibia Federation of Security 
Employers (NFSE). SAN was established in 2006 and is an affiliate of Namibia 
Employers Federation (NEF). Most of the established and major PSCs are members 
of SAN. However, a significant number of companies reportedly do not belong 
to SAN because they either do not meet the organisation’s requirements for 
membership or because they opted not to associate with SAN. SAN currently has 
a membership of 21 companies. A.J. Kannemeyer, in a wide-ranging interview 
on 4 February 2014, emphasised the main aim of SAN as being to establish and 
maintain quality standards and good practices in the sector; it also strives to 
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provide a central organisation to liaise with government, police and other relevant 
institutions and agencies. SAN specifies technical and operational standards 
that all members must comply with. SAN membership is open to all bona fide 
PSCs. The association played a central role in the initiation and setting up of the 
now-defunct police-security forum (POLSEC), the drafting of regulations for the 
industry and strongly endorsed the prescribed minimum wage for the sector. 
SAN is reportedly viewed as being biased towards the interests of white employers. 
Black employers in this industry reportedly therefore established their own 
association called the Federation of Security Employers in Namibia (FSEN) to 
advance their interests (Shindondola-Mote & Indongo, 2012:5). According to 
the records of the Ministry of Labour, the FSEN was registered with the Ministry 
in 2008. To date, no annual return has been submitted by this federation, and 
it has since been deregistered by the Ministry (Ministry Labour, 2012). In fact, 
very little is known about this entity. No evidence whatsoever could be found on 
the role this federation plays in either the Security Labour Form or POLSEC. It is 
thus safe to assume that this federation plays no actual or significant role in the 
regulation of private security companies in the country.
5.4. Main operational areas of private security companies in 
Namibia
The investigation report of the MoL, referred to earlier, reveals that PSCs are 
operating in 51 towns throughout the country. The report also shows the number 
of security companies present in a respective town. Closer reading of this report 
shows that private security companies mainly operate in urban areas. Some 38 
private security companies are currently applying their trade in and around the 
capital. Oshakati and Walvis Bay are joint with the second highest number of 
private security companies at 15. Rundu and Swakopmund are third and fourth 
respectively, with a total of 12 and 11 private security companies providing 
security services there (MoL, 2012). 
5.5. Foreign ownership of private security companies in 
Namibia
The Security Enterprises and Security Officers Act is silent on the regulation 
of private ownership and control of a business operating as a security service 
provider. Foreign-owned private security companies such as Rubicon, G4S, and 
Coin Security thus freely operate in the country. In contrast, in South Africa, in 
2013, the South African Parliament passed an amendment to their Act, whereby 
in terms of Section 9(c) of the Private Security Industry Regulation Amendment 
Bill, the law of that country required that at least 51% of the ownership and 
control of private security companies must be exercised by South African citizens. 
The Security Enterprises and Security Officers Act also does not, as rightfully 
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pointed out by Gumedze (2007-08), address the issue of the exportation of private 
security skills beyond the borders of Namibia, as it is the case in the South African 
equivalent legislation. This is despite the fact that there were concerns around 
the abuse by private security and military companies that surfaced in 2007. 
In that year, a firm called Special Operations Consulting-Security Management 
Group (SOC-SMG), a US outfit, actively went around to recruit ex-combatants 
to guard US bases in Iraq and Afghanistan. This matter, when it became known, 
created a national and international stir. The Namibian government eventually 
declared the two US nationals said to be behind the recruitment drive as prohibited 
immigrants. The two were accordingly deported. The State Security Committee 
also recommended the closure of the SOC-SMG.
5.6. Registration and licensing of private security 
The Companies Act, No. 28 of 2004 governs the registration of all companies in 
Namibia. As such, this Act and its Regulations are the provisions under which 
all private security companies are to be registered. The Registrar of Companies, 
in the Ministry of Trade and Industry, oversees the registration of companies in 
Namibia. Thus, anyone wishing to start a private security company can register 
such a company with the Registrar of Companies. The registration requirements 
are generally very liberal and allow any would-be entrepreneur to start such a 
business. 
However, operating a security company is further subjected to the requirements of 
the Security Enterprises and Security Officers Act, No. 19 of 1998. Section 14(1)
(a) of this Act stipulates that no person may operate a business for purposes of 
rendering a security service unless such a business is registered as a security 
enterprise. Section 14(1)(b) of the same Act similarly prohibits any person from 
being a security guard unless he/she is registered as a security officer/guard. In 
this regard, the Act establishes an entity called the SESORB, which, among others, 
is empowered to grant applications and to register private security companies 
and security officers upon application, respectively (Security Enterprises and 
Security Officers Act, Sections 15(3) and 16(3)). 
It transpired, though, that these provisions are generally not enforced in practice. 
Several of the industry participants have singled out the non-enforcement of the 
application and registration requirements as the most singular reason for the 
proliferation of private security providers in the industry. The non-enforcement 
of these requirements was also commonly cited as the reason why some of the 
registered private security companies refuse and/or are reluctant to pay the 
minimum wage set for the industry. 
The Act empowers the Minister of Home Affairs, in consultation with SESORB, to 
make regulations relating to, inter alia, the training of security officers, uniform, 
insignia and identification of security officers, and requirements for the identification 
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of vehicles used by security organisations and security officers in the course of 
their duty. However, these Regulations are still in draft form – 16 years after 
the passing of the Act. The general non-enforcement of the Act and the absence 
of regulations, as noted by Mr R Wiese, Regional Manager of Rubicon Security 
Services, on 28 January 2014 in an interview, greatly contribute to the non-uniform 
standards currently plaguing the industry. The lack of zeal and leadership on the 
side of the relevant organs of the government in this regard is open to question. 
5.7.  Vetting and screening policies of private security 
companies
Pre-screening of personnel, as observed by Strom et al. (2010), is becoming 
more thorough in the private security industry the world over. As such, criminal 
histories and fingerprint checks are becoming the norm. This is so because the 
nature of the job makes it essential for background checks to include measures 
of the applicant’s personality. Thorough background checks are critical because 
employers have an obligation towards the people they serve. More so for private 
security companies, as they rightfully want to ensure that the individuals they hire 
are competent and mentally fit to handle the daily duties of their jobs (Strom et 
al., 2010). These matters, surprisingly, are not addressed in the Act. 
The Act does not expressly address the issue of background checks. This, 
arguably, is indirectly addressed through the statutory requirement that a “clear 
and complete set of fingerprints” be submitted to SESORB by both prospective 
security enterprises/companies and security officers/guards upon applications 
to provide such services in terms of sections 15(1)(a) and 16(1)(a) of the Act. 
If the applicant is a natural person, their fingerprints will be required; where 
the applicant is a company, such fingerprints must be of each director of the 
company; and where the applicant is a close corporation or a partnership, the 
fingerprints must be of each member. This, however, is currently not happening 
due to the inactive and/or dysfunctional status of SESORB. As a result of this, 
anyone, whether with good or bad intentions, may under the current dispensation 
either operate a private security company or become a security guard. This state 
of affairs, needless to say, provides an ideal opportunity for crime syndicates to 
operate given Namibia’s high crime rate.  
Some private security companies are reportedly addressing this void by having 
formulated their own vetting and screening policies. Such practices are, however, 
mainly done by the major security companies, thus pointing to inconsistency in 
the way things are done. 
In terms of the current practice, security companies collaborate with the Namibian 
Police services to acquire fingerprint-based checks of criminal history records 
to screen prospective security officers. The inherent flaw of this practice is that 
it has no legal basis and is not mandatory. It is thus up to the private security 
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company to do such a check. It was found that some companies would even 
allow employment although the results of the check were still pending. Some 
companies such as Namibia Protection Company also do a background check on 
prospective employees by interviewing family members.
5.8. Unionisation and conditions of employment in the private 
security industry
The right to freedom to form or join a trade union of one’s choice is entrenched in 
the Namibian Constitution (Namibian Constitution, 1990). This right is also listed 
as a non-derogable fundamental freedom under Article 24(3) of the Constitution. 
This right, undoubtedly, equally and unreservedly also applies to employees of 
private security companies. Literature regarding the level of unionisation within 
the private security industry is close to zero. The 2012 LaRRi study, referred to 
earlier, was found to be the only source shedding light on this subject. This study 
reveals that only 40.9% of security guards employed by private security companies 
belong to a trade union (Shindondola-Mote & Indongo, 2012). This report shows 
that there are currently four trade unions organised within the private security 
industry. These are the Namibia Allied Workers and Transport Union (NATAU), 
the Namibia Independent Security Union (NISU), the Namibia Security Guard 
and Watchmen Union (NASGWU), and the National Security Guards Protection 
Union (NSGPU). Most security guards, 83.4%, reportedly belong to NATAU, 
while some 7.3% of the guards hold NASGWU membership (Shindondola-Mote 
& Indongo, 2012). 
The Labour Act, No. 7 of 2011 entitles a trade union, which represents the 
majority of employees in an appropriate bargaining unit, exclusive bargaining 
agency status (recognition agreement) for purposes of negotiating a collective 
agreement on any matter of mutual interest with the relevant employer and/or 
group of employers. Both NATAU and NASGWU enjoy exclusive bargaining agency 
status with some private security companies. Nevertheless, a sizable number of 
employers in the private security industry reportedly do not find it necessary to 
have recognition agreements with trade unions (Shindondola-Mote & Indongo, 
2012). This, if reported correctly, undoubtedly constitutes an unfair labour 
practice. Exclusive bargaining agency status under the current labour regime 
is an entitlement, if phrased differently – a right and not a privilege bestowed 
on a trade union. Furthermore, the importance of recognition agreements in an 
industry notoriously known for low wages, extended working hours, poor working 
conditions cannot be overemphasised. 
120
6. The growth of the private security industry in 
Namibia
Increasingly, the private security industry is taking on roles that have traditionally 
been the preserve of state security providers. This include escorting and transporting 
high-risk commodities; providing rapid-response services attached to alarm 
systems; stewarding large public events; providing surveillance services; risk 
analysis; and providing protective security to a wide range of facilities such as 
banks, ports and embassies (SEESAC, 2006). Richards and Smith (2007) similarly 
observe that the trend towards the provision of increased security by non-state 
actors is prevalent in all regions of the world. Thus, the mixture of state and 
private actors within the field of security, as aptly observed by Creutz (2006), is 
here to stay. It therefore just makes sense that all actors involved in this sector 
“find a way, if not to embrace it, at least to cope with it” (Creutz, 2006). Namibia, 
as was pointed out in section 3, has a rapidly expanding private security industry. 
What has been the driver of this growth and how has this expansion been used 
to the advantage of the nation at large? These are some of the issues canvassed 
in this section. 
6.1. Main reasons for the development of the private security 
industry in Namibia 
Private security provision in Namibia became more prominent after the attainment 
of independence in 1990. Several reasons may be given for this development. One 
such reason relates to the demobilisation of ex-combatants after the end of the armed 
liberation struggle. The main belligerents in the struggle for independence were 
the South African Defence Force (SADF); the locally recruited South West African 
Territorial Forces (SWATF) and paramilitary groups; and the People’s Liberation Army 
of Namibia (PLAN), which was the military wing of the South West African People’s 
Organisation’s (SWAPO). Namibia’s transition to independence took place under the 
United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG). UN-supervised demobilisation 
was initiated as a condition for the transition to independence. UN Resolution 435 
stipulated the demobilisation of PLAN, SWATF and Koevoet (the paramilitary unit 
of SWATF), and the withdrawal of the SADF. Most veterans were unemployed and 
had few marketable skills (IRIN, 2008). The experience gained by many soldiers, 
on both sides of the divide during the conflict, made them ideal recruits and a 
fertile hunting ground for private security companies (IRIN, 2008). The company 
profile of the Namibia Protection Services confirms this assertion. It indicates that 
the company was formed in 1989 by the SWAPO Party leadership as a job creation 
initiative to mainly assist ex-PLAN fighters (Namibia Protection Services, 2014). 
The president of SAN similarly pointed out that many PSCs in the country indeed 
have ex-combatants, retired army officials and even ex-police officers in their staff 
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complement. That said, scholarly information about the demobilisation-reintegration 
process in Namibia is sketchy. Efforts to obtain information from government sources 
in this regard proved futile. This is indeed regrettable because empirical data on 
this issue would have undoubtedly added value to the study by showcasing how 
many of these ex-combatants have ended up in private security firms. Also, due 
to time and resource constraints, the researchers could not identify personnel in 
private security firms who were demobilised from the war. Needless to say, further 
research is needed to substantiate the averment that many ex-combatants have 
been absorbed by the private security industry.
The expansion of the PSI in Namibia can undoubtedly also be linked to the 
rapid migration pattern of people to urban areas in search of jobs and better 
opportunities. The majority of these urban migrants do not succeed in entering 
the employment markets. Anecdotal evidence suggests that many of these 
unemployed rural migrants end up getting involved in criminal activities. Indeed, 
crimes such as armed robbery, murder, housebreaking, domestic violence, baby 
dumping, infanticide, and rape have reached alarming proportions in most towns 
and cities in the country in recent times (NAMRIGHTS, 2012). The fear of crime 
thus fuelled and continues to fuel the booming of the private security industry in 
the middle-class suburbs across the country (Du Pisani, 2006). Private security 
vehicles, for example, are highly visible around Windhoek’s wealthy areas and 
suburbs, parked at strategically central points, ready to respond to calls from 
clients. In fact, in response to the escalating levels of crime, which at times take 
on violent portions, the middle-class suburbs are increasingly characterised by 
gated communities. Du Pisani (2006) describes such communities as fortified 
enclaves with private security, automated surveillance cameras, unfriendly barbed 
and electric wire fencing, and vicious guard dogs (Du Pisani, 2006). In Windhoek, 
these gated communities are scattered in former white areas and are burgeoning 
on the southern and eastern outskirts of the city (Morange, Folio, Peyroux and 
Vivet, 2012). Arguably, in Namibia, just as is the case in South Africa and other 
parts of the world, gated communities have become popular primarily as a response 
to the high levels of crime and the fear of crime (Landman & Schönteich, 2002). 
Namibia, as noted before, has high levels of poverty and employment. Plausibly, 
the majority of rural and urban poor dwellers have not benefited from the growth 
of private security companies. For instance, alarms and rapid-response services 
provided by these companies are outside the financial reach of the vast majority 
of households. Private security services are accordingly affordable only to wealthy 
citizens, expatriates and employees of international organisations, embassies and 
other organisations. The crime levels and sense of security in wealthy areas and 
suburbs are accordingly much lower compared to those in poorer communities. 
Several attempts to get crime statistics from the police to validate this foregoing 
statement proved futile. Those communities that cannot afford private security 
services organise various forms of neighbourhood watch schemes, at times, even 
vigilante groups in order to improve their collective security. 
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6.2. Private security companies and crime levels 
Namibia is essentially an unequal society. Inequality is pervasive in all spheres 
of the Namibian society, be it in terms of income, between genders, or with 
reference to the opportunities and services available in urban versus rural areas, 
or even among different races, ethnic groups or classes in society (Office of the 
Ombudsman, n.d.). The provision of private security in the country is thus no 
exception. Kirunda (2007) forcefully maintains that an examination of all the 
circumstances relating to the growth of the private security industry in Uganda 
reveals that private security in that country has only benefited wealthy people and 
businesses that can afford to pay the hefty bills of the firms or personnel providing 
the security. The people in the rural areas, so he argues, have been left exposed 
to the same security dangers and risks that prevailed prior to the advent of the 
privatisation of security in that country (Kirunda, 2007). The Ugandan situation 
also aptly applies to Namibia. In Namibia, the homes of wealthy citizens in urban 
areas throughout the country have become fortresses under the protection of 
PSCs and strongly built walls lined with electric wires. The crime rate in these 
affluent suburbs is accordingly very low. On the other hand, the poor, who are 
predominantly based in rural areas and informal settlements in urban areas, have 
no access to private security. Police visibility in these areas, as a rule, is usually 
conspicuously absent. These areas, unsurprisingly, therefore, have much higher 
crime rates. It is clear that the commercialisation of security neglects the need 
for the provision of security for rural and poor communities while concentrating 
on the more affluent urban areas (Le Roux, 2007). 
6.3. Relationship between the private security industry and the 
government’s security forces in Namibia
This report is based on the fundamental premise that the government’s security forces, 
especially the police, and private security companies are all in the business of crime 
prevention. If this tenet is correct, then there have to be enormous opportunities 
for the groups to work together more closely to prevent crime in Namibia. 
The relationship between the Namibian Police and the private security industry 
can at best be described as cordial. The Inspector-General of the Namibian Police 
(NamPol), Sebastian Ndeitunga, in a telephonic interview on 24 January 2014 
noted that the relationship between NamPol and the PSI is not institutionalised. 
There is currently no official forum for the sharing of information, experiences, 
resources and expertise. Collaboration between these entities does not happen on 
a daily basis but rather on an ad hoc basis. Such collaboration, as emphasised by 
the Police spokesperson, Deputy Commissioner Edwin Kanguatjivi, in an interview 
on 24 January 2014, mainly occurs in the area of arrests. This, however, is no 
special arrangement, since the Criminal Procedure Act, No. 51 of 1977 provides 
for citizen’s arrests. Deputy Commissioner Edwin Kanguatjivi, however, raised 
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some serious concerns in this regard. He, for instance, questioned the quality of 
training of security guards in carrying out arrests. He also questioned whether 
security officers/guards are taught to apply the minimal use of force for the minimal 
length of time during the training they received? Moreover, whether they inform 
accused persons of their rights upon arrest? These are very relevant questions. 
However, yet again, the government’s failure to effectively regulate the private 
security industry in this regard cannot be wished away.  
The level of collaboration between the City Police and private security companies 
is said to be more frequent than with NamPol. The City Police networks with 
private security companies through what is called zonal policing. However, the 
Namibian Police are reported to be on a quest to improve their service delivery 
with the community in what is called community policing.
6.4. Community policing
The genesis of community policing concept was coined by Sir Robert Peel in 1829. 
To date, this concept is key to crime management strategies worldwide. The 
Namibian Police Force embarked upon a community policing programme in 2011. 
This strategy is aimed at not only reducing the incidences of crime in society but 
to equally improve service delivery by NamPol and to establish a good reputation 
with its community. It is on this foundation that Chief Inspector Victoria Matjila 
strongly affirmed that since its inception, there has developed a strong partnership 
between the force and the communities within which community policing is practiced. 
Inextricably linked to community policing as a crime prevention strategy is the 
partnership between the National Police Force and the community which includes 
the business sector, local councils or municipalities, community-based groups, the 
media, law enforcement agencies, and religious and community leaders. From this, 
one is tempted to arrive at the conclusion that such partnerships would necessarily 
also include the PSI. This is however not a straightforward matter, since private 
security companies are not expressly mentioned in this regard. In fact, the Crime 
Management Strategy of the Namibian Police Force (2011–2014) is conspicuously 
silent on the role to be played by PSCs as a strategic partner in terms of the strategy. 
6.5. Sustainability of the private security industry in Namibia
There is a general consensus in Namibia that the private security industry has 
rapidly become an indispensable component of peace and stability operations 
in the country. Private security companies, as noted earlier, are spread across 
the country, covering all the major urban centres. They provide employment for 
many people, ranging from uneducated youths and school dropouts to retirees 
from government security agencies. Contestably, the insufficiency of resources 
to help the various organs of state, especially the police, in their principal role of 
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protecting the security of their citizens has been a major driver in the growth of 
the private security sector in the country. There is a great problem of exclusion 
though, as not all people can afford private security.
On the issue of the sustainability of the private security industry, anecdotal 
evidence suggests that private security actors tend to be better resourced than 
organs of state. There is therefore an over-reliance on them. In this regard, many 
leading local and international companies depend on private security companies 
for the security of their investments. The private security industry is therefore 
well integrated into the business and domestic spheres of Namibian life. Mr J.H. 
Visser, CEO of Namibian Protection Services, in an interview on 3 January 2014, 
accordingly, forcefully argues that there is a need for the private security industry 
in the country and that it is, in his view, sustainable. Despite this active role in 
the Namibian economy and the monumental growth of the industry, he decried 
though, like everyone else, the absence of specific government regulations or 
rules to standardise the industry’s operations.
6.6. Concerns/challenges in relation to the presence of the 
private security industry in Namibia 
The particular challenges in relation to the presence of the private security industry 
in Namibia are mainly associated with poor regulation of the sector. This research 
found that, as a result of the non-enforcement of the Act and the absence of 
regulations, there is no control over the type or quality of services provided by 
private security companies in the country. On that account, the likelihood of 
untrained staff with questionable backgrounds having access to weaponry and 
using force in an illegitimate way, as cautioned by Richards and Smiths (2007), 
is very real and indeed an occasional occurrence. The dysfunctional status of 
the regulatory body, SESORB, also raises several concerns. The current status 
of SESORB effectively means that the industry is not directed and managed by 
persons with the necessary knowledge, skills and motivation to vet operators 
and to regulate and monitor the sector. Needless to say, an unregulated private 
security industry in the country hinders rather than helps law enforcement. 
Another issue of concern relates to training. The training of private security 
companies is not regulated. In the absence of a standardised training, most private 
security companies use their own types of training. This raises the question of 
whether security officers/guards are well trained to handle firearms. Because of 
a perceived lack of formal qualifications and credibility among practitioners in the 
private security industry, it appears that some organisations (and individuals) 
do not believe that the private security industry is capable of contributing to a 
professional community crime prevention programme. This became apparent 
through the interviews conducted with officials from the Namibian Police, many 
of whom seem to have a perception that private security is a competitor rather 
than an enhancement or assistant to the police role.
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The foregoing problems highlight the considerable challenges raised by the 
operation of private security companies and the consequent need for practitioners 
to develop a comprehensive system providing for their effective regulation and 
oversight (Richards & Smith, 2007).
7. The services provided by private security 
companies 
The commercial sector is the main market for private security, and virtually all 
businesses of any size in Namibia employ private security in one form or another, 
as do international organisations, NGOs and embassies.
7.1. Range of services and/or products offered 
Private security companies in general provide a variety of services, including 
guard services, alarm monitoring, investigation, armored transport, correctional 
facilities management, systems integration and management, security consulting, 
pre-employment screening, information security, and others. In Namibia, the 
leading companies offer a full range of services, including electronic intruder 
alarm systems, radio alarm response, perimeter protection and access control, 
vehicle tracking, as well VIP protection. The majority of companies provide only 
manned guarding for access control and perimeter patrol. Cash-in-transit and 
cash management is a growing and expanding part of the business, as more and 
more clients realise their vulnerability in an increasingly armed environment.
The most sought-after private security demands were found to be physical 
guarding, followed by asset transit (cash-in-transit). Armed response and alarm 
and security system installations were found to be the third and fourth most 
sought-after security services, whereas the occasional request for VIP protection 
is reportedly also on the increase. It is foreseen that with the advancement of 
technology in alarms, camera and surveillance systems, the number of security 
guards may reduce significantly. 
Most of the major security companies operating in the country use technology 
and equipment such as satellite tracking, radio alarms, and panic buttons. In 
fact, one of the widely used security companies in Namibia, G4S, reportedly has 
more than 20 000 alarms. Armoured vehicles are generally only used by those 
PSCs which transport cash and assets. It was found that there is once again no 
consistency in this regard. Only certain PSCs use armored vehicles to transport 
assets even though they are transporting values, thereby endangering the lives of 
their employees and risking the valuables of their clients. Absence of Regulations 
was once again pointed out as being at the heart of this. 
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Satellite tracking is reportedly not commonly used in Namibia. This is mainly due 
to the cost considerations and the availability of the technology. 
7.2. Identification of private security companies 
Section 38(1)(d) of the Security Enterprises and Security Officers Act empowers 
the Minister, in consultation with SESORB, to make Regulations prescribing the 
uniform, insignia and identification documents of security officers. Such Regulations 
should expressly prohibit persons not registered as security officers from wearing 
such uniform or insignia or carrying such identification documents. Regulation 24 
of the draft Regulations gives effect to this statutory injunction. In terms of this 
regulation, the uniform, badges, buttons, logo or insignia of each PSC must be 
registered with SESORB. Examples of all such must also be provided to SESORB 
upon registration. At present, this remains a paper requirement due to the non-
proclamation of the Regulations. Be that as it may, to the credit of the private 
security companies, it appears that most of them are voluntarily complying with 
this requirement. Security guards, generally, wear uniforms with distinguishable 
insignia of their respective companies. 
Furthermore, draft Regulation 10 prescribes that each security guard be issued 
with a durable identity card. However, a random observation carried out for 
this report showed that, on a general basis, security guards do not wear visible 
identification cards when on duty.  
7.3. Who employs the private security companies and why? 
Namibia, as noted earlier, has witnessed an exponential mushrooming of 
private security companies. In fact, the private patrolling of shopping malls, 
university campuses, office buildings, and other semi-public places has become 
so commonplace in Namibia that people hardly take note of it anymore. It is no 
exaggeration to state that the proliferation of ‘mass private properties’ such as 
gated communities, shopping malls, business parks and amusement districts has 
been a widely observed phenomenon since independence. The main market for 
private security services is commercial clients, ranging from industries, banks, 
parastatals, commercial farms to embassies, international organisations, and NGOs. 
The surge in the use of the services of PSCs may, debatably, be linked to the 
security needs of the different sectors of the Namibian society. There is regrettably 
no or scant literature currently available in this regard, as academics and other 
researchers have completely neglected PSCs as subjects worthy of scholarly 
inquiry (Simelane, 2007). The assertion of Krahmann (2009) that the popularity 
of PSCs as illustrated by the growth in industry turnover indicates that citizens 
and corporations are not only willing to tolerate the private use of armed force 
for individual protection but also that they respond positively to the ability to take 
control of their own security quite correctly applies to the Namibian situation. 
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The rise and use of the private security industry, as contended by Krahmann (2009), 
fits the neoliberal paradigm with its preference for the small state, free market and 
maximising consumer choice. Cold logic suggests that the same worldview informs 
the preferred use of PSCs by those who can afford their services in Namibia. 
7.4. Government use of private security companies’ services 
In other parts of the world, as pointed out by Isima (2007), the emergence and 
proliferation of private security companies reflect a trend in which non-core security 
functions of the State are increasingly outsourced to the private sector. This is reportedly 
prevalent in sub-Saharan Africa, where the relative weakness of the State has made 
it very difficult for governments to bargain with powerful private enterprises (Isima, 
2007). This fate, fortunately, has not befallen the Namibian State. In Namibia, state 
institutions responsible for safety and security have formerly retained core security 
functions within the public sphere. The Police spokesperson, Deputy Commissioner 
Edwin Kanguatjivi, when asked, in an interview on 24 January 2014, to what extent 
the Namibian Police contracts the services of PSCs made it clear that no such 
arrangements currently exist. The Police Force, in his view, is more than capable of 
executing its constitutional mandate of securing the internal security of Namibia and 
to maintain law and order. General Veiko Kavungo, Legal Advisor of the Namibian 
Army, in a similar vein indicated that the army does not make use of the services 
of PSCs. He was equally adamant that the Namibian Army, together with the Navy 
and Air Force, is more than capable to defend, as per its constitutional mandate, the 
territory and national interests of Namibia, without relying on the services of PSCs.
In reality though, the GRN does make use of the services of PSCs, especially Black 
Economic Empowerment (BEE) security companies providing mostly guarding 
services. These are the companies which allegedly are mostly not complying 
with the minimum standards. 
Ironically, it appears that the strength of the State bedevils the establishment of 
public-private partnership paths to strengthen the country’s overall crime-fighting 
efforts and influences policy in a constructive and positive fashion (Taljaard, 2007).
7.5. Professionalism in the private security industry 
The reply of the president of SAN in response to the question on whether the PSI 
in Namibia could be regarded as a professional service serves as an indicator of the 
current level of professionalism in the sector. According to A.J. Kannemeyer in an 
interview on 4 February 2014, “The industry cannot be described as professional; 
the reason for this is, once again, the absence of rules and regulations for the 
industry. As a result of this, anyone can register his/her security companies 
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and enter the industry. The lack of rules and regulations effectively means that 
there are no standards governing issues of training, uniforms, pre-employment, 
screening/vetting and other matters necessary to ensure a professional service.” 
However, the level of professionalism as displayed in the private security industry 
in Namibia cannot be generalised. This is so because it transpired that established 
private security companies such as Rubicon Security Services have a dedicated 
training school and place great emphasis on professional conduct and quality 
service delivery. The same can however not be said about the increased number 
of ‘fly-by-night’ companies flooding the industry. Most of these companies, if not 
all, are said to be driven by a quick profit motive. That being so, investing in the 
professional conduct of their employees is said to be the least of their concerns. 
Because the sector is at present largely unregulated, standards of service and 
professionalism vary considerably. Issues compromising professionalism in the 
industry include the following:
• the absence of industry standards to define and control the quality of 
security products or services; 
• the lack of a set of basic standards on training to maintain professional 
standards within the industry; it was found that in some instances new 
employees (security guards) are only provided with a uniform, a bat and 
taught for a few days on how to march and salute;
• the lack of uniform and consistent rigorous background checks of criminal 
records. If the government, as noted by Mkutu and Sabala (2007), requires 
all taxi drivers to have police checks, surely PSCs should be required to do 
so as well. People’s lives and property are at risk if ex-criminals are not 
filtered out. After all, such a checking process occurs in the police; 
• the occasional media reports implicating security guards in crimes, human 
rights abuses and the excessive use of force; and 
• the non-enforcement of the minimum wages by the Ministry of Labour, 
which entrenches security guards remaining among the working poor in the 
country; strikingly, no punitive actions were ever taken against those PSCs 
that do not pay the prescribed minimum wage. 
The result of all these, needless to say, is a compromise of professionalism in the 
sector. The speedy promulgation of the draft Regulations and the draft Code of 
Conduct for the industry will go a long way in addressing some of these issues. 
It is puzzling why the Regulations and Code of Conduct could not be promulgated 
so long after the enactment of the enabling Act. Whether the migration of the PSI 
among three different ministries since the passing of the Act could reasonably 
be given as a justification for this omission is open to debate.  
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7.6.  Code of conduct for private security companies and 
security guards
The Security Enterprises and Security Officers Act, under Section 23(1), provides for 
the promulgation of a code of conduct to regulate the conduct of security enterprises 
and security officers respectively. Further to this, the Minister responsible for policing, 
as mandated by the Act, drafted a code of conduct for the PSI in 2009. The said Code 
is, however, is still in draft format and thus has no legal force as yet. It is however 
important for this exercise to assess whether the draft Code of Conduct, in its current 
format, is addressing some of the areas of concern highlighted in this study.
The draft Code of Conduct, among others, seeks to promote, achieve and maintain 
a professional security service industry. It also aims to promote, achieve and 
maintain compliance with minimum standards of conduct by both PSCs and security 
guards, and to promote client confidence (Code of Conduct, 2009).
The Code aims to achieve the above-listed objectives by imposing a set of binding 
and enforceable rules of conduct on security companies and security guards 
respectively. These rules of conduct are framed as prohibited acts and omissions in 
relation to the rendering of security services. The list of prohibited acts and omissions 
is very comprehensive and does not constitute the list provided in the Code. The 
performance and/or non-performance of any of the prohibited acts or omissions 
constitute misconduct and expose the perpetrator to disciplinary actions by SESORB. 
Some of the specific prohibited acts and omissions include matters relating to 
advertising and touting, the relationship with other security companies or security 
guards; the safekeeping of arms and documents, contracts entered into with clients; 
relations with clients; the safeguarding of client information; and substitution or 
subcontracting of security services without a client’s consent and to a company 
or guard who is unable, ill-equipped or does not have the capacity to render the 
security services in question. Some of the general prohibited acts and omissions 
include collusion of a security company or guard with someone not registered as 
a security company or guard to provide services; the employment of unregistered 
and/or deregistered security guards; failure to report criminal activities; and the 
exploitation of a security guard by a security company. 
The draft Code is silent on a number of pertinent issues. For instance, it does not 
set the professional standards that are to be observed regarding issues of training, 
the use of force and firearms, and the respect for human rights. Strikingly, it also 
does not address issues such as working conditions, pay and remuneration. The 
Code’s silence on issues such as equal opportunities and non-discrimination in a 
predominantly male industry is equally striking. 
Be that as it may, the draft Code of Conduct will go a long way in uplifting the 
professional standards in the private security industry. To achieve and maintain 
the laudable standards of professionalism as envisaged by the Code will require 
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an effective, efficient administration and enforcement. It is questionable whether 
the current set-up of SERSORB as the regulatory authority is capable of achieving 
these standards as will be shown in the subsequent sections.  
8. The effect of the privatisation of security on human 
rights with special reference on vulnerable groups 
including women and children 
The Namibian Constitution contains an array of articles which are directly and 
indirectly applicable to women and children. Those most relevant to this work 
include the rights to human dignity, equality and non-discrimination; and the 
prohibition against torture, and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. The 
Constitution also prohibits forced labour as well as child labour; it guarantees all 
working persons the right to form or join a trade union of their choice and the right 
to strike. All persons are also guaranteed the right to practise any profession or 
carry on any occupation, trade or business of their choice. Furthermore, Article 23 
of the Constitution empowers the legislature to enact affirmative action legislation 
with the aim of redressing the legacies of apartheid and achieving greater social 
justice. In this regard, groups such as women are specifically targeted.  
Additionally, Article 95 of the Constitution obliges the State to actively promote and 
maintain the welfare of the people. In this respect, the State is tasked with enacting 
legislation aimed at ensuring, inter alia, equal opportunities to women in all spheres 
of society; equal remuneration of men and women; maternity leave and benefits 
for working mothers; and the health and strength of workers, men and women so 
that citizens are not forced by economic necessity to enter vocations unsuited to 
their age and strength, and that workers are paid an adequate living wage. 
To what extent, though, are these guarantees and entitlements observed in the 
private security industry? 
8.1. The PSI and women
The Constitution, as noted above, expressly prohibits discrimination. The Labour 
Act, in seeking to give effect to this, specifically outlaws direct and indirect 
discrimination particularly relevant to women. These include discrimination based 
on gender, marital status, family responsibilities, AIDS or HIV status, or previous, 
current or future pregnancy (The Labour Act, Section 5). The Act prohibits sexual 
harassment in the workplace. In fact, it provides that a resignation resulting from 
sexual harassment is regarded as a constructive dismissal. 
These above-mentioned provisions, needless to say, equally apply to the PSI. 




The PSI in Namibia is essentially male dominated. For example, the owners of 
private security companies are predominantly male and the number of male 
security guards far outstrips that of females (Shindondola-Mote & Indongo, 2012). 
Many of the industry participants were of the view that the guarding of premises 
and the challenge of dealing with criminals on a day-to-day basis is a trade less 
suitable for the female gender. A summary of the female to male composition 
of the security guards staff complement of the major security companies in the 
country indeed confirms this perception as shown in the Table 3. 
Table 3: Female to male composition of security guards
Name of company Number of employees Female to male ratio
G4S Security Company 1 800 30:70
Namibian Protection Services (Pty) Ltd 2 000 28:73
Rubicon Security Services 1 254 30:70
Eagle Night Watch 640 40:60
8.1.2. Maternity leave 
The Labour Act provides three months paid maternity leave for a female employee 
who has been continuously employed for a period of at least six months. Such an 
employee may also not be dismissed during her maternity leave or at the expiry 
of her maternity leave due to matters relating to her pregnancy. The LaRRi report 
found that the maternity leave provisions as provided for in the Act are generally 
adhered to in the sector. However, a significant number of female security guards 
are reportedly not aware that they are entitled to maternity leave (Shindondola-
Mote & Indongo, 2012). 
8.1.3. Sanitation facilities
The right of access to proper sanitation facilities is universally guaranteed. 
This right requires, among others, that sanitation facilities be within or in the 
immediate vicinity of the workplace. Sanitation facilities must also be available 
for use at all times of the day or night. This study found that this is not the case 
in many instances in the PSI. Toilet facilities are not provided at all times. It 
appears that such facilities are mainly available on the premises of bigger and 
established clients such as banks, shopping malls, embassies and parastatals. The 
researchers witnessed a few instances of male security guards using the bush to 
relieve themselves. What is the situation with female security guards? Are they 
subjected to the same fate? These are but some of the questions that could not 
be adequately researched as part of this project. It can be stated though that 
the current situation regarding the availability of sanitation facilities appears to 
be an obstacle or even dangerous, especially for female security guards. 
The availability of other facilities, such as facilities with safe drinking water, shade 
in the intense heat or warmth in the cold, also raises serious human rights issues. 
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8.1.4. Sexual harassment 
The Labour Act prohibits any form of sexual harassment by an employer. Not 
much is known about the prevalence of this issue in the industry. For instance, 
A.J. Kannemeyer, the representative of G4S, revealed in an interview on 4 
February 2014 that only two allegations of sexual harassment were ever reported 
in the company. Even then, the matter did not proceed far because of alleged 
insufficient evidence. Other industry participants were reluctant to speak on this 
issue. This might be ascribed to the societal taboo attached to discussing issues 
of a sexual nature in public. Sexual violence is a major issue in the Namibian 
society at large. It can therefore not be said that the private security industry 
is not affected by this societal menace. This matter appears ripe for further and 
more detailed study and analysis. 
8.1.5. Sexual violence 
There have not been many reports of gross human violations perpetrated by 
security guards against women within the broader society. However, as noted 
earlier, sexual violence is a major problem within the broader Namibian context. 
Sadly, the private security industry seems not to have been spared from this. 
Abuse of trust and acts of sexual violence perpetrated by security guards are 
occasionally reported in the printed media. This sad reality is reflected in the two 
boxes below and deserve verbatim and full quoting. 
Box 1
“I PLEAD not guilty.”
With this statement repeated four times, the trial of former security guard 
Lesley Kukame – accused of raping and murdering a three-year-old girl at the 
Katutura Cinema Hall in early 2005 – started in the High Court in Windhoek 
yesterday (24.09.2007). His response came after he was asked to give his 
plea to each of the four charges that he faces: murder, rape and abduction, 
alternatively kidnapping.
It is alleged that between February 7 and 10 2005, Kukame (27) abducted 
a three-and-a-half-year-old girl from the house where she was staying in 
Independence Avenue in Katutura. He took the girl to the disused Katutura 
Cinema Hall, which was next to the child’s house, it is alleged.
At the hall, he raped the girl, it is further alleged. He then murdered her, it is 
charged.
The child is alleged to have died from asphyxia, caused either by strangulation 
or by her panties having been stuffed into her mouth.
Source: The Namibian (2007)
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A similar shocking incident involved an elderly woman raped in a cemetery by 
a security guard. 
Box 2
Cemetery attacker’s appeal thrown out
By: Werner Menges
AN appeal by a former security guard who is serving a 37-year prison term for 
raping and attempting to murder a woman at Windhoek’s Pionierspark Cemetery 
five years ago ended in failure in the High Court in Windhoek last week.
So unconvinced were Acting Judges John Manyarara and Hosea Angula by the 
grounds on which Adolf Kahoro was basing his appeal against the sentences 
that he received in the Windhoek Regional Court on September 17 2004 that 
they did not even want to hear any oral arguments from State advocate Andrew 
Muvirimi before they gave their ruling on Kahoro’s appeal on Thursday. “We are 
satisfied there are no merits in this appeal, and it is dismissed in its totality,” 
Acting Judge Manyarara told Kahoro, with Acting Judge Angula agreeing with 
this judgement.
Kahoro (28) pleaded guilty to charges of rape and theft of a motor vehicle 
when his trial started before Magistrate Ben Myburgh in the Windhoek Regional 
Court on July 30 2004.
He admitted that on January 21 2003, when he was on duty as a security guard 
at the Pionierspark Cemetery, he attacked a woman who visited the cemetery. 
He held her at gunpoint, raped her, and then left the cemetery in her vehicle.
The woman was shot in the neck after being raped. Kahoro claimed that the 
shooting was accidental, but this claim was rejected and he was convicted of 
attempted murder as well.
Magistrate Myburgh sentenced him to 20 years’ imprisonment on the rape 
charge, a 10-year jail term for attempted murder, and a 12-year term for the 
car theft.
Five years of the sentence on the attempted murder count were ordered to be 
served concurrently with the sentence on the rape charge. The effect of this 
was that Kahoro was sentenced to a 37-year prison term.
Source: The Namibian (2004)
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8.2. The PSI and protection of children’s rights in Namibia
8.2.1. Child labour 
No dedicated study on the incidence and prevalence of child labour in the PSI 
in Namibia has so far been conducted. The LaRRi report appears to be the only 
report shedding some light on this matter. This report reveals that on average 
58% of security guards in the country are between the ages of 21 and 30, 26% 
were between the ages of 31 and 40, 8% were between the ages of 41 and 50, 
5% were between the ages of 16 and 20 years and only 0.2% were aged 15 and 
below (Shindondola-Mote & Indongo, 2012). This report also found that there 
was only one case of child labour. It appears therefore that child labour in the 
private security industry is not a major issue.
8.2.2. Impact on children within society
There have not been many reports of gross human abuses perpetrated by security 
guards against children in the country. However, two recent incidents in this regard 
shocked the nation, involving the reckless killing of two boys by security guards. 
In the one incident, a 20-year-old high school pupil was allegedly tortured and 
fatally shot by two security guards. The two guards reportedly tied the boy to 
burglar bars inside a house and beat him severely before shooting him in the 
chest and stomach. The young man was accused of stealing a wallet from the 
security guards. After this, the guards fired off more rounds with some of the 
bullets hitting a wall. One of these bullets ricocheted and struck a bystander in 
the right hand. The two guards were arrested and are currently in detention 
(New Era, 2014). 
In a similar incident on 22 October 2013, learners at the Ella du Plessis Secondary 
School in Windhoek and the nation at large were shocked to learn about the 
shooting of a Grade 10 pupil at the school. The boy reportedly wanted to hit a 
teacher with a brick. Two security guards intervened. After a scuffle with the two 
security guards, the pupil was shot in the head by one of the security guards. He 
was declared dead on arrival at the hospital. It is alleged that the boy was unruly 
and attacking people after “a drinking spree” (Namibian Sun, 2013).  
8.3. General human rights concerns within the PSI
Generally, the human rights infractions within the private security sector often 
received prime-time reporting in the local media. These include, but are not 
limited to, working conditions within the sector, wages, health and safety issue, 
and the handling of firearms. 
8.3.1. Working hours 
The Labour Act, No. 11 of 2007 limits the maximum weekly working hours for 
security officers at 60 hours. The Act also provides that security officers working 
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five days per week may not work for more than 12 hours per day, while those 
working six days per week may not work for more than 10 hours a day. The LaRRi 
report, referred to earlier, found that an astounding 78.9% of security guards 
work between 11 and 12 hours a day and seven days a week. This, if indeed the 
case, amounts to a gross violation of the Labour Act and the rights of security 
guards not to be subjected to long working hours. 
8.3.2. Wages
Guarding, as observed by Abrahamsen and Williams (2005), is a notoriously 
low-paid occupation. This is also the case in Namibia where guards often work 
very long hours for very little remuneration. In an effort to contain the level of 
exploitation, the government introduced a minimum wage for the sector in 2005. 
Nevertheless, despite having a minimum wage in the sector, wages continue to 
be the lowest compared to other sectors in the country (Shindondola-Mote & 
Indongo, 2012). The current minimum wage for entry-level security officers is 
N$5 an hour or N$60 per shift. The prescribed minimum wage is however not 
adhered to by many security companies. In this regard, it is worth reiterating 
that an investigation carried out by the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare on 
this matter found that more than a third of security companies are not adhering 
to the minimum wage agreement. The investigation results revealed that out 
of the 212 security companies inspected, only 147 were in compliance with the 
law. A total of 65 companies did not comply, and 35 of them were issued with 
compliance orders.
Furthermore, allegations of ‘illegal’ salary deductions in the industry are also rife. 
Such illegal deductions allegedly include penalties for sleeping on duty, being 
absent without leave (AWOL) or leaving the site, as well as transport allowances, 
uniform deductions and bank charges. 
8.3.3. Health and safety issues at the workplace
The Labour Act provides that every employer should provide premises that are 
safe, without risk to the health of the employees and that adequate arrangements 
be made to cater for the welfare of such employees. Over and above that, an 
employer employing more than 100 employees should establish a health and 
safety committee to monitor and implement health and safety regulations, among 
others. The LaRRi report reveals that many private security companies do not 
have a health and safety policy or committee in place. With reference to this, 
24.5% of security guards surveyed were of the view that they were exposed to 
injuries at work, while 22.2% felt that they were exposed to the cold (Shindondola-
Mote & Indongo, 2012). Other hazards experienced at work include risk of being 
attacked by criminals (15.7%), standing for too long (9.2%), exposure to dust 
(6.1%), exposure to chemicals and gas in factories (2.7%), and other hazards.
Additionally, awareness regarding health and safety committees in the workplace 
raises another concern. Sixty-five per cent of employees revealed that there 
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is no health or safety committee in the workplace, whereas 28% had no idea 
as to whether such a committee exists, and only a meagre 7% confirmed the 
establishment of such a committee in the workplace.
9. The advantages and disadvantages of the private 
security industry 
The development of the private security industry attracts both positive and 
negative elements. As a consequence, the industry can be analysed in terms of 
the advantages it offers those who utilise them while at the same time containing 
certain disadvantages.
9.1. Advantages of the PSI in Namibia
Among the prominent advantages of private security companies are those that 
follow. 
9.1.1. Providing safety for Namibia’s inhabitants and protecting 
client’s assets
There are many critics regarding the private security industry; however, without 
such an industry, crime levels would probably be much higher. Hence, as 
highlighted by A.J. Kannemeyer in an interview on 4 February 2014, such an 
industry is instrumental in deterring crime. PSCs also assist entities such as the 
police, whose main responsibility is providing safety for all residents in Namibia. 
Additionally, through their actions, they do try to protect their client’s assets 
and have made many arrests in the past. As a result, therefore, this is a positive 
aspect on which to build crime prevention partnerships between the State and 
private security industry, as it will help in keeping the residents of Namibia safe 
and, as a result, the statistics of crime will see a decrease. 
9.1.2. Providing employment opportunities
The private security sector is a major source of employment in Namibia. The 
sector currently employs a significant number of people who would otherwise be 
unemployed given the high unemployment rate in the country. Private security 
is thus an important part of the economy, providing much-needed employment. 
This is despite the fact that PSCs pay very low wages. 
9.1.3. Ease of establishing private security companies 
In an interview on 4 February 2014, A.J. Kannemeyer observed that the ease to 
set up a security company in Namibia also counts as an advantage. Currently, all 
that is required is that the applicant registers his/her company with the Registrar 
of Companies. There are no barriers or extra prerequisites required in registering 
a security company. Hence, from a business perspective, this encourages people 
in Namibia to engage themselves in setting up such companies, as there are very 
few, if any, barriers to establishing such companies. 
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If private security companies are seen as collaborating with state security 
enterprises, then they will be viewed in a positive light by potential clients and 
state security enterprises would then want to enter into partnership agreements 
with them. Thus, other people who seek to undertake a business venture would 
opt to establish such a private security company because of the ease it offers to 
establish such a company. Also, those who enter this market would then also like 
to collaborate with state security enterprises so that they can be placed on the 
map of having a good reputation; as a result, this will benefit both the owner of 
such company and the State.
9.2. Disadvantages of the PSI in Namibia
While several advantages can be outlined, there are also numerous disadvantages 
that can be counted against private security companies in Namibia. 
9.2.1. Increasing the class divide
Since the services of private security companies are class-specific and associated 
with high costs, these services cannot be afforded by the majority of people in 
the country. This inevitably exacerbates the already high levels of inequality. 
9.2.2. No minimum standards
The ease of setting up a security company in Namibia may also arguably count as 
a disadvantage. As an example, some companies reportedly register themselves 
under a vague name, not necessarily only doing business as a security company. 
In their memorandum of association, such companies reportedly outline various 
activities that the company would embark upon, for example, building contractor, 
security company, supplier of equipment, import and export company, and 
many other. This is done, as highlighted by A.J. Kannemeyer in an interview on 
4 February 2014, so that they can be able to apply for any tenders advertised in 
the newspapers or other media and hoping to be successful in their application, 
whether or not they have the necessary experience, capability or funds.
Accordingly, there are difficulties to ascertain whether each and every security 
company in Namibia is fit and qualified for the services they provide, as it remains so 
easy to establish such a security company. Not only is this potentially dangerous for 
society in terms of consumer protection, but it becomes problematic for employees 
as well in terms of the conditions they have to work under (e.g. being exploited due 
to their low levels of education). It can additionally pose a problem for the State to 
enter into partnerships with such private security companies, as the State is unsure 
of the quality of services provided by such companies, as there are no minimum 
standards and, as a result, it may endanger society more rather than protect it.
9.2.3. No regulations
The private security industry, as noted earlier, is currently unregulated. Because of 
this, the standards of service and professionalism vary considerably. This has proven 
to be detrimental to the establishing of crime prevention partnerships with the State.
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9.3. General perceptions about private security companies
No study has been conducted to determine the general feeling in the country 
about the presence of the private security companies. Conclusions and assertions 
can thus only be based on anecdotal evidence. There have been no reports of 
people vehemently opposing the presence and/or operations of PSCs in the 
country per se. General complaints about PSCs mainly relate to the low wages 
and the less-than-ideal conditions of employment prevailing in the industry. It 
thus appears that most Namibians are prepared to tolerate the presence of private 
security companies while expecting them to pay their employees decent wages 
and improving their overall conditions of employment. Notwithstanding, there is 
still a need for more authoritative research into this issue.
9.4. The impact of the private security industry
The growth of the private security industry has benefited many sections of the 
Namibian society. There is even no doubt that the Namibian government itself 
has benefited immensely from the presence of private security companies. The 
following are some of the ways in which the PSI has had an impact: 
 • Public security services: Institutions and companies offering services 
to the public make regular use of private security companies, such as 
their security guards, installing alarms, vehicle tracking, VIP protection, 
surveillance, valuables in transit, and others. 
 • Crime levels: Private security companies came into existence with the aim 
of providing protection for their clients and, as a result, the actions taken 
by such companies may indeed lower crime levels. For example, one of the 
widely used security companies in Namibia, G4S, has better statistics than 
NamPol. It has more than 20 000 alarms, and it responds to most of them. 
The forum of interaction between this company and NamPol has stopped 
due to the latter showing no interest whatsoever in the meetings prepared, 
according to A.J. Kannemeyer in an interview on 4 February 2014.
 • Public safety: Because of the nature of the services that private security 
companies provide, this contributes to the overall safety of the public. 
People therefore are said to feel much safer when a security guard is 
around, according to A.J. Kannemeyer in an interview on 4 February 2014.
 • Economy: The security industry no doubt is a low-income industry; 
however, it does contribute towards Namibia’s economy if one takes 
cognisance of the fact that with an estimated 14 000 security officers 
operating in Namibia and each one, for instance, supports five others, 
then this industry does have an impact on the economy, according to 
A.J. Kannemeyer in an interview on 4 February 2014.
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10. Public private partnerships in the provision of 
security 
Partnerships between state law enforcement agencies and private security 
providers have become a popular phenomenon in many countries. Many states 
worldwide are increasingly outsourcing functions to private contractors that were 
traditionally undertaken by their military and police, partly in response to public 
sector downsizing, but also because of the changing nature of warfare (Richards & 
Smith, 2007). In theory, this new model of security provision allows governments 
and public institutions to increase efficiency by concentrating on their core functions 
while transferring surplus responsibilities to private companies. For example, 
private security companies have taken over the administration of prisons in some 
countries including the UK, Canada, Mexico and Lesotho (Richards & Smith, 2007). 
The above naturally begs the question: what is the situation regarding the 
outsourcing of the State’s security mandate to private sector partners in Namibia? 
Specifically, does the government of the Republic of Namibia (GRN) outsource 
its security/military services to the private security industry? Is there a policy 
regarding the outsourcing of government security services to private security 
companies? If so, which services? These are some of the questions briefly 
considered in this section. 
10.1. Outsourcing of its security/military services to the 
private security industry in Namibia 
The Namibian government, as noted earlier, has a rather cold relationship with 
the private security industry. A key informant for this study observed that the 
government’s attitude towards the private security industry amounts to suspicion 
and ascribed this to the country’s recent historical past. Also, the state institutions 
responsible for peace and security remain fully in charge of public security matters. 
Given this position of strength, there is seemingly no incentive for the State to 
work with the private security companies on peace and security matters. There 
are accordingly no outsourcing agreements of security and/or military services to 
the private security industry in Namibia. In fact, from the interviews conducted 
with high-ranking officers from both the army and the police, it seems highly 
unlikely that this might happen soon in Namibia. 
10.2. Policy regarding the outsourcing of services to the 
private security companies
There is currently no national policy regarding the outsourcing of services to the 
private security companies in the country. This is seemingly left to individual 
ministries, government departments, parastatals and agencies. For instance, 
certain schools, hospitals, clinics and public offices are making use of the guarding 
services provided by private security companies. The trend to contract out 
security services has also been observed in parastatals such as Telecom Namibia, 
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NamWater, the National Housing Enterprise (NHE), NamPost, Namibia Statistics 
Agency (NASA), to mention but a few. Efforts to verify whether this is part of 
GRN’s policy or an ad hoc decision have so far proved futile. 
10.3. Other establishments outsourcing their security services 
to private security companies in Namibia
This research found that private security firms are also contracted by non-
governmental organisations, commercial banks and other private companies. In 
most instances, such services are sought to provide guarding. Embassies also 
depend on private securities companies to augment their security needs.
 
10.4. Public-private partnership in the provision of security 
services in Namibia
There is currently no formal partnership that exists between the State (as represented 
by the police department) and the private security sector in Namibia; each of these 
sectors operate in its respective sphere, each functioning in a mutually exclusive 
manner with respect to the provision of protection for the people of Namibia. More 
so, the relationship between these potentially strategic partners is clearly imbued 
with mistrust. For instance, it was found that police officers feel that private security 
personnel (security guards) generally lack education and training and are threats 
to their policing domain (professionals versus non-professionals). Private security 
personnel, on the other hand, believe that public law enforcement officers have 
limited knowledge about the private security industry and do not appreciate the 
important role they play in solving and preventing crime. This partly explains why 
the Police Security Forum (PSF), reportedly initiated by the private security sector, 
proved ineffective and naturally ceased to exist. In fact, key participants in the 
PSI were adamant that the demise of the forum was solely because of the lack of 
interest shown on the side of the police. Inspector-General Sebastian Ndeitunga, in 
a telephonic interview on 24 January 2014, conceded that the government needs 
to do more to initiate such initiatives. In fact, he blamed the lack of a public-private 
partnership in the provision of security services on the inaction from the side of 
the police. He committed himself to take the initiative in this regard and to address 
the long-outstanding regulations for the industry.  
It is common knowledge that the police and PSCs have different motivations 
for their activities. The police and non-police government agencies, as noted by 
Golsby (1998), exist to serve the public good, whereas private security exists 
for the profit motive. Notwithstanding this, private security officers are regularly 
seen in shopping centres mingling with the crowds and are used regularly at 
sporting events alongside the police. Thus, regardless of the motivations of both 
sectors, if it is accepted that the different sectors are in the business of crime 
prevention, then there are opportunities for a coming together, for the formation 
of partnership arrangements to provide a more concerted, efficient attack on 
crime and consequently to make people feel more safe (Golsby, 1998).
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There is a need to establish a formal relationship between the police and the 
security industry, as both have many common goals, and the security industry 
provides a major protective role in Namibian society. It is widely known that 
public policing is desperately inadequate for those unable to afford private 
security. It thus just makes sense that logistical cooperation between the police 
and the private security sector in some areas might free up public resources for 
deployment elsewhere. Resolving these issues and ensuring that private security 
resources act as a supplement to public policing are key future considerations 
for the Namibian society (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2005).
 
11. Gaps, inconsistencies and areas of improvement 
with regard to the private security sector 
11.1. Major gaps and inconsistencies 
The major gaps and inconsistencies devilling the private security sector in Namibia 
undoubtedly appear to relate to the following:
• the dysfunctional state of the regulatory body;
• the non-enforcement of the governing Act;
• the lack of Regulations;
• the lines of communication and lack of collaboration between the GRN and 
the PSI;
• the number of fly-by-night companies present in the industry;
• the questionable conditions of services prevailing in the industry;
• the non-enforcement of the minimum wage agreement;
• the quality of training, or lack thereof, given to security guards;
• the lack of requirements for background checks and vetting for potential 
security guards in the Act;
• lack of literature on the private security industry; and
• the commercialisation of security through the growth of the private security 
industry. 
11.2. Areas for improvement
Areas of improvement for the private security industry in Namibia relate to:
• governance and regulation;
• communication between public and private security stakeholders;
• working conditions; 





The following recommendations are given on how the private security industry 
in Namibia can be effectively regulated:
1. Develop a clear definition of private security.
2. Develop a clear definition of a security officer/guard.
3. The Minister in charge of policing, and not the Minister of Home Affairs, 
should take full charge of the industry as envisaged by the Act.
4. Activate and reconstitute the regulatory authority as envisaged under 
the Act as a matter of urgency so as to ensure the industry is properly 
regulated.
5. Concerted efforts must be made to develop the capacity of oversight agents 
such as an Ombudsperson, parliamentary committees and other such 
regulatory authorities to scrutinise the activities of PSCs and the industry in 
general.
6. Trade unions must do more to educate their members of their rights and to 
bargain for better conditions of service in the industry.
7. Academia should be encouraged to publish and to do research on PSIs in 
Namibia. 
12. Conclusion 
It is vital to note that the mushrooming of PSCs in Namibia is both an economic 
and social problem. Insecurity is not simply a matter for the police. Ways need 
to be found to establish a working and effective partnership between the police 
and the private security industry; doing that is in the long-term interest of the 
broader Namibian society. 
The legislative and policy framework for regulating the private security industry 
in Namibia appears to be solid. What appears to be lacking is the will and/or 
willingness to implement. This in itself raises various human rights issues, among 
others, a failure on the part of the State to comply with its duty to protect. The 
Namibian people are entitled and deserve no less – to be protected from the 
current unregulated private security industry. 
Related to the above, it is worth stressing that the current set-up of SESORB 
needs to be reviewed. SESORB in its current format is not sufficiently geared to 
regulate and monitor the private security industry in an effective and efficient 
manner for the benefit of all. 
It has been shown that guards are increasingly getting involved in criminal 
activities. The industry can and should get rid of such elements. This is an 
unnecessary and avoidable evil. This is so because both the draft Regulations and 
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draft Code of Conduct sufficiently address this matter. The speedy promulgation of 
these instruments can therefore no longer be delayed. One again, the Namibian 
public deserves no less. There is thus a need for complementary policies, tighter 
regulation, better law enforcement, greater transparency and accountability, 
active leadership, and more collaboration. 
The issue of low wages paid by private security companies must always be 
given the attention that it deserves. There can be no justification for tolerating 
a situation whereby those who are guarding wealth are paid starvation wages, 
thereby perpetuating and exacerbating inequality in the country. 
Lastly, there is no doubt that Namibians – either as individuals or groups – are 
spending heavily on security. The question worth debating is whether there is a 
way that the nation’s spending can be used to build the capacity of the existing 
official state agencies. This thus makes the establishment of a working partnership 
between the state security architecture and the private security industry an 
inevitable must. 
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Since the dawn of democracy, the Republic of South Africa has experienced a 
profound shift in the characteristics of policing and the provision of security in 
the country. The African National Congress (ANC) has been the driving force 
behind policy direction since the first democratic elections in 1994. The party’s 
policies regarding security have been representative of the State’s monopoly on 
the legitimate use of violence, in line with Weber’s notion of the modern nation 
state (Weber, 1919). Notwithstanding the authority entrenched by the state 
security apparatus, non-state actors and particularly the proliferation of the 
private security industry in the country has surpassed the capacity, in terms of 
size, of the members of the South African Police Service (SAPS). 
The objects of the SAPS are to prevent, combat and investigate crime, maintain 
public order, protect and secure the inhabitants of the Republic and their property, 
and uphold and enforce the law (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
Chapter 11, Section 205(3)). This report explores the theory that the traditional 
conception of the State, as being solely responsible for the monopoly of violence, 
is becoming increasingly blurred (Bayley & Shearing, 1996; Flemming, 2005). 
The analysis presented here of the dynamic landscape of security provision in 
the country seeks to uncover the value or lack thereof found in the exponential 
growth of a private security industry, adjacent to the public police.
Shortly after 1994, the integration of the country into the rapidly globalising 
economy was given priority (Official Government website, 2014). The ANC-
led government embarked on a programme that was aimed at promoting the 
reconstruction and development of the country and its institutions, informed by 
a strict commitment to the principles in the Constitution of upholding democracy 
and ensuring socio-economic change. An interpretation of the Constitution and 
the democratic dispensation it gave birth to shows that its uncompromising aim is 
to, improve the lives of all South Africans, especially those who prior to 1994 had 
been marginalised under the apartheid government. The improvements inferred 
in the Bill of Rights would come through the provision of basic needs, such as 
health care, housing, piped water, electricity, freedom and security of a person 
(Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Chapter 2, Subsection 12, 26, 27). 
Precedence was given to improving the safety of citizens, which highlighted the 
need for a transformation of the police to become “a service working with the 
community, and overcoming the grave problems of criminality and a culture of 
violence, created by the social dislocations inherited from the past’’ (Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa, Chapter 2, Subsection 12, 26, 27). 
The newly formed police service had to be aligned to new legislation and to the 
process of transformation in South Africa (SAPS website, 2014). Political leaders 
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concerned themselves with ensuring a transition that would allay past fears of 
abuse by agencies of the State and ensure that the police would support rather 
than challenge the new-found democracy (White Paper on Safety and Security, 
1998). The current Constitution affirms that the governing principles underpinning 
security services is that they are subject to the authority of Parliament and the 
National Executive and must reflect the resolve of South Africans to be free from 
fear and want (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act, No. 108 of 1996, 
Chapter 11, Section 198(a) and (d)). Hence, security services for the Republic 
constitute a single defense force, a single police service, and an intelligence 
service established in terms of the Constitution; any other armed service must be 
established, structured and regulated in terms of national legislation (Constitution 
of South Africa, Act, No. 108 of 1996, Chapter 11, Section 199(1), (2), (3), (4), (5)).
 
Parallel to the reform of the police force into a police service, there has been 
an unprecedented proliferation of private security services; hence, the Private 
Security Industry Regulation Act, No. 56 of 2001 was promulgated to regulate and 
maintain a trustworthy and legitimate private security industry (Constitution of 
South Africa, Act, No. 108 of 1996, Section 22). To this end, the Private Security 
Industry Regulatory Authority (PSIRA) was established in terms of Section 2 of 
the Act. The Preamble of the Act states that since protecting the right to life and 
the right not to be deprived of property is fundamental to the well-being and 
economic development of every person and the private security industry plays an 
important role in safeguarding the aforesaid rights, and since every citizen has 
the right to choose an occupation, including the occupation of a security service 
provider, it is necessary to achieve and maintain a trustworthy and legitimate 
private security industry which act in terms of the principles contained in the 
Constitution and is capable of ensuring greater safety and security in the country 
(PSIRA Act, Preamble). Chapter 2, Section 3 underscores that the objects of the 
Authority ‘are to regulate the private security industry and to exercise effective 
control over the practice of the occupation of security service provider in the 
public and national interest and the interest of the private security industry itself.’
Notwithstanding the legitimacy and primacy of authority of state security structures, 
the exponential growth of the private security sector gives impetus for an analysis of 
the security architecture that frames the South African context. The transformations 
that have been taking place within the SAPS and the private security industry 
reflect changes taking place in policing and security provision in the global context. 
The provision of private security services by civilians is a significant feature of the 
contemporary global security context. This phenomenon has been informed by 
states increasingly shifting some public responsibilities to the private sector. The 
privatisation or outsourcing of security are interchangeable terms and can be traced 
back to the writings of founding economist Adam Smith from the 1700s (Singer, 
2003: 7). Factors such as cost, efficiency and changing conceptions of public sector 
responsibility, have led to the outsourcing of services such as: healthcare, education, 
tax collection, prison services and the police (Singer, 2003: 7).  
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‘Crime prevention’ refers to ‘strategies and measures that seek to reduce the risk 
of crimes occurring, and their potential harmful effects on individuals and society, 
including the fear of crime, by intervening to influence their multiple causes’ 
(ECOSOC, 2002). While security and the tools of violence have historically been 
conceptualised as being the sole purview of the state against external foes, and for 
citizens in the domestic context, it has been observed that ‘security intervention 
from private [actors] is as old as warfare itself (Holmqvist, 2005: 1).’  
Establishing the extent to which partnerships – ad hoc or formal – between 
members of the South African Police Service (SAPS) and members of the private 
security industry as manifested in day-to-day security provision will form a 
critical point of departure for this analysis. Underscoring this is the importance of 
effective regulation and a high level of compliance to accountability mechanisms 
for security service providers in the country. This, it is emphasised, refers to both 
public and private actors involved in security provision. 
The hypothesis presented here posits that a causal link exists between improved 
crime prevention capabilities and government support for a crime prevention 
partnership; that includes accredited members of both the SAPS and the private 
security industry. The hypothesis put forward does not seek to disparage the 
sovereignty of the State and its security architecture; rather, it is based on the 
realities that underpin security provision and, in particular, the major role that 
the private security industry plays in providing security in the country. It is also 
derived from a cost-benefit calculation of the gains that could be made in crime 
reduction and community safety, once a robust debate leads to the development of 
a mechanism to promote crime prevention partnerships between the two entities.
 
It is anticipated that this report will encourage dialogue and debate by policymakers 
responsible for policy direction for the provision of security in the country and by 
South African citizens. The envisioned outcome for this is the development of a formal 
model for enhancing the capacities for crime control, prevention and community 
safety. In theory, coordinated interaction led by state organs responsible for security 
provision would facilitate a partnership with private security companies (PSCs) 
to complement the already established security architecture for the benefit of all 
citizens. The emphasis is on understanding the principles that inform the plurality 
of agents responsible for security provision, particularly the public police and the 
private security industry, and developing a partnership approach to deal with the 
divergent factors that govern crime in the South African context.
Empirical research regarding the nature, governance and accountability of such 
partnerships was undertaken using both primary and secondary sources. The 
primary sources were drawn from interviews with managers of different private 
security companies, members of the PSIRA’s leadership, and heads of different 
private security industry associations. The secondary sources were drawn from 
academic journals, books, newspaper articles, official government policy, the 2010 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Handbook, Commission on 
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Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice through the United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime (UNODC) Resolution 21/1, E/CN.15/2012/20, the Report on the meeting 
of the Expert Group on Civilian Private Security, UNODC/CCPCJ/EG.5/2011/2, 28 
October 2011, the United Nations Economic and Social Council Resolution 2002/13 
and the official SAPS website. The research findings will clarify the current and ad 
hoc nature of public-private engagement and give suggestions about how they should 
work and be formalised, in order to help create a framework for a crime prevention 
partnership approach.
The research question that this report seeks to answer is ‘to what extent crime 
prevention partnerships between the state security architecture, particularly the 
SAPS and the private security industry, are feasible?’ For purposes of this research, 
29 semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted with the management 
of private security companies in Pretoria, Johannesburg, Durban and Cape Town 
between October 2013 and March 2014. Twelve of these were conducted on a one-
on-one basis, and eight were carried out with multiple members of the companies’ 
management teams, varying from two to seven members. Contributions from 
members of the industry provided invaluable insights regarding the dynamics that 
may affect the prospects for the proposed crime prevention partnership (CPP).
One of the company managers interviewed was Mr Diavastos, who represents 
two of the most influential security industry bodies, namely the Security Industry 
Alliance (SIA) and the Security Association of South Africa (SASA). Also interviewed 
were the Chief Operations Officer of SIA, Mr Conradie, and the Secretary of both 
SIA and SASA, Mr Botes; the two bodies are currently in the process of merging. 
Four members of PSIRA’s leadership were also interviewed, including the Director, 
the Deputy Director for law enforcement, the Deputy Director for communications 
and the Senior Manager of legal services at the Authority; this process yielded 
pivotal insights into the role that compliance and enforcement play in regulating 
the private security industry in the country. 
It must be noted that some requests for interviews with actors in the private security 
industry were rejected because the persons were not interested or were unable to 
due to organisational commitments; the responses therefore are from individuals 
who were available and willing to participate in the research. Unless otherwise stated, 
for referencing purposes, only the date of the interviews will be provided so as to 
preserve anonymity as requested by the participants. In this report, contributions 
from participants will be referred to as responses from undisclosed managers of 
private security companies. As a result, anonymity and confidentiality of participants’ 
identities have been maintained. This condition was deemed necessary to elicit 
authentic responses, but mainly because most participants were unwilling to confer 
consent to allow the names of their private security companies to appear in this report. 
Additionally, there was a request to review this report, as a precondition for 
some participants’ consent. The foregoing represented a limitation in terms 
of referencing the PSC in question and by whom the information was sourced. 
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Participants were informed that they would only be privy to the final report and 
thus chose to remain anonymous. In order to conduct these interviews, a semi-
structured interview questionnaire which contained 41 open-ended questions for 
company managers and 15 for industry representatives was developed. Open-
ended questions were ideally suited for this research, because they are aimed at 
encouraging respondents to express their own opinions, and they provided the 
opportunity for detailed responses from individuals. 
Questions were structured in a way that prompted the respondent to express 
their sentiments, perceptions, opinions and suggestions that may not have been 
initially considered. Such an approach presented an opportunity to gather more 
insights to include when answering the research question. The concerns raised 
during the course of the interviews have defined the modalities that underpin 
the current gaps in knowledge about the private security industry, especially in 
relation to the support they offer the State through the provision of security. 
Indeed, Stenning argues that in a contemporary context, it is near impossible to 
‘identify any function or responsibility of the public police that is not, somewhere 
and under some circumstances, assumed and performed by private police in 
democratic societies’ (Stenning, 2009: 25). The reference to private police in 
referring to private security actors, as interpreted by other scholars, is avoided 
in the analysis presented below in order to provide a clear distinction between 
the public police and private security actors.
2. Contemporary security threats
2.1. Background
As alluded to earlier, the political transition in South Africa also necessitated 
a transformation of the security structures of the country. Key to this was 
establishing a police service capable of operating in a democratic environment. 
A major complication was the need to amalgamate the policing structures of the 
separate political entities that had been reincorporated into South Africa. These 
included the policing structures of four nominally independent states (Transkei, 
Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei), six self-governing territories (Gazankulu, 
Kangwane, KwaNdebele, KwaZulu, Lebowa and Qwaqwa) and the South African 
Police Force, as it was formerly called (SAPS website). Unlike the former police 
force that was authoritarian, highly centralised and para-military, the new police 
service was required to resonate with principles of democratic policing (White 
Paper on Safety and Security, 1998). 
Furthermore, immediately after 1994, there was a significant surge in crime 
and a perception that organs intended for social control made no real effort to 
control crime (Cavallaro, 2008). The 1998 White Paper on Safety and Security 
affirmed that the surge in crime in the country reflected a typical feature of 
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states undergoing political transitions (White Paper on Safety and Security, 
1998). This surge in crime led to a lack of confidence in government’s ability to 
protect its citizens and to the proliferation of the private security industry. The 
lack of confidence was informed and framed within the context of a protracted 
process of transforming the police service. This was evidenced by the first phase 
of Western-led assistance, which aimed to transform and legitimise the police 
as an organ for social control, followed in 1996 by a second phase of Western 
assistance to address emerging crime (Cavallaro, 2008). 
Clarno and Murray find that policing in South Africa was never conventional and 
there was no ‘golden-age’ of policing whereby a single state-sponsored agent was 
able to preside over a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence (2013: 212). 
Rather they argue that the idea of upholding law and order through a centralised 
order was largely symbolic (Clarno and Murray, 2013: 212). Heavy handed policing 
tactics were commonly used under the apartheid regime. Vigneswaran argues 
that a collective selective memory and a path dependency condition forged; as 
new policing actors are taught law enforcement techniques from officials trained 
by the apartheid regime informs the continued use of this approach by South 
African police today (2014: 92).
A direct consequence of the apartheid government’s use of the police to control 
political opponents meant that police expertise to concentrate on crime control 
and crime prevention was severely weakened in the post-transition era (White 
Paper on Safety and Security, 1998). The racial fragmentation of police services 
in 1994 revealed the extent of the challenge facing the country as “74% of the 
country’s police stations were situated in white suburbs or business districts” 
(White Paper on Safety and Security, 1998). The architects of the new Constitution 
required a police service that would be responsive to all sections of society, with 
the envisaged aims articulated in the Constitution as follows:
 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act, No. 108 of 1996 lays down 
that the South African Police Service has a responsibility to: prevent, combat and 
investigate crime; maintain public order; protect and secure the inhabitants of the 
Republic and their property; and uphold and enforce the law; create a safe and 
secure environment for all people in South Africa; prevent anything that may threaten 
the safety or security of any community; investigate any crimes that threaten the 
safety or security of any community; ensure criminals are brought to justice; and 
participate in efforts to address the causes of crime. (SAPS website, 2014)
However, despite the ambitions of the proposed reforms for the SAPS, the number 
of and evolution of private security services form a critical point of departure for 
understanding the provision of security in the country. Reference is made to the 
National Crime Combating Strategy (NCCS) introduced in 2000 by the then Police 
Commissioner, the late Jackie Selebi, the aim of the strategy was to ‘‘stabilise 
153
and then normalize the crime rate’’ by committing increased manpower and 
resources to operational policing in the stations that had recorded the highest 
crime rates (Vigneswaran, 2014: 98). The strategy entailed using high-impact 
raids targeted at ‘high crime areas’ (Vigneswaran, 2014: 98). An example is used 
of the approach used in the Hillbrow area in Johannesburg in 1999 that included 
raids on crime hot-spots such as street corners and ‘bad buildings’ where crime 
rates were higher than average (Vigneswaran, 2014: 99). The focus was turned 
from criminals and their networks and concentrated on their infrastructure; 
results meant that several criminal syndicates left the area and overall there 
was a significant decrease in crime rates in Hillbrow (Vigneswaran, 2014: 100). 
The unintended consequence of this was that the syndicates simply adapted 
and responded to this new approach, leading to their criminal networks ‘spilling 
over’ to other major cities that previously never had a problem (Vigneswaran, 
2014: 100). It was observed in 2001 that an overwhelming majority of South 
Africans were not confident in government’s ability to control crime; this spurred 
the proliferation of the private security industry and vigilantism in the country 
(Cavallaro, 2008). The rapid and influential growth of the private security industry 
was described by one commentator as the ‘silent revolution’ (Irish, 1999). 
Arguably, this revolution was influenced by multiple factors including, the segregated 
policing during apartheid that created a “fragmented criminal justice system 
characterised by lack of infrastructure, scarcity of properly trained personnel, and 
poor service delivery; notwithstanding this, many trained detectives [from the 
former SAP] opted for highly paid jobs in the private [security] sector” (South 
African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC), 2006:127). The irony is that this 
migration of former members of the SAP was needed for the newly formed SAPS 
to bear a semblance of transformation. 
A view is held that further incentives to join the private security industry came in 
the form of the massive retrenchment packages that were offered to senior white 
police officers that were leaving the newly restructured police service (Minnaar 
& Mistry, 2004:41). The flight of experienced police officers was compounded 
by increasing crime rates during the transition period and a moratorium on the 
appointment of new police personnel between 1995 and 2002, decreasing from 
140 000 to 121 000 (Minnaar & Mistry, 2004:41-42). “With the opening of the 
country’s borders after 1994 and South Africa’s developed banking and transport 
infrastructure, various forms of organised crime like money laundering, cyber 
crime, vehicle hijacking and narcotics syndicates experienced rampant growth” 
(Minnaar & Mistry, 2004:42). 
The central argument in this report is that a partnership between state and 
non-state actors involved in crime control and prevention would be in line with 
already established trends of broadening the concept of ‘policing’. In 2010 the 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) published a ‘Handbook on 
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the Crime Prevention Guidelines: Making them Work’. The Handbook emphasises 
the importance of a shared responsibility for general safety and security. This is 
based on the recognition that the formal criminal justice system is not sufficient 
for preventing crime. Furthermore, it is conceded that with the leadership of 
government, different sectors of society can work together to ensure a shift from 
deterrent and reactive to forward-looking and proactive approaches to combat 
crime (UNODC Handbook, 2010). 
In this report, unless otherwise indicated, policing should be taken to mean any 
services rendered by the SAPS, pursuant to the objectives of the Constitution of 
the Republic outlined in the Police Service Act, No. 68 of 1995 and the subsequent 
South African Police Amendment Bill of 2012, the Criminal Procedure Act, No. 51 
of 1977 and the Firearm Control Act, No. 60 of 2000. Policing as undertaken by 
the SAPS refers to services including, but not limited to, visible policing, protection 
and security services, crime intelligence, detective services, criminal record and 
forensic services, combating organised crime, public order policing, community 
policing forums and boards, emergency response services, and reservists. On 
the 25th of February 2014 the former Minister of Police, E N Mthethwa, remarked 
in the National Assembly, that there are over 270 000 armed statutory forces 
comprising; the SAPS and the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) 
compared to over 445 407 registered private security officers – almost double 
the number of statutory forces combined (Politics Web, 2014). 
PSIRA’s Director, Mr Chauke, stated in an interview on the 30th of July 2013 that 
the vision for the private security industry in crime prevention stems from the 
preventative role they play in averting crime in the communities they operate in 
(2013). This is complementary to the SAPS’s reactionary role, and it was noted 
that there were potential gains to be made if planning on how to prevent crime 
was formalised. The Director asserted that a crime prevention role for the private 
security industry was already touted in the 1996 National Crime Prevention Strategy 
(NCPS), as part of an integrated society. He further highlighted that some joint 
operations already existed, for example, in the assets-in-transit (AIT) sector; in 
the form of a joint operations centre for collaboration between private security 
actors, the police, the banking sector and business (2013). 
According to Mr Chauke, since the establishment of the aformentioned centre, 
AIT ambushes have decreased, and this has been made possible through the 
dedicated work and intelligence of the private security industry and the SAPS, 
through investment in helicopters to monitor and respond when needed. He 
underscored that resources for a crime prevention partnership (CPP) should come 
from both agencies – as a sign of the willingness to contribute to crime prevention. 
He further noted that simultaneously, the SAPS should develop effective policies 
that can facilitate and enhance the manpower needed to prevent crime (2013).
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The Civilian Secretariat for Police in the ‘Policy for [the] Establishment of 
Community Safety Forums’ (CSF) asserts that indeed crime hinders socio-economic 
growth and that enhanced coordination and planning would drastically improve 
conditions of safety in South Africa (Civilian Secretariat for Police: 11). One of the 
main objectives of a CSF is to: coordinate, promote cooperation, synergise and 
integrate planning and budgeting between government departments on matters 
of community safety and security (Civilian Secretariat for Police: 12). Despite 
the usefulness of a CSF in cultivating networks with relevant agencies to assist in 
crime prevention, appropriate buy-in is however lacking with regards to including 
the private security industry. The inclusion of the private security industry to 
support crime prevention initiatives could be interpreted to mean that government 
inputs and outputs can be expedited; through the use of available resources from 
within the private security industry and in line with a developmental perspective 
(Civilian Secretariat for Police: 6).
2.2. Contemporary security threats
A critical aspect of domestic security in South Africa is framed around the reality 
and perception of crime. The SAPS 2011/2012 Crime Statistics charted the anatomy 
of serious crime in the country between 2004/05 to 2011/12 (see Figure 1). 






















Source: SAPS Crime Statistics Overview RSA 2011/12 page 6
Figure 1 reflects serious crime categories whose distribution is calculated by 8 year 
crime data. These categories are contact crime, contact-related crime, property-
related crime, crime detected by police actions and other serious crime. Contact 
crime examples include murder, attempted murder, sexual offences, assault with 
grievous bodily harm (GBH), common assault, aggravated robbery and common 
robbery. It also includes trio crime such as carjacking, residential and business 
robberies (SAPS Crime Statistics, 2011/2012). Contact-related crime refers to 
arson and malicious damage to property, whereas property-related crime is 
defined as burglary – residential and non-residential; theft of motor vehicle/cycle; 
theft out of motor vehicle; and stock theft (SAPS Crime Statistics, 2011/2012). 
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Crime detected as a result of police action refers to illegal possession of firearm/
ammunition and driving under the influence of alcohol and drugs. It is noted that 
this category of crimes may increase as a result of police action. Other serious 
crimes relate to theft, commercial crime, and shoplifting (SAPS Crime Statistics, 
2011/2012:6). According to managers from undisclosed private security companies 
in an interview on 7 October 2013 and 15 November 2013, the crime statistics 
are of significant relevance to the private security industry, which relies on these 
statistics to plan and pre-empt security services for its clients.
Managers of PSCs that were interviewed for this research were asked if they had a 
way to chart crime levels in the area where they operated. The responses that follow 
were recorded. Two managers from an undisclosed private security company in Cape 
Town stated in an interview on 13 November 2013 that they did not have a way of 
charting whether crime had increased or decreased in the area where their PSCs 
operated, further noting that according to their experience, crime seemed to have 
increased over the past eight years, especially on farms in Stellenbosch – referring 
to armed robberies and an increase in ATM bombings. Another manager from an 
undisclosed private security company stated in an interview on 12 November 2013 
that crime rates were dependent on the location of the site and the type of crime 
prevention the client sought, claiming that in residential areas, crime had gone down 
and that in low-cost housing areas, there were minor incidences involving access 
control. He further went on to state that the biggest problem the PSC experienced 
was with construction sites, especially with cases involving employees that stole 
equipment (such as cement and pipes), but noted that through police assistance 
there had been major improvements. Managers of two different undisclosed PSCs 
noted in an interview on 14 November 2013 and 15 November 2013 that crime 
had levelled and had even decreased, based on their experience, comparison of 
previous years, interaction, and reliance on the SAPS’s crime statistics.
Two different interviews with a manager from an undisclosed private security 
company and another from Quemic Group on 8 November 2013 yielded responses 
that affirmed a decrease in copper cable theft, with one specifying that their 
services for power utility Eskom had resulted in a 75% decrease in this crime. 
One manager from Silver Solutions Fund claimed in an interview on 10 October 
2013 that it was difficult to know if crime had peaked or dipped, as they had not 
experienced much crime in the area where they operate and was unsure if this 
was as a result of the services they as a PSC offered. He also stated that there 
was no accurate data from SAPS, which made it difficult to know what was real 
and what was not. Two managers in Pretoria from an undisclosed PSC claimed 
in an interview on 7 October 2013 that there had been no decline in crime and 
copper theft, which had continued unabated in the area. 
In Durban, two managers from Tactical Security Services highlighted in an interview 
on 8 November 2013 that the biggest problem in the area was housebreakings, noting 
that he and his colleagues continued to attend weekly meetings with the SAPS to keep 
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up with crime trends in the area. One manager from an undisclosed private security 
company noted in an interview on 6 November 2013 that there had been a definite 
decline in crime on the farms where most of their operations were concentrated, and 
the manager had seen a decline from 140 incidents every month to only 25. This, he 
noted, was because of the role the PSC officers played in arresting suspects. 
Minimal incidents of crime were recorded at the point of duty for another PSC, 
according to the manager from the undisclosed PSC in an interview on 7 November 
2013, while another manager from an undisclosed private security company noted in 
an interivew on 8 November 2013 that his PSC relied on information from the police 
station in the area; however, he could not say for sure that crime had gone down 
in the area. Another manager from an undisclosed private security company noted 
in an interview on 5 November 2013 that crime was lower where they operated, 
particularly theft, which had become minimal with one or two incidences a month. 
Yet another manager from an undisclosed private security company noted in an 
interview on 5 November 2013 that they had no way of charting crime levels, which 
came down to police visibility that was lacking in the area. It was noted that monthly 
meetings were held with clients to allow the PSC to map crime trends in the area; 
the manager noted that intermittent spikes of crime were dealt with accordingly. 
A question was posed to the managers of different private security companies 
regarding what the most common kind of crime that private security officers 
had to attend to in the pursuit of their companies’ objectives. One manager 
from an undisclosed private security company in Durban stated in an interview on 
5 November 2013 that the theft of cable was the most concerning and common 
crime, especially at the container depot; the manager recalled an incident in 
which 30–40 metres of cable was stolen. The PSC is responsible for providing 
24-hour monitoring, including CCTV surveillance for clients such as Transnet 
and Greenrock Shipping. Another manager from an undisclosed PSC whose 
company also deals with the protection of copper cables stated in an interview 
on 6 November 2013 that this was a major issue on farms as well and posed a 
threat to the stability of dams and boreholes. Cable theft came up again as being 
a major crime, and one of the interviewees from an undisclosed private security 
company stated on 5 November 2013 that his PSC is responsible for preventing 
this crime for the eThekwini Municipality and the Pietermaritzburg Municipality. 
They also identified the illegal sale of scrap metal and second-hand goods as a 
major concern for their clients. 
An aggregate of the most common crimes recorded by PSCs, according to managers 
of private security companies in interviews from 5 October 2013 to 15 November 
2013, were housebreaking, burglary and robbery, armed robbery, breaking and 
entering, vandalism, assault, malicious damage to property, stowaways, illegal 
immigrants entering and leaving the country on ships, theft, mugging, assaults 
in health institutions, public disorder, shoplifting, heists during cash-in-transit, 
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trespassing, internal cash losses and internal theft of security equipment such as 
laptops and hand radios, fraud, and sabotage of parastatals, with regard to an 
incident that involved a stand-off with the organisation Green Peace. 
These crimes represent the primary concern for the private security companies 
that participated in the study and reflect a close resemblance to the crimes the 
SAPS have a mandate to address, despite the real and perceived dichotomy of 
the two agents. The distinction in legal terms between the police and the private 
security industry is clear and concise; however, Berg notes that ‘they seem to 
underpin not necessarily what the private security does – in terms of its similarity 
to the State police and the oversight challenges that this creates – but rather 
that industry is run on business principles’ (Berg, 2007). How this may affect the 
proposal of a crime prevention partnership between the police and the private 
security industry will be discussed in more detail later in the report.
2.2.1. Crime as a social phenomenon
Developing a substantial argument to show causality between socio-economic 
challenges, namely, inequality, unemployment and poverty and how this is 
correlated with crime, is beyond the scope of this report. However, one can 
establish the emergence of fault lines in the South African context, particularly 
when socio-economic challenges are conflated with the realities of maintaining 
stability within the global economy (World Economic Outlook Update, 2014) and 
consequently the effect this has on the local public. The 1995 National Crime 
Prevention Strategy (NCPS) asserted that the “causes of crime are deeply rooted 
in the history and socio-economic reality of South African society” (National 
Crime Prevention Strategy, 1995). What applied in 1995 can still be traced in 
the contemporary South African context, as the emphasis continues to be on 
“transformation imperatives that will accelerate growth, create work opportunities 
and build a more equal society” (Minister of Finance, Budget Speech, 2014). The 
NCPS juxtaposed the violent history of the country and the ‘culture of violence’ 
associated with criminal activity, with the unfulfilled material expectations from 
the political transition and the limited capacity to deliver for the new government 
(National Crime Prevention Strategy, 1996). The inference was made that “the very 
high and often unrealised expectations associated with transition have contributed 
to the justification of crime” (National Crime Prevention Strategy, 1996). 
The Victims of Crime Survey (VOCS) is a countrywide survey that aims to 
provide information regarding the dynamics of crime from the perspective of 
households and the victims of crime; perceptions about crime and victimisation 
are complemented by crime data provided by the SAPS. While the VOCS cannot 
replace police statistics, it can contribute to capturing the overarching characteristics 
that govern crime and perceptions of crime (Victims of Crime Survey, 2012). 
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VOCS reflects data that is sensitive in nature. Hence, Statistics South Africa is 
obligated to survey households using the highest ethical standards in order to 
ensure integrity, informed consent and the protection of privacy. The following 
quote is noteworthy:
Victimisation surveys are likely to produce higher crime estimates than police-recorded 
administrative data. This is due to the fact that many crimes are not reported to 
the police. Victim surveys deal with incidents which may not necessarily match the 
legal definition of crime. Although data from crime victim surveys are likely to elicit 
better disclosure of criminal incidents than data from police records, they can also be 
subject to undercounting, as some victims may be reluctant to disclose information, 
particularly for incidents of a sensitive nature, such as sexual assault. The accuracy 
of statistics is influenced by the ability of people to recall past victimisations. The 
longer the elapsed time period, the less likely it is that an incident will be recalled 
accurately. Surveys are also subject to sampling and non-sampling errors. The most 
basic difference between the two types of crime measurement is the method of data 
collection. Police-reported statistics obtain data from police administrative records. 
In contrast, victim surveys collect both household and personal information about 
their victimisation experiences through face-to-face interviews. The survey covers 
victims’ experiences of crime at a micro-data level, including the impact of crime 
on victims. Police-reported statistics normally collate information on all incidents 
reported to a variety of police stations. Victim surveys ask a sample of the population 
about their experience and, if well designed, this sample should be representative 
of the population as a whole. (VOCS, 2012)
 
A 2003 VOCS revealed that in the four largest cities in South Africa, namely, Pretoria, 
Johannesburg, Durban and Cape Town, “the most common crime was burglary 
followed by muggings, robbery and assault, with the exception of Pretoria, where the 
next most common crime was vehicle motor theft” (Van Der Spuy & Rönsch, 2008). 
It was affirmed that in all four cities, previously disadvantaged groups (Africans, 
Coloureds and Asians) were disproportionately more affected by violent crime and 
Whites were affected by property crime (Van Der Spuy & Rönsch, 2008). 
Figure 2 was taken from the most recent VOCS for 2012, which takes a different 
approach and reveals the main reason why households that participated in the 
survey felt they were not satisfied with the police in their area. It was indicated 
that 72.4% of participants highlighted that this was because of the delays it took 
for the police to respond, while 58% noted that it was due to police laziness 
(Victims of Crime Survey, 2012:32). Hence, it is worthy to note, 
The 2012 Victims of Crime Survey found that six in every ten (59.3%) households 
perceived housebreaking/burglary to be one of the most common types of crime, 
followed by home robbery (46.2%), street robbery (41.4%) and pick-pocketing 
(32.1%). Only 1.7% of the households perceived white-collar crime as a common 
type of crime. Approximately half of households thought housebreaking/burglary 
(57.4%) and home robbery (49.8%) were the most feared crimes in their areas. The 
third most feared crime was street robbery (39.6%), followed by murder (38.8%). 
About one in three households said that they were afraid of pick-pocketing (31.2%), 
sexual offences (29.8%) and assault (23.6%). (Victims of Crime Survey, 2012:7)
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Figure 2: Results from the most recent VOCS for 2012
WC EC NC FS KZN NW GP MP LP RSA
 Not enough
    resources 32,6 37,8 44,7 37,8 37,7 47,5 34,8 34,4 29,9 36,5
 Lazy 61,8 60,1 44,1 51,7 71.2 38,7 62,2 36,6 55,5 58,0
 Corrupt 59,2 30,5 30,3 46,4 43,2 36,4 63,8 35,2 42,8 46,8
 Don’t come to  
    the area 50,6 37,1 35,7 39,9 45,0 31,9 36,6 40,2 51,0 41,2
 Release  
    criminals early 50,9 51,5 34,0 40,4 36,9 38,5 52,1 33,2 49,2 44,8
 Cooperate 
    with criminals 47,8 22,0 32,9 30,0 23,5 27,2 53,0 27,7 34,1 35,0
 Harsh towards 
    victims 46,7 32,8 18,3 28,3 23,4 27,1 36,4 14,6 27,5 30,1
 Never recover 44,2 38,4 28,0 43,9 44,6 38,7 48,4 32,3 37,0 42,1
 Don’t respond  
    on time 69,1 82,6 80,2 82,7 65,4 84,9 67,0 70,2 72,7 72,4












Source: Statistics South Africa, Victims of Crime Survey 2012
A consensus exists among both scholars and the international community that 
lethal violence is often rooted in contexts of deprivation, inequality and injustice, 
social marginalisation, low levels of education, and a weak rule of law (UNODC 
Handbook, 2010:29). At a global level, low levels of violent crime are associated 
with higher stages of development and income equality (UNODC Handbook, 
2010:29). Economic deprivation in no way justifies the incidents of crime, but it 
should rather inform decision-makers of the importance of enacting policies to 
address the root causes of crime associated with deprivation and the consequences 
this has on the society as a whole. 
A further security threat in the South African landscape has been framed by the 
increasing prevalence of violent service delivery protests ‘galvanised by inadequate 
local services or tardy service delivery, the responsibility for which lies with a 
municipality’ (Allan & Heese, Municipal IQ website, 2009). Research from Municipal 







deprived unemployed persons from rural to urban areas and the occurrence of 
violent service delivery protests; this is revealed by their occurrence in informal 
settlements – a sign of failed local government economic policy (Allan & Heese, 
2009). Figures 3 and 4 reflect barometers from the Multi-Level Government Initiative 
(2014) that have charted the frequency of service delivery protests and the annual 
growth rate of protest activity, which indicate that the growth rate of protests has 
increased by 100% in each year of the data set. The initiative defines protest as 
any complaint or issue cited by protesters in reports, whether related to the delivery 
of municipal services or not, over which citizens decide to and actually engage in 
organised public protest activity (Multi-Level Government Initiative 2014).
















Source: Multi-level Government Initiative, Data on Protest Activity from February 2007 to 
August 2012




















Source: Multi-level Government Initiative, Data on Protest Activity from February 2007 to 
August 2012
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The pervasive nature of service delivery protests and their susceptibility to 
violence is most notable in the South African context, with implications on the 
way that the police’s approach to service delivery protests is discerned. The Bill 
of Rights underscores that ‘everyone has the right, peacefully and unarmed, to 
assemble, to demonstrate, to picket and to present petitions’ (Constitution of South 
Africa, Act, No. 108 of 1996, Section 17). However, protest activity is becoming 
increasingly marked by violence “service delivery protests are not supposed 
to be dangerous; it is the responsibility of the police to deal with it in such a 
manner that it does not become dangerous … police violence at service delivery 
protests it has been noted, has become a trend” (Mail & Guardian website). The 
link was made in the 1996 National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) between 
unfulfilled material expectations of citizens and the justification of crime, and that 
the “historical criminalisation of political activity and protest has…contributed to 
a blurring between legitimate forms of protest and criminality’’ (NCPS, 1996).
 
A reflection of the paradoxes and conflicting morality that exists in policing practices 
are highlighted in particular reference to the public police who are ‘intended to 
produce a degree of certainty in managing fundamentally problematic yet recurrent 
situations’ (Loader, 2011:451–452). It is argued that the public police are proverbially 
caught between a rock and a hard place due to the fact that they are the ‘fire that 
you fight fire with’ and are endowed with the authority to partake in activities that 
would be considered as criminal for the rest of society (Loader, 2011:452).
Faull (2013:9) makes the claim that violence as a tool for earning respect has 
been normalised and that many members of the SAPS have embraced the view 
that violence teaches lessons and solves problems, and also that it builds respect. 
Conversely, it is noteworthy that the police, in their efforts to counter crime, are 
caught in the ‘crossfire’, and ‘between 2005 and 2013, close to 800 police officers 
were killed’ (State of the Nation Address, 2014). One of the most compelling 
incidents that have brought to the fore the challenges in public policing was the 
16 August 2012 Marikana massacre and its subsequent aftermath. The incident 
involved the shooting and deaths of 34 mineworkers (South African History 
Online, 2014), and cast an ominous shadow on the future of the mining industry 
and the South African economy as a whole due to incidences of strike action that 
followed in the mining sector. The strike action referred to here was prominent 
during the drafting of this report; and was the five-month strike action in the 
country’s platinum sector (Fin 24, 2014). The Marikana massacre illustrated the 
increasingly strained link between human rights, the plight of the economically 
marginalised and public policing procedures in the country. 
During his 2014 State of the Nation Address, President Jacob Zuma expressed 
concern regarding violence during some of the protests that have been occurring 
in the country. He affirmed that the government supports “the right [of citizens] 
to protest, peacefully and unarmed … [but] that acts of violence, intimidation and 
destruction of property were criminal offences, and the police would arrest and 
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prosecute those who committed such acts” (State of the Nation Address, 2014). 
The President further stated that the loss of life in the hands of police could not 
be overlooked and asserted that the police must act within the ambit of the law at 
all times, but that scrutinising police action should not lead to glorifying anarchy 
in the South African society (State of the Nation Address, 2014).
It is however, worthy to note that, the National Development Plan (NDP) advocates 
for the professionalism of the police rather than the militarization of the police; 
owing to the increased likelihood of the latter influencing violent conduct against 
members of the police service (NDP, Chapter 12:355). It is highlighted in a 2011 
report by the Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID) formerly known 
as the Independent Complaints Directorate that there was an 800 percent increase 
in torture by the police, who’s role should not be conflated with the army but 
should rather discharge their duties with respect for civil and criminal law, and 
particularly, the Constitution (NDP, 2011:356). The NDP notes that, “the SAPS 
and the metropolitan police should be viewed as professionals, working in a 
skilled occupational group with a prime function to protect the public. They are 
the only agencies mandated to use necessary coercive force’’ (NDP, 2011:353).
The 2012/2013 National Crime statistics highlighted that “there had been a 
continued decline, in both ratios and figures of crime over the past nine years, 
2004/2005 to 2012/2013, against the increase in population figures” (SAPS, 
2013:2). The National Commissioner for Police asserted that there has been an 
observed correlation between the incidence of crime and the challenging socio-
economic conditions that prevail in the country (SAPS, 2013:2). It was stated that 
violent social behaviour characteristic of a majority of serious crime categories 
is deemed to be a serious concern, owing particularly to the failure for such 
violent behaviour to be deterred by [state] law enforcement agencies (SAPS, 
2013:2). The concession was made that a collective effort was paramount from 
all affected stakeholders, including local communities, and that the prevention 
of crime should be approached as a partnership in order to prevent the domino 
effect where small crimes escalated into more serious crimes (SAPS, 2013:2).
The question was posed regarding the standards of members of the private security 
industry and whether this ought to elicit endorsement from the SAPS as part of 
the State’s crime preventing force. PSIRA’s Deputy Director for Communications 
Ms Mofikoe, maintained in an interview on 2 June 2014 that technological 
advancements in the private security industry demonstrated that the industry 
was evolving with the times and was constantly refining the skills of members to 
provide better security. However, it was noted that low barriers-to-entry created 
challenges with respect to ensuring that standards of the industry were kept high, 
this was further compounded by the fact that the industry created jobs, which 
meant that barriers should neither be too high (Deputy Director Communications, 
2014). Concerning this, it was noted that it was essential to develop a new minimum 
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entry requirement that would enable the private security industry to create jobs, 
without hindering the quality and professionalism of recruits (Deputy Director 
Communications, 2014). 
3. The size of the private security industry
The proliferation of private security service providers reveals a gap in the safety 
and security demands of what South African citizens expect and the reality of what 
the SAPS can feasibly offer. Historical circumstances have played an instrumental 
role in the current unequal strength of the SAPS, which is considerably limited in 
size when compared to the South African private security industry. Concerning the 
growth of the private security industry, two critical policy shifts are worth mentioning. 
Firstly, the withdrawal of the South African Police (SAP) from conventional policing 
functions in the late 1970s to concentrate the SAP on efforts to suppress liberation 
movements and consolidate political control (White Paper on Safety and Security, 
1998; Berg & Gabi, 2011:3). According to Minnaar, ‘‘responding to burglar or 
intruder alarms situated in private homes, business premises and factories [was], 
strictly speaking, part of the police’s crime-combating and prevention functions, but 
due to resource constraints, this is no longer performed by the police’’ (Minnaar & 
Mistry, 2004:50). As a result, private security companies provide armed response 
services for clients who are able to afford it (Minnaar & Mistry, 2004:50–51).
Secondly, the enactment of the National Key Points (NKPs) Act, No. 102 of 1980 
that required PSCs to be recruited to support the role of the State in protecting 
NKPs, such as ports of entry, military bases and fuel plants (Berg & Gabi, 2011:3). 
Under the supervision of the South African Defence Force – the managing agent 
of the NKPs – the security of the NKPs was entrusted to their proprietors who 
were international companies, and were in favour of outsourcing security to 
local PSCs and to whom search and seizure powers were extended (Berg & Gabi, 
2011:3). It is submitted that the professionalism and militarism of the private 
security industry was due to the influence from the defence force (Berg & Gabi, 
2011). Legislation enacted to regulate the industry, led to expectations from 
other clients that the special powers and status of NKPs guards could be applied 
for the security services they sought (Berg & Gabi, 2011:3).
Additionally, it is noted that the practice of PSCs recruiting only members of the 
former SAP was abandoned in the 1990s (Irish, 1999), although this had already 
led to a dramatic influence on the quality of security provision. The skewed ratio 
of public police per head is also an intervening variable and can be attributed to 
the sense of inadequate security provision, whether real or imagined. The total 
personnel strength of the SAPS is 197 946, which is comprised of 155 531 SAPS 
Act and 42 415 Public Service Act personnel, at 31 March 2013, the police versus 
population ratio stood at a comparative ratio of 1:336 (SAPS 2012/2013 Annual 
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Report:26). Furthermore, claims have been made by Gareth Newham of the 
Institute for Security Studies (ISS) ‘that there are glaring ‘errors,’ in the newest 
crime statistics as a result of inaccurate population figures being used to compare 
the change in crime ratios between 2011–2012 and 2012–2013’ (S. Masombuka 
& G. Hosken, Times Live, 2013). This will remain a matter for conjecture, but 
may perhaps lead to a robust debate and engagement from the public regarding 
the merits or lack thereof of the SAPS crime statistics. 
In order to ensure that policing, both public and private, is equitable and accountable, 
it is asserted that private security needs to be considered in national and local 
government plans. This is provided for in the Constitution of South Africa Act, 
No. 108 of 1996, section 206 with regards to the political responsibility for the 
police; the member of Cabinet responsible for policing “must determine a national 
policing policy after taking into account the policing needs and priorities of the 
provinces” (Van Der Spuy & Rӧnsch, 2008:38). The 1998 White Paper on Safety 
and Security alluded that the role private security industry played in providing 
security was “useful … [and] in principle [the private security industry’s future 
role should be] one of partnership with the State” (White Paper on Safety and 
Security, 1998).
 
In South Africa, security provision and the criminality it seeks to counteract 
continues to be a reflection of the kind of society South Africans live in. It can 
be contended that a considerable number of the challenges facing South Africa 
as a developing country are derived from the high levels of crime, the high 
levels of fear of crime and the limited role the SAPS can play in crime prevention 
(Van Der Spuy & Rӧnsch, 2008:56).
Community involvement in crime prevention measures should be framed as an 
inevitable need, considering the demands on the SAPS since 1994 to respond 
to the constitutional criteria for police reform and the challenges of policing in a 
democratic environment (White Paper on Safety and Security, 1998). According to 
the South African Police Service Act, No. 68 of 1995, Chapter 7, Section 18, (1) (a), 
(b), (c), (d), (e), (f), Community Policing Forums (CPFs) were established. Their 
objectives are to establish and maintain a partnership between the community 
and the SAPS, promote communication, cooperation and joint identification and 
problem-solving, and improve police services and transparency in the SAPS. For 
well-resourced communities, this also means taking responsibility for their safety 
through the private security industry and neighbourhood watch initiatives (Van 
Der Spuy & Rönsch, 2008:57). According to the 2011/2012 VOCS, 
About two-thirds (65.6%) of households in Gauteng and the Western Cape (64.4%) 
indicated that they took physical protection measures to protect their homes. The 
extent to which a household crime is reported to the police depends on the type of 
crime. Murder was most likely to be reported (98.2%), followed by car theft (92.2%). 
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About 60% of housebreaking/burglary, deliberate damage of dwelling, and home 
robbery was reported to the police. Amongst those who didn’t report crime to the 
police, some had indicated that they had reported it to a traditional authority, local 
gang, Community Policing Forum, insurance company, private security, local ward 
councillor or local vigilante group. (Victims of Crime Survey, 2012:2–3)
The private security industry in South Africa is considered one of the largest in 
the world, in terms of its contribution – which amounts to 2% of the country’s 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Berg & Nouveau, 2011:23). The industry is made 
up of private security companies and private security officers who are legally 
registered business entities and individuals who provide – on a contractual basis 
– security services as defined in the PSIRA Act, No. 56 of 2001. It is stated 
that the industry has continued to grow, in response to the growing crime rate 
characteristic of the transitional period and because it has created an ‘avenue 
for employment for returning liberation army members’ and also as a result, of 
increased liberalisation of the economy (Berg & Gabi, 2011:5). 
The figures that represent the industry are staggering, and they strengthen the 
point that the industry is growing at an exponential rate. This is the same industry 
that was valued at R1.2 billion in 1990 (Minnaar, 2007:127). In 2007, the industry 
was estimated to have a net worth of R30 billion (Minnaar, 2007: 129). In 2010, 
as an indication of the private security industry’s rapid growth, the industry was 
recorded to have an annual turnover of R40 billion (Berg & Gabi, 2011:5). Figures 
5 and 6 reveal the growth of active and inactive private security businesses and 
security officers since 1991 respectively. This information has been sourced through 
PSIRA’s records.  
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Figures 5 and 6 reveal the sheer demand for the private security industry, which has 
become a critical player in the provision of security in South Africa. It is no secret 
that South African crime statistics are among the worst in the world. Between April 
2013 to March 2014, the SAPS recorded 17 068 instances of murder, 62 649 total 
sexual offences, 260 460 instances of burglary at residential premises, 11 221 
instances of carjacking, 145 instances of robbery of cash-in-transit, and 19 284 
of robbery at residential premises (South African Police Service, 2014). It can be 
argued that on their own, the South African police do not have sufficient capacity 
to effectively provide security to the South African population. This is where the 
demand for the private security sector becomes critical and has been manifested 
in the increase in demand for security services, particularly in the guarding sector. 
From the figures reflected in the latest PSIRA Annual Report (2013/2014), it 
is clear that the guarding sector continues to be the most sought after. During 
this period, a total of 7 220 active guarding businesses were registered with 
PSIRA as compared to 6 370 during the 2012/2013 financial year (PSIRA Annual 
Report 2012/2013:36). The demand for armed response services is also on the 
rise. During the financial year 2013/2014, a total number of 4 550 registered 
armed response security businesses were recorded as compared to 2 740 for the 
2012/2013 financial year (PSIRA Annual Report 2012/2013:36). Another increase 
is also recorded within the cash-in-transit sector. During the same period, a total 
number of 4 465 cash-in-transit security businesses were registered as compared to 
2 061 during the 2012/2013 financial year (PSIRA Annual Report 2012/2013:36). 
The above figures illustrate that the South African private security industry is 
thriving and will continue to do so in the foreseeable future. South African private 
security providers are armed, and the services that are most in demand remain 
the guarding services, followed by armed response and cash-in-transit services.
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However, some rogue elements have also tainted the industry by committing 
criminal offences, resulting from the nature of their work. The misuse of firearms 
by security guards has also been witnessed within the private security industry. 
Regarding the illegal use of firearms within the private security industry, Jaynes 
postulates that private security companies are perceived as a high risk for the 
diversion of company weapons to an illegal pool that uses company firearms to 
perpetrate violence (Jaynes, 2012:24). Jaynes affirms that there is insufficient 
data on how many firearms are used, in which crimes they are used and on the 
rates of diversion. The shortcomings, in terms of misconduct and criminality 
within the private security industry, are highlighted later in this report, in order 
to assess the feasibility of a crime prevention partnership between state and 
non-state actors. 
4. Reasons for the growth of the private security 
industry
In the first 10 years of South Africa’s democracy, many of the laws, rules and norms 
pertaining to security governance and the public figures responsible for implementing 
them underwent constant transformation (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2006:303). Communities’ 
increased participation in the governance of their own security was markedly influenced 
by the growing crime levels – a typical feature of transitional countries. This reflects 
a legacy of the devolution of security to private actors that was encouraged in the 
early 1970s (by the apartheid government), intended to allow the national police to 
focus on political objectives (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2006:301-302). Many residents, rich 
and poor, black and white, expressed that at a certain point, they ‘had to take the 
law into their own hands’ (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2006:302). 
International trends for good governance and community participation in the 
production of security, the necessity of regaining residents’ (particularly in townships) 
confidence, as well as the current inability of the police service to ensure security, led 
the post-apartheid state to enhance non-state actors’ participation in the provision 
of security. (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2008:1934)
In the preceding period before 1994, security in affluent (predominantly white) 
neighbourhoods was outsourced to private security companies, while in the townships, 
community policing and justice systems developed, spurred on since the 1980s by 
urban political movements intended to make the townships ‘ungovernable’ (Bénit-
Gbaffou, 2006:301-302). Civic organisations developed with the aim of making 
self-justice movements, with very tight street and neighbourhood networks, more 
politically visible (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2008:1934). There was a pervasive perception that 
the police were unable to protect the public. South Africa’s apartheid government 
encouraged the expansion of the private security industry in order to allow the police 
services to focus on consolidating political control. This explains the dominance 
of white former police and military personnel in management positions of PSCs 
(Abrahamsen & Williams, 2007; Irish, 1999). However, today this dominance 
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has changed markedly, and the private security industry is increasingly seen as 
a lucrative and entrepreneurial enterprise for all members of the South African 
society; despite room for improvement in this regard.
The growth of the private security industry was also informed by the increased 
access for the public to private property, such as shopping malls. The powers 
exhibited by members of the private security industry and private security officers, 
in particular, derive from the property laws of the 20th and 21st century and are 
compounded by the urbanisation of modern cities (Stenning, 2009:24). This is 
characterised by ‘mass private property’ and other forms of ‘communal property’ 
(Stenning, 2009:24). The property rights in the South African Constitution 
effectively give the property owner the right of admission for the type of persons 
allowed on their property; such property, although it is considered to be privately 
owned, is used by the public as a public space. 
‘Mass private property’ refers to urban shopping malls, sports stadia, recreational 
and entertainment centres, airports, transport hubs and ‘communal property’ such as 
gated communities or security villages (Stenning, 2009:24). The potential for abuse is 
noted when private property owners and their private security agents have ‘unfettered’ 
powers to control members of the public who use or access mass private property 
(Stenning, 2009: 27). How this may lead to the rights of individuals being infringed 
upon, in the South African context, is discussed in more detail later in the report.  
One of the questions invited opinions from security managers of private security 
companies in interviews from 5 October 2013 to 15 November 2013. It was regarding 
the factors that contribute to the growth of the private security industry. While 
all expressed that the biggest factor was crime and the fear of crime, responses 
revealed that managers of PSCs felt that the increased demand for their services 
was because crime is at its worst. The suggestion was that in most cases this 
was related to unemployment. One manager from an undisclosed PSC stated in 
an interview on 5 October 2013 that the growth was linked to the ‘huge increase 
in crime and the inability of police to reduce it’. 
In interviews with managers of private security companies from 5 October 2013 
to 15 November 2013, the aggregate of the responses suggested a consensus 
that key factors for the growth of the private security industry included; the lack 
of trust in the SAPS and lack of sufficient capacity for the SAPS on the ground. 
In Durban, one manager from an undisclosed private security company noted in 
an interview on 5 November 2013 that the economy was booming, and this was 
interpreted through the increase in the construction of warehouses and the increased 
flow of exports which had made security vital. It was stated by respondents from 
Quemic Group in an interview on 8 October 2013 that the business sector and 
individuals did not have enough trust in the police, and this was compounded by 
low barriers to entry and how easy it was to buy a fake PSIRA certificate – that 
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only costs R50; these factors made private security a career of last resort and a 
key aspect of the unprecedented growth of the private security industry. 
The potential for misconduct and criminality, apparent in certain sectors of the 
private security industry highlights the need for stricter application and enforcement 
of PSIRA’s regulatory policies, to root out criminality and for the promotion of 
higher training standards, which are considered very low. The Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) that was concluded between PSIRA and the Safety and 
Security Sector and Education and Training Authority (SASSETA) in 2014 facilitates 
opportunities for skills transfer and development for all South Africans in the 
safety and security sector, seeking nationally recognized industry qualifications. 
SASSETA has been accredited by the South African Qualifications Authority (SAQA) 
to perform the function as an Education and Training Quality Assurance Body in 
terms of the SAQA Act and in agreement with the Quality Council for Trades and 
Occupations in terms of the National Qualifications Framework Act in respect of security 
qualifications registered on the National Qualifications Framework. Synergy between 
the PSIRA and SASSETA is critical in the sense that while the mandate of the former 
is to “promote high standards in the training of service providers and prospective 
security service providers” (PSIRA Act), the latter’s mandate is to “promote learning 
programmes” within the area of safety and security (Skills Development Act, 1998).
Overall the issue of low barriers to entry prompted a discussion about the 
establishment of a formal education system for the security industry, but this 
was discounted, as it would become too expensive. A suggestion was made that 
entry and training of school leavers that cannot afford tertiary education should be 
provided; however, it was noted that this would only be feasible if it were funded 
by the Safety and Security Sector Education and Training Authority (SASSETA). 
It was conceded that absence or negligence of the private security industry could 
have a negative effect on citizens, but that the consumer also played a crucial 
role and needed to be properly informed as ‘some members of the public only 
got private security in order to get insured’ (Quemic Group 08/10/2013). In Cape 
Town, one manager from an undisclosed private security company highlighted in 
an interview on 14 November 2013 that the increased demand for volumes of cash 
that needed to be transported, particularly to the suburbs, to supply the increasing 
number of ATMs was a sign that a booming economy also played a role. It was 
underscored by a manager from an undisclosed private security company in an 
interview on 15 November 2013 that the contribution of new smaller companies, 
with low rates for clients that outpaced the already established PSCs benchmark 
on quotations, was made worse by the ignorance of consumers. 
One manager noted that there was a link between the growth of the private 
security industry and the need for active monitoring because ‘a camera cannot 
offer any response or call the police’. A manager from an undisclosed private 
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security company, however, conceded in an interview on 12 November 2013 that 
a security officer is very limited in his/her response, as ‘they have limited training 
and are not willing to lose their lives for such little pay’. Two managers in Pretoria 
from an undisclosed PSC stated on 7 October 2013 that economic growth indeed 
played a role in the growth of the private security industry and noted that most of 
their clients were commercial enterprises, noting that the ease it took to become 
a security officer as compared to a police officer was also a factor. Furthermore, 
they highlighted that a major challenge in the industry was related to the training 
aspect of recruits and particularly those responsible for issuing training certificates; 
emphasis was placed on SASSETA’s role in inspecting these centres.
The claim has been made that the delegation of security is also rooted in a desire 
for public authorities to develop new and improved ways of managing the city, 
informed by “both an international call for ‘good governance’ and a neoliberal 
shift” (Bénit-Gbaffou, Didier & Morange, 2008:692). The plethora of actors, state 
and non-state, participating in the provision of security is an indication of the fear 
of crime and insecurity that persists in the country (Minnaar, 2007). It is alleged 
that this fear and insecurity stems from the Constitution’s protection of the rights 
of “arrested, detained, and sentenced persons … while not equally protecting 
ordinary citizens” (SAHRC Report, 2004:23). Private security providers conform to 
the demands of communities that seek a specialised and extra sense of security, 
which is supplementary to that provided by the public police. Their service resonates 
with residents who wish to “appropriate the streets for themselves and promote 
a condition of well-being, social linkage and safety” (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2006:309).
Regarding which security services are the most sought after in the private security 
industry, the responses from managers of private security companies revealed 
in interviews from 4 October 2013 to 15 November 2013 that the following 
services were in demand: guarding, installing electronic security systems, close 
protection, VIP protection, transporting high-risk cargo, Assets-In-Transit, farm 
security, investigations, monitoring and armed response, integrated and dynamic 
solutions (which included guarding and training), private investigations, consulting 
to ensure that electronic systems are up to standard and are compliant, and 
tactical teams sought after by farms and mines. 
It was however noted by a respondent from Silver Solutions Fund on 10 October 
2013 that requests for guarding and armed guarding had decreased in terms 
of people’s interest due to the length of time it takes to get a certificate issued 
from PSIRA. The Authority’s registration unit has heeded this challenge and, in 
line with PSIRA commitment to excellent service delivery, has achieved on overall 
average of a turnaround time of 19 days for individual registrations and 15 days 
for business registrations (PSRA Annual Report, 2013/2014:35). 
Furthermore, it was noted that regarding electronic security installations, clients 
do not want to pay for a proper camera, so they purchase one from the ‘China 
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malls’ and subsequently have difficulty servicing the camera. It was asserted by 
the respondent from Silver Solutions Fund that strict laws regarding the sale and 
installation of electronic security equipment and services should be implemented 
in a similar fashion as the law that applies to electric fences. For example, from 
1 December 2012, all new, upgraded and repaired electric fence installations in 
South Africa must be compliant, and the government has now established strict 
new regulations for this industry. By 1 October 2013, all electric fence installers 
were required to be registered after first passing a tough exam. The new law 
prescribes that electric fences must now be certified with an electric fence system 
certificate of compliance. However, electricians cannot issue this Electric Fence 
Certification (EFC), unless the electrician is also qualified in terms of the new 
electric fence laws and has been registered with the Department of Labour. Should 
a fence be found non-compliant, it will either have to be upgraded to compliance 
or the owner will be forced to remove it, according to the Department of Labour, 
Occupational Health and Safety Act, 1993.
In Cape Town, one manager from an undisclosed private security company stated 
in an interview on 14 November 2013 that his company provided ‘end-to-end’ 
type of security solutions, not just guarding, but also cash-in-transit (CIT) and the 
processing of cash. He indicated that to minimise incidents regarding the movement 
of consignments, clients used the same PSC for collecting and processing of cash 
in order to decrease chances of theft. One manager from an undisclosed PSC noted 
in an interview on 12 November 2013 that the most sought-after services were 
guarding and 24-hour monitoring from the control room. The manager went on 
to say that in the private security industry, there is always an issue with the cost 
structure and a concern of losing the client. He noted that government contracts 
were more profitable because ‘the government was able to pay’.
5. Services offered by the private security industry
Chapter 1, Section 1 of the PSIRA Act defines ‘security equipment’ to mean the 
following: an alarm system; a safe, vault or secured container; a satellite tracking 
device; closed circuit television or other electronic monitoring devices or surveillance 
equipment; a device used for intrusion detection, access control, bomb detection, fire 
detection, metal detection, X-ray inspection or for securing telephone communications; 
a specialised device used to open, close or engage locking mechanisms; or a 
specialised device used to reproduce or duplicate keys or other objects which are 
used to unlock, close or engage locking mechanisms (PSIRA Act, No. 56 of 2001). 
The Act further defines ‘security service’ to mean one or more of the following 
services or activities: protecting or safeguarding a person or property in any 
manner; giving advice on the protection or safeguarding of a person or property, 
on any other type of security service as defined, on the use of security equipment; 
providing a reactive or response service in connection with the safeguarding of a 
person or a property in any manner; providing a service aimed at ensuring order 
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and safety on the premises used for sporting, recreational, entertainment or similar 
purposes; manufacturing, importing, distributing or advertising of monitoring 
devices contemplated in Section 1 of the Interception and Monitoring Prohibition 
Act, No. 127 of 1992; performing the functions of a private investigator; providing 
security training or instruction to a security service provider or prospective security 
service provider; installing, servicing or repairing security equipment; monitoring 
signals or transmissions from electronic security equipment; performing the 
functions of a locksmith; making a person or the services of a person available, 
whether directly or indirectly, for the rendering of any service referred to in the 
aforementioned paragraph to another person; and managing, controlling or 
supervising the rendering of any of the services referred to in the aforementioned 
paragraph (PSIRA, No. 56 of 2001). Table 1 gives a more comprehensive look at 
the different services offered by private security providers according to PSIRA’s 
2013/2014 Annual Report.
Table 1: Different services offered by private security providers
Category of Security Service Number of PSC’s 2013/2014
1 Security guards (Industrial and Commercial) 7 220
2 Security guards – cash-in-transit 4 465
3 Bodyguarding (CPO) 6 089
4 Security consultant 4 181
5 Reaction services 4 550
6 Entertainment/venue control 6 231
7 Manufacture security equipment 1 705
8 Private investigator 4 478
9 Training 5 304
10 Security equipment installer 3 670
11 Locksmith/key cutter 1 160
12 Security control room 5 715
13 Special events 5 578
14 Car watch 3 199
15 Insurance 846
16 Security and loss control 707
17 Fire prevention and detection 459
18 Consulting engineer 155
19 Dog training 13
20 Alarm installers 129
21 Anti-poaching 5
22 Rendering of security service 5 093
Source: PSIRA Annual Report 2013/2014, p 41
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The private security sector is largely made up of private security companies and 
private security officers who play a defining role in the provision of security. 
The activities of the private security industry were legitimated by the Criminal 
Procedure Act, No. 51 of 1977, this allows private security members to: arrest 
persons without a warrant on the basis that the person committed or was suspected 
of committing, an offence; pursue that person; break open premises in order to 
effect the arrest; use force – even deadly force – to effect the arrest should the 
person offer up resistance and seize articles from that person (as long as they are 
delivered to a police officer as soon as possible). (Criminal Procedure Act, No. 51 of 
1977, Section 42 (a)(b)(2); Section 48; Section 49(2)(a)(b)(c)).
However, this is only applicable once the Commissioner of Police has conferred 
upon the private security officer a ‘peace officer status’. It must be noted that 
private security officers, even though the law allows this, are not conferred with 
a ‘peace officer’ status, and they carry out their duties as civilians, only incurring 
legitimacy from the contract with the client and property owner. The debate 
surrounding the constitutionality of the use of force sanctioned by the State for 
members of the SAPS when effecting arrests is of relevance here, owing to the 
proposal for a partnership to formalise the cooperation between the SAPS and 
members of the private security industry. In the field work undertaken, there 
was significant evidence of the reliance on the SAPS by members of the private 
security industry. Based on interviews from 4 October 2013 to 10 February 2014 
with managers and heads of industry associations of private security companies, 
this was particularly evident in instances where the response units and private 
security officers encountered a situation that required them to apprehend a 
suspect and required assistance from members of the SAPS to affect the arrest.
 
Interviews conducted with managers of undisclosed private security companies 
from 4th October 2013 to 15th November 2013 revealed resoundingly that the 
private security industry believed that its work would be enhanced if included 
in governmental policies dedicated to crime prevention. However, one private 
security company manager was adamant that the work of the police and the 
work of the private security industry should remain separate. Managers of the 
private security company that were interviewed on the 8th of November 2013 
were keen on the idea of a partnership with the police; ironically reiterating that 
the growth of the private security industry was due to the failings of the SAPS 
which was in need of reform. 
Managers of private security companies that were interviewed on 7 November 2013, 
that were in favour of a government-endorsed partnership with the SAPS, asserted 
that both partners would need to reform in order to have a meaningful partnership. 
The role the private security industry played in investigations and solving cases was 
highlighted in an interview on 6 November 2013 by one manager of an undisclosed 
private security company whose company specialised in investigations. He proposed 
that a budget and special status should be provided to the PSCs that solved a 
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certain number of cases. Investigations carried out by members of the industry 
are considered a key aspect of crime prevention, mainly due to the way this duty 
overlaps with the investigations carried out by members of the SAPS, according 
to a manager of a PSC interviewed on 5 November 2013. Improved training on 
the part of the private security companies – it was conceded – would be a vital 
element of such a partnership. This was emphasised in line with the proposition 
that such a partnership between the police and private security should include 
search and seizure powers for the latter. Regarding these comments, it is unclear 
how extending the powers of a security officer to include search and seizure would 
be implemented and be void of abuses considering the nature of transgressions 
characteristic of the private security industry. This will be discussed in more detail 
later in this report.
A question was posed regarding the kind of crime prevention partnership that 
members of the private security industry would envision if a partnership with 
the SAPS was formalised. Better access to crime data, more powers to handle 
crime prevention, search and seizure powers as opposed to powers of arrest, 
an enhanced status for security officers, and better cooperation and intelligence 
sharing were some of the responses by the managers of PSCs interviewed from 
4 October 2013 to 15 November 2013. The view was held by a respondent from 
Silver Solutions Fund interviewed on 10 October 2013 that the concept of a crime 
prevention partnership should foster access to data to ensure proper planning, 
in which case the security officer would remain subordinate to the police, but 
enable partnering only in specialised fields.
 
According to one manager from a PSC interviewed on 4 October 2013, information 
from the SAPS would be vital to training and particularly understanding the latest 
trends of criminals. This, it was noted by a manager of a PSC who was interviewed 
on 8 October 2013, would make it easier for private security officers to do their 
job. Having an input in the county’s crime prevention agenda, it was noted by 
another manager from a PSC who was interviewed on 7 October 2013, should 
not confuse roles because of the different levels of training for security guards 
and for the SAPS, conceding that prerequisite training was needed and that such 
a partnership was currently not possible. Mr Diavastos stated that he did not 
believe that private security officers should get more powers. He asserted that 
the private security industry should not take over any kind of state policing and 
noted that the SAPS made crime data available to everyone. Furthermore he stated 
that the private security industry should not do any intelligence gathering as this 
was the domain of the police, noting that the private security industry should 
rather  augment and fill the areas that the police could not (10 February 2014).
It was stated in an interview with a manager from a PSC on 4 October 2013 that 
access to crime data should only be for the managers of security companies and 
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not for security officers. Generally, it was stated that giving security officers more 
power was not a good idea; rather, only supervisors should get a special status or 
a ‘peace officer’ status. As far as one manager from a PSC who was interviewed on 
5 November 2013 was concerned, ‘peace officer’ status should only be granted to 
those security officers with the highest training levels, and it would be necessary for 
these officers to be familiar with the law. It was stated by another manager from 
a private security company who was interviewed on 7 November 2013 that more 
power, particularly of arrest, would allow security officers to apprehend suspects 
without any delays and would be more constructive after the appropriate training. 
More cooperation was deemed feasible because the majority of members of the 
private security industry had previously worked as police officers in the former 
police force and the SAPS, according to one manager from an undisclosed private 
security company whose interview took place on 13 November 2013.
One manager from a PSC, whose interview occurred on 13 November 2013, 
submitted that PSCs already had access to crime data through attendance of 
CPFs and noted that the SAPS does not have a problem giving information; he 
argued that rather more legitimacy is what was required. Being fully compliant 
is a criterion for getting a contract at government agencies; however, it was 
noted by another PSC manager interviewed on 13 November 2013 that there 
were some PSCs that had acquired contracts to provide security at government 
agencies, even when compliance was questionable. Some company managers 
continued to emphasise that they would want better access to crime data. The 
remark was made by a manager from an undisclosed private security company 
in an interview on 15 November 2013 that there was the risk of security officers 
becoming reluctant and turning a blind eye, and that it would have to be the 
best-trained private security officers to be considered for a partnership. 
Rooting out elements of poor training and criminality, in the context of such a 
hypothesis, was deemed by a manager of a PSC in an interview on 15 November 
2013 to be a critical component to its feasibility. It was stated that a partnership 
would only be constructive if regulation of the industry was improved. Once this is 
done, then officers could be trusted with more power because currently the attitude of 
security officers was that they were only civilians; this was the feeling of a manager 
from an undisclosed private security company interviewed on 14 November 2013. 
Certainly, benefits could be gained if a partnership was based on mutual respect 
and issues of egos were put aside. The focus would eventually gravitate towards 
complementing each other’s work, with a crucial awareness that one cannot expect 
a security officer to do the work of a police officer; instead, the emphasis should be 
on enabling the private security industry to play a supportive role.
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6. Privatisation of security: effect on women and 
children 
During the 2014 State of the Nation Address, President Jacob Zuma highlighted that 
one of the key focus areas for his government was the eradication of violence against 
women and children. He noted the measures that had been put in place to address 
this, including the reintroduction of the Family Violence, Child Protection and Sexual 
Offences Units, as well as the Sexual Offences Courts. This offers a contextual framing 
of the challenges that South Africa faces regarding violence against women and 
children (State of the Nation Address, 2014) and gender-based violence in general.
Regarding the role women play in the private security industry, the question was 
posed to find out what factors hindered or promoted the entry of women into 
the industry. Most responses by managers of PSCs that were interviewed from 
4 October 2013 to 15 November 2013 suggested that the main issue or hindrance 
for women in the private security industry was the type of site that was guarded 
and the clients’ preference. One manager in Cape Town who was interviewed on 
14 November 2013 noted that 50% of his officers were female and stated that they 
were not used for CIT and protection services; nevertheless, he noted that 50-80% 
of the personnel that were used to count and pack cash were female. Managers 
interviewed on 12 November 2013 highlighted that the main hindrance for women 
in the private security industry was that clients would specifically request to have 
only male security officers; some even went to the extent of requesting security 
officers from specific racial groups to work on their sites.
 
It was noted by one manager who was interviewed on 13 November 2013 that clients 
preferred male officers, particularly for guarding residential areas; conversely, in 
the retail and hotel industry, women were afforded more opportunities as security 
officers because of the role they played in searching female patrons. Other than 
that, it was affirmed by managers of private security companies interviewed from 
4 October 2013 to 15 November 2013 that there was no discrimination and that 
women worked in various capacities in the private security industry such as in 
management positions, as supervisors, control room operator administrators, 
secretaries and drivers. One manager in Durban, interviewed on 5 November 2013, 
stated that he had five female top site commanders, and there was nothing in 
his opinion that hindered their promotion; he however stated that more caution 
was applied in instances when women were deployed to sites.
It was conceded by one manager whose interview was conducted on 6 November 
2013 that it was his opinion that the private security industry was a dangerous 
environment for female officers, who only constituted 5% of the workforce in his 
PSC. This concern was raised by another manager interviewed on 7 October 2013 
that a female officer would be an easy target if she were to guard a site by herself 
because, indeed, danger is associated with site protection and management. One 
manager in Pretoria whose interview took place on 11 October 2013 noted that 
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women were hindered from progressing in the private security industry because 
they wanted to start families. 
Another manager in Durban who was interviewed on 8 November 2013 stated 
that 30% of his officers were female and that it was ‘just common sense that 
women could not do some jobs that men could’, reiterating that this was also 
influenced by the client’s preference. Another manager from an undisclosed 
private security company whose interview occurred on 8 November 2013 stated 
that female officers were only deployed to protect sites as a group and not for 
individual guarding; that manager emphasised that this was as a key precaution 
considering South Africa has one of the highest rape statistics in the world. The 
field work carried out does not point to any direct effect on children as a result 
of the services provided by the private security industry. 
7. Advantages and disadvantages of the private 
security industry
In South Africa, the evolution of policing services has been an inevitable necessity 
that has responded to the flux and flow of crime (Marais, 2001). Berg contends that 
it is no longer sufficient to engage with different policing agencies in isolation from 
one another, since increasingly, a diverse set of entities engage with one another on a 
daily basis (2007: 3). Pooling the resources and expertise from the police and private 
security would serve to enable a framework for cooperation and division of labour, 
help cultivate a coordinated approach to policing, and mitigate the prevalence of crime 
in the medium to long term. Undoubtedly, there was consensus among members of 
the private security industry who participated in the study that authority need not 
be a zero-sum game and that it is possible that the private security industry can 
strengthen and even support the authority of the State. Without doubt, it is exactly 
the relationship with the State that gives the private security industry legitimacy for 
their activities (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2007; Wakefield, 2005).
A re-conceptualisation of the ‘state, territory, authority’ marriage has been 
advocated for in order to enhance the understanding of new networks between 
state and non-state actors (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2007). It is stated that in an 
era of globalisation, PSCs are changing the conditions of ‘stateness’ through their 
day-to-day provision of security and the protection of life and assets (Abrahamsen 
& Williams, 2007). However, in South Africa, the State maintains an oversight 
role of the private security industry through the establishment of PSIRA – an 
independent regulatory body formed to facilitate all aspects of regulation of the 
private security industry including ‘compliance, legal services, enforcement, 
forensic investigations, industry training, customer relations management (CRM), 
registrations, communications, stakeholder management, and research and 
development’ (PSIRA Annual Report, 2013). 
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Some key developments for security privatisation indicate an alteration of the 
primacy of state authority. What follows below is an analysis of the circumstances 
that influence the alleged changing conditions of ‘stateness’. The emergence of road 
closures in affluent and sometimes less affluent residential areas was born out of 
residents’ decreased confidence in the State’s capacity to ensure security. However, 
these alternative security features have had major implications regarding questions 
about rights to access specific areas and the spatial fragmentation that they support. 
The development of road closures in the mid-1990s forged broader debates about 
the continued use of race and class divisions strongly resembling those used for 
political, economic and social segregation in the apartheid era. It is argued that these 
security practices that are exclusionary and in many ways criminalise poverty, are 
indirectly encouraged by public authorities through the State’s reliance on residents’ 
participation, in the production of their own security (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2008:1938).
 
“What happens when the private becomes the public, when the right to exclude 
expands from the home to a commonly accessible space, or when that right exists as 
a new spatial practice that allows us to [exclude those we do not want to encounter]?” 
(Berg, 2007). This conundrum implores a consideration of what it means when a 
public space comes to be governed by rules formerly reserved for private property 
(Berg, 2007:24). This query is of relevance, particularly after a consideration of the 
development of “more than 300 road closures [that were] implemented since 1996 
in the most affluent areas of Johannesburg … matching the socio-economic pattern of 
the city, [the prevalence of these road closures were erected mainly in] the northern, 
white, middle to upper-income class suburbs’’ (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2008:1935). 
The South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC), a state institution 
established by Chapter 9 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 
No. 108 of 1996 received complaints regarding the public road closures by using 
boom gates for crime prevention in some suburbs (SAHRC Report, 2004:7). 
The SAHRC concluded a report that found that the road closures were violating 
ordinary citizen’s human rights, mainly due to the allegation that individuals were 
being denied access based on their race and the infringement of individuals’ right 
to dignity and privacy (SAHRC Report, 2004:7). It was reported that domestic 
workers were required to produce their identity documents to gain access to the 
area (SAHRC Report, 2004:7,17). 
The racialisation of the road closures debate was underscored by the different 
treatment that was on offer for different races. “It was alleged that many of the 
security guards at these booms were instructed to, or chose to routinely stop 
black people in order to enquire about their movements; such treatment was not 
applied to white people” (SAHRC Report, 2004:17). The right to privacy was also 
emphasised in the discussions about the constitutionality of the road closures, 
and the assertion was made that privacy was only violated if “[t]he information 
was obtained in an intrusive manner, contained intimate aspects of a person’s life, 
180
the information provided was then used for another purpose, or disseminated to 
the press or general public or to persons for whom the person could reasonably 
expect such private information would be withheld” (SAHRC Report, 2004:19).
Ambiguity abounds regarding the successes of road closures in reducing incidences 
of crime. Some accounts suggest that road closures are not effective due to the laws 
that prohibit restricted access and claims that “the criminal has more time to act 
from within and is actually protected from the police by the closure” (Bénit-Gbaffou, 
2008: 1937). Other accounts have identified the gains made by the development 
of road closures in “preventing road-assisted crime, particularly hijackings” (Bénit-
Gbaffou, 2008: 1937). Notwithstanding the potential for infringements of ordinary 
citizens’ human rights, it must be noted that the prevalence of private security 
personnel manning road closures, points to broader social changes in the way South 
African citizens believe they need to manage their safety and security.
 
The process of delegation of security and other aspects related to city management 
has been protracted and, at times, presented an immense challenge in terms of the 
way the State delegates the governance of its domestic security architecture. On the 
one hand, pursuing ways to entrench its power and control, and on the other hand, 
promoting the use of alternative private security providers. Increasingly, trends are 
gravitating towards consumerism and the commodification of security. The fear of 
crime coupled with the supply of private security agents in the absence of state 
security guarantees, and the States’ adoption of ‘responsibilisation’ strategies, has 
created a platform through which private security providers can thrive (Berg, 2007:4). 
This is demonstrated by the development of different security networks informed 
by citizen’s security concerns, thus leading to specific urban and architectural forms 
and fragmentation (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2008:1934). It can be inferred that the use 
of road closures and boom gates imply that the State is loosening its grip on the 
monopoly of the legitimate means of violence. Arguably, ownership and stewardship 
of the proposed crime prevention partnership would realign and fortify the State’s 
principal role in providing security in the domestic realm.
During the field work carried out for this report, managers of private security 
companies were asked if they thought that the SAPS would benefit from working 
with members of the private security industry and what services they could offer 
in this regard. One company manager from a PSC expressed in an interview that 
was held on 7 October 2013 that they already had a close working relationship 
with the SAPS, particularly due to the criteria required for the protection of a NKP, 
which they were currently involved in guarding. They noted that they provided 
VIP protection and assisted the SAPS with investigations into copper cable theft. 
Another company manager interviewed on 10 October 2013 asserted that 
their company had dedicated and specialised experts that were involved in the 
protection of non-ferrous metals. The view was expressed that members of the 
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private security industry could offer a force-multiplying effect to bolster the 
work of the SAPS and assist with intelligence gathering. This is because private 
security companies had access to information on the ground and could be the 
eyes and ears of the police, according to a PSC manager that was interviewed 
on 8 October 2013. The force-multiplying effect that private security companies 
provide to state security members has also been identified by some scholars, 
namely Bayley & Shearing’s 1996 report titled ‘The Future of Policing.’ It was 
stated by a respondent from Quemic Group in an interview on 8 October 2013 
that the company had been allegedly encouraged by the Member of the Executive 
Council (MEC) of Mpumalanga to become more involved in the safeguarding of 
wildlife tourism in that area, which they were currently engaged in.
One manager of a private security company in Pretoria, who was interviewed 
on 10 October 2013, held the view that the SAPS officers were too busy and 
incapacitated to provide security comprehensively, affirming that more cooperation 
and dialogue would guarantee tangible gains through working together instead 
of against each other. It was highlighted in an interview with a manager of an 
undisclosed private security company on 10 October 2013 that the SAPS would 
benefit from a partnership with the private security industry because there was 
a significant amount of expertise that had shifted from the SAPS into the private 
security industry. By discarding the idea of such a partnership, it was emphasised 
by a manager of a PSC in an interview on 10 October 2013, that this would reflect 
a denial of the skills entrenched within the private security industry. Additionally, 
it was asserted that the SAPS and South African citizens would benefit from a 
public-private partnership through increased support and visibility from the private 
security industry.
8. Crime prevention partnerships between state and 
non-state actors
8.1. Findings
When asked whether the PSC has ever been involved in a joint operation with 
any state organ or member of the SAPS, what the operation was and how roles 
were divided, one company manager interviewed on 5 November 2013 stated 
that his company had not been involved in a joint operation with the SAPS but 
that they had in instances of theft, collected evidence and passed it over to the 
SAPS for further investigation. Three other PSCs highlighted in interviews held 
on 5 November 2013, 7 November 2013 and 8 November 2013 that they had 
not been involved in a joint operation with any state organ or the SAPS. Majority 
of respondents however, highlighted that joint operations with the SAPS were 
a common occurrence and, in fact, happened on a daily basis. It was stated by 
one respondent from Silver Solutions Fund on 10 October 2013 that one joint 
operation included a contract to take over providing VIP protection for delegates 
at the World Bankers Association Forum. 
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One group of company managers operating under Quemic (Pty) Ltd highlighted 
in an interview on 8 October 2013 that their interaction with the SAPS was 
influenced by contracts for guarding services to parastatals such as Eskom and 
the municipal agent City Power. The same managers also identified that the PSC 
has an ad hoc working relationship with the Hawks and also worked with the 
SAPS with reference to their wildlife conservation initiatives. The Hawks refers 
to the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation which was established as an 
independent directorate within the South African Police Service in terms of Section 
17C of the South African Police Service Act, 1995 and as amended by the South 
African Police Service Amendment Act, No. 57 of 2008.
 
The Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation is now responsible for the combating, 
investigation and prevention of national priority crimes such as serious organised crime, 
serious commercial crime and serious corruption in terms of Section 17B and 17D of 
the South African Police Service Act, 1995 as amended. It was noted in the interview 
with management from Quemic (Pty) Ltd on 8 October 2013 that roles during joint 
operations were divided depending on the kind of operation it was, affirming that 
sometimes the company took the lead while other times the SAPS took the lead; it was 
emphasised that the PSC had no mandate on public roads nor on intelligence matters.
Another joint operation with the SAPS was identified by a PSC with operations 
in KwaZulu-Natal and involved efforts by both entities to apprehend members 
of a syndicate selling copper to scrap dealers, as indicated by a manager from 
a PSC interviewed on 8 October 2013. The roles during these operations were 
divided depending on what branch of the state security authorities they worked 
with, the manager noted that their engagement with members of the Hawks was 
welcomed more than with members of the SAPS who were more authoritative 
(Undisclosed Private Security Company, 8 October 2013). He stated that 90% of 
the private security company was comprised of former police officers who in their 
experience of testifying in court ‘had to put up a fight to get the work done, as 
the police do not think that this crime is a problem’. The manager from the PSC 
brands his company as a specialist in mitigating copper cable theft for the past 
11 years and asserted that this crime poses a detrimental impact on the South 
African economy. Two managers from an undisclosed PSC stated in an interview 
on 7 October 2013 that their work of conducting investigations into cable copper 
theft for parastatals such as Telkom, Eskom, and Transnet was supported by the 
SAPS, and joint operations were carried out on an equal footing.
Two managers from another company, Tactical Security Services, who were 
interviewed on 8 November 2013, stated that joint operations with the SAPS 
in Durban’s Brighton Beach area were important to ensure visible policing for 
abandoned buildings and illegal shacks. The company claimed that they were 
currently assisting the SAPS to carry out their functions to ensure visible policing 
in the area and had also secured a contract to provide VIP protection for members 
of the Road Traffic Inspectorate. Another company manager from an undisclosed 
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PSC, whose interview was conducted on 6 November 2013, submitted that they 
had been involved in many joint operations with the SAPS involving the recovery 
of illegal firearms and narcotics. It was stated that in many of these operations, 
the private security service provider had taken the lead role in the operations, and 
the SAPS were involved because their assistance had been requested for support.
In Durban, one manager from an undisclosed private security company, whose 
interview took place on 5 November 2013, highlighted that the SAPS would assist 
them in their functions of guarding certain sites and claimed that, he was involved 
in the debates and discussions surrounding the successes and shortcomings of the 
crime prevention approaches that took place in the area. It was noted during the 
interview that those present at the discussions were members of the Metro Police, 
medical emergency response teams, and councillors that represented the area. 
One company manager of a PSC, who was interviewed on 5 November 2011, noted 
that his company was responsible for ensuring security for representatives from 
international delegations – for a convention held at the International Conference 
Centre in Durban during the meeting of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China 
and South Africa) group. The company was contracted by the International 
Conference Centre (ICC) for security provision in conjunction with the SAPS. A 
manager highlighted, during his interview on 5 November 2013, his company’s 
role in providing security together with the SAPS in conjunction with the local 
port authority, which included escorting the utility service provider, ensuring 
port security, and addressing the issue of stowaways. One manager who was 
interviewed on 7 November 2013 asserted that his PSC worked closely with various 
branches of state security authorities, such as Crime Intelligence and Public Order 
Policing, and that this was primarily to ensure orderliness during sports events 
and concerts. It was noted in an interview on 5 November 2013 with another 
manager of a PSC that the SAPS would take the leading role in the pre-planning 
stages, while the company played a bigger role on the day of the event.
Two managers of an undisclosed PSC who were interviewed on 13 November 2013 
claimed that they had been involved in joint operations with the SAPS; this included 
armed response operations and patrol of farms with the help of the SAPS, the efforts 
of which were undertaken with equal responsibilities. The relationship, it was noted 
in the interview, had grown, and there was a strong sense of mutual respect; they 
claimed that the company even helped the SAPS with road blocks. The police stations 
that the company had a close working relationship with were the Stellenbosch Police 
Station and the Kuils River Police Station, highlighting that the De Doorns Police 
Station was reluctant to work with the private security company, particularly during 
the farm protests that engulfed the area in early 2013. It was suggested that this 
aversion to work together was because there were many employees of the company 
that previously worked in the police service, whose attempts to dominate the tactical 
operations of the SAPS, in that particular instance, led to the poor cooperation.
One PSC manager who was interviewed on 12 November 2013 was contracted 
by the City of Cape Town to provide security guards at different venues and open 
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areas; this also meant working with the SAPS during special events such as the 
Cape Town International Jazz Festival and the Cape Argus Cycle Tour. Another 
manager of a PSC interviewed on 13 November 2013 stated that his company 
had been contracted by the City of Cape Town and was required to patrol the 
city under the auspices of the Central City Improvement District (CCID). It was 
highlighted in an interview with another manager of an undisclosed private 
security company on 13 November 2013 that crime in the Cape Town city centre 
had declined significantly, owing to the increased visibility from the joint patrols 
which were not there before the CCID initiative. It was alleged – in the interview 
– that during the period when CCID officials were engaged in strike action, 
another PSC was contracted by the same municipality to maintain peace in the 
city centre, while a subsidiary of the company worked closely with the SAPS to 
ensure security during the 2010 FIFA World Cup Tournament.
One of the most reputable private security companies in the country stressed 
during an interview on 14 November 2013 with one of its managers, that they 
were involved in an ongoing operation with the SAPS and several other covert 
operations which were legally sanctioned through an official agreement with 
the State Prosecutor and the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) (Undisclosed 
Private Security Company, 14 November 2013). This joint agreement allowed 
for information sharing between the PSC and the SAPS, and helped apprehend 
criminals and prevent incidences of crime. Another PSC manager highlighted on 
12 November 2013 in an interview how their company had assisted on numerous 
occasions to profile international dignitaries and guests for events hosted in the 
country, and because the directive was initiated by the SAPS, the police assumed 
the lead role and the PSC played a supportive role.
8.1.1. Prospects for a crime prevention partnership
Regarding crime prevention partnerships and state authority, it is argued that 
states are able to confer authority on private security companies by incorporating 
them into law and leaving them to self-regulation; the emphasis here is that 
authority need not be a zero-sum game (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2007). It is 
posited that such a strategy would relieve the state police from the burden of 
negotiation, implementation and enforcement of [non-core police duties] while 
still maintaining legislative authority and a breadth of jurisdiction that no other 
actor possesses (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2007). In the global context, changes 
in policing policy were initiated in the late 1970s by changes in the perception 
that policing and the legitimate use of violence was ideally a state monopoly, 
and it began to be seen as ‘everybody’s business’ (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2006:301). 
Urban unrest in several North American cities in the 1970s and in European cities in 
the 1980s led public authorities to challenge the way social order [was] created at 
the local level ... this new form of security governance corresponds to a paradigm 
shift where disorder rather than crime is the main concern. [The emphasis being 
that] collective effort should focus less on ‘bandit catching’ [and more on] ‘problem 
solving’, which requires all stakeholders at the local level to interact and cooperate. 
(Bénit-Gbaffou, 2006:301)
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Accordingly, developed countries in the mid-1990s began initiatives to strengthen 
community safety through public-private partnerships (Bayley & Shearing, 
1996). This was informed by a break from the narrow interpretation that the 
public police were solely responsible for crime prevention (Bayley & Shearing, 
1996). The restructuring of policing in democratic societies globally, highlights 
the type of evolution of crime control and law enforcement that has taken place 
in the North. This evolution revealed that due to the lack of a monopoly by the 
public police over policing, security would increasingly be provided by private 
companies on a commercial basis and by communities on a volunteer basis 
(Bayley & Shearing, 1996). 
Indeed, there has been an acknowledgement that crime is too complex to be 
dealt with solely by the police and that the profit motive is not to be feared in 
policing. Constraints on police organisations around the world have bolstered public 
demands for the public police to ‘achieve more with less’ (Loader, 2011:455). This 
has prompted the support for police to ‘generate resources by selling services or 
merchandising the police “brand” while acknowledging the risks of a loss of a distinct 
police identity and neglect of core policing’ (Loader, 2011:455). Developments 
in security provision mean that policing has become pluralised and police are no 
longer the primary crime deterrent presence in society. This means that the public 
police have been supplanted by numerous private security companies (Bayley & 
Shearing, 1996). It is averred that the British government’s promotion of private 
sector involvement in criminal justice through the outsourcing and fostering of 
inter-agency partnerships has in effect legitimised the private security industry 
in the United Kingdom (Wakefield, 2005).
Arguably, all explicit efforts to create visible agents of crime control are increasingly 
perceived as policing and hence not just the police, affirming that the two concepts 
have become increasingly blurred (Bayley & Shearing, 1996). Indeed, while 
customary police are paid, new policing agents are both paid – such as PSCs – 
and non-paid, such as those agencies involved in community crime prevention. 
There are three categories of non-state policing, these include vigilantes that are 
associated with violent methods of control and fail to cooperate with the police, 
‘responsible citizens’ that patrol their communities with the approval of the 
police, and the third group are the registered PSCs (Baker, 2002). Berg alleges 
that the private security industry or the ‘private police’ as they are sometimes 
termed, due to their close similarities with the public police, play a key role in 
crime prevention through their appearance and influence (2007:3). 
Academic debates often focus on the many challenges that private policing poses on 
a normative and practical level, and the private security industry in particular forms 
part of these debates …For instance, a community may be secured not only by the 
state police, but by private security patrols, metro police and neighbourhood watch 
organizations or other voluntary community patrol systems working to secure the 
same area possibly in a cooperative framework…There is a tendency to blur state 
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and non-state security dynamics and thus the involvement of a range of ‘nodes’ – 
those who initiate and those who provide security relating to each other in security 
networks. (Berg, 2007:3)
It is acknowledged that in order to improve crime prevention, new approaches must 
be sought together with a shift in the logic of policing, from one that conceives of it 
as remedying past wrongs to one that seeks to promote security (Bayley & Shearing, 
1996). A key element to the deterrence of crime is the reliance on visible policing 
for both the public police and the private security industry. Hence, it is feasible to 
accept that pluralising the sources of policing enhances not only the quantity but also 
the quality of policing (Bayley & Shearing, 1996). The credibility of plural policing 
may be realised when underpinned by explicit endorsement from the incumbent 
state authorities. This is surmised from the UK Crime and Disorder Act of 1998 that 
requires police authorities, health authorities and fire brigades to work and share 
information with the private security industry, for crime detection and prevention 
(Wakefield, 2005). Plausibly, changes in legislation and the shift in the perception of 
who is responsible for crime prevention contained in the Act has led to a significant 
decrease in crime in the United Kingdom (Moss. K, Academia.edu website).
The promotion of a plural policing framework between state and non-state actors 
may prove to be effective and efficient in terms of reducing the incidences of crime 
when applied to the South African context. One manager of an undisclosed PSC in 
Durban underscored in an interview on 5 November 2011 the benefits of a partnership 
between the SAPS and the private security industry. The company provides guarding 
services for an NKP, VIP protection, and security for the ports in Durban, while its 
sister company provides guarding services for the main airport in Durban. The 
manager stated that the emphasis should be on visible policing, which due to the 
nature of security guards who were on the ground and were the eyes and ears of 
the police could assist in providing information to the SAPS, vital for solving crimes. 
One company manager who was interviewed on 7 November 2013 held that a 
partnership would be beneficial to both parties and would avoid duplication of 
services. Carrying out investigations to help solve cases, it was admitted in the 
interview, was already happening, albeit in an ad hoc manner, and it was noted that 
a formalisation of ongoing partnerships and the development of stronger links would 
in essence give credit where it was due. One company manager whose interview 
was conducted on 8 November 2013 averred that due to the limited number of 
SAPS officers, closer liaison and information sharing would be critical to solving 
crimes, particularly housebreakings, which was the most common crime that the 
company had to deal with. The manager of one company in Cape Town claimed in 
an interview on 15 November 2013 that they had a contract to protect pensioners 
as they get their money at cash point services (CPSs) and at the South African 
Social Security Agency (SASSA) payout points. He also highlighted that they had a 
contract with the Department of Justice for VIP protection of magistrates and judges. 
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The findings from the field work conducted underscore the fluidity of ‘policing’ 
as a traditional concept and seeks to expand on the perception of policing as 
a ‘broader activity than just what the police can do’ (Baker, 2002). In South 
Africa, this is further compounded by the presence of former state police officers 
operating within the private security industry. It is argued here that effective 
crime prevention would fare better when conceived through effective partnerships 
between agents of public and private security. Accordingly, in order to ensure 
that policing – both public and private – is equitable and accountable, private 
security agents should be considered in national and local government plans and 
partnership consultations. This would enhance the efficacy of crime prevention 
strategies which could be formulated on a national level with the inclusion of 
non-state actors; with members of the private security industry playing a support 
role in a new national crime prevention strategy. 
The rise in mass private property is a key element in the commodification of 
security, which has influenced changes in conditions of ‘stateness’ and encouraged 
the deconstruction of traditional state-centric ideas of security. Partnership policing 
brings up questions regarding the nature of the partnerships to be formed and 
the kind of information that would be shared. Additionally, a more capacitated 
PSIRA, in terms of human and financial resources, would be required to play a 
critical role in ensuring that regulatory policies are adhered to and compliance is 
enforced. A change in the way people think of policing is advocated for in order to 
establish an effective approach towards the way accountability and resources for 
crime prevention and control are allocated, for both state and non-state actors. 
One of the more notable examples of a functioning crime prevention partnership 
between state and non-state actors was that coordinated by the SAPS Honeydew 
police precinct in association with Business Against Crime (BAC), the SIA and 
twelve different PSCs in 2008 (Tony Botes, 4 March 2014). The initiative that was 
termed the Private Security Alignment Initiative has since dwindled in effectiveness, 
influenced by the changes in station commanders who subsequently were not in 
support of the initiative, as indicated by Tony Botes on 4 March 2014 and Steve 
Conradie, CEO of SIA, on 5 March 2014. Information from the initiative termed the 
Honeydew Private Security Alignment Initiative, highlighted that it provided for;
 
a single dedicated and secure radio system to be installed in the operational coordination 
centre of the Honeydew SAPS radio control room and manned by operators under the 
control of the station commissioner or cluster head on a twenty-four hour basis… This 
system was linked to the response vehicles of parties to the agreement (PSCs), so 
that in the event that any of the participants witnessed any criminal activity, they 
would notify the radio operator who would subsequently relay this to the control 
room head and initiate a response by the SAPS to the crime scene. (Conradie, 2014) 
SAPS Honeydew was responsible for selecting the senior supervisors from accredited 
PSCs to undergo special training, who would then train the reaction officers to be 
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deployed in the area specified in the agreement (Conradie, 2014). Mr Botes noted 
that SIA played a key role in the formation of the initiative, and asserted that the 
police did not have the manpower to handle their existing load, and the only way 
they were be able to proactively prevent crimes was to get partners. Dunmar 
Security, Venture Security, Apcan Risk Management, Peaceforce Security Group, Top 
Security, Accumen Security Services, ADT Security (Pty) Ltd, Piranha Security CC, 
Chubb Security SA (Pty) Ltd, Viper Risk Management, DCS, Trojan Security, Business 
Against Crime South Africa, and Security Industry Alliance were the actors that were 
initially part of the Honeydew Private Security Alignment Initiative (Conradie, 2014). 
It was noted, that the SAPS Honeydew would keep the information regarding the 
time, location and nature of a joint operation private, and only on the morning of 
the operation were the parties informed of what it would entail. The initiative’s 
strongest point, as highlighted by Mr Conradie in an interview on 5 March 2014, 
was the quick reaction time to apprehend suspects and the crime scene training 
and management that private security officers received; consequently, there was 
a recorded drop in trio-crimes, referring to house robberies, vehicle hijackings 
and business robberies. Mr Conradie acknowledged that additional powers for 
private security officers were not necessary and that is was important not to 
interfere with police work; hence, he continued to support the concept of a crime 
prevention partnership based on information sharing.
Discourse and the development of a feasible model for a public-private partnership 
would ensure that the different variables that govern crime and more importantly 
its prevention would be integrated into a credible network for security provision. 
This process would help entrench pre-emptive responses for crime prevention 
and ensure the safety of citizens. However, this should be accompanied by 
government endorsement and a commitment to an effective network from the 
relevant security agencies. It is widely held that deterrence through enhanced 
visibility and effective cooperation between public and private policing would 
lead to a safer society (Wakefield, 2005). Crime prevention as the outcome of 
increased visible policing can only be achieved when two conditions are met, 
namely, a shift in the expectations of citizens and security agencies regarding 
what is required for community safety, and a new multi-pronged approach towards 
crime prevention (Wakefield, 2005).
 
The importance of engagement is underscored by the similar yet distinct role in 
policing and providing security for the SAPS and the private security industry, 
respectively. This is more pronounced in the immediate response that is required by 
those who are first at the scene of a crime. It is worthy to note that amendments 
to the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 were enacted to substitute Section 49 of the 
Act and align the provisions relating to the use of force in effecting the arrest of 
a suspect. The amended Act is now referred to as Act, No. 9 of 2012: Criminal 
Procedure Amendment Act, 2012. The following provision for the ‘use of force in 
effecting arrest’ was made:
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If any arrestor attempts to arrest a suspect and the suspect resists the attempt, or 
flees, or resists the attempt and flees, when it is clear that an attempt to arrest him 
or her is being made, and the suspect cannot be arrested without the use of force, 
the arrestor may, in order to effect the arrest, use such force as may be reasonably 
necessary and proportional in the circumstances to overcome the resistance or to 
prevent the suspect from fleeing: provided that the arrestor is justified in terms 
of this section in using deadly force that is intended or is likely to cause death or 
grievous bodily harm to a suspect, only if he or she believes on reasonable grounds
a. That the force is immediately necessary for the purposes of protecting the 
arrestor, any person lawfully assisting the arrestor or any other person 
from imminent or future death or grievous bodily harm;
b. That there is a substantial risk that the suspect will cause imminent or 
future death or grievous bodily harm if the arrest is delayed; or 
c. That the offence for which the arrest is sought is in progress and is of 
a forcible and serious nature and involves the use of life-threatening 
violence or a strong likelihood that it will cause grievous bodily harm, 
However, in addition to the requirement that the force must be reasonably 
necessary and proportional in the circumstances, the arrestor may use deadly 
force only if –
a. The suspect poses a threat of serious violence to the arrestor or any 
other person; or
b. The suspect is suspected on reasonable grounds of having committed a 
crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious bodily harm 
and there are no other reasonable means of effecting the arrest, whether 
at that time or later (Criminal Procedure Amendment Act, No. 9 of 2012). 
The authority granted to the members of the SAPS, for the use of force when 
enacting arrests, is wide-ranging, whereas the powers conferred upon members of 
the private security industry are limited, in comparison. Private security officers, 
even though there are laws that allow this, are not conferred with a ‘peace officer’ 
status and carry out their duties as civilians, only incurring legitimacy from the 
contract with the client and property owner. 
A study of ‘plural policing’ in the United Kingdom found that ‘it is often security 
guards rather than police that constitute the primary form of visible policing’ 
(Crawford. A et al, 2005). In South Africa, there has been limited research 
conducted on whether members of the SAPS or the private security industry 
are responsible for more ‘visible policing’ than the other. Nonetheless, it can be 
argued that due to the sheer disparity in the ratio of SAPS officers to private 
security officers, the reassurance that emanates from visible policing would be 
increased by the presence of private security officers and through a partnership 
between both agencies. 
In South Africa, an endorsement of crime prevention partnerships was hinted 
at by former President Thabo Mbeki; according to the former President, police 
partnerships would allow security expectations to be met (Baker, 2002). This was 
190
further highlighted by the then Minister of Safety and Security Charles Nqakula 
when he called for partnership policing because the private security industry had 
already been ‘looped in for crime prevention’ (Baker, 2002). The previous Minister 
of Police Mr Nathi Mthethwa urged private security companies to work with police to 
enhance the fight against crime, affirming that the private security industry could 
complement the police’s efforts and have a crucial role to play in making South Africa 
safe (South Africa Government News Agency, 2011). A 2008 Democratic Alliance 
(DA) discussion document, asserted that bringing in the private security sector to 
work effectively with the SAPS would double the number of people available for the 
fight against crime, underscoring the value of a partnership between the private 
security industry and the SAPS (Democratic Alliance, 2008).
Chapter 12 of the NDP underscores that the 2000 National Crime Combating 
Strategy due to its focus on criminal justice resources led to an interpretation of 
the police as an ‘‘all-purpose agency rather than a highly specialized resource 
to be deployed strategically and this has led to a police agency that is stretched 
beyond its capacity with; a mandate that is impossible to fulfill, and disenchanted 
police officers with fragile authority and legitimacy’’ (NDP, 2011: p 357). It 
is acknowledged by the NDP that in order to build safer communities what is 
required is a different approach, as law enforcement agencies do not and cannot 
provide a ‘total response.’ The assertion is made that the private sector plays a 
critical role in community safety through technological support and further that 
joint operations between the SAPS and the private security industry should be 
supported and extended (NDP, 2011: 360).
9. Policy framework for outsourcing private security
Crime prevention aims to improve security by deterring the conditions that cause 
crime; for the community, this inevitably requires taking ownership of their 
communities and working together with the police and non-state security agents. 
For the former, useful steps have been taken to meet this end. As discussed earlier, 
in 1995, the SAPS officially established CPFs aimed at forging dialogue and re-
establishing trust between the police and residents at the local level (Bénit-Gbaffou 
et al., 2008:694). Initially, CPFs gave residents important powers for identifying local 
security priorities; however, in the late 1990s, new regulations were implemented 
to restrict residents’ participation in simple consultation (Bénit-Gbaffou et al., 
2008:694). CPFs were introduced to allow residents to monitor the police and 
hold them accountable for their actions. However, the power entrusted to local 
communities by the Police Service Act of 1995 that conceived of CPFs began to 
manifest itself as a politically and racially motivated opposition to the incumbent 
political party (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2008:1943). 
The dramatic shift in power structures that accompanied the democratic political 
transition in the country and the symbolic platform that the CPFs initially 
represented led to some confrontations. “The most powerful CPFs were in the 
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previously advantaged areas, and the predominantly white residents were dealing 
with [allegedly] black, illiterate police officers” (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2008:1943, 1945). 
Hence, amendments to the Police Act were implemented to reassert the authority 
of state officials, particularly elected local representatives, and to relieve the 
condescension characteristic of the initial resident-police interaction from the CPF 
initiative. Despite the shift in policy direction for the CPFs, there was an awareness 
of the importance of maintaining a ‘grassroots’ coordination between the public 
authorities and local residents (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2008:1943, 1945). 
It can be argued that the State by extension – through the authority granted to 
municipalities- indirectly supports the outsourcing of services that were traditionally 
viewed as being the preserve of the State. It is worthy to note that contemporary 
projections for the City of Johannesburg point to the creation of a safe, inclusive 
and sustainable city management approach; it is stated that, 
The Joburg 2040 Growth and Development Strategy (GDS), launched in October 
2011, responds to the multiple challenges and uncertain futures faced by the 
city… The Joburg 2040 GDS is driven by the goal of capable and capacitated 
communities and individuals. With this realised, the City of Johannesburg will be 
able to achieve a more sustainable, inclusive future, in which communities and the 
individuals who live in them hold the potential and the means to imagine and grow 
their neighbourhoods, their communities and themselves. A balanced focus on the 
environment, management and services, good governance, economic growth and 
human and social development will assist in achieving a resilient and sustainable 
city – and a city in which all aspire to live. (JDA, 2012/2013, mid-year report)
 
Major changes in mass private property have also led to the emergence of 
Community Improvement Districts (CIDs) in central Cape Town and the northern 
suburbs in Johannesburg. The CID refers to a security scheme established with 
public endorsement and private interests responsible for ensuring improved 
security, refuse collection, alleviation of inner-city decay, and helping these cities 
become ‘world-class cities’, which is facilitated by public service support at the 
local level (Bénit-Gbaffou et al., 2008:695, 698). The concept of the CID is taken 
from the Business Improvement District (BID), first developed in North America 
(Bénit-Gbaffou et al., 2008:695). 
The funding [for the CIDs] consists of an additional levy paid by all the property owners 
of a specific area it is raised by the municipality but spent exclusively in the CID’s 
perimeter. [A] non-profit company is set up by the property owners and businesses of 
the area for the management of this local resource. (Bénit-Gbaffou et al., 2008:695)
For example, the Johannesburg Development Agency’s (JDA) key objectives are to 
restructure and upgrade public space, promote economic growth and encourage public 
management and development partnerships (JDA, 2012/2013 Mid-year report). JDA 
implements area-based initiatives for overall development; these initiatives may be 
outsourced for certain objectives while maintaining its primary accountability as the 
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development manager (JDA, 2012/2013 Mid-year report). It is submitted that the 
outsourcing of key town management responsibilities through the support of CIDs 
and the concomitant fiscal and spatial fragmentation that they produce represents: 
A political tool for the municipality, allowing the City to have resources channeled for 
the securitization of business and commercial cores, without being accused of avoiding 
redistribution and following the apartheid legacy of the bigger share of the public budget 
being invested in white and privileged areas. [Outsourcing city development] actively 
proves quite rewarding politically (lack of opposition) and economically (efficient and 
visible cleansing of business districts), in the short term. However, in the longer term 
it can lead to its weakening, through fiscal fragmentation, exclusionary practices, and 
loss of political legitimacy. This strategy, far from being a solution imposed by market 
forces or international institutions to local public authorities, is a way for the city to 
instrumentalise globalisation in order to follow, without too much political contest a 
focused economic growth policy. (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2008:1943)
 
The broader social changes that are characteristic of an increasing reliance on a 
public-private partnership and the new spatial practice that it cultivates prompts 
an inquiry into the kind of limits that a “political community, committed to equal 
citizenship and concerned [with] encouraging social cohesion among its members, 
place on the market exchange for security provision” (Berg, 2007:24).
Marks, Shearing and Wood assert that in order to ensure that crime prevention 
partnerships between the SAPS and the private security industry are effective, the 
‘police and the public need to be clear on what the core competencies and functions 
of the public police are’ (2009:150). Likewise clarity should be provided on what 
functions can be outsourced to members of the private security industry. This, it is 
argued, would resemble good security governance where different policing nodes 
are distinguishable and allow ‘‘all parties in networked arrangements to be clear 
about what it is they can individually contribute and what they can realistically 
expect from the public police’’ (Marks, Shearing and Wood, 2009: 150). The police, 
as representatives of government, would in such a context be able to steer a crime 
prevention partnership and help safeguard policing norms, due process and justice 
(Marks, Shearing and Wood, 2009: 152).
10. Regulatory framework for the South African  
private security industry
PSIRA was established in terms of Section 2 of the Private Security Industry 
Regulation Act, No. 56 of 2001. The Authority is mandated to regulate the private 
security industry and exercise effective control over the practice of the occupation 
of security service providers in the interest of the State, the public and the private 
security industry itself. Inadequate resources for the Authority hinder effective 
regulation; PSIRA receives no government funding but rather generates revenue 
from annual fees from the private security industry and penalties incurred by 
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members of the industry when they are found to be non-complaint. The activities 
of the private security industry and its members are regulated and governed by 
the Act. The private security industry was previously regulated in terms of the 
Security Officers Act, No. 92 of 1987 by the Security Officers Board (SOB), which 
failed due to partiality, the exclusion of in-house security and a myopic focus on 
guarding services. PSIRA is administered by a Council which is accountable to 
the Minister of Police for the performance of its functions and must provide the 
Minister with any requested information (PSIRA Amendment Bill, 2012). 
PSIRA’s main responsibilities are to determine and enforce minimum standards of 
occupational conduct in respect of security service providers; monitor the private 
security industry and promote compliance with minimum standards; regulate the 
private security industry and exercise effective control over the practice of the 
occupation; to ensure that the industry acts in the interests of the public, and 
the country and the industry itself, when rendering security services; to promote 
a legitimate private security industry characterised by the principles contained in 
the Constitution and other applicable law. [This should be done] whilst upholding 
professionalism, accountability, transparency, equity, accessibility and stability of 
the industry; to protect the rights of security officers; to consider applications for 
registration, suspension or withdrawal of registrations, prevent the exploitation or 
abuse of security officers and ensure high quality standards of training. (PSIRA 
Annual Report, 2013/2014) 
The Act introduced a redefinition of a security service provider, obliged across the 
board registration of service providers and gave stronger powers for inspection. 
Complementary to the Act was the Private Security Industry Levies Act, No. 23 of 
2002 which supplemented the PSIRA Act, the Code of Conduct for Security Service 
Providers, 2003 and the Improper Conduct Enquiries Regulations, 2003 which have 
all been instrumental in the enforcement of minimum standards of occupational 
conduct of security service providers (PSIRA Annual Report, 2012/13:17). The 
Code of Conduct is a key component of the regulatory framework and places the 
responsibility on security service providers to adhere to minimum standards that 
are aimed at promoting responsible conduct, trustworthiness, quality of service, 
and adherence to other relevant laws (PSIRA Annual Report, 2012/13:17).
 
A Code of Conduct for Security Service Providers of 2003 was prescribed under the 
Private Security Industry Regulation Act, 2001. The purpose of the Code is to provide 
binding rules that all security service providers and employers of in-house security 
officers must obey, i.e. in order to promote compliance in line with a minimum 
set of standards that are established by the Authority in the endeavour to realise 
its objects (Code of Conduct for Security Service Providers of 2003, Chapter 1, 
Section 1). These include promoting a trustworthy and professional private security 
industry with regard to their obligations to the State, the Authority, consumers, the 
public and the private security industry itself; this includes ensuring the payment of 
minimum wages and compliance with standards aimed at preventing exploitation 
or abuse of employees in the private security industry (Code of Conduct for 
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Security Service Providers of 2003, Chapter 1, Section 1, Subsection (a), (b), (c) 
and (d)). The Code of Conduct is legally binding on all security service providers, 
irrespective of whether they are registered with the Authority or not, and to the 
extent provided for in this Act on every person using his or her own employees to 
protect or safeguard merely his or her own property or other interests, or persons 
or property on his or her premises or under his or her control (Private Security 
Industry Regulation Act, No. 56 of 2001, Chapter 4, Section 28).
 
Improper conduct proceedings may be instituted by the Authority against a PSC or 
other person who employs a security officer, on account of an allegation of improper 
conduct, whether such improper conduct was allegedly committed within or outside 
the borders of the Republic (Private Security Industry Regulation Act, No. 56 of 
2001, Chapter 4, Section 29, Subsection 1). Any person aggrieved by the refusal 
of the Authority to grant his or her application for registration as a security service 
provider; the suspension or withdrawal of his or her registration as a security service 
provider by the Authority; or a finding against him or her, of improper conduct in 
terms of this Act, or the punishment imposed in consequence of the finding, may 
within a period of 60 days after service of the notification of the relevant decision, 
appeal to an appeal committee (Private Security Industry Regulation Act, No. 56 
of 2001, Chapter 4, Section 30, Subsection 1(a), (b) and (c)).
 
Chapter 5 of the Act refers to the monitoring and investigation component of 
the Authority’s mandate. According to this chapter, the Council is responsible for 
appointing inspectors for the Authority; inspectors are required to perform functions 
in terms of the Act and any other law and are subject to the control and direction 
of the Director (Private Security Industry Regulation Act, No. 56 of 2001, Chapter 
5, Section 31, (1) (a) and (2)). The Director must furnish every inspector with a 
certificate in the prescribed form to the effect that he or she has been so appointed 
and is deemed by virtue of Section 34(3) of the Act to be a peace officer. 
An inspector in respect of any provision of this or any other law applicable to security 
service providers is deemed to have been appointed as a peace officer by the Minister 
of Justice in terms of Section 334 of the Criminal Procedure Act, No. 51 of 1977 for 
the national territory of the Republic and for the purpose of exercising the powers 
contemplated in Sections 40, 41, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49 and 56 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act, 1977. An inspector may use the powers in terms of this subsection 
only to serve the purposes of this Act and matters incidental thereto (Private Security 
Industry Regulation Act, No. 56 of 2001, Chapter 5, Section 34, (3) (a) and (b)). An 
inspector must at the request of any interested person produce the certificate when 
performing a function in terms of this Act (Private Security Industry Regulation Act, 
No. 56 of 2001, Chapter 5, Section 31, (2), (3) and (4)). All inspectors are legally 
bound by a code of conduct and must comply with rules to realise the objects of the 
Authority; penalties are provided for instances when inspectors’ compliance is found 
to be wanting (Private Security Industry Regulation Act, No. 56 of 2001, Chapter 
5, Section 32, (1), (2) and (3)).
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An inspector may, subject to the direction of the Director, carry out an inspection 
of the affairs or any part of the affairs of a security service provider, or any other 
person who employs a security officer, or of a person whom the Director has reason 
to believe is a security service provider or employs a security officer (Private 
Security Industry Regulation Act, No. 56 of 2001, Chapter 5, Section 33, (1)). 
After completion of the inspection, the inspector must compile a report of the 
inspection, provide a copy thereof to the relevant security service provider or other 
person contemplated in Subsection (1), and submit the original to the Director 
(Private Security Industry Regulation Act, No. 56 of 2001, Chapter 5, Section 33, 
(1)). Carrying out an inspection allows an inspector to, at any reasonable time, 
[W]ithout prior notice enter any premises occupied by or used in connection with 
the rendering of a security service by a security service provider or another person 
contemplated in Section 33; which the Director has reason to believe are occupied 
by or used in connection with the rendering of a security service by a security 
service provider or another person contemplated in Section 33; or from where 
a security service is rendered or the Director has reason to believe that such a 
service is rendered; use any applicable equipment which has not been prohibited 
by the Council during such inspection and conduct such inspection, examination 
and investigation as may be necessary for the purpose of monitoring or enforcing 
compliance with [the] Act or the Levies Act; use any computer system or equipment 
on the premises which is or appears to be utilised for the control or administration 
of the rendering of a security service, or require reasonable assistance from any 
person on the premises to use that computer system to access any data contained 
in or available on that computer system; reproduce any record from that data; and 
seize, against the issue of a receipt, any output from that computer for examination 
and copying. (Private Security Industry Regulation Act, No. 56 of 2001, Chapter 5, 
Section 34, Subsection (1) (a), (b) and (c)).
PSIRA endeavours to ensure integrity and excellence in the regulation of the private 
security industry, whose efforts in maintaining oversight of the private security industry 
must be lauded for the progress that has been accomplished thus far. Although 
room for improvement remains, leadership to ensure more effective regulation of 
the private security industry in the future is underscored by the development of a 
strategic plan covering financial years 2014/15 to 2018/19. The Authority aims to 
focus on 11 strategic objectives to “ensure good governance and a sound financial 
control environment; ensure that PSIRA has in place effective and reliable IT systems; 
ensure that PSIRA has a competent, ethical and skilled workforce; ensure effective 
regulation in the security industry; enforce minimum standards of occupational 
conduct in respect of security service providers (SSPs); promote awareness amongst 
the public and the private security industry on the functions and role of PSIRA in 
the industry; promote the protection and enforcement of the rights of security 
officers and other employees in the private security industry; promote the interest 
of the consumers of private security services; ensure that the registration process is 
transparent and timeous; promote high standards in the training of security service 
providers and prospective (SSPs); and ensure that PSIRA is a centre of excellence 
in private security research” (PSIRA Strategic Plan, 2014/2015 to 2018/2019).
196
Furthermore, it can be argued that recognition of PSIRA’s unrelenting approach to 
improve the regulation of the private security industry represents an awareness 
of the weight of the Authority’s responsibility. A key element of PSIRA’s mandate 
requires that the Authority ensure that private security service providers comply 
with the legislation that legitimises the occupation of security service providers, 
and that compliance is regulated through the inspection and education of security 
service providers (PSIRA Annual Report, 2012/13:17). Non-compliance results in 
regulatory measures being escalated to the Law Enforcement Division. As discussed 
above, inspector’s conduct investigations to establish if a security service provider 
is registered with PSIRA or detect other criminal contraventions in relation to the 
PSIR Act and Firearms Control Act (PSIRA Annual Report, 2012/13:24). Certain 
contexts require members of the SAPS to assist PSIRA inspectors, particularly when 
carrying out investigations that necessitate arrests to be made and during site 
inspections and law enforcement operations (PSIRA Annual Report, 2012/13:25). 
Compliance inspections were stepped up dramatically, with 27 072 inspections conducted 
during 2013/2014 as compared to 23 827 during 2012/2013 and 7 669 during 
2011/2012. This is the highest number of inspections ever conducted by PSIRA … During 
2013/2014, a total of 1 489 improper conduct dockets against security businesses 
were compiled, compared to 1 052 dockets during 2012/2013 … During 2013/2014, 
740 criminal cases were opened by inspectors of the Authority as compared to 727 in 
2012/2013, and during 2013/2014, 301 criminal cases were finalised by the National 
Prosecuting Authority. (PSIRA Annual Reports, 2012/13:15; 2013/14:28, 29, 30) 
The Deputy Director of law enforcement at PSIRA, expressed in an interview on 
23 January 2014 the view that the work of promoting compliance and enforcing 
it when the former had failed would be more effective if PSIRA inspectors had the 
mandate to investigate cases, from the cradle to the grave (Mthethwa, 2014). As 
opposed to what is currently happening whereby inspectors collect information for 
the SAPS to process, he underscored that the optimal use of inspectors’ function 
and execution of PSIRA’s mandate would only be realised when inspectors have 
exclusivity with crimes associated with the private security industry. He noted that 
the impression from the SAPS was that crimes related to the private security industry 
were inferior, unlike other major crimes such as murder and organised crime; this 
meant that the SAPS did not see value in the transgression of an unregistered PSCs. 
According to the principal Act, PSIRA inspectors have the powers to, inter alia, 
enforce sanctions as determined by the crime or offence, the Deputy Director 
noted that if inspectors were only required to acquire a case reference number 
from the relevant police station, this would allow more control with cases related 
to the private security industry. He highlighted that this would also deter the 
current trend where pending cases that were being investigated by the SAPS were 
shifted from one prosecutor to another, noting that it had been observed that 
SAPS prosecutors exhibited significant leniency for perpetrators of crimes related 
to the private security industry, which typically only led to a slap on the wrist. 
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There is a close working relationship between the Authority and the SAPS, which 
assists the Authority in investigations where the Authority requires arrests to be made. 
As at 31 March 2014, a total of 1 740 outstanding criminal cases were pending with 
the South African Police Service, compared to 1 301 cases as at 31 March 2013. The 
Authority proposed the drafting of a standard operating procedure for the SAPS in 
respect of Authority-related cases in terms of the Private Security Industry Regulation 
Act and Regulations. The SAPS undertook to compile the standard operating procedure 
and the Authority requested to have inputs into the document. This will form part 
of a National Consultative Forums agenda in the new financial year. (PSIRA Annual 
Report, 2013/2014:30)
It is noteworthy that neither of the legislative Acts referred to above gave provisions 
for a crime prevention partnership between the private security industry and 
the SAPS; any such cooperation was to be left to the prerogative of the latter. 
However, in the 2012 draft Private Security Industry Regulation Amendment Bill, 
there was a proposal to amend Section 3 of the principal Act through a provision 
to ‘promote crime prevention partnerships between the private security industry 
and organs of the State responsible for crime prevention’ (Private Security 
Industry Regulation Amendment Bill, 2012). This amendment was however not 
approved by Parliament. 
The question was posed to the senior manager for legal services at PSIRA in an 
interview on 26 February 2014 regarding whether he believed that the work the 
private security industry did would be enhanced if the private security industry 
were included in governmental policies dedicated to crime prevention. He noted 
that if this was in the form of legislation, it would go a long way, and he gave the 
example of the Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act, No. 13 of 2005 whose 
spirit encourages all government institutions to work together. He further stated 
that prospects for the inclusion of the private security industry into the security 
cluster would require engagement from all relevant stakeholders, including the 
Security Manager’s Forum and Security Industry Alliance.
Notwithstanding this, it has been noted that the lack of a formal framework has 
been the main root cause of distrust and resentment between public and private 
policing. The Director of PSIRA conceded that trust was a major factor that hindered 
the feasibility of a crime prevention partnership. He stated that it was prudent to 
acknowledge that legislation had allowed criminal elements to infiltrate into the 
private security industry; hence, it was imperative to develop vetting procedures that 
could guarantee that crime prevention partnerships would operate with the utmost 
professionalism and the highest integrity. Furthermore, he noted that applying the 
same vetting procedures used for the police, on members of the private security 
industry that wish to be included in the partnership would help address the issue 
of trust. He asserted that it was important not to generalise the issue of criminality 
or stereotype the work of security guards as being susceptible to crime, noting that 
private security officers were aware of the role that integrity played in their jobs.
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The Deputy Director of law enforcement at the Authority noted that a key aspect 
of the Crime Prevention Partnership (CPP) would be the standardisation of training; 
thus, aligning the training of the private security industry to that of the SAPS would 
be crucial to harmonise the basic training minds that were currently fragmented. 
According to the Deputy Directory, this shift would enable the private security 
industry to assist in the prevention of crime from a proactive point of view. He 
submitted that the SAPS was mandated to ensure the safety of the public, and in 
this context, the private security industry must at all times maintain a supportive 
role to the SAPS. He opined that there existed reasonable suspicion that there 
were some PSCs that were involved in burglaries and housebreakings, and noted 
that this represented the putrid aspects of the private security industry, presenting 
themselves as the solution to the very crime they perpetrate. It is however 
encouraging that concerted efforts to curtail criminality and enforce compliance 
is a key strategic focus of the Authority’s management.
It is contended here that undertaking the arduous task to make all South Africans 
be and feel safe would be optimally achieved through a partnership with the SAPS, 
members of the private security industry and the explicit support and awareness of 
consumers of private security services. It is anticipated that this report will encourage 
discourse about the feasibility and usefulness of a partnership between public and 
private policing agencies and will contribute to a shift in attitudes about policing and 
security provision in the country. This will play a critical role in laying the foundation 
for the development of a framework that would use an integrated approach, in order 
to take advantage of the work done by both the public police and private security 
actors and establish an integrated method of holding both agencies accountable.
 
11. Use of firearms by the private security industry
The Central Firearms Registry (CFR) is principally responsible for firearms control 
in the country. PSIRA is required to supply information to the CFR regarding 
security service providers that apply for firearm licences. The information required 
is the registration status of the security business, the number of security officers 
employed by the business, training status, and the annual amounts due to PSIRA 
(PSIRA Annual Report, 2012/13:26). Managers of private security companies 
were asked how they characterise the role of the CFR in issuing certificates for 
firearm ownership. It was claimed that the CFR was not effective in its mandate, 
and the suggestion was made by one of the managers of an undisclosed PSC in 
the interview on 6 November 2013 that this might be because the CFR did not 
know what their role was regarding who should or should not get approved. It was 
alleged by one manager interviewed that the CFR was notorious for massive delays 
in issuing competency certificates and then proceeded to penalise officers when 
their certificates were not on site. It was however noted that there had been a 
slight improvement. Another manager stated in an interview on 7 November 2013 
that effectiveness was generally poor at the CFR, and was made worse because 
of the prevalence of ‘fly-by-nights’ brandishing fake competency certificates.
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According to one manager in Cape Town in an interview conducted on 14 November 
2013, delays were to be expected, and it was important that all necessary 
processes were followed; even so, he stated that it seemed as though there was 
not enough personnel to handle the number of applications. He gave an example 
of an officer who had a criminal case pending against him for domestic violence, 
and the CFR withdrew his firearm competency. This resulted in him losing his 
income, while he still had to pay legal fees. He stated that all officers receive 
counselling for domestic issues and family problems, and that the employees’ 
well-being was outsourced to a private company. He claimed that the prevalence 
of fake certificates is the reason for in-house vetting processes.
Limitations on the scope and nature of recording, regulation and control of firearms 
for the private security industry in the country are a major concern. It can be 
surmised that this stems from the poor alliance between the CFR and PSIRA; the 
question was posed to the Director of PSIRA regarding how this relationship could 
be improved in line with the Authority’s endeavour to improve compliance rates. He 
stated that there has been no effort to regulate the use of firearms in the private 
security industry properly, which was partly due to the poor alignment between 
PSIRA and the CFR despite attempts by the Authority to forge a closer relationship 
with the latter. He highlighted that, as a result, the PSIRA Firearms Regulatory 
Committee worked to ascertain which PSCs have been issued with firearms and their 
status with the Authority. He indicated that an audit on this issue was conducted 
and revealed that 15 000 firearms were recorded as belonging to PSCs that were no 
longer registered with PSIRA and, as a result of this finding, a proposal was made 
that PSIRA and the SAPS should sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to 
allow the Authority to have access to their real-time database. 
Using this strategy, it can be inferred that increased information sharing with 
the CFR, screening to verify which PSCs have firearm licenses and conducting 
joint operations with the SAPS to address non-compliance would lead to greater 
transparency on this issue (PSIRA Director, 2013). Currently, PSIRA is limited in 
the information it receives from the CFR; the Authority is granted access when a 
request is made; however, this is not from the CFR’s real-time database (PSIRA 
Director, 2013). Furthermore, it was underscored that the issue of ensuring a 
robust partnership needs to be addressed from a different angle that keenly 
considers the balance between oversight and regulation. The Director of PSIRA 
also highlighted that questions such as how abuses or deaths would be recorded, 
as well as firearm use and losses in the line of duty, are crucial and would need to 
be sufficiently addressed. This, he noted, required the private security industry to 
be more accountable regarding how many people die or are affected by firearms. 
Compliance Forums are one of the ways PSIRA engages with the private security 
industry, the aim being to discuss and target issues that affect non-compliance. 
It was argued by the Director of PSIRA that a broader consultative process with 
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stakeholders such as the SAPS, BAC, SIA and the SASA could help develop 
measures to deter non-compliance (2013). He stated that engagement with the 
National Commissioner of Police on the matter had already taken place and that 
the terms of reference were still being formulated. The Director of PSIRA stated 
that the National Commissioner of Police supported the idea of partnerships but 
had not articulated to what extent this support reached.
12. Gaps, inconsistencies and areas of improvement
The private security industry has grown tremendously over the past 20 years. 
Since the promulgation of the Private Security Industry Regulation Act, No. 56 of 
2001, PSIRA has been concerned with the regulation of the industry, particularly 
with regards to ensuring effective regulation. The challenges of the private security 
industry have been manifested in many ways, including the lack of adequate 
resources of the Authority, which generates revenue from the fees and penalties 
from the private security industry. This affects most notably PSIRA’s inspectorate 
that is understaffed, there are currently 45 inspectors nationally, more inspectors 
are needed to fulfil PSIRA’s regulatory mandate.
Insufficient resources have compromised effective regulation, compounded by 
the lack of proper accountability for firearms in the possession of members of the 
private security industry, security services rendered outside the Republic by South 
African security companies, and criminality within the private security industry. 
These challenges have thus necessitated the fortification of the already established 
regulatory framework. The call for the review of the Act can be viewed as an 
affirmation of government’s will to ensure that every citizen feels and is safe and 
a commitment by PSIRA to enhance the regulation of the private security industry.
Certainly, crime prevention strategies in South Africa should be informed by the 
rate of crime. This would best be achieved by conceiving the efforts of relevant 
security agencies, both state and non-state, through a binding and accountable 
multi-stakeholder approach, catered to preventing crime. When developed together 
with the principles of the 1996 National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS), this 
should elicit an understanding of the importance of cooperation and collaboration 
in the country. The NCPS envisaged a strategy to tackle the root causes of crime 
through an integrated and coordinated government response (Rauch, 2001). 
The NCPS floundered on many fronts but mainly due to the failed integration of 
different departments and agencies (Rauch, 2001). 
The establishment of a formal structure and guideline for cooperative policing, it is 
averred, would address issues of accountability, monitoring and civil liabilities, and 
enhance information sharing for enhanced crime prevention (Minnaar, 2007). Marks, 
Shearing and Wood underscore that police officers should be trained as ‘‘knowledge 
brokers and experts in the discretionary enforcement of law’’ (2009: 153) and seek 
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to impart these skills on the members of the private security industry. Although 
legislation has been effective in fostering a structure for regulation, enforcement 
and management of the private security industry more is needed to increase 
compliance to the PSIRA Act and ensure a credible private security industry capable 
of working with the SAPS. This is hampered by amongst other things, concerns 
regarding foreign ownership and the perception of low-quality training standards 
(Minnaar, 2007). It was noted during the fieldwork that the use of foreign security 
officers is pervasive in the private security industry, foreign security officers are 
deployed mainly during weekends and public holidays when PSIRA inspections do 
not take place. However, more pressing are concerns regarding foreign ownership of 
private security companies, the intention is to limit foreign ownership in the private 
security industry. In theory, however, this has been addressed in the Private Security 
Industry Regulation Amendment Bill of 2012, which is yet to be signed into law.
In addition, the question was posed to PSIRA’s Director regarding whether the 
current sanctions regime was sufficient to ward off criminality in the private 
security industry; the Director of the Authority conceded that indeed they were 
not sufficient. He highlighted that the issuing of fines must be understood within 
the correct context, and that according to the Act, labour-related contraventions 
require that a fine be issued accordingly, whereas sanctions related to criminal 
offences are issued by the courts. The Director noted that the latter represented 
a more pressing concern because there was no formal strategy to deal with these 
in relation to enforcement as dictated by the Act. 
Furthermore, the Director of PSIRA stated in the interview that administrative- or 
labour-related fines were not sufficient, and PSCs find it easy to pay the fines, 
with PSIRA having accumulated R10 million in fines in one year. It was noted 
that this trend promoted non-compliance and exacerbated the criminality within 
the industry. According to the Act, PSIRA is mandated to deal with issues of 
abuse, payment of wages and exploitation of labour. This provision is informed 
by the history of the private security industry; however, PSIRA has scaled down 
on adjudicating on labour matters, which are now referred to the Department 
of Labour (Director, 2013). The Director emphasised that PSIRA’s role was not 
restorative but punitive. Nevertheless, the promotion of the protection of the 
rights of security officers is a key consideration for the Authority. Notably, Berg 
(2007) posits that the treatment and working conditions of security officers has 
a direct implication on the levels of accountability that can be expected from 
private security officers and
 
[although] the State has to some extent attempted to enforce the labour rights of 
those employed in the security sector through, amongst other things, regulating 
working hours, overtime and payment thereof, regulating rest and meal intervals, the 
receipt of benefits, and so forth. There is a general consensus that these conditions 
constitute the most basic conditions of employment and that security officers are 
still expected to perform in less than optimal conditions for relatively low pay or 
incentives. (Berg, 2007:19)
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In addition, there is a need to focus on current challenges affecting the private 
security industry, such as criminality, non-compliance and firearm control; the fact 
that PSIRA has recorded 2 million private security officers on its database but can 
only account for 400 000 is illustrative of this point (PSIRA Director, 2013). The 
Director also highlighted that PSIRA still relied on unofficial figures to determine 
how much the private security industry in South Africa is worth, and the Authority is 
yet to obtain data from Statistics SA on how much the industry is really worth. The 
challenges of training should also lead to promptly addressing the shortcomings in 
literacy, as currently there is no defined threshold for entry into the private security 
industry, for example a matric certificate (PSIRA Director, 2013).
The view was held, according to PSIRA’s Deputy Director of communication that 
moving from the old PSIRA ‘grades’ to the National Qualifications Framework 
(NQF) space was a critical move rooted in the signing of the MoU between PSIRA 
and SASSETA. The Deputy Director emphasized the point that additional debate 
and engagement with the industry was needed to ascertain the material, quality 
of content, quality assurance process and the duration for improved training for 
the private security industry. This process is currently underway and is intended 
to enhance the credibility of members of the private security industry.
It is prudent to acknowledge the hindrances created by the lack of strategic planning and 
foresight from previous management at the Authority most of whom were suspended 
for poor performance in relation to their inability to carry out the objectives of the 
Authority, this has created a huge lapse in efforts to ensure effective control and 
regulation of the private security industry today. The result is a pattern of reactive 
responses to address a plethora of challenges that stem from poor regulation of 
the private security industry in the past, exacerbated by the industry’s growth. 
Despite this, the Authority’s management structures have been developing policies 
to respond to the growth of the private security industry. The Deputy Director of law 
enforcement indicated that the new management of PSIRA had, in the process of 
reviewing policies, uncovered that there had been no clear policies in the past, thus 
prompting the development of clear and responsive policies in the current context. 
Viewed within the framework of a partnership between the police and the private 
security industry, technology could be used to help enhance the mandate of 
such a partnership. According to the Senior Manager of legal services the kind 
of partnerships envisioned between the private security industry and the SAPS 
ought to be based on experience, which had revealed that the role of information 
sharing should be at the forefront of all agreements and MoUs. It was noted 
that this should centre on how to communicate with each other and how to use 
information technology (IT) to help each other. The Senior Manager highlighted 
that the intention in this instance would be to ensure that the lines between the 
two entities are not blurred any further.
What is more, challenges experienced with regulation, which emanate from staff 
shortages within PSIRA must be addressed. There are currently seven vacant 
203
inspector positions (four senior inspectors and three inspectors) within the 
Compliance and Enforcement Departments at Head Office, following previous 
resignations/alternative deployments and promotions (PSIRA Annual Report, 
2013/14:33). Other factors that deter more effective regulation of the private 
security industry are a poor database that allows transgressors to re-register 
with new companies (Minnaar, 2007). This gap is influenced by the once-off 
registration, which means that the database cannot be updated (Minnaar, 2007). 
New mechanisms such as the expiration of registration for security companies 
and officers is one of the ways PSIRA plans to address this issue. The need for 
the creation of opportunities to change information online, access the Home 
Affairs fingerprint database, and outsourcing the function of background checks to 
enhance efficiency in regulation is of paramount importance. Certainly, integrating 
the efforts of relevant stakeholders and organs of state would facilitate more 
effective regulation in this regard and provide the platform for crime prevention 
partnerships. Greater engagement with relevant state agencies, for enhanced 
regulation is envisioned under the Amendment Bill. 
The Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice through the United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime has emphasized that “private security services 
while preventative in nature may compliment the work done by the criminal justice 
system and in some countries are often supportive of public safety” (UNODC, 
2012). The UNODC Report on the meeting of the Expert Group on Civilian Private 
Security Services, noted that states may consider; “reviewing, evaluating and 
revising existing regulation on civilian private security services and, where no 
regulation exists, enacting specific comprehensive legislation for the regulation 
of private security services” (UNODC, 2012). Key to this is: defining exactly 
what private security services are; what their responsibilities entail; maintaining 
accurate records; limiting their use of force; establishing an effective sanctions 
regime for any transgressions; and regular reviews and amendments of legislation 
to address any weaknesses (UNODC, 2011).
Section 22 of the principal Act, No. 56 of 2001 was amended by the Private 
Security Industry Regulation Amendment Bill of 2012 with regard to the renewal 
of registration. It states that “the Minister may prescribe, through regulations, 
procedures and principles in respect of periodic applications for the renewal 
of registration by registered security service providers and the conditions and 
requirements for the granting of such applications” (Private Security Industry 
Regulation Amendment Bill of 2012, Section 22, (1) [B 27B–2012]). Regulation 
of the private security industry continues to experience extensive challenges 
related to non-compliance, because of that, during the 2014/2015 financial year, 
the Authority will be introducing the following measures with the objective of 
improving industry compliance:  
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The launch of the new certificates with improved security features to prevent forgery 
and address identity theft; the new certificate will be implemented in line with the 
Home Affairs database integration to authenticate the identity of applicants; the 
new certificate will have an expiring date (18 months for Security Officers and 
12 months for security business). The next phase of improvements will focus on 
the replacement of current identity cards for security officers. The process will also 
involve employers taking accountability by applying for identity cards on behalf of 
a security officer. This means that only security officers issued with identity cards 
will be deployed to provide security services (PSIRA Annual Report, 2013/14:6-7).
The framework for a crime prevention partnership would work more effectively 
once the regulation and oversight of the activities of the public police and members 
of the private security industry are coordinated under a standardised mechanism. 
There is a dire need for a robust debate about changing the way the South 
African society conceive of accountability for policing and security provision; the 
emphasis as Berg (2007:26) argues should be placed on engendering a new way 
of ‘ensuring accountability from a plural perspective’. Berg postulates that the 
context of accountability for both policing agents, state police and the private 
security industry, should be reinforced through an emphasis on what activities 
they undertake.
13. Conclusion
The peaceful transition to democracy in South Africa was an indication of the 
remarkable and visionary agents of change that were responsible for the country 
that many now live in. The country boasts strong institutions that bode well for the 
future of democratic principles in the country. However, the legacy of inequality is 
reflected in the contemporary context, in differing and mutually reinforcing ways, 
as the country continues to be burdened with the triple challenge of poverty, 
inequality and unemployment. The increasing levels of crime are a reflection of the 
increasing levels of joblessness and poverty in the country (South African Human 
Rights Commission, 2006:12). Since the NCPS was unveiled, government has 
been directing significant resources to addressing crime in the country. There has 
been a concession that “high levels of crime pose a serious threat to our emergent 
democracy … [and] results in the deprivation of the rights and dignity of citizens, 
and poses a threat to [citizens’] rightful participation in the democratic process” 
(NCPS, 1996). The NCPS made bold and honest assertions about the state of crime 
and prescribed the “development of wider responsibility for crime prevention and 
a shift in emphasis from reactive ‘crime control’, which deploys most resources 
towards responding after crimes have already been committed and towards proactive 
‘crime prevention’ aimed at preventing crime from occurring at all” (NCPS, 1996).
The reform of the police to suit a democratic order was imperative, considering 
the injustices and abuses that were normalised and even authorised by the 
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apartheid government for members of the South African Police force. The police 
force’s transition to a police service has been facilitated by the highest echelons 
of power, but divergent factors have contributed to the police’s inability to control 
and prevent crime in isolation. Notwithstanding the reality that no police service 
in any country has the ability to control and prevent crime unilaterally, gains could 
be made through partnerships with relevant state security structures, the private 
security industry and the communities towards which these efforts are directed. 
The hypothesis of an improved crime prevention capacity is therefore feasible; 
however, it is only feasible through more effective regulation of the private 
security industry, failure of which could possibly hinder instead of help a crime 
prevention partnership. This analysis is similarly true for the SAPS, in terms of 
ensuring credibility and accountability. The main argument in this report is that 
salient shortcomings may persist in a narrow conception of which agents in 
society are responsible for policing and preventing crime in particular. The findings 
presented in this report suggest that an integrated domestic security provision 
that includes the role of the private security industry in support of the police could 
yield significant gains, but must be closely monitored and a premium placed on 
accountability and credibility of the partners of such a proposal. 
The research findings are accurate representations of members of the private 
security industry, prominent representatives of private security industry agencies 
and PSIRA’s management structures responsible for the core business of the 
Authority. The responses reveal that there are already ad hoc operations and 
working relationships with some members of the private security industry and the 
SAPS. The way these are executed and consequently their potential for a formal 
and effective partnership needs to be supported and steered by government, but 
after robust and transparent dialogue on this topic. 
That being the case, the objective of this research is to be one of the initial 
avenues to foster the discourse and ultimately cultivate a new way of thinking 
about policing, and who the policing agents and providers of security in the South 
African society should be. The aim is to augment the idea that conceives of the 
police as the only guarantor of security, to one that refers to a body of people 
officially employed to maintain order and enforce regulations. Broadening the 
concept of policing and security providers would help to facilitate and enrich 
partnerships between the public police and the private security industry for 
enhanced crime prevention. Furthermore, reinforcing the skills and resources 
of public and private security agents will serve to benefit the citizens of South 
Africa through better control and prevention of crime.
It is envisioned that a crime prevention partnership would be successful if included 
in governmental policies dedicated to crime prevention through an accreditation 
scheme that would facilitate a crime prevention partnership for optimally 
trained, vetted and experienced members of the private security industry and 
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SAPS members. In essence, the private security industry elicits a portion of its 
legitimacy from the laws of the country, which have been instrumental in the 
industry’s development, specialisation and growth. Indeed, the constitutional 
protection for property laws, neo-liberal policies espoused by government in 
favour of privatisation and significantly high crime statistics in the country propel 
the existence of private security service providers. 
The proposal put forth is that crime prevention and control may be improved through 
a shift in the way people think about crime prevention, and who should represent 
policing and security provision in this country. It is argued here that both public police 
and private security agents form an essential component of the security architecture 
for the safeguarding of local communities in South Africa. Accordingly, through a 
formalised framework for an integrated use of these complementary skills, knowledge 
and experiences, policing and the provision of security and thus community safety 
can be markedly improved. It has been noted that, the police ‘neither create order 
nor sustain it, [instead] they react to its episodic breakdown and seek to repair the 
resulting damage to security and trust’ (Loader, 2011:451). Ownership by the State, 
an olive branch extended to the private security industry and reform of both public 
and private security agencies, is needed in order to facilitate the success of a crime 
prevention partnership and improved crime prevention and control in South Africa.
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SWAZILAND
Hamilton Simelane and Wonderboy Maziya
1. Introduction
The concept of security is old, but through history, it has been continuously 
contested. Such contestation has largely been positive because it has allowed 
those researching the subject to adopt an evolutionary approach that has allowed 
previously neglected actors to be integrated into the study of security. For instance, 
traditionally, and more so, among analysts of international relations, security was 
analysed within the context of the operation of the State because it was assumed 
that the State was the only agent for ensuring security. The works of Ullman and 
Buzan have shown that even non-military aspects of society constitute elements 
of security (Ullman, 1983; Buzan, 1991). Consequently, scholars in the fields of 
critical security studies, feminist security, and human security began to broaden 
the concept even further to allow individuals and communities to be referent 
objects. It is through this evolutionary conceptual process that research on 
security issues has been broadened  to cover private and community security. 
 
While there has been a very clear paradigm shift in the analysis of security 
provision (Baker, 2008; Singleton, 1988) and an impressive array of studies that 
have emerged, especially on the nexus between security and the role of the State 
(Holmquist, 2005; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2007; Sheehan, 2005), there are still grey 
areas in the research and general study of security. It appears that in countries 
with a high democratic deficit, such challenges are more pronounced. This is the 
case because in such countries, the question of security punctuates all analysis 
of security provisioning. Also, while at an international level there are numerous 
studies on security, the development of such studies has not been even. Swaziland 
is one of the countries in which research on different aspects of security is at an 
underdeveloped stage. It was only in 2007 that the first academic research on 
the Swazi security architecture emerged. 
While the aforementioned neglect continues, the narrative of the Swazi security 
architecture remains incomplete. However, the demand for security has increased 
the demand for security provisioning, going beyond the capabilities of the State 
as an institution. This has witnessed a rapid entry of non-state security actors 
onto the scene, and this entry has complicated the discourse on who provides 
security, for whom and how? Notable among these non-state actors was the 
rapid growth in the number of private security companies (PSCs). While there 
is no dispute that security actors have grown beyond the confines of the State, 
that their purposes converge to the single goal of combating crime for Swaziland 
and other countries of southern Africa, and the extent to which they cooperate, 
collaborate, and form partnerships with the State in combating crime, remains 
very unclear and begs more authoritative research.
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It was out of the realisation of the above that the South African Private Security 
Industry Regulatory Authority (PSIRA) embarked on research to interrogate 
the extent to which security actors have forged partnerships for more effective 
combating of crime. The purpose of the research in Swaziland, on which this 
report is based, is to interrogate the extent to which state and non-state security 
actors have constructed partnerships for effective crime prevention.
2. Methodology
The research conducted was achieved through a combination of different research 
methods. For purposes of understanding the general Swazi security sector, 
desktop research was undertaken, yielding a wealth of information on when the 
Swazi private security sector was established and how it has developed over the 
years. Desktop research also provided invaluable information on how the Swazi 
security sector has evolved from a state-centric structure to one where even 
local communities have developed their own security structures and institutions. 
The second method that was employed was the qualitative research method in 
which unstructured interviews were carried out with certain members of Swazi 
society, especially those connected with the country’s security sector. The sampling 
procedure adopted for identifying the individuals was purposive sampling. An 
interview guide constructed in the form of a questionnaire was used to collect 
information on different aspects of the Swazi security sector.
The research in Swaziland experienced some methodological limitations in 
that it was difficult to get information from the Swazi military. This is because, 
presently, there is much secrecy surrounding the Swazi military. The dominant 
view is that the military is not an institution for public debate, such that all issues 
concerning the army are not available for public scrutiny. The other limitation was 
that the smaller private security companies in the country were not forthcoming 
with information on certain matters. It was therefore impossible at times to get 
information on their structure and performance.
3. Country profile
3.1. Geography and population
Swaziland is a small landlocked southern African country surrounded by South Africa 
on the south, west, and north, and with Mozambique on the east (Booth, 2000). 
In terms of geographical size, Swaziland is 17 703 square kilometres in area and 
is estimated to be about the same size as Wales and arguably the smallest country 
in the Southern Hemisphere. It is divided into four topographical and climatic 
areas ranging from 400 to 1 800 metres above sea level, each with its own unique 
characteristics. From the west, there is the mountainous Highveld that features 
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rivers, waterfalls and gorges. During the colonial period, Transvaal sheep farmers 
grazed their sheep there (Matsebula, 1972). It is followed by the Middleveld at a 
lower altitude; the Lowveld, which is the largest region covering about 40% of the 
country; and then the Lubombo Plateau. The activities of private security companies 
cut across these geographical regions. Regions such as the Middleveld and the 
Highveld, with a higher concentration of population and economic activities, tend 
to have a higher concentration of private security companies.
According to the 2007 Swaziland Population and Housing Census, the country 
has a population of about 1 018 449 (Population and Housing Census, 2007). 
A disaggregation of this figure by gender shows that there are 481 428 males 
and 537 021 females. The census report also indicates that the population is 
largely rural, as 793 156 (78%) Swazi reside in the rural areas, while 225 293 
(22%) reside in urban areas. This spatial distribution of the country’s population 
provides an indication of the concentration of private security companies. Most 
of their activities address the needs of only 22% of the population. According to 
the 2007 Swaziland Population and Housing Census, the regions of Manzini and 
Hhohho accommodate a large proportion of the population (see Table 1). Because 
they are the locations of the two largest cities of the country, they also enjoy a 
much larger concentration of private security companies.






Total 1 018 449
Source: Swaziland 2007 Population and Housing Census
 
3.2. Brief history
The modern Swazi state was in an embryonic stage at the beginning of the 
19th century. Security issues were important even then as the new state developed 
in the neighbourhood of more powerful indigenous states. The 19th century was 
also an important historical period, as the forces of Western imperialism began to 
affect state architecture and bring a very strong change dynamic. As a result of 
the dynamism of imperialism, between 1902 and 1967, the country was governed 
by Britain under a very ambivalent status. It was never clear whether Swaziland 
was a colony, a protectorate, or a protected state. Despite such ambiguities, 
the country gained political independence in 1968. During the colonial period 
the basics of the Swazi security architecture were founded – the coercive state 
security machinery was created and the precursor of the private security industry 
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established. After independence the growth of private security companies was 
consolidated and expanded. 
From 1973 to part of 2005, the country was governed without a constitution, and 
this period bequeathed to the country a legacy of a substantial democratic deficit. 
Such a deficit was not even addressed by the promulgation of a constitution in 2005. 
Although the Constitution provides for freedoms of assembly and association, the 
respect and guarantee of these freedoms remain very questionable. Swaziland’s 
political landscape has the outward appearance of stability, while internally there 
is much tension and political contestation. The Swazi monarchy continues to rule 
supreme, and opposition political groupings are systematically squeezed out. The 
democratic deficit that is characteristic of the country informs security dynamics 
in many respects. It may even inform the structure and operations of private 
security companies. 
The recent economic performance of the country has been less than satisfactory. 
This is partly shown by the fact that the overall real Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) went down from 1.9% in 2010/11 to about 1.2% in 2011/12 (Swaziland 
Business Year Book, 2013). Even though this is a very crude measurement of a 
country’s economic performance, it is an indication that all is not well. This low 
economic performance can be explained in different ways. Conventional wisdom 
posits that it is a result of fiscal problems allegedly induced by loss of revenue 
from the Southern African Customs Union (SACU); others have argued that it 
is a long-run problem associated with the country’s democratic deficit. The only 
positive economic performance came from agriculture that grew by 8%. While 
there has been some improvement in agriculture, the same cannot be said of 
the tertiary sector that normally accounts for 51.2% of GDP. This sector went 
from 5.3% to 1.3%. Poor economic performance impacts significantly on security 
issues, especially on the increase in the level of crime.
Despite its numerous challenges, the country is not a conflict zone and is among 
the most peaceful African states, but the majority of the citizens live in poverty, 
especially those residing in the rural areas. Poor economic performance has direct 
relevance on security issues, as it leads to job losses, which can, in turn, lead to 
an increase in the level of crime. Furthermore, the economic security of individuals 
at community level is undermined, as some fail to be economically active. 
The country’s constitution places issues of peace and security in the hands of the 
State and consequently government. This has been done through the creation of 
certain structures that are responsible for peace and security. The state police 
are responsible for peace and security at both state and community level. They 
monopolised this function for a long time until the formation of the Umbutfo 
Swaziland Defence Force (USDF) (Simelane, Kunene & Magongo, 2006). 
The question of how effective state security actors are remains a subject of 
debate. State police annual reports indicate successes. They indicate that for the 
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last three years, cases reported were reduced from 44 334 in 2010 to 40 510 
in 2012. However, broader developments indicate that the state police are not 
coping. For instance, the fact that communities in Swaziland have constructed 
their own community security structures is evidence that the state police are not 
reaching all the areas with their crime prevention strategies (Simelane, 2013). 
Also, the fact that over the years Swaziland has experienced a fast growth in the 
number of private security companies indicates a deficit in security provisioning 
by state police (Simelane, 2007). While all these issues raise concerns about the 
extent to which structures created by the State ensure peace and security, the 
overarching question is whose security is being considered? (Simelane, 2008).
4. Swaziland security threats: real and perceived
The issue of security threats to a state and society has evolved over time. 
Traditionally, the conception of threats was always in the context of external forces. 
Consequently, the militarisation of the State was seen as a security solution. 
This was very evident during the period of mercantilism when state power was 
measured through military power. However, over time, the whole concept of 
threats has been expanded to include a much wider range of issues that could 
constitute threats to a state. 
Swaziland security threats are both perceived and real. One of the perceived 
threats concerns a possible invasion of the country by other countries. This was 
probably at the back of the minds of the Swazi leadership that established the 
Swaziland Umbutfo Defence Force. Looking at the terrain of international relations 
in the present century, it is very unlikely that such a threat will come true. 
Another security threat revolves around the issue of regime security. Presently, 
there are no public expressions of issues of regime security. However, there is an 
indication that the Swazi leadership is constantly concerned with possibilities of 
internal revolts. The security scenarios that emerge out of this are diverse. There 
has been a drive by the monarchy to control the security forces. This scenario has 
been unveiled several times over the years, the most recent being in 2012 when 
the Swazi military was used against pro-democracy protesters (Simelane, 2013). 
Such a threat is sometimes projected as an issue of protecting the national interest.
Internal migration constitutes a real security threat for Swaziland. This is particularly 
the case with continuous internal movement of people from rural to urban areas. This 
process has a long history, and it has been intertwined with cross-border migration. 
This has become a serious security threat, as the State has not been able to cope 
with the demand for diverse services. State security has been overstretched and 
is incapable of handling the surge in crime associated with rural-urban migration. 
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Debatably, one of the major factors behind the fast development of the private 
security sector in the country is escalating crime that makes individual home owners 
and business individuals feel very insecure. According to state police reports, 
the most reported crimes in Swaziland are housebreaking and theft, stock theft, 
drug abuse, car hijacking, rape, armed robbery, murder, and culpable homicide. 
According to several police reports, such crimes are more pronounced in areas of 
in-migration. Research has shown that one of the reasons for the development 
of community security actors has been crime against women who remain in their 
homes in the absence of husbands who have taken up work in neighbouring 
South Africa and some areas of employment inside Swaziland (Simelane, 2013).
The security threats continue to rise because the state police are thin on the ground. 
The complement of the Royal Swaziland Police Force is currently 4 611 men and 
women. Evidence suggests that male state police officers outnumber female state 
police officers. This suggests that the police ratio to the Swazi population stands 
at 1:260. However, taking into account that there are some officers who are not 
operating because they are involved in administrative duties, the ratio may be 
higher. This indicates that it is extremely difficult for the state police to provide 
security for all, and this opens a gap for private security to fill. The number of 
private security personnel has risen much higher than that of state police. The 
ratio of public police to private security guards in the country is around 1:5. 
Research carried out in Swaziland six years ago indicated that the state police and 
the armed forces are not able to address the security challenges in a satisfactory 
manner (Simelane, 2007). The situation appears to be worse at the moment, as 
the circumstances demanding security have become more pronounced and more 
complex. As a result, there has been a more intensive privatisation of security, a 
tendency that points to the continued growth in the demand for services provided 
by private security companies. Most security threats in Swaziland are internally 
generated. 
The perceived threats in Swaziland are state-centric in that they are conceptualised 
in terms of regime security. They lead to an overconcentration of public security, 
dedicated to protecting the political interests of the institution of monarchy. They 
also lead to an increase in the number of people employed in the army and the 
police. The perceived threats do not have a direct impact on the development 
of the private security sector in Swaziland. Nevertheless, there is an observable 
impact in the sense that as the public security forces are overstretched, there 
has been a growing tendency to engage private security companies in the public 
domain, especially that section of the public domain that concerns the functioning 
of government. The public domain is increasingly becoming a viable market for 
private security companies. This is an observable and growing trend that continues 
to result in the growth of public security companies.
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5. Development of the Swaziland security industry
The analysis of the development of the private security industry is plagued by 
conceptual ambiguities. While the concept of private is easily understood within the 
ethos of capitalism, it becomes less easy to understand when it is applied to issues 
of security. This is the case because conventional wisdom has it that private security 
is provided by organised companies for corporate organisations and individuals for 
profit. Nonetheless, there has also been the emergence of community non-state 
security actors whose purpose and nature is different from that of conventional 
private security companies. For purposes of better understanding the Swazi security 
architecture, this report will extend the discussion to community non-state security 
actors and will refer to them as quasi-private security actors.
The development of the Swazi private security industry began in the colonial 
period where there were indications of private security activity. It was, however, 
in the post-colonial period that the industry grew to higher levels of organisation. 
Such growth was due to internal factors that tended to transform the whole 
security architecture of the country. Among the most important factors was an 
increase in economic activity and the inability of the State to cope with security 
demands. During this period, the industry was consolidated and reorganised into 
formal companies. In 2007 there were about 50 private security companies, in 
2013, they had increased to over 70. The areas of operation were in surveillance, 
intelligence and undercover activities, preventive activity, and investigation and 
detection. About 61% of the employees are working for only nine companies. In 
the manned sector, the dominant actors are Guard Alert, VIP Protection Services, 
and Buffalo Soldiers. The companies employ about 10 000 workers, but this figure 
should be used with caution as some private security companies refused to share 
information on the size of their establishments. Using the above estimate, the 
ratio of state police to private security employees is about 1:2.
The Swaziland private security industry is divided into three categories. The first 
category is that of companies providing physical or mechanical items such as 
security locks, safes, strong rooms, grills, shutters, security glass, anti-bandit 
screens, vehicle security etching, and cash bags. The leading companies in this 
category are Chubb Electronic Swaziland (Pty) Ltd and Swazitronix, which supply 
safes, vaults, security locks and doors. Despite the presence of these companies, 
a large number of security items are still imported from South Africa and to a 
limited extent Europe.
The second category of companies are the manufacturers and installers of security 
electrical or electronic devices such as intruder detection, alarms, control panels, 
CCTV, signalling apparatus, video motion detection, access control systems, security 
cameras, and cash-handling aids. At the moment, Sequre Retractable Barriers 
(Pty) Ltd is the only manufacturer of these items. The country has experienced a 
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proliferation of electronic systems in clubs, discos, shops, banks, residences and 
offices. The most lucrative sector of the industry is alarms, access control and CCTV 
because of tenders worth millions. The advent of such systems has inevitably led 
to the restructuring of security architecture in many facilities to enhance security. 
For purposes of convenience and clarity, the installers can be divided into two 
sub-divisions. They include those that specialise in the installation of residential 
and commercial security gadgets such as alarms, CCTV, and access control 
systems. There are presently over 10 companies that specialise in installations. 
The oldest is Swazitronix (Pty) Ltd, followed by Radio Link (Pty) Ltd. Swazitronix 
specialises in the supply, installation, and servicing of integrated security services 
encompassing building management systems involving access control, CCTV 
surveillance, evacuation, fire and intrusion detection. The company was registered 
in 1988 and has been under the management of the current owners since May 
1991 (see Annexure 1).
The second sub-division is the installers of vehicle tracking gadgets and fleet 
management systems. Under this division, there are five companies: V-Trac 
Investment, Cartrack, Tracker, Netstar, and Instrument and Control (Pty) Ltd. 
Based on the number of subscribers, the market leader is Netstar, as it is currently 
providing monitoring of 1 190 subscribers followed by Tracker/Radio Link, with 
1 012 subscribers. Netstar is a subsidiary of the Altech Group, an international 
company with its head office in Midrand, South Africa, and offices in Botswana, 
Namibia, Swaziland, Zambia, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Ivory Coast. Out of 
the service providers mentioned, V-Trac and Instrument and Control (Pty) Ltd 
are independent companies. V-Trac uses products of Tramigo, a Finland company, 
although they are free to use any other system. Instrument and Control, on the 
other hand, uses VDO systems, as a sole distributor of the same in the country. 
There is also Radio Security Link Ltd (Radio Link) which was formed in 1989 and 
acquired by Secure Holdings in 1991. Other members of the Secure Holdings 
group include Guard Alert Security Services (Pty) Ltd and Cash Security Services 
(Pty) Ltd. Originally a Guard and Alarm company, for more than 20 years, Radio 
Security Link has focused on alarm installation and monitoring, and complementary 
activities including access control and CCTV installation.
The Swazi-based installers compete with South African-based companies. This is 
another indication that this is a lucrative sector in addition to the tenders worth 
millions awarded by both the private sector and government. The South African-
based companies have a competitive advantage over the Swazi-based companies 
in terms of cost and experience, however, they experience challenges in the area 
of after-sales service. The Swazi-based companies import most of their systems 
from South Africa; consequently, their prices are much higher as compared to 
the South African-based companies (Nxumalo, 2013).
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In addition to the above-mentioned companies, there are 11 PSCs that do installation 
to augment their core business of providing guarding services. These are VIP 
Protection Services, Buffalo Soldiers, Awesome Security, Phoenix Security, 4Him 
Security, Stealth Security, Gridlock Security, Swaziland Lumber Security Services, 
One-to-One Emergency Services, Anped Security Services, and Swaziland Security 
Guards. These companies mainly install intruder detection systems which they 
also monitor. Based on the number of systems they are currently monitoring, it 
seems the market leader is VIP Protection Services, as it currently monitors 195 
clients (see Annexure 4).
The last category of private security companies are those that provide what 
Johnson (1992) refers to as manned (and womanned) services. These include 
static or patrol guarding services, cash transportation (bank collection and wage 
packaging), key holding and responding to alarms, alarm monitoring, CCTV, and 
audio surveillance remote monitoring. The manned/womanned security category 
accounts for 98% of the total man/womanpower absorbed in the private security 
industry. These include proprietary security guards and those employed by private 
security companies. There are about 20 companies that have in-house security, 
employing about 550 staff or 6% of the manned/womanned security labour force 
in the country. These companies are in different industries, with the Swaziland 
Civil Aviation Authority employing the highest number of proprietary guards. 
It seems to be a norm that the proprietary guards enjoy a better status compared to 
the guards of the PSCs because the operations of the proprietary guards are supported 
by legislation which affords them better privileges. For instance, the Civil Aviation 
Authority (Security) Regulations, 2011, promulgated in terms of Section 104 of the 
Civil Aviation Authority Act of 2009 establishes a Civil Aviation Security and Regulatory 
Division with vast powers in order to ensure safety and security in the operations of 
the Aviation Authority. The powers of the aviation security officers include, inter alia, 
unobstructed access at all times to an aircraft and premises of an operator within 
the country for the purpose of inspecting security operations or to carry out security 
inspections and surveys, safety and security audits and testing functions. 
The manned/womanned services sector also includes cash transportation. There are 
six players in this sector, namely, Cash Security Services, Fidelity, VIP Protection 
Services, Swaziland Security Guards (Pty) Ltd, Swaziland Lumber Security Services 
(Pty) Ltd, and Stealth Security Services (Pty) Ltd. The leader in this sector is Cash 
Security Services (Pty) Ltd. This market leader in this sector is a sister company 
of Guard Alert Security Services and Radio Link (Pty) Ltd under Secure Holdings. 
It prides itself on having been in the industry for over 20 years with a fleet of 
17 specialised armoured vehicles manned by a staff of 51. Its crew comprises 
people with a police or military training background. 
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In the entire private security industry of the country, it is in the manned/womanned 
services sector, especially the guarding sector, where work conditions are poorest. 
There is widespread sexual abuse; exposure to harsh weather conditions; 12 hour 
shifts that are not commensurate with the salaries; work for some months without 
rest; always being the first suspects when there is no one to be blamed for a crime 
committed in their area of responsibility; alienation from their families, as they 
hardly find time to spend with their spouses and children; insufficient sleep because 
at times some get home as late as midnight and need to wake up three hours later 
to prepare for duty; provident fund subscriptions that are not deducted; and some 
employers that do not remit such deductions to the appropriate institutions (Sukati, 
2013). The plight of the security guards has not gone unnoticed by the Ministry 
of Labour and Social Security, as will be shown under the control and regulation 
section in this report. 
The guarding sector is both ineffective and inefficient because companies compete 
on costs, not on differentiation. They win guard contracts by undercutting their 
competitors. This kind of practice has a detrimental effect in the long run, as companies 
end up offering wages below the minimum wage and offering substandard services. 
There is no private security company in Swaziland that offers wages that are above 
the stated minimum wage. Although some companies offer performance bonuses 
in addition to the basic remuneration, the use of pricing as the major determining 
factor in awarding contracts also negatively affects the standard of security, as clients 
end up getting what they paid for – substandard service. It is a common practice 
for companies not to have enough staff on duty, staff not wearing proper uniform 
and protective clothing, and guards engaged in dishonest acts while in their area 
of responsibility because employers do not conduct strict screening procedures. In 
the absence of a centralised database of security guards, this is bound to happen. 
The practice of price cutting has also pushed down the profit margins to as low 
as 2% at times. Because of this low-profit margin, in an interview on 5 November 
2013 in Mbabane with Peter Drummond who is one of the directors of Cash Security 
Services, he said, “It is more like we are in a social responsibility programme, 
not in business. In one of our board meetings we asked ourselves why are we 
not closing down the guarding aspect and concentrating on the other sectors, 
but because of the number of people it has been difficult to take that route.”
All the private security companies in Swaziland are not big enough to have 
subsidiaries operating outside the country. The only exception is Fidelity, which 
is a subsidiary of a South African company and commands 7% of the market 
share. In terms of market share, it is smaller than VIP Protection Services, which 
has 17% of the market share and Guard Alert Security (Pty) Ltd, which has 14% 
of the market share. 
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Almost all the private security companies in Swaziland operate in the urban areas 
or in rural areas where there are industrial establishments. The majority of them 
are found in the Mbabane-Manzini corridor, which is at the same time the most 
economically advanced area of the country. This is an indication that private 
security companies are predominantly capitalist establishments that are at the 
service of individuals or groups who have the money to hire them. 
There are no specific regulations for private security companies, but they are 
established in terms of the Companies Act and get trading licences in terms of 
the Trading Licences Order No. 20 of 1975. Because of this reason, it is very 
difficult to ascertain with certainty the number of private security companies in 
Swaziland. The licences do not restrict them in terms of geographical area but 
only in terms of the kind of work they do.
Presently, business people can establish private security companies whenever 
they want. In fact, the only conditions they have to satisfy are those related 
to the establishment of companies as stipulated by the laws of the country. 
There is no process of screening, and it does not appear that there is a system 
for monitoring their operations. It is only when they have violated some of the 
country’s laws that they are brought to book. This appears to be a very unstable 
situation, especially when it comes to the protection of citizens who are employed 
by the private security companies. At the same time, the companies themselves 
cannot be blamed for such a situation, as it is the responsibility of the State to 
construct and implement vetting or screening policies.
Owners of private security companies have not been totally against the unionisation 
of workers. At present, there is a union of employees of private security companies 
that has been in existence for some time. Nevertheless, information from some 
office bearers in the union indicates that it has not been functioning well. This has 
not been due to employer intransigence, but because many employees did not 
register with the union. The failure of the union to work well is a disadvantage for 
both the employers and employees, but more so for the employees. 
The issue of transparency about their operations is not uniform. Through fieldwork for 
this research, it came to light that the more established and bigger private security 
companies were more willing to share information about themselves and their 
operations. In contrast, the small companies were reluctant to provide information 
about their operations. The situation was even worse for those companies engaged 
in game ranging. Their lack of cooperation was justified with arguments of security 
sensitivity. This made it very difficult to create a general picture on most issues. 
In some instances, the bigger picture was established through estimates from the 
information provided by the main private security actors.
Research on the development of the Swazi private security industry shows that 
the industry has witnessed extensive growth, and such growth is continuing. 
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The research also indicated that in terms of extent, the private security industry 
is moving towards larger-than-the-State security structures. This leads to the 
conclusion that the private security industry is a real factor in the provisioning 
of security in Swaziland and cannot be simply wished away. This demonstrates 
that the State needs to be proactive in dealing with the governance of the private 
security sector in order to maximise its benefits to the economy and society.
6. Drivers for the growth of the Swaziland security 
industry
The issue of the factors behind the development of the private security sector in any 
country remains a debatable one. This is the case because different researchers are 
bound to put emphasis on different factors. Much as the Swaziland situation has its 
own peculiarities, the country still shares common factors with other countries of the 
world. The development of the private security sector has been founded on several 
economic and political considerations. Consequently, different scholars have interrogated 
the reasons behind the development of PSCs in different parts of the world. 
The marketisation and commodification of the public good in the form of the 
‘privatisation revolution’ has played a crucial role in the worldwide growth of the 
private security sector (O’Brien, 1998). This has gone hand in hand with the principle 
of globalisation in which it is believed that privatisation can maximise the efficiency 
and effectiveness of states through comparative advantage and competition. It 
symbolises a belief in the superiority of the marketplace over government in the 
provision of services. The main result of this has been an upsurge in outsourcing 
of service provision by the State such that services that were traditionally provided 
by the State are now performed by private companies. Some State institutions 
have turned to the private sector for their security requirements. The analysis of 
the drivers of the growth of private security companies in Swaziland is informed by 
these broad arguments, but also largely anchored in the realities of the country. 
There are several factors behind the growth of PSCs, but they also tend to revolve 
around economic and political issues. In both the colonial and post-colonial periods, 
economic and political relations have always been at the root of the growth of 
the private security sector in Swaziland. Politically, the growth is spearheaded by 
the tendency to concentrate security measures on protecting the interests of the 
leadership. As mentioned above, this tends to overstretch the state security resource, 
and consequently leaves room for private security companies to play a role.
The Swazi economy experienced a fundamental transformation after the Second 
World War. This was a product of intensive capitalisation of the economy through 
British and South African capital (Booth, 1983; Simelane, 2004). As a result of 
capital investment, numerous industries were established mainly in the areas of 
mining and agro-industries (Crush, 1979). Such a development continued into 
the post-colonial period as more and more industries were developed in different 
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parts of the country. From 1968, the management of the growing Swazi economy 
was taken over by the indigenous leadership that was a mixture of traditionalists 
and the middle class under the leadership of the monarchy (Macmillan, 1983). 
Security began to be confined to the protection of the economic interests of the 
monarchy and the middle class (Simelane, 2006). The growth of the economy 
imposed unprecedented security demands on the State, and this was made worse 
by the ascendance of social classes that also imposed further security demands 
on the State. The paradox was that the State was no longer able to adequately 
provide protection to all economic enterprises. It could not provide security to 
rural dwellers who by the beginning of the post-colonial period made up more 
than 70% of the Swazi population (Fair, Murdoch & Jones, 1969). 
The growth of the private security sector in Swaziland derives its character from the 
economic disparities that accompanied the growth of the Swazi economy. Economic 
growth significantly contributed to the affluence of the royal family and the middle 
class (Fransman, 1978). Economic disparities reached high levels as poverty became 
more entrenched, while the rich became richer (Times of Swaziland, 2005). It is 
also estimated that about 69% of the Swazi population lives below the poverty 
line. About 400 000 (about 40%) Swazis depend on food handouts. Research has 
also shown that 20% of Swazis control about 54% of the country’s wealth, while 
the poor control only 4.3%. Swaziland is therefore a country of huge economic 
inequalities. Security has come to mean protecting the economic interests of the 
rich, and the development of the private security industry addresses this goal. The 
poor majority remain outside the operation of private security companies, and they 
remain vulnerable to many security threats. The private security companies have 
therefore become synonymous with the rich whose interests drive them. 
The development of the private security sector in Swaziland has a great deal to do 
with the desire of individuals to ensure personal safety and that of their families 
and properties. From the time of colonialism to the independence period, Swaziland 
has experienced crimes of different magnitudes. These crimes have occurred at a 
personal level and also at the level of economic enterprises. The crime level has gone 
up as a result of easy access to firearms that are used to rob families and economic 
enterprises. The increase in the crime rate has expanded the market for private 
security companies. Individuals are compelled to find means to protect their homes 
and their businesses. Local and foreign companies are compelled to hire security 
companies to protect their operations and premises. In the same breath, foreign 
missions in Swaziland are compelled to hire private security companies to protect 
themselves against all security threats including crime. As a result of the escalation 
of crime, Swaziland has developed a strong market for private security services.
Swaziland provides an unfortunate environment for the development of crime as 
the majority of its citizens live in abject poverty and they witness the affluence 
of the few rich on a daily basis; the country has an unemployment rate of about 
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40%. Crime has become a weapon of the poor in an attempt to realise economic 
equality. The response of the rich has been a heavy reliance on private security 
companies, as the police are overstretched and are not up to the task.
Since 1968, the Swazi state weakened and that led to its inability to discharge its 
obligation of being a protective shield for its citizens. The State had no capacity to 
effectively deal with the security concerns of the citizens in both rural and urban 
areas. The State’s diminished capacity to deliver on its promise of security has been 
justified by some commentators. While it is true that the responsibilities of the State 
have expanded, some observers feel that the Swazi state is failing to protect the 
economic interests of the majority of its citizens in the rural areas. Because of its 
weakness, and because security demands have dwarfed state security institutions, the 
Swazi state is clearly neglecting its responsibilities in terms of security provisioning. 
Some commentators have observed, “The private provision of security and military 
services challenges conventional assumptions about the roles of the nation state as 
the main protagonist in military affairs and as the guarantor of physical security for 
its citizens” (Holmquist, 2005:1). This is true of the Swazi state today.
The relationship between the Swaziland Government and private security companies 
has been good. This has been the case since the early days of the growth of private 
security companies. There has never been any indication of conflict or tension 
between the two. This is indicated by the fact that the government has continued 
to employ private security companies to guard its own establishments, as there are 
not enough state police to perform all the security functions of the State. Although 
no authoritative research has been conducted in this area, anecdotal evidence 
indicates that all government ministries have employed security companies for 
protection services. This has extended to schools in different parts of the country 
that are guarded by private security companies. The only area that has not been 
penetrated by private security companies has been the guarding services of the 
royal family, as they still rely on military personnel. The government recognises 
the private security providers as important stakeholders in the war against crime. 
This is indicated by the government’s reliance on private security companies to 
provide security to offices and facilities such as hospitals. 
Privatisation of some government functions also cemented the relationship 
between the government and private security companies. A good example is the 
collapse of the Income Tax and Immigration government departments and the 
establishment of the Swaziland Revenue Authority to take over their functions. 
This Authority has engaged private security guards to provide security at the 
various border gates and posts and their offices.
The question of the cooperation between the State and private security companies 
can be a source of concern. It appears that such cooperation contributes to the 
violation of the human rights of citizens. Rumours have circulated that some 
private security companies have been employed to supress trade union action in 
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different parts of the country. In different periods of labour unrest, there have 
been claims that the State, to augment its police force, has employed private 
security companies to do its dirty work.
Considering the limitations of the Swazi state and state police, private security 
companies will always be needed in Swaziland. This is particularly the case because 
as the economy of the country continues to grow, the demand for security in excess 
of state capacity will always grow. It is also very reasonable to conclude that as the 
demand grows, more private security companies will be established to satisfy the 
supply end of the equation. It is doubtful whether the Swazi business community 
and the Swazi economy will survive without private security companies. 
Currently, no serious concerns have been raised against the private security 
companies in Swaziland. This derives from certain circumstances. First, Swaziland 
has not experienced serious social divisions and conflict that would force private 
security companies to take sides. Also, up to now, the Swazi state has been very 
cautious in terms of involving private security companies in political conflicts. 
Again, this may be because up to now, the country has not experienced serious 
political conflict. However, there have been some concerns about the involvement 
of employees of the security companies in crime. Anecdotal evidence indicates 
that in many cases of break-ins into business establishments, the guarding 
personnel played a part. It also indicates that in many money-in-transit heists, 
an employee of security companies was implicated. 
7. The Swaziland private security industry and the 
provision of services
The development of the Swazi private security industry was a response to the 
security needs of some sections of the Swazi population. It was to satisfy an existing 
market, and for this reason, the services provided will always be determined by 
what the market needs. The services provided by private security companies can be 
divided into four broad categories, namely, guarding and protection; surveillance, 
intelligence and undercover; preventive activity; and investigation and detection.
Most private security companies in Swaziland are engaged in the business of 
guarding and protection of property and persons. Duties include the protection 
of industrial, commercial, and retail premises by static uniformed security guards 
and a very small percentage of personal protection services, normally referred 
to as ‘bodyguarding’. There are only two companies that provide the services 
of personal protection service. The first is Gridlock Security (Pty) Ltd. It offers 
this kind of service to the managing director of Salgaocar Swaziland, a company 
involved in mining of iron ore in the country. The second one is a small company, 
Kwekwe Security (Pty) Ltd, that is usually engaged when there are music festivals 
in the country to provide personal protection services to outside artists. 
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The social and economic position of Kwekwe Security (Pty) Ltd and activities 
for which the services of bodyguards are utilised may indicate that this kind of 
service is associated with prestige, more than anything else; hence, its demand 
in Swaziland is very low. Those companies that offer this kind of service rely 
on people with a military or police training background. For instance, when the 
managing director of Salgaocar Swaziland is in the country, it becomes the sole 
responsibility of the managing director of Gridlock to escort him because he is 
a former police officer. The managing director of Kwekwe also has a military 
background gained from services in the army of Zimbabwe.
Another area of guarding and protection relates to the protection of wildlife. The 
country has two major players, four small players and one PSC of game rangers. 
The major players are The Game Parks (Mkhaya, Mlilwane and Hlane game parks) 
and Swaziland National Trust Commission (Mlawula, Magadzavane, Malolotja, 
Mantenga and Orion game parks). The small players are Nisela, Phophonyane, 
Embuluzi and Tshaneni game reserves. 
The category of preventive activity involves private policing, which has increased 
the emphasis on proactive rather than reactive modes of intervention, aiming to 
intervene before crime is committed. The preventive role of the private security 
actors is typically referred to as ‘loss prevention’ in terms of which the role players 
acknowledge that their principal concern is the protection of their clients’ assets. 
The industry’s commitment to loss prevention is well illustrated in the case of risk 
management. Risk management is concerned with anticipating risks, planning for 
avoidance of risks whenever possible and, where it is not possible, shifting risks 
to another, for instance, to an insurance company (Johnson, 1990).
There are two companies that specialise in risk management. These are Kosi 
Capital (Pty) Ltd and AON Insurance Brokers. The former specialises in enterprise-
wide risk management, whereas the latter on insurance risks. In an interview on 
28 October 2013 in Mbabane with Thembinkosi Dude, it was highlighted that one 
of the factors that may cause few Swazi companies to participate in this sector 
is that some people tend to draw an artificial line between risk management and 
security instead of treating the former as the governing body and the latter as a 
branch of the former, although security, as a concept, has a long history.
Another factor as regards the low participation of Swazi companies in risk 
management might be that the first PSCs were formed by ex-police or military 
men, who are mainly concerned with their area of speciality of crime prevention, 
where the emphasis was visibility of security guards as a mitigating factor. The 
private security guards were considered a substitute to the state police who could 
not meet the demand for a visible uniformed police presence on the streets. This 
mindset has robbed the industry of a risk management approach, where its primary 
concern should be one of loss prevention and offering an array of loss prevention 
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strategies such as physical security, information security, business continuity 
management, disaster recovery planning, and safety and health programmes. 
In Swaziland, another area into which private security shows signs of expanding 
is the policing of transport facilities. These include the railway stations and airline 
facilities. The Swaziland Railway Company has engaged two small private security 
firms that have deployed their personnel both to man the trains and their facilities. 
The Swaziland Civil Aviation Authority has an in-house security force of over 90 
people that has statutory powers to search airline passengers and their luggage 
(Civil Aviation Authority (Security) Regulations of 2011). 
Furthermore, another activity under preventative measures is that of alarm or 
emergency response. Private security companies have taken over first response to 
intruder alarm calls, with the police only being notified when someone has actually 
broken into a building to take appropriate steps in order to effectively prosecute 
the offender.
Despite the industry’s preoccupation with loss prevention, there are elements of 
reaction once preventative measures have been compromised. As reactive measures, 
the private security providers carry out some preliminary investigations if crime has 
been committed in their areas of responsibility. Insurance companies and banks 
have recruited people with police backgrounds to investigate internal insurance and 
fraud cases. In part, this is due to the inability of the state police to keep up with 
the sophisticated techniques employed by those engaged in large-scale fraud. The 
other reason for the privatisation of fraud investigation, of course, is the fact that 
incidents remain private, thus mitigating the loss of reputation if such incidents 
were to be publicised. Banks, in particular, do not readily report fraud cases to the 
police because they feel that exposure of the occurrence of crime might threaten 
public confidence in their operations.
In addition to private security providers performing investigations as a reactive 
measure, there are organisations and individuals (self-employed) who specialise in 
investigations. It is very difficult to ascertain the number of private investigators 
in the country with certainty. However, research has identified five private 
investigators operating in the country. Their activities include tracing missing 
persons, process serving, undercover work, vetting prospective employees, 
insurance claims, debt collection, bailiff work (hence some are appointed as 
deputy sheriffs), and, to a lesser extent nowadays, matrimonial work involving 
the investigation of unfaithfulness in matrimonial affairs. The sector’s strong 
links with the police force are inevitable given the problem of ‘moonlighting’ and 
the fact that private investigation is a common second career for retired police 
officers. The investigation aspect is dominated by Huntsip (Pty) Ltd, which is 
oldest in the field.
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If one considers the array of services provided by the PSCs, it may be assumed 
that the PSCs in Swaziland provide rigorous training to empower their employees 
for the different activities. In practice, that is not the case, as people are hired off 
the street, given uniforms and deployed at a post to provide security. This works 
well for most clients who award tenders based on cost instead of the quality of 
service. The problem here is the fact that there is no regulatory framework that 
stipulates the minimum education requirements for employees of private security 
companies. This is despite good practice experience in other parts of the world 
that stipulates minimum education requirements.
The private security industry, especially the guarding sector, offers no upward 
mobility to its employees. A guard will remain a guard for the rest of his/her 
working life in the company. In the absence of standardised training, a guard 
will always be treated as a novice irrespective of the fact that he/she might have 
been in the industry for a long time. This is the case because when he/she moves 
from one company to another, he/she has to undergo the same training because 
the other company does not recognise the training and experience he/she would 
have acquired from his/her previous employer. For instance, Guard Alert offers a 
basic training course which includes introduction to security, discipline, hygiene, 
communications, access control, patrols and searching, legal aspects of arrest 
and search, fire, and first aid. Fidelity uses the South African grading system 
that also covers the topics covered in Guard Alert’s basic course. However, when 
a guard moves from Guard Alert to Fidelity or the other way around, he/she 
has to undergo the same training before being deployed. A few private security 
companies that operate in Swaziland are easily identified. Most however, especially 
the smaller companies, operate in a hidden way; they are unregistered, do not 
have identifiable offices, and their employees do not wear uniforms. 
Research revealed that private security companies in Swaziland offer a range 
of activities. The major difference between the companies is always one of 
concentration or specialisation. Nonetheless, the general practice is that the 
majority of them attempt to cover most aspects of security. The research did 
not bring out any evidence of enforced or compulsory specialisation. The market 
for the Swaziland private security sector is both private and public. Government 
departments and institutions employ private security companies for different 
services depending on their expertise.
8. Effects of the privatisation of security on human 
rights: vulnerable groups, women and children
There has always been a concern over the operation of PSCs when it comes to the 
subject of human rights. The main concern has been that in their operations, PSCs 
have little regard for human rights or have been used by repressive regimes who 
desire to entrench their authority irrespective of how that process violates the rights 
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of individuals or groups (Hansen, 2008; Buur, 2008). It is important to note that in 
most instances, the nexus between private security companies and human rights 
violation is usually not an aberration but is the product of existing socio-political 
configurations. Consequently, an analysis of the privatisation of security and human 
rights in Swaziland should be undertaken within the context of existing local conditions.
The Constitution of Swaziland embraces some fundamental human rights and 
freedoms that are applicable to all vulnerable groups and minorities in the country. 
Section 14 of the Constitution guarantees these fundamental rights and freedoms 
(Swaziland Constitution, 2005). However, there is a challenge in upholding some of 
these fundamental rights and freedoms (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and 
Labour, 2012). Women and children are sometimes victims of these challenges. 
There are numerous reports of sexual harassment in the workplace that have gone 
unpunished. In an interview on 20 January 2014 in Mbabane with Frank Mncina, 
the Secretary General of Swaziland Amalgamated Trade Union, he mentioned, 
We are aware of sexual harassment going on within the security industry on women 
by male supervisors. It has been reported to us a number of times and we have 
raised it in other forums where some companies have unionised employees. Some 
supervisors dangle contracts to hire females on condition that they have sex with 
them. Where an employee agrees she will be subjected to the very ill-treatment of 
having to have sex with the manager before the contract can be renewed. We call 
this kind of process a ‘carpet interview’ which has become the norm. If a female 
security guard does not wish to be stationed in unfavourable working conditions, 
she is forced to have sex with her boss or risk being fired. If you give into those 
sexual advances you get to be posted to flexible workstations.
As much as the rights of persons with disabilities are enshrined in the Constitution, 
only one security firm (Buffalo Soldiers) has reported having employed people with 
disabilities. The small number of people with disabilities in the industry suggests 
that such people are discriminated against. This state of affairs is made worse 
by government’s failure to enact laws to prohibit discrimination against persons 
with disabilities in employment.
There are indications of violations of the rights and freedoms enshrined in the 
Constitution in the security industry. However, compared to other countries of 
the world, PSCs in Swaziland as entities do not appear to have a high instance of 
violation of human rights. There is no doubt that from time to time a security guard 
may violate people’s rights, but the companies themselves seem to be marginally 
involved. The reasons behind this are actually not very hard to identify. The main 
one has to do with the fact that the integration of private security companies in 
the political activities of the State is presently very minimal. 
Present research does not indicate that PSCs in Swaziland impact negatively upon 
women and children. It appears that the companies play no defined role affecting 
women and children except in those instances where individuals have committed 
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some crime in the sphere of operation of private security companies. Even in these 
cases, evidence suggests that the general pattern is that these companies deal 
with such crime in accordance with the laws of the country. Be that as it may, 
there have been incidents where employees of private security companies have 
acted in an abusive manner to members of the public irrespective of whether they 
are women or children. For instance, violent action against individuals suspected 
of committing crimes has been observed.
While the foregoing information may be true, the actions of private security companies 
in the country sometimes raise human rights concerns. According to principles of 
liberal democracy, the right to self and family reproduction is fundamental. Private 
security companies in Swaziland are notorious for paying low wages which prevents 
employees from constructing a decent living for themselves and their families. These 
low wages perpetuate poverty and may also lead to social ills that undermine the 
security of those concerned and society at large. The private security companies 
are also notorious for providing sub-standard working conditions. Once again, this 
may be considered to be a violation of human rights.
PSCs in the country employ both men and women, and the duties they carry 
out are largely the same. However, women constitute only about 15% of the 
total workforce of the companies. It is presently not clear if women are treated 
equally with men in the workplaces of private security companies. There have 
been no incidents of abuse of female employees that have come to the attention 
of the public. Considering the issue in the context of general Swazi society, 
it is very possible that acts of discrimination and abuse against women have 
been committed but they have not been reported. Although child labour is rife 
in Swaziland (Simelane, 1998), there are no reports of children in the employ 
of private security companies. This is possibly the case because the companies 
have access to plenty of adult workers that they can control and pay low wages.
At the moment, the Swazi media, the Human Rights Commission, and non-
governmental organisations have not reported any violation of human rights 
against women and children at the hands of private security companies as 
corporate bodies. Most of the reports from these structures have concentrated 
on violations by the State, especially state security forces. Generally, therefore, 
the Swazi private security industry does not have a bad record of abusing the 
human rights of women and children, or vulnerable groups of different kinds.
9. Advantages and disadvantages of the private 
security industry in Swaziland
From a historical point of view, the development of the private security industry has 
been attended by both positive and negative elements. As a result, the industry 
can be analysed in terms of advantages it offers those who employ them while 
at the same time containing certain disadvantages. 
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Private security companies have improved access to security for those who have 
the money to hire them. This has happened at both the personal level and at the 
level of business enterprises. At the moment, it is easy to employ the services of 
private security companies for one’s security. In this manner, the private security 
companies have made many people feel safe and can follow their pursuits for 
the betterment of the country.
The PSCs have filled the security void created by the failure of state security forces. 
Over the years, state security has become overstretched resulting in failure to provide 
security for all. This has been compounded by the unreliability of state police, as they 
have increasingly been involved in crime themselves. Private security companies 
have expanded security options beyond the limits of state security provisioning. 
The have reached a market that was increasingly becoming too big for state police.
Private security companies have made a significant contribution to the expansion of 
economic activity. Almost all economic establishments and enterprises in Swaziland 
are protected by private security companies. The increase in the GDP of the country 
is highly dependent on the security of business enterprises, and this would not have 
been possible without the presence and operation of private security companies. 
Even agricultural enterprises are able to meet their quotas in the international market 
because their produce is protected by private security companies. If it were not for 
the presence of private security companies, the economy of the country would be 
affected by widespread criminal activity, which would undermine its growth.
Private security companies have contributed to the reduction of crime through the 
many services they provide to individuals and the business community. Between 
2010 and 2012, police reports indicated that because of the partnership between 
state police and private security companies, many of the major crimes in the country 
had been reduced. Crimes of domestic violence, murder and culpable homicide, 
housebreaking and theft, car theft, and car hijacking have been reduced because 
state police and private security companies have been able to work together 
towards crime prevention. As a result, many citizens of the country are able to 
live in an environment of reduced crime. There is no doubt that private security 
companies can make an even more significant contribution to crime prevention 
and reduction, as there are already visible indicators of positive contribution.
Private security companies have significantly contributed to the reduction of the 
rate of unemployment in the country. Such a contribution has been most notable 
in the last decade where the Swazi economy has not been able to open more job 
opportunities. This has been especially the case with high school leavers whose 
absorption into the country’s workforce has been stagnant, if not declining. The 
more than 70 private security companies that have been established in the country 
up to now have created jobs for a large number of young people. The creation 
of job opportunities has not been limited to young people but extended even to 
older people. The contribution of the companies to employment has also been 
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made significant by the fact that they have also offered jobs to women. While the 
number of women employed by these companies is still low, there is evidence 
that the companies have contributed to breaking down patriarchal barriers and 
ventured into employing women.
While several advantages offered by the presence of private security companies 
can be outlined, there are also numerous disadvantages that can be raised. 
The presence of private security companies has fulfilled the neoliberal dream 
of rolling back the State. The privatisation of security has allowed the State to 
avoid its traditional responsibility of providing security to the citizens. There has 
been a gradual but consistent tendency to commercialised security out of the 
arena of the State. For some, this is a welcome development because the State is 
sometimes characterised as an inefficient and ineffective institution. However, the 
privatisation of security has tended to crowd out the public security architecture. 
The commodification of public security that comes with the growth of private 
security companies may not be a positive development for ordinary citizens. 
While private security companies can be praised for increasing job opportunities, 
they are guilty of offering very low wages. These low wages are sometimes 
justified in terms of low skills capacity of those employed. The low wages are a 
huge disadvantage to the recipients who cannot redeem themselves from poverty 
through them. Historically, wages and savings have played a very important role 
in capital formation and investment. These ingredients of economic growth and 
possible development are not possible due to the low wages paid by Swazi private 
security companies. They only perpetuate levels of exploitation that have been 
characteristic of the private ethos of capitalism.
Another disadvantage of private security companies in Swaziland is that they fail 
to lead to social cohesion. This is the case because private security companies 
are exclusive. As market-driven entities, their services can only be accessed 
by those who have the capacity to afford them. In other words, they are class-
specific and cannot be relied upon to serve all sections of a country’s population. 
This discriminatory characteristic can hardly serve countries well, especially 
African countries, as they have been subjected to numerous divisive elements 
in their histories. Private security companies have marginalised the majority of 
the indigenous population in Swaziland.
In the case of Swaziland, private security companies are a huge disadvantage 
because they are not controlled by any regulations. It is an unregulated industry, 
and this can become a huge problem when the companies become a law unto 
themselves. When such a development takes place, the companies become a 
security threat to individuals and citizens at large. This condition is not caused by 
the companies themselves, but it is an environment that allows them to become 
dangerous to the citizens.
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Another disadvantage is that private security companies are a window for possible 
undermining of democratic principles. This is the case because the only value system 
that guides their operations is money. It does not appear that they are guided by 
values of preserving humanity or protecting the human rights of individuals. If a 
dictator can pay them to violate democratic principles and force citizens to acquiesce, 
they can readily do so. They can intervene in political disputes on the side of the 
paymaster despite the immorality of the action. They have the propensity to prop 
up undemocratic regimes only on the promise of payment. In this manner, private 
security companies are potentially a huge danger to society. Even in instances 
where they are regulated, they do proceed to commit atrocities against humanity. 
In the case of Swaziland, this disadvantage has not yet played itself out, but the 
potential is there because the country has an observable democratic deficit.
The use of private security companies has impacted on different aspects of the 
country. For instance, it has impacted on the public security services. To a large 
extent, its impact on public security services has been positive. PSCs have expanded 
public security services beyond the capabilities of the Swazi state. In fact, it is 
doubtful if the present services outlined above would have been available to the 
Swazi public if private security companies were not available. 
When it comes to the impact of the private security companies on crime levels, the 
evidence is not very conclusive. It is very difficult to quantify the extent to which 
the private security industry has impacted on crime levels because interviews 
with members of the state police and public personnel could not come up with 
the necessary statistics to demonstrate the impact. For instance, in an interview 
on 23 November 2013 at Manzini Police Station, Ndabazezwe Ngwenya, a police 
officer, responded to the question on the impact as follows: 
Up to now, no person can tell in quantifiable form the extent to which private 
security companies have impacted on crime levels. This is because we have failed 
to put in place a system of identifying, in record form, arrests that have been due 
to the actions of private security company personnel. There are many such arrests 
but they have not been recorded as such. Maybe this is because private security 
personnel report crime rather than make arrests. Maybe we should begin a system 
of disaggregating the reported crimes in terms of who reported them. I am therefore 
not able to answer your question constructively. 
When asked the same question, Albert Smith, a director in one of the private 
security companies, in an interview on 23 November 2013 in Manzini said:
Although I do not have the figures to prove what I am saying, private security companies 
have played a very important role in the reduction of poverty in this country. Our 
strength has been at the preventive level, and less so in making arrests. The physical 
presence of private security personnel in most public and private establishments has 
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been a huge dettering factor in reducing crime. At the moment, our main weakness 
is that we have not been able to make a systematic analysis of how many crime 
activities were reported before private security companies were engaged, and how 
many were reported after. Most of us do not have the resources to do so, and it also 
appears that our clients do not either. However, even though I cannot provide you 
with the evidence you want, I can assure you that private security companies have 
made a huge impact in the reduction of crime in the country.
Despite the absence of statistical data, the extent to which PSCs have provided 
protection to private and public establishments is indicative of a positive impact on 
crime prevention. In fact, almost the whole economic establishment in Swaziland 
is dependent on the services of private security companies. It can be submitted 
that if there has been a reduction of crime in Swaziland, part of the credit should 
go to private security companies, although it may not be possible to quantify the 
extent. This is particularly the case at the level of prevention because private 
security companies have provided security protection to both private and public 
establishments. The reality of the situation is that even the Swazi state relies 
on private security companies for prevention of crime in its establishment. The 
companies have much to improve in their operations in providing security, but 
their contribution to the prevention of crime and lowering levels of crime in the 
country has been very significant.
The contribution of the PSCs to public safety is debatable. As already indicated, 
the services offered by private security companies are not available to 70% of the 
Swazi population. These are the poor and marginalised who reside mainly in the 
rural areas. This is because the private security industry is largely defined by the 
commercialisation of security that is usually beyond the means of the majority 
of the citizens. The reality of the private security industry in Swaziland is that it 
is not focused on general public safety. It usually provides safety to the public 
when there are national functions organised by the State. Whatever protection 
members of the general public receive from private security companies, it is not 
direct, but circumstantial or by association.
It is on the economy of the country that the impact of the public security industry 
has been felt. As pointed out already, the development of the Swazi private 
security industry has been associated with development in the Swazi economy. 
The security of the Swazi economy is in the hands of private security companies. 
All the premises of private firms are protected by private security companies. The 
movement of cash between different points in the country is largely in the hands 
of private security companies. In fact, the whole private security architecture in 
Swaziland is constructed around economic dynamics.
The private security industry has had only a marginal effect on poverty levels. The 
contribution of the industry has been through wages paid to workers. However, 
there have been complaints that the wages in the private security sector are very 
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low. It is possible that the low wages are due to the fact that most of the people 
employed in the private security industry are not skilled and not educated. In 
the final analysis, the private security industry has had very little impact on the 
reduction of poverty levels in the country.
The growth of the private security industry has benefitted many sections of Swazi 
society. There is no doubt that the Swaziland government itself has benefitted 
immensely from the presence of private security companies. Evidence of this 
is the fact that many government establishments are protected day and night 
by personnel from the private security industry. Even the orderly performance 
of some government offices hinge on the services provided by private security 
companies. Private security personnel monitor public visits to government offices 
to ensure that there is order, and the officers are able to conduct public business 
in an orderly fashion. As much as there is no evidence of a statement from the 
Swaziland government expressing or acknowledging the benefits it receives from 
the operations of private security companies, the extent to which government 
has contracted these companies for certain services indicates acknowledgement. 
Government is fully aware that the state security forces are overstretched and 
thin on the ground and cannot cope with the ever-increasing demand for security. 
The private security companies have relieved the State of the huge burden of 
security provisioning, and there is ample evidence to demonstrate this.
No study has been conducted to determine the general feeling in the country 
about the presence of the industry. The conclusions and assertions that can be 
made can only be based on anecdotal evidence. Up to this point, there has been 
no expressed complaint against the presence of the industry from the citizens. 
This may largely be because, to a large extent, private security companies in 
Swaziland have been able to restrict their activities to security provisioning and 
not venturing into the arena of perpetrating violence against the citizens. It 
therefore appears that the citizens of Swaziland are still happy with the presence 
of private security companies in the country. This is partly the case because as the 
citizens interact with different establishments where private security companies 
operate, they, by extension, feel protected, as they can conduct their businesses 
freely. As much as this positive image is portrayed, there is still a need for more 
authoritative research into this issue.
10. Partnerships between state police and private   
 security companies
Like many jurisdictions, Swaziland has experienced an increasing complexity 
of crime control as indicated by the emergence of other actors in the policing 
arena, thus producing a shift from the traditional state police monopoly. Such 
236
plural policing is productive and synergic only if some form of cooperation or 
partnerships between the role players are established and maintained. Since state 
police officers and private security officers are the most common representatives 
of the ‘plural police family’, it is imperative that there should be some kind of a 
relationship between both the state police and private security personnel and 
the organisations to which they belong. It is illogical to have two organisations, 
operating in different spheres, where the state police perceive themselves as the 
only institution established and dedicated to the provision of security, public order 
and legality, while private security is first and foremost an economic activity only 
concerned with profit maximisation (Sotlar & Mesko, 2009). 
Partnerships between state law enforcement agencies and private security providers 
have become a popular phenomenon in many countries. In some jurisdictions, 
this is so common that some practitioners have termed them “P3 network”, which 
refers to a public-private partnership network (The Law Enforcement-Private 
Security Consortium, 2009). Generally speaking, the attitude of the state police 
in Swaziland is ‘to protect and serve’, while that of the private security providers 
is ‘to protect and make profit’; hence, their relationships take different forms 
and shapes because of the intersection of protecting life and property although 
with different emphasis and latitudes. 
Public-private partnerships exist in different forms. They may be formal or informal, 
open to all or limited to approved members, dues charging, or free. Partnerships for 
crime prevention can take different forms (The Law Enforcement-Private Security 
Consortium, 2009; Johnston, 1990). Some of the notable forms revolve around 
organisational structure, specificity of purpose, leadership source, funding, and 
the nature of relations between the police and the private security.
In terms of organisational structure, partnerships may be non-formal, written 
commitment, reliance on structure of a related organisation, non-profit making, 
and task team membership. In the case of Swaziland, the relationship between the 
state police and private security practitioners is a mixture of formal and informal. 
There is a common understanding of cooperation whereby the state police invite 
the security companies to discuss different issues. This is usually during the festive 
season and when there will be big gatherings where the security actors share 
strategies of crime prevention. These forums also incorporate other stakeholders 
such as the commercial banks, depending on the topic of the day. The commercial 
banks are involved in issues touching on cash-in-transit and ATM fraud and/or scams. 
The security companies have the leeway to have direct relationships with specific 
police officers. For example, Mr Malcolm Barlow-Jones, the Managing Director 
of Fidelity, said in an interview in 2013 that if there is a topic he wants to cover, 
he simply calls Thembinkosi Dlamini, a police officer assigned by the National 
Commissioner of Police to escort their cash-in-transit vehicles to come to their 
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premises and address his staff and also to take them for shooting sessions. The 
relationship with this police officer is so strong that the police even avail themselves 
on Sundays during their own spare time. This kind of sacrifice is appreciated even 
by the police authorities. 
What is also important to note in their relationship is that the PSCs do not pay for 
the services provided by the police. However, this works to their disadvantage in 
certain areas. For instance, the cash-in-transit operators have to queue for the 
limited number of police assigned to escort them. The delays that are caused by 
the limited resources negatively affect their daily schedules. The fact that PSCs 
do not pay for the service shows how committed the police are to ensuring that 
the country is safe and secure.
The police also have formal relationships with other private security providers. 
By formal partnerships, reference is made to written commitments establishing 
parameters of control. One example is a memorandum of understanding (MoU) 
between the state police and the Central Bank of Swaziland signed on 16 May 
2012. In terms of this agreement, inter alia, the Bank has a dedicated armoured 
vehicle worth over a million Emalangeni that is fitted with police equipment and only 
used by the police when conducting the Bank’s cash-in-transit operations. This is 
a partnership and at the same time it can be considered as a form of outsourcing. 
There are different forms of partnerships manifested through the operations of the 
state police and private security companies. Some of these come in the form of 
reliance on structures of either party. The security companies, for example, rely on 
the police for vetting their staff. The security companies also avail their technological 
systems to help the police to crack down on some crime. For example, some car 
tracking devices of some private security companies such as Tracker are installed 
in some police vehicles to facilitate tracking of stolen vehicles by the police. These 
structural linkages and collaboration indicate partnerships aimed at combating crime.
Partnerships also come in the form of task teams. It is common to have the police 
being members of task teams. For example, the National Commissioner of Police 
assigned two police officers to be members of a technical task team established 
by Swaziland Standards Authority, a body responsible for establishing standards 
in the country, which was responsible for establishing Swaziland National Standard 
Private Security Services – Requirements (SZNS 024:2012). In these task teams, 
members of the state police and personnel from private security companies work 
together towards the common goal of fighting crime. 
In terms of their degree of focus in addressing crime and other problems, state and 
private security partnerships tend to fall into three groups, namely, multipurpose, 
single purpose, and evolution to multipurpose. Multipurpose partnership addresses 
several security and public safety issues. Single purpose partnerships may be 
established to address a single issue and keep on focusing on that issue alone. 
Under this type, there is the Fraud Liaison Committee established by all the players 
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in the banking sector and the police to share information on fraud. The commercial 
banks and the Central Bank of Swaziland are represented by officials who are 
instrumental in the investigation of fraud and related cases in their respective 
place of employment. In the case of evolving partnerships, there is specificity of 
purpose that can be seen in partnerships that originally addressed a particular 
concern, but created relationships that proved useful in solving a range of problems. 
Leadership is another characteristic that varies from one partnership to another. 
Leadership in this context refers primarily to the task of setting the partnership’s 
agenda or representing the partnership before other groups. There are three 
options of leadership of partnerships, namely, law enforcement leadership, 
joint leadership by law enforcement and private security, and private security 
leadership. Law enforcement leadership is common in the country because the 
main activity is the sharing of crime-related information. The police leadership 
can be viewed as a function of the department’s ability to provide funds and meet 
space, staffing, and other resource requirements. Joint leadership is common 
although it perfectly exhibits the nature of the organisation as a partnership. In 
such leadership, leaders are elected at regular intervals and could come from 
either the police or private security. The Crime Prevention Councils and Committees 
embrace private security leadership. 
When it comes to funding, for any partnership to execute its responsibilities, 
resources such as finance are needed. Either partners purchase them, or members 
or outside benefactors donate them. Most of the partnerships are funded by 
the state police, as they provide meeting spaces and refreshments. Some are 
funded by private security providers. For instance, the Central Bank provides the 
necessary resources such as meeting space and refreshments. 
Partnership or cooperation between the state police and the private security 
providers can further be dissected by analysing interpersonal and inter-institutional 
relations of the two groups of security professionals. Johnston (1990) posits 
that the relations between the two groups can be dissected into interpersonal 
relations between the police officers and security officers, common operations, 
exchange of favours, and outsourcing of security functions to the private security 
companies as is shortly discussed.
Interpersonal relations between state police officers and private security officers 
have shaped the nature of partnerships. Many retired police officers join or establish 
private security companies. Some, in search of greener pastures, quit the police 
force and join the private security providers. The latter is more common with in-
house security. Almost all the proprietary security is staffed with ex-police officers. 
This kind of scenario makes it easier for a good working relationship between 
the police and the private security providers to exist because they usually know 
one another on a personal level. Anecdotal evidence indicates that some police 
officers in their personal capacity are engaged by the private security companies 
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for specific assignments. However, this kind of behaviour is not encouraged by the 
National Commissioner because there is an element of abuse of power, as such 
police officers do so for their personal benefit while using their official capacity 
and official resources. 
Common operations of the police and private security in Swaziland present 
opportunities for closer contact between the two groups. In most cases, the two 
groups work together in sporting, cultural or musical events because it is impracticable 
that the police can provide security in all events due to limited resources. In order 
to augment the effort of the police, it has become a norm for organisers of such 
events to contract private security officers to work alongside the police. The same 
applies to organisations that have their in-house security such as the Central Bank 
of Swaziland and the Swaziland Civil and Aviation Authority where one finds the 
police and the proprietary security officers working hand in hand. 
The police and private security companies practically exchange various favours. 
There is a flow of relevant information between the two parties. For instance, the 
private security companies screen their employees by getting criminal records 
from the police and private security also shares information with the police on 
issues of crime to assist the police in their own investigations. Depending on the 
intensity of their relations, sometimes the police share intelligent information 
with the private security, especially on possible crime risks, so that the latter 
may strengthen their operations to ward off any attack. It has become a norm 
for the police to offers some training to the private security staff in areas of crime 
prevention and firearms, among other things. In a nutshell, it can be said that 
the relationship between the two parties is of mutual benefit and is founded on 
respect for each other. 
It has become accepted practice for the Government of Swaziland to engage 
PSCs to provide security services on its premises. The services outsourced from 
the private security companies are guarding and installation of electronic security 
gadgets. The Government Senior Security Officer under the Prime Minister’s Office 
issues a call for expression of interest for the supply of security services to the 
Swaziland government annually, through which potential vendors are shortlisted to 
supply security services to government ministries and departments. Once vendors 
have been shortlisted, they are then invited during that financial year to submit 
tenders for the provision of security for a specific category they are eligible and 
qualified for. Tenders are issued to shortlisted firms to obtain competitive prices. 
This means that government ministries and departments are obliged to engage 
only the shortlisted security providers for their security needs.
The trend to contract out security services has also been seen in parastatals 
such as Small Enterprises Development Corporation (SEDCO), Central Bank of 
Swaziland, Komati Basin Water Authority (KOBWA), Swaziland Electricity Company, 
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Swaziland Water Services and Sewerage Corporation, to mention just a few. 
Non-governmental organisations such as World Vision, have also followed the 
trend. Embassies also depend on PSCs for their security to augment the efforts 
of the state police. 
There has also been the development of quasi-private security actors in the form 
of community security actors (Community Police/Emaphoyisa Emmango) that have 
joined the nexus of partnership construction. They are referred to as quasi-private 
because they are a hybrid of private security, as they are outside the realm of state 
security but anchored on group initiatives in the community. The development of 
community security actors expanded the possibilities of constructing partnerships 
for crime prevention between state security, private security companies, and 
community security actors. There have been more concrete developments towards 
developing partnerships between state police and community security actors. This 
was clearly seen in the promotion of the Crime Prevention Bill of 2010 whose main 
aim was the promotion and coordination of crime prevention in Swaziland. 
Much as the Bill carries the assumption of establishing Community Police/Emaphoyisa 
Emmango, this structure has been in existence in peri-urban and rural communities 
for a very long time. This Bill clearly expresses the intention of forming a partnership 
with Community Police/Emaphoyisa Emmango for purposes of preventing crime. 
Part IV of the Bill outlines some of the issues pertinent to this partnership. This 
was an important development because for a long time, the community security 
actors were not willing to collaborate with state police whom they accused of being 
in cahoots with criminals. The main challenge faced by the construction of this 
partnership is that the Bill has up to now not been passed as an Act of Parliament. 
It is not clear why the Minister responsible for the police has not pushed this Bill 
to be made law. As long as it remains a Bill, the envisaged partnership between 
the state police and the community police remains unanchored in law.
According to reports compiled by the state police, the partnership between state 
police and private security companies has yielded positive results in terms of crime 
reduction. This conclusion was arrived at through an analysis of the occurrence 
of certain crimes in the period 2010-2012. As a result of this partnership, it was 
reported, “The overall crime rate was reduced over the period under review by 
-4.6%” (Royal Swaziland Police, 2013:2). It was also reported that prioritised 
crimes such as armed robbery, car theft, housebreaking and theft, stock theft, 
and car hijacking were reduced by 4% in the period under consideration (Royal 
Swaziland Police, 2013:3). For instance, a total of 109 cases of armed robbery 
were reported in 2012 compared to 218 in 2011. Between 2011 and 2012, 
reported housebreaking and theft cases were reduced by 5.4%. Available statistical 
information indicates that positive results have been reported in the partnership 
between state police and the private security sector.
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11. Regulating the private security industry
There are no specific regulations for private security companies in Swaziland, and 
like all other legal entities, they come into existence in terms of the Companies 
Act and get trading licences in terms of the Trading Licences Order No. 20 of 1975. 
However, the Registrar of Companies indicates that there are over 70 companies 
that are registered as PSCs. Although there is no regulation or policy framework 
relating to the legal and procedural operations of PSCs, these entities are expected 
to comply with certain statutory provisions that relate to general employment issues. 
These include the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 2001, the Employment Act 
of 1980, the Wages Act of 1964, and the Workmen’s Compensation Act of 1983. 
PSCs are under an obligation, inter alia, to provide safety measures to prevent 
or minimise harm to employees, for example, by installing safety equipment, 
providing protective devices, and exercising proper supervision. This common law 
obligation is ratified by Section 9 of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, which 
provides that an employer has to put in place a systematic and functional way of 
identifying, evaluating and controlling hazards in the workplace, provide free of 
charge adequate and appropriate personal protective appliances, equipment and 
clothing to mitigate exposure to safety and health risks in the workplace, and 
further ensure that employees are appropriately trained and instructed such that 
they perform their duties in such a way as to avoid any danger or risk. 
It is however a well-known fact that most security guards are not issued with 
appropriate personal appliances or equipment. According to Frank Mncina, 
Secretary General of Swaziland Amalgamated Trade Union (SATU), in an interview 
on 20 January 2014 in Mbabane, security guards are not issued with the general 
aids for security and this makes them vulnerable. Some are even forced to pay 
for the protective clothing (Sukati, 2013). 
The Office of the Commissioner of Labour and employers are not in agreement as 
to what constitutes protective clothing. The employers are of the view that they 
are entitled to deduct a certain amount of money from the salaries of employees 
for uniform, which they keep and pay back on submission of the issued uniform 
by the employee. Their argument is that a uniform is not protective clothing. 
On the other hand, the Office of the Commissioner of Labour is of the view that 
everything worn by a security guard is protective clothing; therefore, they have 
to be given the uniform free of charge.
In a nutshell, there are no systematic ways of identifying, evaluating and controlling 
hazards in the workplace in the security industry. Employers take contracts without 
any regard to safety issues. This point is illustrated by an unfortunate incident 
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where a cash-in-transit operator was gunned down during a heist at Mbabane 
Swazi Plaza on 23 September 2013. It is alleged that the operators had to travel 
about 200 metres from the Corporate Place Building carrying boxes of money 
along the corridors where there were throngs of people. 
This incident raises several pertinent issues such as the availability or non-
availability of standard operating procedures, proper firearms for this kind of 
operation because if the operators were to fight back in such busy areas, there 
could have been many casualties. Another issue raised is whether the riskiness 
of this kind of operation was considered by the banks and their regulator, the 
Central Bank, when deciding to operate in this place. An additional issue arising is 
whether they were actually armed because one guard confided to the researcher 
the fact that in one of the companies involved in cash-in-transit operations, 
security guards who have not been trained in weapon handling are assigned to 
escort duties without being issued with live ammunition and to the use of boxes 
instead of technologically sophisticated cross-pavement protective devices.
It is a common fact that most security guards are paid way below the stipulated 
amount, which is E71.88 per shift or E1 868.88 per month (as per the Regulation 
of Wages (Security Services Industry) Order of 2014). One security guard is 
reported to have said that he had been a security guard for the past five years. In 
all three companies that he had worked for, he had never earned anything above 
E1 000 per month (Sukati, 2013). Even the stipulated minimum wage is very 
small, especially when compared with the number of hours they are supposed to 
work (72 hours per week). This amount is small even when compared with the 
average manual worker’s wage. It is therefore understandable why the industry 
has a high labour turnover. 
In terms of the Workmen’s Compensation Act of 1983, particularly Section 25, the 
PSCs have an obligation to have valid insurance cover to compensate employees 
whose safety and health may be negatively affected while in the course of duty. 
The latest report of the Office of the Commissioner of Labour indicates that over 
90% of PSCs do not have any cover in terms of the Act.
Violations under the Employment Act of 1980 (as amended) include employees 
not having signed written particulars of employment form (Section 22); procedural 
unfairness on termination of contracts of engagement (Section 33); employees not 
paid all their benefits on sale of business (Section 3bis); notice of redundancies 
not given (Section 40); security guards paid their wages way after month end 
(Section 47); employers making unlawful deductions from their employees’ 
wages (Section 56); employees not being issued with pay slips (Section 61); no 
security of wages (Section 62); employees not being given paid vacation leave 
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(Section 121); employees not being paid for medical leave days (Section 129); no 
provision of first-aid equipment for the treatment of accidents (Section 150); and 
most PSCs  not keeping records of their employees and wages register (Section 
151). Sadly, the Employment Act does not appear to be effective in regulating 
the salaries of the employees of PSCs.  
In an attempt to close the gap caused by absence of a regulatory framework for 
the security industry and the weakness of statutory laws to regulate the industry, 
two initiatives have been put in place. The first one came from the founders of 
certain small PSCs. It was some kind of self-regulation through the formation of 
the Security Industry Association of Swaziland in 2012. Its two main aims were 
to regulate the business activities of the providers of private security and regulate 
standards of service delivery, including training of security personnel. 
The effectiveness of this association is a source of concern for most people engaged 
in the private security industry in the country. The association is somehow made 
ineffective by the fact that membership is not compulsory, and this leaves out 
a number of companies that are not under the regulation of the association. 
It appears that at the beginning, the founders of the association expected the 
government to issue a directive compelling all the private security companies 
to be members. This did not happen, and at the moment, the association does 
not even have an office. Its members hold their meetings in the offices of one of 
the companies, and this has proved to be a major challenge. It appears that the 
association will continue to face challenges in terms of membership because it has 
a very high indigenisation tone while the majority of private security companies 
in the country are South African. At present, the association has remained very 
ineffective. 
The second attempt was the promulgation of Private Security Services – Requirements 
by the Swaziland Standards Authority in 2012. This Standard provides the minimum 
requirements for the provision of private security services in the country. Among 
others, the Standard provides guidelines on risk management methodology; policies 
and procedures for performing reference enquiries, verification of qualifications, 
credit and criminal history checks; requirement on issuance of uniform and personal 
protective clothing by employer and, in a way, addresses the debate whether an 
employer is obliged to issue a uniform in terms of the law; use of appropriate 
vehicles; and most importantly, provisions on personnel empowerment to ensure 
effective service delivery. The last proviso entails that employees and/or other 
persons undertaking security work should only be engaged in duties consistent 
with their qualifications and training. According to this Standard, the training 
programme should be comprehensive and cover many essential issues. 
Most of the private providers of private security companies have not embraced 
the Standard. The reason behind this is that the Standard requires a substantial 
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overhaul of the private security sector in the country. For instance, its training 
requirements are a major shift from what is happening at the moment, and it is 
doubtful if private security company owners will be willing to invest in it. Another 
problem is that some service providers are not even aware of the existence of such 
a framework. There is much effort needed in popularising the framework, and it 
is hoped that in the absence of a legal framework, the Standard may engender 
a certain degree of professionalism in the private security industry.
12. Private security companies, the use of firearms, 
and wearing of uniforms in Swaziland
The issue of the use of firearms by the personnel of private security companies 
has remained a contentious issue, and its development has not been even. It is 
even more contentious in circumstances where the State is not in control of the 
private security industry. There is always danger that the firearms may be misused.
It was indicated that the services of the security industry can be narrowed down 
to four categories, namely, guarding and protection; surveillance, intelligence and 
undercover; preventative activity; and investigation and detection. This section seeks 
to deal with two issues: the use of firearms and uniform by the private security 
providers in the country. The main issue here is whether the security companies are 
allowed, in terms of the laws of the land, to use firearms and wear a uniform while 
carrying out their activities. In many instances, the security of the State or that of 
the regime in power is taken seriously in considering access or owning firearms.
From a general point of view, the acquisition and usage of firearms and ammunition 
is regulated and controlled by the Arms and Ammunition Act of 1964. According 
to Section 10 of this statute, any person, either natural or juristic, who desires to 
acquire any firearm or ammunition should make an application to the Licensing 
Officer through the nearest police station where the National Commissioner of 
Police has designated the Station Officers of the different police stations to serve 
as intermediaries between the applicants and the Licensing Officer. The Station 
Officer accepts applications, makes his/her own recommendations and forwards 
the applications to the Regional Commander of the region and thereafter to the 
Licensing Officer, who is based at Police Head Office in Mbabane. The decision 
by the Licensing Officer, whether to grant or refuse permit, is communicated to 
the applicant through the Station Officer. This means that if a security company 
wants to own firearms, it must go through this process as well.
Juristic persons may own firearms, but they will be used by people on behalf of 
the company, hence the Act also deals with possession and usage of firearms to 
close any possible gap in the administration of control and regulation of firearms 
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and ammunition. Section 9 of the Act states that no person shall be in possession 
of a firearm or ammunition unless he/she is permitted to possess it under the Act. 
This means that companies have to follow certain procedures in order to acquire 
firearms and ammunition, and their staff also need to adhere to certain legalities in 
order to use the company firearms and ammunition. In terms of Section 11(4), the 
employee must be above the age of 18 years because this subsection disqualifies a 
person under the age of 18 years from owning or possessing a firearm. Subsection 
6 of the Act states that private security officers may be granted temporary permits 
to possess company’s firearms and ammunition in their official capacity. 
The above legalities seem to be more of use to those security providers who are 
engaged in cash-in-transit services. This is justified because, from a risk-based 
approach, the cash-in-transit operators are exposed to higher risk as compared 
to the normal guarding services providers. Since heists are committed by fully 
armed thugs, it is imperative that the security officers engaged in such dangerous 
activities be well equipped to return fire with fire. The need to possess firearms 
by the cash-in-transit guards can further be justified by the increase of heists 
experienced in the country. In 2013, the print media reported two incidents where 
cash-in-transit operators were gunned down while in the line of duty. 
Officers who deal with cash-in-transit are permitted to possess and use shotguns 
and handguns such as revolvers and 9mm pistols in their course of duty. When 
one takes into account the kind of attacks targeting the cash-in-transit operators, 
the shotguns are not suitable. The heists now take place in busy streets, and if the 
guards may open fire using their shotguns, many people may be injured or even 
killed. When interviewed on 22 January 2014, Mr Malcolm Barlow-Jones, sharing 
the same sentiments, stated that cross-pavement operations are becoming more 
targeted by robbers while the operators can not shoot freely in the streets because of 
the throngs of people and risk shooting innocent people and be held up for murder. 
As service providers, they are now considering changing their shotguns to handguns 
because of these challenges. The handguns are easier to manipulate than any other 
type when taking into account that their people have to carry the boxes of money 
with one hand while the other hand is on the handgun. He further lamented the 
fact that they do not have the latitude to deploy more people such that they may 
have others to cordon the area while others are doing other necessary manoeuvres. 
In practice, these officers are issued with firearms and ammunition when they 
assume their duties on a daily basis. This entails that the private security companies 
discharge the obligation of taking all reasonable precautions to ensure that their 
firearms and ammunition do not get lost or stolen or become available to a 
person not lawfully entitled to possess them. In carrying out this obligation, the 
companies have firearm registers wherein the issuance and receipts of firearms 
and ammunition are registered. The registers are occasionally inspected by the 
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police from the Firearm Registry, who are more interested in the adherence to 
the Act by the licensees. However, there has been an incident where firearms 
of a particular security company were reported stolen from their offices, which 
shows that there is always a need to step up security of firearms to avoid arming 
the wrong people for the wrong reason. 
Static guards are not allowed to use firearms. This practice is supported by all 
stakeholders because if all guards were issued with firearms, the risk of many 
firearms being in the hands of the wrong people would increase. The only 
exception to the golden rule relates to proprietary security officers and game 
rangers. Organisations such as the Central Bank of Swaziland, Royal Swaziland 
Sugar Association and Tambankulu Estate allow their guards to carry and use 
firearms in executing their official duties. 
The permission given to game rangers to carry firearms is guided by the Game Act 
of 1991. In terms of this Act, game parks are permitted to own semi-automatic 
rifles such as LM5. This type of firearm has a similar range to those used by 
the state armed forces. There has been an outcry against the Act, which allows 
game rangers to arrest without a warrant any person suspected on reasonable 
grounds of having been poaching on a reserve. In the process of effecting an 
arrest, the game rangers may and have been reported to have shot to death 
suspected poachers and could not be prosecuted for murder (Nsibandze, 2014). 
The issuance of uniforms to the security officers is governed by the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act of 2001 and the Regulation Wages (Security Services Industry) 
Order. In terms of the former, employers should provide employees with personal 
protective clothing to mitigate exposure of employees to specific work-related risks. 
This is in line with the Regulation Wages (Security Services Industry) Order, which 
specifies that employees should be provided with boots or shoes, whistle, club, 
torch, and depending on the weather conditions, may also be issued with hats and 
raincoats. 
The bone of contention between the Office of Labour Commissioner and the security 
companies is whether the word ‘uniform’ is synonymous with ‘personal protective 
equipment’. The security companies believe they may provide both uniform and/
or protective clothing but deduct a certain amount from the employee’s salary 
as uniform deposit  which would be paid back when the employee submits the 
uniform or protective clothing on termination of contract of employment. However, 
the Office of Labour Commissioner insists that as long as what is issued to the 
employee has a company logo, it should be free of charge and the companies 
should not deduct anything from the salaries of employees as uniform deposit. 
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When interviewed on 22 January 2014, in Matsapha, Mr Malcolm Barlow-Jones 
stated that the interpretation of the Office of Labour Commissioner of this issue 
works against the security companies and the public at large. Having paid nothing 
for the uniform, the security officers are not compelled to bring back the uniform 
on termination of their contracts of engagement. Consequently, it is possible that 
a person may have a number of uniforms from different companies which may 
be used in committing a crime under the disguise of a security practitioner of a 
particular company. This risk is exacerbated by the fact that there is no law in 
the country which obliges security officers to carry some kind of identity card 
while on duty. With that said, there is no other means of identifying a security 
practitioner other than through what he/she wears. 
When it comes to firearms and uniforms for private security companies in 
Swaziland, the whole terrain is contested. In the case of firearms, the terrain is 
still uneven despite the fact that differences are based on certain Acts which are 
still effective in the country. Such contestation is not unique to Swaziland, as 
international experience has shown that even in developed countries there are 
still debates over the issue. As pointed out above, the issue of state and regime 
security has informed most of the debate. When it comes to uniforms for security 
companies, the debate is still evident. In the majority of cases, the debate is not 
just who should pay for what, but how the issue of uniforms for private security 
companies interfaces with uniforms for state security actors. This debate has not 
manifested itself in Swaziland because the State has been lax over the matter. 
International practice has shown that there is a very good case for regulating the 
type of uniforms worn by private security companies. Such regulation has come 
to be very important in consideration of accountability.
13. Limitations and inconsistencies of the private 
security industry
The Swaziland private security industry has developed at a very fast rate in the 
urban areas and industrial centres. This development has been a product of the 
demand for security for the majority of economic establishments. Research has 
shown that while the growth has been impressive, there is still much room for 
improvement in several aspects.
Even though the private security industry has developed under a free-market 
framework, its regulatory framework remains very weak and poor. The Swazi state 
and all those concerned with the operation of the industry have not done much 
to regulate the industry. This gap has been observed over a long period of time, 
but very little has been done to address the situation. Presently, the Swazi state 
appears to hope that PSCs will be regulated through general national statutory 
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laws such as those pertaining to the establishment of companies and labour 
laws. This is despite the fact that best practice has indicated that there is a need 
for well-established regulatory approaches for PSCs and their activities. This is 
particularly the case where democratic concerns are extended to the activities of 
private security companies. Countries such as Canada and Australia have even 
gone to the extent of regulating the terms used in the private security industry. 
This is a gap that needs to be addressed, and failure to establish a regulatory 
framework for the country may be viewed as an indication of a democratic deficit.
Another gap that exists within the private security industry is poor training of 
personnel. Evidence indicates that the personnel of the private security industry 
are poorly chosen and poorly trained (if at all). This could be partly because 
private security companies who contract with clients are paid very little for their 
services. Usually, selection of these companies for service is based on cost rather 
than their experience and professionalism. The issue of training is so crucial that in 
countries such as Australia, all persons performing security activities are required 
to undertake a course on professional development. This assists in regulating the 
educational standards and knowledge base. In the Swaziland situation, there is 
no stipulation of a minimum educational requirement for people to be employed in 
the private security industry. This has resulted in situations where the guards that 
are employed are just picked from the street with no reference to their educational 
achievements. Such a situation creates challenges for the employees and the PSCs.
There is still a gap in the creation of partnerships for crime prevention. While there 
seems to be a general understanding that state police should be in partnership 
with private security companies to prevent crime, this remains informal and not 
enshrined in robust legal or formalised agreements. What is considered as formal 
at the moment are simple agreements that are largely gentlemen’s agreements and 
are not binding. Most of them are simply for convenience for the state police or the 
private security companies. This general understanding first came to the forefront 
when the Royal Swaziland Police developed the Crime Prevention Strategic Plan. 
The aforementioned plan came out of a realisation that the state police were losing 
the battle against crime, and the feeling was that crime prevention was not being 
successful because there was no strategic plan. The plan was therefore the first 
step towards partnership building but was flawed from the very beginning. The 
main limitation of the initiative was that it was conceptualised largely through the 
operations of state security practitioners. It was not strategic because it did not 
integrate all the elements involved in security provisioning and crime prevention. 
It was therefore a good initiative that failed to build partnerships with all players 
in the industry. Nevertheless, the mission statement does indicate a desire for 
constructing partnerships as it states, “The Royal Swaziland Police is responsible for 
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upholding the rule of law fairly and firmly, and ensuring the safety of communities 
in partnership with all stakeholders, through prevention of crime, protection 
of life and property, preservation of public peace and order, detection of crime 
and bringing offenders to justice” (The Crime Prevention Strategic Plan, 8). The 
construction of partnerships remains operational rather than cemented in informal 
legal agreements. The most observable gap here is a transition from theoretical 
assumptions to practical construction of partnerships. These practical and formal 
partnerships are needed for the benefit of society at large and for support of the 
state police in fighting against crime. 
13. Conclusion
The development of the Swazi private security industry has been very evolutionary 
in nature, and such evolution can be associated with changes in the Swazi economy 
over time. There are some indications to suggest that private security in the 
country was first established by colonial officials and white settlers who were to a 
large extent motivated by some negative attitudes towards the indigenous Swazi, 
particularly as far as crime was concerned. It is therefore easy to conclude that the 
genesis of private security is located in the colonial period and the white population 
may be a reflection of people’s shallow knowledge of what was happening in the 
period just before the imposition of British colonial rule. Whatever may have been 
the situation, private security at this time was very informal and unorganised, 
and therefore, there were no security companies to speak of.
It was, however, during the post-independence period, especially in the 1980s, that 
formalised security companies began to appear. Their growth during this period 
was anchored on three related conditions. These were increased economic activity, 
an increase in the demand for security services, and the increasing failure of the 
state police to provide security to individuals and corporate establishments in the 
country. It was therefore developments at the social and economic levels that 
provided the impetus for the growth of private security companies in Swaziland. 
The state security structures were on the retreat, not for ideological reasons, 
but because of failure to cope with demand for security as a result of increasing 
levels of crime.
The research conducted in Swaziland indicates that the security threats that have 
contributed to the growth of private security companies are largely economic. 
The issue has been economic security rather than threats arising from outside. 
Therefore, politics has made an insignificant contribution to the development 
and shaping of the private security architecture in Swaziland. Consequently, the 
Swazi private security industry has had very little involvement in the political 
affairs of the country. This is particularly the case if compared to what has been 
happening in some African countries and other regions of the world. Largely 
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because of the nature of their evolution, based on economic threats, the Swazi 
private security companies have no history of committing political atrocities or 
violating the political rights of the citizens.
The report on Swaziland has shown that the private security industry in Swaziland 
provides a range of services to the Swazi community but is dominated by the 
guarding sector. This is especially the case with the business community that is 
eager to protect their establishments against different acts of crime. It is therefore 
important to note that the services provided by private security companies in 
Swaziland are class-relevant, as they are available to those who command higher 
financial resources. The reality of this situation is that the services of private 
security companies are consumed by only about 30% of the Swazi population. 
The special distribution of the services is such that they are available mostly in 
the urban areas while most of the rural areas remain outside the operations of 
private security companies. Such issues give character to the political economy of 
the private security industry in Swaziland. The Government of Swaziland is one of 
the leading contractors of private security companies. PSCs are employed to guard 
many buildings of the State. Through the Government, the Swazi monarchy has 
also tapped into the numerous services provided by private security companies. 
The professionalism of these companies is questionable, but they have contributed 
to preventing crime in the country. However, due to lack of statistics, it is very 
difficult to quantify this claim.
Research conducted in some African countries has shown that private security 
companies have immensely contributed to the violation of human rights. This is 
probably the case because in some countries the operations of private security 
companies are interwoven into the politics of the countries. Evidence indicates 
that Swazi private security companies are not high on the violation of human 
rights. There is, for instance, no evidence of the employment of private security 
personnel in perpetrating violence against citizens. Nonetheless, individual security 
guards have been involved in acts tantamount to the violation of the rights of 
some people. For instance, there are reports of people who have been beaten 
by employees of private security companies on suspicion of having committed 
certain crimes. In some instances, they have been implicated in cases of rape.
An analysis of the private security industry in Swaziland shows that it is characterised 
by both positive and negative dynamics. This points to the fact that private security 
companies or the industry as a whole can provide a country with progressive 
dynamics, while at the same time containing certain aspects which do contribute 
positively to the transformation of societies. However, it should be noted that 
from an economic or business point of view, there are many positives that come 
from private security companies. They protect businesses and allow economic 
activities to take place in a close to free environment. Also, at the level of crime 
prevention, there have been positive developments that have contributed to 
251
human security. Be that as it may, this advantage is limited by the fact that the 
services of the companies have not extended to the rural communities.
When it comes to the construction of partnerships for purposes of preventing 
crime, the terrain is still very unclear. This is the case because what may be 
called partnerships between the private security industry and public security 
actors, particularly the state police, are simply acknowledgements of each other’s 
existence. It is more a matter of functional cooperation whenever necessary. There 
is no indication of the existence of concrete frameworks of partnership. Although 
security imperatives dictate that partnerships are the best way to go at this 
juncture, the state police still conceptualise crime prevention as their monopoly. 
There is no evidence of formal agreements, and all forms of cooperation are ad 
hoc. Outsourcing of services by establishments is widespread. This is usually the 
case because of lack of capacity in some of the establishments that make them not 
be able to adopt the in-house approach to security provisioning. The Swazi state 
is probably the largest outsourcing institution, and that speaks volumes about 
the capacity of state police in handling security matters. Where the state police 
have attempted to forge formalised partnerships is where it deals with community 
security actors. Formalisation in this case is indicated by the development of the 
Crime Prevention Bill of 2010.
Swaziland still has a huge deficit in the regulation of the operations of the private 
security industry. The report has indicated that in Swaziland, the private security 
industry is almost completely unregulated. Instead, the government hopes that 
the industry will be regulated by the general laws of the country that deal with 
the establishment of companies and relations in the workplace. The private 
security industry is so complex and, at times, vulnerable to many abuses, that 
it needs specific rules and regulations to guide its operation. It is not enough 
to regulate the industry through general laws. For instance, if poorly regulated, 
the identity of private security personnel can be mistaken for that of the state 
police. This is what has made some countries such as Canada regulate the colour 
of the uniform of private security personnel, together with the emblem attached 
to their uniform. Non-regulation of the activities of private security companies is 
bad for the State and citizens.
The report has outlined the gaps and challenges in the analysis of the private security 
industry in Swaziland. Most of the gaps identified in this section have much to do 
with the relationship between the State and private security companies. These 
include the general failure to create a platform for building formal partnerships 
between all actors involved in the security industry. While ad hoc partnerships 
have been created, their sustainability is questionable and may compromise crime 
prevention initiatives. Formal partnerships are also very important for purposes of 
accountability. All ad hoc formations are very difficult to judge on accountability, 
and that compromises the principle of security provisioning with responsibility.
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Swazitronix is a Matsapha-based company specialising in the supply, installation, 
and servicing of integrated security services encompassing building management 
systems involving access control, CCTV surveillance, evacuation, fire and intrusion 
detection.
The company was registered on 18 March 1988 (Registration No. 88 of 1988) 
and has been under the management of the current owners since May 1991.
Its clientele includes, but is not restricted to:
• His Majesty’s Royal Residence, Engabezweni
• Her Majesty’s Royal Residence, Ebuhleni
• The American Embassy
• The British High Commission
• Cadbury (Pty) Ltd
• Coca Cola Swaziland (Conco Limited)
• The German Embassy
• The European Union
• Central Bank of Swaziland
• Nedbank (Swaziland) Limited
• Standard Bank Swaziland Limited
• First National Bank Limited
• Swaziland Development & Savings Bank
• The City Council of Mbabane
• The City Council of Manzini
• MTN Swaziland Ltd
• Nampak (Swaziland) Ltd
• Swaziland Meat Industries
• Illovo Ubombo Sugar
• Royal Swaziland Sugar Corporation
• Swaziland Beverages Limited
• Swaziland Posts & Telecommunications Corporation
• Swaziland Electricity Board
• Swaziland National Provident Fund
• Swaziland Royal Insurance Company
• Swaziland Sugar Association
• Swaziland Water Services Corporation
• Tibiyo Taka Ngwane.
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Expertise
Swazitronix employs an experienced and highly qualified team of technicians, 
with expertise covering all facets of access control and electronic security. The 
focus is on the supply and installation of:
1. Access control
- Blick, Impro, Softcon, Niagara Tridium, Babylon and Lattice Proximity and 
Biometric Equipment with Full Report Writing and Anti-Passback function
2. Alarm systems
3. Anti-bandit doors
4. Digital CCTV surveillance systems 
5. Metal detectors 
- Walk-through and hand-held
6. Revenue parking
- Automatic traffic barriers
- Ticket dispensers
7. Safes 
- Supply of safes and vaults
- Time delay locks and seismic detectors
8. Security access doors
- Anti-bandit doors, level 2 and 3
- Interlocking mantraps
- Automated sliding doors
9.  Speed gates 
10. Turnstiles
- Industrial full height and waist height
- Glass waist height
11. Trellidor security barriers – exclusive distributor for Swaziland
12. Rapiscan X-ray machines – exclusive distributor for Swaziland
Site References
MTN Head Office, Ezulwini Valley – Recently completed the supply and 
installation of a full electronic security solution, including CCTV, access control, 
X-ray machines and intruder detection, all managed from a control room. MTN’s 
remote sites at Sidwashini, Manzini, Matsapha and Phutfumani Building are 
monitored and controlled from Head Office via LAN networking and include CCTV 
surveillance of the remote sites.
Central Bank, Head Office, Mbabane – In a joint venture with Engineered 
System Solutions (ESS) from South Africa, Swazitronix recently embarked on the 
revamp of the entire security system for Central Bank’s Head Office, including 
CCTV, access control, fire detection and evacuation.
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Nedcor – The installation of the entire security system for Nedbank’s Head Office 
in Mbabane, as well as the entire branch network including access control and 
digital CCTV surveillance.
Nedbank, Corporate Place – Was responsible for the move of the Main Branch 
to Corporate Place in Mbabane and supplied and installed CCTV, access control, 
and intruder detection systems.
First National Bank – Access control for Head Office and branches.
Standard Bank Swaziland Limited – Access control for its Head Office 
incorporating 20 doors with full report writing capability. Digital CCTV surveillance 
of all branches.
Standard Bank Cash Centre, Matsapha – Through a JV, Swazitronix installed 
a fully integrated security system, including 72 cameras, 12 biometric controlled 
doors, and intrusion and fire detection, all controlled from a manned control room.
Standard Bank, Corporate Place – Recently completed the supply and 
installation of the full electronic security needs for the bank, including 73 CCTV 
cameras, biometric access control of 18 doors, and an intruder detection system 
all managed from a control room. 
Happy Valley Resorts & Casino – The installation of access control for the 
new casino, including automatic traffic barriers at the main entrance and into 
VIP and residence parking. 
Manzini City Council – Card reader access control for their offices.
Swazi Plaza Properties – Fully automated revenue-parking system including 
CCTV surveillance.
Tibiyo Offices, Johnson Street, Mbabane – Parking and pedestrian access 
control, including control of the lift and office doors. 
Swaziland Development & Savings Bank – A full 29-door access control 
system covering the Engungwini and Mlunguziwendlovu Buildings (Head Office), 
including CCTV surveillance.
Swaziland Electricity Company – Access control system involving 36 doors 
and digital CCTV surveillance.
Swaziland Beverages – Full access control system with time and attendance 
software linked to their payroll system. Also CCTV coverage of production, vehicle 
loading, accounts, stores and main gate.
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Swaziland Building Society – Recently completed the access control and CCTV 
requirements for Head Office, Mbabane involving 14 doors (biometric and card 
reader) and 26 cameras.
Swaziland National Provident Fund – Full access control of their Head Office 
in Manzini.
Swaziland Posts and Telecommunications – The installation of a full access 
control system for the SPTC Head Office and telephone exchange. 
Swaziland Royal Insurance Company – Full access control, including vehicle 
traffic barriers.
Swaziland Examinations Council – A full access control and CCTV surveillance 
system at the Head Office in Ezulwini.
Ngwane Mills – Turnstile access control for their workforce, linked to the payroll 
system.
Swaziland Water Services Corporation – Staff and vehicle access control of 
the Ezulwini Head Office, including alarm and digital CCTV surveillance.
University of Swaziland – Installation of the full access control requirements 
for the Kwaluseni campus, and high-speed surveillance cameras covering the 
examination halls at Luyengo campus.
Current Projects
Sikhuphe Airport – Swazitronix, in a joint venture with South African company 
Landis & Staefa, is responsible for the installation of the entire security system for 
the new airport, including access control, CCTV, fire detection, intruder detection, 
and evacuation all controlled from a centralised building management system.
Swazitronix is also supplying and installing all roller shutter doors and automatic 
sliding soor systems at the airport.
As the Swaziland distributor for Rapiscan Security Screening Equipment (X-ray 
machines), Swazitronix is responsible for all the new equipment for the airport.
Swaziland Revenue Authority – The supply and installation of the Head Office 





Radio Security Link Ltd (Radio Link) was formed in 1989 and acquired by Secure 
Holdings in 1991. Other members of the Secure Holdings group include Guard 
Alert Security Services (Pty) Ltd and Cash Security Services (Pty) Ltd. 
Originally a Guard and Alarm company, for more than 20 years Radio Link has 
focused on Alarm installation and monitoring, and complementary activities 
including Access Control and CCTV installation.
 
Alarm monitoring and reaction services are operated from control rooms in 
Mbabane, Manzini, Matsapha and Nhlangano.
Since 2001, Radio link has been the agent for Tracker Stolen Vehicle Recovery 
and Fleet Management systems in Swaziland. 
Services/products offered include:
• Market-leading access control systems, including IMPRO and PROXNET 
allowing PC-based management control, integration with time-managed 
control systems and integrated salary packages
• Analogue and digital IP CCTV systems 
• Security alarm installations
 - Wired and wireless systems
• 24-hour alarm monitoring and reaction with vehicles equipped with state-
of-the-art RF, GPS, GPRS and GSM technology for faster reactions to any 
emergency
• Accredited DStv installer
 - Residential and commercial installations
 - HD and XtraView






GKR Netstar Swaziland was started in January 2011 to resume the rendering of 
services from Netstar Swaziland. One of the key objectives was to reinstate the 
services that all Netstar Swaziland clients enjoyed. This exercise required the 
removal, refurbishment and sim swop of the tracking/fleet management device. 
This process has been successfully completed with more than 900 clients over 
the past year.
Business Address:
Unit E3, Printpak Square, Sheffield Road, Industrial Site, mbabane – 
24040946/76723325.
Previous/Ongoing Contracts
World Vision, SWADE, Parmalat Swd, Swazi Observer, Logico.
Altech Netstar – Combined Profile
 • Subsidiary of Altech Group
 • Winner of Technology Top 100 Minister’s Award for Excellence in 2007
 • National footprint includes:
 - Head Office in Midrand, 14 Regional Offices
 - Over 115 Fitment Centres countrywide in Southern Africa: Botswana, 
Namibia, Swaziland, Zambia, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Ivory Coast
 • 800 employees
 • Subscriber base over 486 000 (+550 000) units
 • 24/7 Operation Centre and after hours Technical Support
 • Eight 24/7 Control Centres within South Africa and four in Southern Africa
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 • Dedicated Ground Recovery Teams
 • Largest Air Recovery Service – 36 aircraft and 12 airfields
 • Recovered in excess of 40 000 vehicles, estimated value of E5 billion
 • Average recovery time of 47 minutes
 • Over 2 800 arrests made. 
Altech Netstar – Swaziland
 • 10 employees
 • Subscriber base over 1 150 units (from March 2011)
 • 24/7 Operation Centre
 • Dedicated Ground Recovery Teams
 • Dedicated Air Recovery – Matsapha Airport




1. The need for partnerships 
Writing from a criminologist perspective, Stenning (2009) argues that “[t]he 
increased public/private blurring, whereby certain state functions are delegated to 
private actors, requires the creation and adoption of more ‘efficient accountability 
mechanisms’.” In as much as accountability mechanisms are critical to ensuring 
that the private security sector is kept in check, the research findings in this 
monograph point to the need for the establishment and strengthening of partnerships 
between the state and private security sector in the fight against crime. Mindful 
of the fact that the establishment and strengthening of such partnerships is not 
the only solution to crime, the research findings show that the contributory factor 
of such partnerships cannot be overemphasised. This stems from the fact that 
individuals and businesses alike more often that not turn to the private security 
sector, especially where the state is unable to address the challenges associated 
with insecurity. 
The existence of a mixed economy of security personnel points to the need 
for a rethink in terms of approach. This mixed economy incorporates a wide 
range of security actors, namely, police officers, community police, local police, 
neighbourhood watch wardens, private security guards and volunteers, among 
others. The reality today is that crime prevention cannot be left to the police 
alone. The so-called ‘foot soldiers’ in the private security sector not only require 
recognition, but they have become important players, who are heavily relied upon 
by those who can afford to pay for their services. There is no doubt that their 
contribution to crime prevention remains critical in any society.     
2. Key issues and research question
Through this study, four key issues have been addressed. First, the role, trends and 
extent of the public police and private security sector in the prevention of crime 
in Botswana, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland. Second, the legitimacy and 
accountability of the various security actors involved in crime prevention, such as 
state security agents, private security sector, community police and civil society. 
Third, the extent to which Botswana, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland have 
realised and appreciated the role played by the private security sector (as non-
state actors), and the establishment and/or nurturing of partnerships between 
state institutions and non-state actors, particularly private security companies, in 
crime prevention strategies, taking into account the gender perspective. Fourth, 
the extent to which these countries have effectively implemented crime prevention 
strategies/policies (including their reform) in order to ensure the security of its 
citizens (both poor and rich). 
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These four key issues have been addressed with the following research question 
in mind: 
Based on the role played by the private security sector, that is, private security 
companies in the southern African region, to what extent can crime prevention 
between the State and the private security sector effectively prevent crime in 
Botswana, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland? 
The findings of this study are summarised below in chronological order.
3. The role of and trends in the public and private 
security sectors in preventing crime
The study found evidence that in more developed countries, such as in South 
Africa, where the statistics are arguably more reliable, private security officers 
outnumber the police almost three-fold. Whilst this cannot be said with certainty 
for the other countries, due to the lack of official statistics, the South African trend 
should be a cause for concern, as the police are seemingly not coping with the 
ever-increasing population that is faced with social ills, such as crime. This, in 
itself, requires an appreciation of the role played by the private security industry 
in the prevention of crime. 
The lack of statistical data for the private security sector in some of the countries 
also points to the need for the establishment of regulatory bodies specifically 
mandated to regulate and control the private security sector. The estimates given 
on the number of private security officers show that it is a growing sector with 
immense potential to take up the challenges in the security space, especially with 
new technological advancement. The range of products offered by this sector are 
sometimes more sophisticated to those that are used by the police in the fight 
against crime. This again supports the need for the establishment of partnerships 
between the state and the private security sector in crime prevention initiatives. 
4. The legitimacy and accountability of security 
actors in crime prevention 
The legitimacy and accountability of the security actors in crime prevention 
varies. Legitimacy, in this context, refers to the value whereby the private security 
industry is recognised and accepted as right and proper by the state in question. 
Accountability, in this context, refers to the process of the private security sector 
being called to account for their actions. As far as the private security sector 
is concerned, (being the main focus of the study), where there is an effective 
regulatory framework, such as in the case of South Africa, the industry’s legitimacy 
is more present (comparatively speaking). In a country such as Namibia, where the 
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regulatory framework is there but not in force, the legitimacy is not as profound. 
In the case of Botswana, where the regulatory framework is in existence, though 
insufficient, the legitimacy is lukewarm. In the case of Swaziland, where there is 
no regulatory framework (including a regulatory authority, body or controller for 
that matter), the legitimacy of the private security sector is minimal. 
The study shows that in general terms the more legitimate the private security 
sector is, the more accountable it will be to be considered by the state in crime 
prevention initiatives. This, however, does not mean that there are no ‘bad apples’ 
within these legitimate sectors. The issue of legitimacy and accountability is also 
linked to the professionalism, quality and standing of the private security sector. 
The study also reveals that the more professional the private security sector is, 
the more legitimate and accountable it will be. The same applies to the quality 
of service and standing of the sector. It cannot be said that the professionalism, 
quality and standing of the private security sector in some of the countries studied 
necessitates partnerships with state in crime prevention.
The study reveals that in as much as the private security sector is one that is 
formidable in all these countries, to a large extent it generally remains unprofessional. 
The entry level of private security officers into this sector is very low. While in 
some countries certain training is required (though not as intense), in others no 
training is required whatsoever. This presents a dilemma in the states’ willingness 
to partner with a sector with untrained officers in crime prevention initiatives. 
Again, the study highlights the need for states to professionalise (or facilitate 
the professionalisation of) this important sector. 
5. The realisation and appreciation of the role played 
by the private security sector 
The study shows that the majority of private security company owners are former 
public security personnel. The wealth of knowledge these owners amassed whilst 
in the public security sector is therefore transferred to the private security sector. 
This creates a greater opportunity for the private and public sector to collaborate 
in crime prevention initiatives, as the individuals concerned are usually known to 
each other. Such partnerships, however, remain ad hoc in that relations between 
the police and private security are more often than not dependent on informal 
networks, particularly where the security managers (including owners) previously 
worked in the police. The realisation and appreciation of the role played by the 
private security sector, therefore, depends solely on individuals. At the state or official 
level, such realisation and appreciation is not formalised. This is the main challenge 
faced by the states which is largely informed by the fact that the ‘unprofessional’ 
security providers pose a security threat. For this reason, these private security 
providers cannot be included in crime prevention initiatives. In most instances, the 
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approach by states is that the private security sector should be strictly regulated 
and controlled as it poses a threat to national security. This approach, however, 
overlooks the positive role the private sector plays in providing security services to 
a segment of society. It is also a sector which contributes towards the employment 
of a considerable number of people.  
The realisation and appreciation of the role of the private security sector needs 
to be unpacked. In fact, the study shows that for any viable partnership and/or 
collaboration to take place between the state and private security sector, this 
realisation and appreciation of the private sector’s role must exist. As long as 
the police remain adamant that the private security sector is part of the problem 
and not the solution, collaboration and/or partnerships between them will remain 
a pipe dream. The study shows that in all these countries studied, the policies 
on crime prevention (if existing) do not include the private security sector. This 
is always a missed opportunity on the part of states, as the sector is already in 
the field of security and arguably ready to assist in crime prevention initiatives. 
The absence of effective regulatory frameworks also poses a serious challenge in 
so far as improving the professionalism, quality and standing of the private security 
sector. This consequently negates any call for the establishment of partnerships 
for crime prevention with a sector that is unregulated or not effectively regulated 
as the case may be. The study shows that there is still a long way to go towards 
the establishment (in some states) and/or nurturing of partnerships between the 
state and private security in crime prevention strategies. Currently, the private 
security sector is not considered, at least on paper, to be an actor to be relied 
upon in so far as the fight against crime is concerned. There is therefore a need 
for the creation of channels for the police and private security to engage in more 
productive relations and enhance cooperation in crime prevention initiatives. Such 
channels could be the development of crime prevention policies that include the 
private security sector, taking into account gender perspectives. 
In so far as the gender perspective is concerned, the study found no trace of 
adherence to the United Nations Platform of Action of 1995 (para. 123), which 
states that in addressing violence against women, governments and other actors 
should promote an active and visible policy of mainstreaming a gender perspective 
in all policies and programmes so that, before decisions are taken, an analysis 
may be made of their impact on women and men respectively. The study showed 
that the ratio of women to men in the private security sector is not balanced. This 
results from the fact that the existing regulatory frameworks and policies relating 
to the private security sector do not adequately address the issue of gender. This 
will no doubt affect any initiatives aimed at preventing crime.
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6. The implementation of crime prevention 
strategies/policies 
The study revealed that crime prevention strategies and policies do exist. However, 
in all the countries studied, these strategies and policies overlook the private security 
sector. The focus seems to be on community policing as opposed to inclusive policing, 
which includes the so-called ‘foot soldiers in the private security field’. 
In the case of Botswana, the broader crime prevention strategy was developed 
involving the entire community, which resulted in the formation of crime prevention 
committees. This was mainly to close the gap between the police and the public, 
particularly on information sharing. It eventually led to the establishment of 
the National Crime Prevention Coordinating Unit, which falls under the Criminal 
investigations Department. This department coordinates crime prevention 
initiatives throughout Botswana, whilst the mandate of the unit ranges from 
coordination, internal awareness, monitoring and evaluation of crime prevention 
activities, crime audits, public education, and advising senior management on 
crime prevention policy matters, to generally promoting active participation by 
the unit in crime prevention initiatives. This unit however, remains silent on the 
role of the private security sector. Nevertheless, a number of crime prevention 
initiatives were introduced as soon as the National Crime Prevention Coordinating 
Unit was established.  
In the case of Namibia, the Namibian Police Force recognises the fact that it cannot 
effectively carry out its mandated duties without the assistance of other government 
institutions, the business community as well as individual citizens. The concept of 
community policing is aimed at promoting active partnerships between the public 
and the police. The focus, therefore, is on both the public and the police. Yet the 
Crime Prevention Strategy of the Namibian Police Force (2011–2014) remains 
silent on the role of the private security sector, and the actors who are recognised 
as collaborators are NGOs, stakeholders, religious institutions/groups, traditional 
leaders, community-based groups, the public sector, the business sector, the media, 
women’s groups, and anyone who forms part of the society. Whilst the private 
security sector can identify with some of these role players, they are not expressly 
included. The implementation of the crime prevention strategy could be greatly 
enhanced with the specific inclusion of the private security sector. 
In the case of South Africa, there is the Policy for Establishment of Community 
Safety Forums (CSFs), which emanated from the requirements outlined in the 
National Prevention Strategy of 1996 and the 1998 White Paper on Safety and 
Security. The CSFs are based on the premise that increased cooperation and 
interaction would improve the functioning and deliberations within the local 
criminal justice system and the delivery of crime prevention projects. The policy 
makes a clear distinction between the CSF and the Community Policing Forum 
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(CPF) concepts. The CSFs are meant to facilitate the delivery of a multi-sectoral 
governmental approach on safety in local communities and is distinguished from 
the CPF through its jurisdiction and tasks. The CPF, on the other hand, is a legal 
community structure established in terms of the South African Police Service 
Act, and is mandated to facilitate community-police relations within a specific 
police station precinct (police station boundary). It serves as the mouthpiece 
of the community with the police and vice versa on policing matters and other 
relevant safety issues.
In terms of the policy for establishing community safety forums, the member 
of the executive council responsible for policing shall, in consultation with the 
mayor(s), establish a csf that is broadly representative of local community 
structures and organs of state, to be located and operate within the metropolitan, 
district and local municipal boundaries. The policy states that the civil society 
or organised local communities that form part of CSF must include at least 
existing CPF; non-governmental organisations working in relevant functional 
areas (e.g. In respect of child protection, victim support, restorative justice or 
economic empowerment); faith-based organisations; ward councilors as ex-officio 
members; organisations representing the interests of specific groups like women’s 
formations; traditional leaders; business sector; and other organised community 
structures such as military veterans. Whilst the private security sector can identify 
with some of these role players, it is not expressly mentioned. In terms of the 
policy, municipalities and provincial secretariats (of police) are regarded as the 
key role players (implementing agents) to guide and facilitate community safety 
initiatives at local level. 
In the case of Swaziland, there is a Crime Prevention Unit within the Royal Swaziland 
Police Service which works towards closing the gap between the police, community 
and the nation at large by conducting campaigns and training the community on 
the importance of partnerships and coperation in the fight against crime. The crime 
prevention strategies include the establishment of neighbouhood watch schemes 
and campaigns aimed at crime prevention targeting localities, schools, centres, 
other security agencies, clinics, the business community, churches and financial 
institutions. Other activities include radio programmes aimed at conscientising 
the public on crime prevention. One of the downsides is that, Swaziland does not 
seem to have a policy document on crime prevention which is accessible to the 
public. The express inclusion of the private security sector is not mentioned in 
the existing strategies. This, however, does not mean that the private security 
sector is excluded from such programmes.
The study also highlighted the existence of the Crime Prevention Bill of 2010, which 
opens a window of opportunity for the express inclusion of the private security 
sector as an important role player in crime prevention initiatives. Currently, the 
Bill only makes mention of the formation of partnerships between the police and 
community police for purposes of preventing crime. The importance of considering the 
private security sector is important. The non-inclusion of the private security sector 
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may be due to the absence of a regulatory framework for the sector in Swaziland. 
A sector, which does not arguably enjoy legitimacy, as is the current situation in 
Swaziland, cannot be seen as an important role player in crime prevention. The 
study revealed the importance of addressing the huge deficit in the regulation 
of the operations of the private security sector, before any consideration of its 
involvement in crime prevention partnerships can even be discussed.
  
7. Conclusion
This study has revealed that it is no longer realistic to consider the provision of 
security as the sole preserve of the police. The private security actors have ‘invaded’ 
the security space, not necessarily for purposes of usurping the mandate of the 
police, but as a result of a constant demand for safety and security on the part of 
those who can afford to pay for such services. The use of private security leads 
to the notion of ‘double taxation’, whereby citizens pay tax for the public police 
(through the compulsory income tax) and also pay for private security services. 
The fact that the private security actors are now complementing the work of the 
police points to the need for their consideration in crime prevention initiatives. 
The (mis)perception that all private security officers are rouge, sometimes without 
any supporting evidence, is not only reckless but also clouds the debate on the 
role they play in crime prevention. This does not mean that the private security 
sector is always professional, ethical and trustworthy. Just like in the case of the 
police, there are also rouge elements, which taint the work of the private security 
providers. As in the case of the police, systems should be put in place for ensuring 
that members of the private security sector are beyond reproach in so far as their 
work is concerned. One way of addressing this problem is to ensure that the sector 
is professionalised and that its regulatory framework is effective. Moreover, it is 
important that regulatory frameworks are implemented through effective and efficient 
mechanisms. While some states are much advanced in terms of their regulatory 
regimes, some are still lagging behind. A sector that is unregulated or ineffectively 
regulated, cannot be a viable partner, particularly with the state, in crime prevention. 
Having analysed the private and police sectors in the various countries, there is 
room for the establishment of partnerships between the state and private security 
providers as a means of addressing crime. There is a need to develop or even 
amend policies or laws on crime prevention in such a way that the role of the 
private security sector is recognised, nurtured and included in crime prevention 
partnerships and strategies. 
That the private security sector has become a force to be reckoned with is no 
longer in doubt, and states must consider taking advantage of their presence in 
the security field, particularly in crime prevention. Embracing this sector extends 
to bringing it on board in terms of addressing crime, that is, at the level of the 
state. After all, security from the threat and reality of violence remains critical to 
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